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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Diagnosing Gender through Desire
How You Know You’re in Bed with a Woman
In 2009, popular writer Daniel Bergner published two articles on the com-
plexities of female sexuality and desire in the New York Times Magazine. The 
first, published in January 2009, was titled “What Do Women Want?” and 
the second, published later that year, in November, “Women Who Want to 
Want.” It was in these two popular pieces, over a decade ago now, that the 
seeds of this book were sown. Twenty- first- century women were apparently 
stricken with low desire, and their sexuality, their femininity, was a frontier 
to be explored. Bergner’s articles described the new pioneers—the explorers 
were young, smart, ambitious, and energetic; they called themselves feminists. 
These new scientists were there to help women figure out what the problem 
was, why they weren’t in the mood. It was upon reading these articles that I 
realized that what I now refer to as the “new” science of female sexuality was 
blossoming, and that it was going to be—already was—very big.
In the second of his two articles, Bergner points to both the ambiguous 
nature of female sexuality and to the ambiguously feminist nature of the driv-
ing force behind this new science: “More than by any other sexual problem—
the elusiveness of orgasm, say, or pain during sex—women feel plagued by low 
desire.” Many low- desiring women, however, want to want. He describes how, 
in her efforts to help these women, the Canadian sex researcher and clinician 
he interviews in the article, Lori Brotto, deals “in the domain of the mind, 
or in the mind’s relationship to the body, not in a problem with the body 
2 • INTRODUCTION
itself.” Bergner suggests that the ultimate therapeutic goal for clinicians like 
Brotto, then, might be to help women repair this estranged mind/body con-
nection by suturing (physical) sensation and (subjective) sexual self- image, 
and cultivate their own desire, even in the face of what he calls “women’s 
complex sexual beings.” Questions of women’s sexual complexity, responsive-
ness or receptivity, and how their minds and bodies line up (or, more often 
in these accounts, do not) seemed to be at the heart of this new science and 
its accompanying sexual response models and treatment protocols for low 
female desire. But how had it come to be that at the beginning of the twenty- 
first century, self- identified feminist sex researchers described women’s sexu-
ality as reactive, receptive, and responsive? Did these researchers believe, as 
these popular articles implied, that women’s sexuality operated according to 
a completely different logic than men’s sexuality? Why were women’s sexual 
problems, no longer the result of hysteria or frigidity, still so confounding to 
scientists? And if, as these popular articles posited, women were so sexually 
complex, in many cases lacking an urgent sense of lust yet also demonstrating 
strong physiological arousal and a fluid responsiveness and receptivity—how 
did they get to be that way? Furthermore, how was the problem of women’s 
low desire to be solved?
A few aspects of Bergner’s articles, and others like it, jumped out at me. 
One was that the new science of female sexuality described desire from what 
we might call a behaviorist perspective. In this way of thinking about sex, 
human beings are almost robot- like organisms with instincts and drives. The 
desire for sex, in this framework, is sometimes understood as inextricable 
from the drive to reproduce, as one might expect given behaviorism’s frequent 
pairing with evolutionary psychology. Even more to the point, though, the 
behaviorist perspective reduces desire to a cost- benefit analysis of what the 
organism is willing to seek out for sex—or more often, for women, what the 
organism will be receptive to. The idea is that, like Pavlov’s dog, we learn (or 
are trained) to find certain stimuli desirable, weighing internal and external 
criteria to make rational, incentive- motivated, and reward- seeking decisions 
about whether or not to engage in sex. Particularly in the first decade of the 
twenty- first century, this cost- benefit analysis was often portrayed as being 
more complex for women than for men, in part because the related evolution-
ary psychology discourse views women as beholden to a maternal drive that 
complicates their sexuality and orients it toward finding a good mate. I came 
to identify behaviorism and evolutionary psychology as the twin foundations 
of several contemporary sexual response models that I will describe in this 
book. I also came to see that, in these models, desire, per se, wasn’t part of the 
sexual equation. And this seemed to be especially true for women.
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This absence of desire in the new science of female sexuality was jarring 
for me. For Freud, Lacan, all of the many queer, feminist, and postcolonial 
scholars that followed (and critiqued) them, desire was about aims, objects, 
fantasies, fetishes, power, and trauma. Desire was sexy, it was hot, sometimes 
it was ugly, shameful, and unspeakable, but it was never fully capturable or 
controllable; there was a je ne sais quoi that was indeed constitutive of it. 
It was sometimes differentiated along the lines of gender in these theories, 
but rarely reduced to evolutionary adaptations or machinelike rationality. For 
post- Freudian psychoanalytic thinkers like Laplanche (1976), there may be 
a mechanics or hydraulics to desire, a libidinal economy, but there was still 
a wiliness to it that couldn’t be trained away—or conjured up—by any pro-
verbial Skinner Box (the behaviorist black box trope of cognitive psychology 
and operant conditioning designed by founding father B. F. Skinner [1938]). 
If anything, as Jagose (2013) has pointed out regarding behaviorism and sexu-
ality, whatever it is that cognitive conditioning models have tried to do to 
human sexuality, from the sensate focus techniques of Masters and Johnson 
in the 1960s to the erotic conversion therapy (including “orgasmic recondi-
tioning”) used on gay men in the same era, these models cannot account for 
desire’s vicissitudes. There is always an excess, a part of desire that cannot be 
fully redirected, even if behaviors themselves can be changed. This is in part 
because, unlike most other human behaviors, fantasy is constitutive of sexual-
ity in a way that suggests that desire—that fundamentally intersubjective and 
unrequited wanting or longing—is never reducible to behavior or motivation 
and can never be approximated or fully delimited.
Beyond the lack of attention to desire, another thing stood out to me 
about these popular articles and other discussions of the new science of 
female sexuality, including the research studies that I began to voraciously 
read. Many of these studies were deeply invested in making comparisons 
between the objective arousal of the body, as measured by a subject’s physi-
ological sexual response (determined by attaching machines to her genitals), 
and her subjective experience of arousal—the desire she experiences in her 
mind, abstracted into quantitative and behaviorist terms. These two measure-
ments were increasingly taken in laboratories, and the gap between them was 
made to say a lot of things about gender (long story short: women have a 
much bigger gap). This seemingly new trend, what I have come to call the 
work of the gap, was all over the place in the scientific research and its popu-
lar interpretations. I learned that experiments that used arousal- measuring 
instruments were called volumetric studies, and that the use of these machines 
was called plethysmography (the machine for people with penises was some-
times called a penile strain gauge). In his first 2009 New York Times Magazine 
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piece, for instance, Bergner describes the work of the Canadian experimen-
tal sex researcher Meredith Chivers. Chivers uses plethysmography to mea-
sure her subjects’ physical arousal, then compares the results to the numbers 
these subjects record on an “arousometer,” a tool for registering how turned on 
they feel. In many of these volumetric studies, cisgender men and cisgender 
women1 are compared in terms of this gap.
The studies work something like this: A person sits down in a LaZBoy 
recliner, alone in a lab, and inserts a probe into their vagina (in more recent 
studies, measuring devices may also be attached to the labia or clitoris) or 
attaches one to their penis. They watch different films or other stimuli, maybe 
listen to an audio recording. Some films are considered neutral (like a doc-
umentary on lei- making in Hawai’i—true story), while some feature sexual 
content. The sexual stimuli include a variety of scenes and situations—men 
having sex with women, women having sex with women, men having sex 
with men, a naked man alone walking on a beach, a woman working out. 
Sometimes there are rape scenes. Sometimes there are animals having sex, 
like bonobos, overdubbed with loud ape sex noises. Across these studies, the 
common finding has been that cis men—both gay and straight—tend to have 
physiological and subjective experiences of arousal that line up with each 
other. They are “concordant.” Cis women, on the other hand, particularly 
those attracted to cis men, tend to be physically aroused by everything, or at 
least any “relevant sexual stimuli,” even when they report low levels of subjec-
tive desire via the arousometer. They are “discordant.” In other words, women 
who are attracted to men have the biggest gap.
This was the cutting- edge research of the twenty- first century. I had spent 
many years in graduate school reading Freud, Foucault, Fanon, Butler, and 
many other bad guys, girls, and genderqueers of critical race and queer theory, 
cultural studies, psychoanalysis, and poststructuralist feminism, but I was way 
more shocked by the new science of female sexuality than I was reading about 
hysteria, wish fulfillment, and the repressive hypothesis. In the January 2009 
article, Chivers tells Bergner that she hopes one day to develop a “scientifically 
supported model to explain female sexual response.” Bergner writes:
 1. In some cases, such as in a study conducted by Lawrence, Latty, Chivers, & Bailey 
(2005), the subjects are also transgender women, who are referred to as “male- to- female trans-
sexuals” and are said to “display male- typical [sic] category- specific sexual arousal” (p. 135). 
The potentially violent cisnormativity and heternormativity inherent in the methodology of 
studies like this—particularly those conducted in the first decade of the twenty- first century—is 
a theme I will interrogate throughout this book. See chapter 2 especially for more on the con-
struction of “category- specificity” in terms of genital sexual response.
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When she peers into the giant forest, Chivers told me, she considers the 
possibility that along with what she called a “rudderless” system of reflexive 
physiological arousal, women’s system of desire, the cognitive domain of lust, 
is more receptive than aggressive. “One of the things I think about,” she said, 
“is the dyad formed by men and women. Certainly women are very sexual 
and have the capacity to be even more sexual than men, but one possibility 
is that instead of it being a go- out- there- and- get- it kind of sexuality, it’s more 
of a reactive process. If you have this dyad, and one part is pumped full of 
testosterone, is more interested in risk taking, is probably more aggressive, 
you’ve got a very strong motivational force. It wouldn’t make sense to have 
another similar force. You need something complementary. And I’ve often 
thought that there is something really powerful for women’s sexuality about 
being desired. That receptivity element.”
I read these words and saw the history of sexology flash before my eyes. I 
was immediately struck by how this idea of female reactivity, responsiveness, 
receptivity, that had been supposedly abandoned with all the other misogyny 
of the premodern sciences (including psychoanalysis, abandoned much to my 
dismay) had somehow been maintained in the twenty- first century. How were 
words like these being uttered by a feminist scientist in 2009? Why was this 
being discussed in the New York Times Magazine? What would the impact 
be? Then I read the comments. Of course, many people lauded the Times for 
publishing such an article. Others said this research diminished the variation 
across women’s sexualities. And plenty said that the “gap” of female discor-
dance identified in this research indicates that women are lying about what 
turns them on, or that they don’t know the truth of their own desire. For 
instance, commenter “George” from Irvine says: “Undamaged, quality women 
want real men. They want the strength, protection, leadership, stability and 
commitment of a man who isn’t afraid to express his masculinity. A man who 
understands that women are driven by their emotions, not necessarily by logic 
and reason, as the article well points out. When men understand this, they 
can have their way with women.” Similarly, “David” from Boston tells us: “So, 
the conclusion among leading (female) sexologists is: Women are selfish nar-
cissists who don’t know what they really want, except that, underneath it all, 
what they really want is to be ravished against a wall in a dark alley by a 
stranger. Well! Any man could have already told you that!”
Beyond the retrograde nature of the scientists’ words and the way they 
were being taken up by everyday misogynists, another thing that caught my 
attention in these articles was the focus on new ways for women to enhance 
their desire, including through sex therapy techniques that utilize cognitive 
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behavioral methods and mindfulness. Although at the end of the first decade 
of the twenty- first century, plenty of antimedicalization feminists were focused 
on critiquing pharmaceutical interventions like Addyi for women, in the wake 
of the supreme success of Viagra for men (see the work of the New View Cam-
paign2 for the quintessential example of this anti–Big Pharma movement), I 
was more interested in what other sexual enhancement techniques were being 
developed and deployed. This was in keeping with my interest in the work 
of French theorist Michel Foucault and his notion of biopolitics (1978, 2000, 
2003)—or the ways that our lives are governed, in late neoliberal capitalism, 
through technologies that don’t so much discipline us as make us live in cer-
tain ways. Bergner underscores some of these new techniques and associated 
research in his second 2009 Times article. For instance, according to Bergner, 
while Brotto’s “patients’ genitals commonly pulse with blood in response to 
erotic images or their partners’ sexual touch, their minds are so detached—
distracted by work or children or worries about the way they look unclothed, 
or fixated on fears that their libidos are dead—as to be oblivious to their bod-
ies’ excitement, their bodies’ messages.” Mindfulness, by combining an atten-
tion to bodily sensations with the “power of positive thinking,” allows women 
to cultivate a subjective sense of sexual arousal or “trains patients to immerse 
themselves in physical sensation”—that is, it trains them to work to bridge the 
mind/body gap. Through Bergner’s interviews with Brotto and another Cana-
dian sex researcher, Rosemary Basson, readers also learn about women’s ten-
dency toward “responsive” or “receptive” desire, and the formulation of a new 
“trigger- based” sexual response model. For women, Basson reports, “the start 
of plenty—and maybe the great majority—of sexual encounters is defined not 
by heat but by slight warmth or flat neutrality.” This was the new “arousal- first” 
sexual response model for women, based on reactivity, receptivity, and bridg-
ing the gap: I will refer to it from now on as the circular sexual response cycle, 
as it is described in the literature. “Basson’s lesson for women, which has been 
distilled by sex therapists into three words, ‘desire follows arousal,’ is a real 
rearrangement of expectation and a reweighting of sexual theory,” Bergner 
wrote. But was it really so new? The idea that women lack free- flowing desire 
and require sexual activation (by men) seemed pretty old to me. Indeed, it 
appeared in some of the earliest sexological texts, including in those by Wil-
helm Stekel, Havelock Ellis, and Richard von Krafft- Ebing.
The final thing that stood out to me as I read these articles over a decade 
ago was the way they discussed diagnoses for sexual dysfunctions, includ-
ing low desire. In the second of his 2009 articles in the Times, Bergner raises 
questions surrounding the next incarnation of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
 2. Website: http://www.newviewcampaign.org/
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Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM, the psychiatric bible since the 1950s that 
infamously once included an entry for homosexuality. The volume was sched-
uled to be updated and rereleased in 2013. What would the new low desire 
diagnosis look like, Bergner asked, given all of this new research into female 
sexuality? The existing unisex diagnosis of hypoactive sexual desire disorder, 
or HSDD—defined in the DSM- IV as “persistently or recurrently deficient 
(or absent) sexual fantasies and desire for sexual activity”—struck him as 
“simplistic,” or at least as insufficiently complex to apply to women. Bergner 
wouldn’t know it for certain yet, but similar concerns would eventually lead to 
the development of a new female- specific diagnosis for low- desiring women—
female sexual interest/arousal disorder, or FSIAD. And so it was, that in an 
attempt to depathologize women’s responsive desire, the DSM- 5 (2013) sexual 
and gender identity disorders work group included a new criterion for women 
only (three out of six criteria are required for an FSIAD diagnosis): “does 
not initiate/is not receptive to a partner’s initiations.” The scientific research 
and clinical treatments described in Bergner’s articles and in other popular 
accounts, and later the revised low female desire diagnosis itself, in concert 
indicate that women should not be diagnosed with a disorder just because 
they lack fantasies or a strong initiating sexual urge (they aren’t men, after 
all?). These discourses instead suggest that if more women knew about their 
own responsive desire, then maybe they wouldn’t feel like their desire was low. 
And here, I began to see, is where all the pieces fit together.
Throughout the rest of this book, I will refer to the broad paradigm 
connecting these strands as the feminized responsive desire framework. This 
paradigm, which became ubiquitous at the turn of the twenty- first century 
and which has left its imprint through today, consists of all the themes I just 
outlined: the absence of desire from behaviorist models of sexuality; ple-
thysmographic research suggesting a commonplace discordance between 
objective and subjective experiences of female arousal; a theory of circular 
sexual response for women in which desire is said to be triggered by receptive 
arousal, and new DSM diagnostic criteria for low desire in women codify-
ing that theory; and finally, new modes of treatment for women’s discordant 
desire/arousal system, including mindfulness practices intended to work on 
the gap by bringing the undesiring mind into line with the aroused body. 
Something didn’t sit well with me about this entire framework, and this book 
is an attempt to explain, analyze, and theorize what that reaction was and 
where it came from.3 It is only in a moment in which liberal feminism has 
 3. Since the publication of the DSM- 5 in 2013, several of the experts involved in this 
original line of research have stated that responsive desire may be common in men, too, and 
more research has since been conducted on men in this vein. I am aware of the quickly shifting 
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been mainstreamed, right alongside evolutionary psychology, that this model 
of female sexual response could make it into the media spotlight and be read 
as feminist. And it was only at the turn of the twenty- first century, with no 
critical or activist response, that this type of reductionist, hetero- /cisnorma-
tive, and anti- intersectional thinking about female sexuality could become 
common parlance across the Global North, and particularly in the North 
American context.
While the new science of female sexuality and the feminized responsive 
desire framework are certainly meant to be feminist, and in fact came into 
being as a response to what was understood to be a restrictive male- oriented 
model of desire (Tiefer, 1991, 1995, 1996), I question the feminism of this new 
paradigm on a variety of bases. My concerns include the way that “women” 
are (re)produced as a population here; how this population is read as white, 
wealthy or middle- class, straight, and cisgender; how widespread gendered, 
raced, and classed trauma too often goes unaccounted for in this framing; 
and how this feminized population is positioned to be managed through new 
techniques framed as “safe” simply because they don’t involve psychopharma-
ceutical drugs or hormones. I argue that this framework must be interrogated 
as it plays into tropes about white cisgender heterofemininity, and particularly 
because it will invariably affect a lot of other people who don’t fall into this cat-
egory. I write from a crip- queer- femme perspective, and want to attend to the 
ways in which these discourses pathologize queer femmes and nonbinary and 
gender- nonconforming folks, including femmes of color and trans women. A 
further gap that I will explore in this book is why trauma—including banal, 
everyday, and insidious forms of trauma including but also beyond childhood 
sexual abuse—has been largely unaccounted for when considering the dif-
ferences between men’s and women’s desire. My analysis suggests that this 
is a direct result of a shift away from psychoanalytic/psychodynamic think-
ing in mainstream psychology. But what is also important to consider is how 
women—cis and trans, across racial backgrounds, of different embodiments 
and other disparate statuses—understand their own desire, or lack thereof. My 
terrain of sexual science and recognize that much has changed even in the last five years, but in 
this book, I want to emphasize how these reductive ideas about women’s desire have been taken 
up broadly in the mainstream since the turn of the twenty- first century through today. One 
problem is how quickly media latch on to scientific explanations for gender differences in sexu-
ality; however, over the course of the last two decades, the scientists themselves have also made 
broad, sweeping claims in both media interviews and in their expert publications, even when 
their findings are actually just hypotheses in an ever- shifting world of scientific knowledge (see 
DeJesus et al., 2019 for empirical evidence [!] on problems with scientific overgeneralizing). 
Thus, I argue that even as they move their research agendas forward in the spirit of feminist 
inquiry and ethics, these experts must first reckon with their own recent pasts.
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main quest was to seek information from these folks themselves about how 
well this feminized responsive desire framework applies to them. And I found 
out that for a lot of them, it doesn’t work so well. Certainly, some of these folks 
do feel receptive and responsive, but those experiences are often related to 
trauma, and with how the people we call women are socialized; they are not 
neutral or natural. So, let me be clear: My project here is not to make the case 
that men’s and women’s sexualities, or that masculine and feminine desires, 
are exactly the same. Instead, I argue, along with the new scientists of female 
sexuality, the pioneers and explorers of this frontier, that many women are 
absolutely different from many men. But in this book, I consider and honor 
how they’ve come to be that way, rather than simply describing them as such.
To this end, I want to explain how I use the term femininity in this book, 
and why I chose to use she/her pronouns in most cases throughout the text. I 
did this for a couple of reasons, and my decision- making here was an incred-
ibly fraught and difficult process. First, for reasons that I will explore through-
out this book, it was primarily cis women who responded to participate, and 
all participants used she/her pronouns at the time of the interviews; how-
ever, these interviews represent only a snapshot in time in terms of partici-
pants’ gendered subjectivities. I strongly suspect that in the case of at least 
a few folks, their pronouns have changed, but conducting follow- up inter-
views about participants’ gender identities to confirm this is the province 
of a future study. Indeed, how trans women, nonbinary, two-spirit, agender, 
gender queer, and gender- nonconforming individuals uniquely experience 
these heteropatriarchal medical and scientific norms regarding feminin-
ity should be explored further and in greater depth. How some trans men 
have potentially experienced coercive medicalized norms for responsive fem-
ininity pre- transition is imperative to study, as well, particularly insofar as 
these men have a unique perspective to offer on the gendering of desire and 
sexual expectations. Second, and relatedly, I talk about women and feminin-
ity throughout this book because those are the terms used—and taken for 
granted—in much of the medical and scientific literature that I engage with 
and critique, and it is this research that I argue produces these very categories 
(categories that individuals, in the case of this study assigned- female- at- birth, 
or AFAB, individuals, are then forced to navigate—and in some cases reject 
but are often still haunted by). I hope that readers will understand the deli-
cacy of choosing language to use for a project such as this one, dwell with me 
in this conceptually difficult space, and read my use of the terms women and 
feminine throughout the text as somewhat tongue- in- cheek—yet also uttered 
with a certain sobriety and solemnity. The truth is that I know these categories 
could never be so monolithic, and that they are coproduced with race, class, 
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nationality, and so many other categories of difference. This is precisely why I 
wage the critique that I wage in this book—the “femininity” that clinical and 
experimental researchers too frequently imagine belongs to a white, cisgen-
der, middle- class or wealthy, normatively able- bodied woman in the Global 
North. But this femininity is then deployed as timeless and universal—even 
evolutionarily ordained.
In this vein, I am not describing femininity as an identity in this book; 
instead, I describe it as a process—one that is embodied and experiential 
but not essential, one that in its hegemonic or dominant formulation may 
be experienced as coercive, and one that is most specifically connected, in 
my analysis, to the traumatizing effects of receptivity as a clinical protocol, 
as a technoscientific framework, and as a lived—but extremely mercurial 
and unstable—materialization of sexual difference. Here, women- with- low- 
desire, sexuality, and contemporary sexology are co- constituted; there is no 
natural category of “woman” here to be recuperated. Femininity is then a 
material- discursive socialization process, enacted in part through medicine 
and science, and it is the project of this book to connect that process to its 
promulgation via contemporary sexological discourse and that discourse’s 
popular framings. My formulations here of femininity- as- process have much 
in common with other contemporary sociotechnical investigations of gen-
der, including with the pharmacopornographic or techno- chemical dimen-
sions of gender in the work of Preciado (2013), the biopolitics of gender in 
the post–John Money era as analyzed by Repo (2016), and the production of 
gender via scientific and medical categories, particularly as they pertain to 
discourses around hormones and to treatment of intersex, as described by 
Jordan- Young (2011) and Jordan- Young and Karkazis (2019). Other impor-
tant recent interlocutors include Labuski (2014, 2015, 2017), who considers 
how vulvodynia and its treatment inform experiences of race, gender, and (a)
sexuality, and Ward (2015), who examines straight white men’s sexual behav-
iors outside of the deterministic logics of biology and identity but instead as 
part of a culturally delimited process that is bound up with misogyny and 
white supremacy.
Ideas about women’s responsive sexuality and fluidity are found in myriad 
popular cultural domains today. And it is the pervasiveness and popularity 
of “expert” discourses on receptive femininity that are precisely why many of 
the AFAB folks I interviewed—most of whom identify as women but some of 
whom also reinvent or reject femininity—still have to navigate and grapple 
with these ideas about women (and what it means to be one) throughout their 
lives. So, although all the participants in this study describe interacting with 
femininizing discourses, technologies, and protocols, they absolutely occupy 
a diversity of spaces in relation to femininity and feminine or femme iden-
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tity. This is in no small part due to the fact that they come from a diversity of 
racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, and other backgrounds in addition to being 
of diverse sexualities; a fact that emphasizes the need to implement an inter-
sectional feminist framework and to consider the racialized Eurocentric and 
white supremacist origins of sexual difference, which I address below.
Race, Femininity, and the Whiteness of Sexual Difference
Very little work has looked at the phenomenon of low desire through an inter-
sectional (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991) lens, so desire issues have either been 
framed as universal for women or the impression has been given that concerns 
about desire are specifically problems encountered by white women (my data 
suggest otherwise). Following the recent work of Snorton (2017) and Schul-
ler (2018), I seek to highlight the racialized terrain of sexual difference pro-
duction—for this project, within contemporary discussions of female sexual 
dysfunction and women’s low and/or responsive desire. Schuller (2018), for 
instance, argues that discourses of sexual difference are not only related to 
racial difference narratives, but that sex difference is a function of racial dif-
ference—that is, without the evolutionary logic embedded within racist scien-
tific discourses of the nineteenth century and before (including, for Schuller, 
impressibility and sentimentalism—white people are more “receptive in a 
good [evolved] way,” according to these logics), there would be no civilizing 
project in which male and female as distinct types emerged.
The idea encapsulated in early racist scientific narratives is that as the 
“races” became more evolved and civilized—moving up the “great chain of 
being”—masculine and feminine types became more distinct. The white Euro-
pean male was produced as anatomically, behaviorally, and psychically dis-
tinct from the white European female; in some sense, the passive, receptive 
nature of the white European female became the constitutive ground for white 
European male rationality and objectivity, while white femininity became 
produced as something in need of protection (in most cases from the figure 
of the Black male rapist). Of course, the other constitutive ground here has 
always been Black femininity—conceived initially as not very differentiated 
from Black masculinity (i.e., “Black gender” or “flesh” for Spillers, 1987), and 
then as hypersexual, exotic, and tempting to white men (Collins, 2004; Ham-
monds, 1994, 1999).
Black feminist scholars have opened up critical investigations of the ways 
in which notions of sexual difference have always rested upon regimes of 
racial difference—to the point where neither can be examined alone. Spill-
ers (1987) argued that the treatment of Black bodies under slavery produced 
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them as ungendered flesh—that bodies that were enslaved and produced as 
Black were not gender differentiated or subject to the same regimes of sexual 
difference as white bodies, and further that sexual differentiation was part 
and parcel of narratives of racial evolution and civilization. Hartman (1997) 
extended this argument and examined the ways that Black womanhood (or 
the figurative lack thereof) was codified under regimes of slavery in the US 
and thus illuminated “the contingency of woman as a category” (p. 101). In 
Scenes of Subjection, Hartman (1997) examines sexual injury as it relates to 
conceptualizations of femininity, addressing how Black women were legally 
figured as “unrapeable” and thus as not really “women” at all, stating:
By interrogating gender within the purview of “offenses to existence” and 
examining female subject- formation at the site of sexual violence, I am not 
positing that forced sex constitutes the meaning of gender but that the era-
sure or disavowal of sexual violence engendered black femaleness as a condi-
tion of unredressed injury, which only intensified the bonds of captivity and 
the deadening objection of chattel status. (p. 101)
Hartman’s discussion of the relationship between sexual injury and feminin-
ity has special import for the current project—particularly in that my proj-
ect investigates the widespread popular deployment of expert discourses of 
purportedly “unmarked” feminine receptivity and responsiveness, discourses 
that have their origin in colonialist science, but that are now disseminated 
broadly and sometimes taken up by—or forced upon—women of diverse 
backgrounds.
Scholars who critically interrogate philosophies and histories of sci-
ence have also added much to this conversation about racialized femininity. 
McWhorter (2004, 2009) makes a case for the co- constitution of biopoliti-
cal regimes of racial and sexual difference, and Somerville (1994, 2000) has 
described the ways in which the designation of the “homosexual” has always 
been a racially freighted category. Somerville (1994) illuminates how the 
pathologization of the purported anatomical idiosyncrasies of lesbian bod-
ies (large labia and other genital anomalies) were bound up with racialized 
descriptions of the supposedly abnormal bodies of Black women (the so- 
called hottentot apron, or enlarged labia, also analyzed by Fausto- Sterling, 
1994). Markowitz (2001) extended the conversation by looking specifically at 
how ideas about female pelvic size were used in conceptualizing racist frame-
works of sexual difference. In both early comparative anatomy and sexology, 
including in the work of Havelock Ellis, white women were figured as hav-
ing larger pelvises than Black women—a trait that was said to have evolved 
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because white women needed to have more pelvic space in order to give birth 
to white babies (who were figured as having larger skulls according to the 
logics of craniology and phrenology!). At the same time, Black women, who 
in these early discourses were regularly framed as having larger and more 
voluptuous lower bodies than white women, were said to look this way due 
to “steatopygia”—a physical anomaly that included large buttocks, which gave 
the (compensatory and deceptive) appearance of a larger pelvis without actu-
ally having that “evolved” trait (Markowitz, 2001).
Snorton (2017) has recently revisited these themes, as he analyzes how the 
formation of white femininity quite literally relied on medical experimen-
tation conducted on Black women by early gynecologists such as J. Marion 
Sims. Snorton argues that the regular occurrence of vesicovaginal fistula 
(VVF) in Black women slaves was a product of the circumstances of living 
on the “medical plantation” of chattel slavery, but was simultaneously blamed 
on the lack of expertise of Black midwives and/or posited as a product of the 
biologically inferior and categorically “unfeminine” bodily constitution of the 
Black woman. Snorton (2017) sums up this paradox, and the imbrication of 
racial difference and sexual difference, stating: “The founding of the field of 
American gynecology thus raises a number of questions, including how race 
constructs biology, and whether sex is possible without flesh” (p. 20). Impor-
tantly, these differences in discursive production and material treatment of 
real live (Black) bodies is not just a thing of the past—Black women today 
experience disproportionately poor treatment in terms of gynecological care 
and sexual and reproductive outcomes, including in maternal and infant mor-
tality rates (Casper & Moore, 2009; D. C. Owens, 2017; Washington, 2006).
All of these scholars illuminate the whiteness of sexual difference dis-
courses as these are produced under colonialist medicine and via scientific 
racism. Whiteness is similarly the foundation of the feminized responsive 
desire framework I analyze in this book. If sexual difference is, in fact, a func-
tion of race (and I argue, along with the scholars cited above, that it is), then 
there can be no feminine receptivity without race—or, more specifically, with-
out the privileging of whiteness. White feminine receptivity has always been 
produced against Black feminine hypersexuality as its counterpart. Further, 
white women have traditionally been framed as more sexually receptive, but 
women of color have traditionally been expected to actually be more receptive 
to sex. In this study, I do not extensively examine the Black hypersexuality 
against which white receptivity is framed, but rather illustrate the dominant 
white discourses and the insidiousness of their reach, as I critique a particular 
moment in contemporary popular psychology that is very much white (i.e., 
the publication of the DSM- 5 and its related discursive formations). While 
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these discourses about women’s sexuality are racialized as white or are left 
“unmarked,” my findings importantly suggest that women across racial iden-
tities experience low desire and are forced to navigate this white framework 
of receptive femininity.
In spite of a plethora of excellent intersectional research from critical 
scholars, contemporary scientific narratives of sexuality and gender continue 
to reify binary conceptions of sexual difference, specifically since the modern 
Darwinian synthesis in which male and female were firmly cast as distinct 
and complementary types, with all of their binary trappings, and since the 
X chromosome was formally posited as the “female” chromosome (Richard-
son, 2012). Beginning with this neo- Darwinian shift and through to today, 
(discursively unraced) women are broadly understood as being more sexually 
receptive, responsive, and reactive than (discursively unraced) men—and this 
is in part due to how ubiquitous experiences associated with white feminine 
sexuality have become. Part of what I will engage with in this book is how the 
idea that women as a whole are sexually “receptive” became popularized and 
how it has come to affect diverse individuals. How did sex difference as binary 
become such a truism in popular culture in the Global North, and how is 
this idea perpetuated through expert knowledge? What are the contemporary 
technologies that produce binary sex difference? And why is it that so many 
women today do, in fact, end up experiencing their desire as low or lacking?
Diagnosably Low Female Sexual Desire: A Brief Clinical 
History
Although the contemporary iteration of feminized responsive desire is my 
focus in this book, the main sexual complaint that women tend to present 
with clinically is “low desire.”4 Indeed, sexology, sex therapy, and sexual medi-
cine shifted to a responsive model of female desire in part because of the prev-
alence of this complaint. Beginning in roughly the 1970s, antimedicalization 
feminists began to argue that a male model of spontaneous desire had been 
applied to women, and that women were therefore pathologized (or patholo-
gized themselves) when in fact their desire was simply different from men’s: 
 4. Although there is little to no epidemiological data on racial or class demographics of 
the women who seek medical help for low desire, due to the very structure of what it means 
to “present clinically,” particularly in the US, where health insurance is a commodity, we can 
assume that most of these presenting women are white, cisgender, and middle- class or wealthy. 
However, due to the way that expert discourses travel in the popular sphere, many other women 
may self- diagnose as low in desire and self- treat. That is precisely what this book is about.
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potentially weaker, more receptive or responsive, often following arousal 
and needing to be triggered. However, as “low desire” has been registered as 
women’s key complaint and as the notion of women’s responsive desire only 
entered mainstream medical discourse in its newest guise around the turn of 
the twenty- first century, I will elucidate a brief history of low female desire 
here.
Many sexual disorders are accounted for in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but none 
included the language of desire until 1980. That year, two new disorders—
inhibited sexual desire (ISD) and sexual aversion—were introduced into the 
DSM- III, both emphasizing desire disorders as dyadic; in other words, they 
were said to afflict the (implicitly heterosexual) couple rather than just one 
partner, and were brought to bear in the context of sex therapy treatment. In 
the DSM- III- R, published in 1987, ISD was divided into two categories: hypo-
active sexual desire disorder (HSDD) and sexual aversion disorder (SAD), 
and when the DSM- IV was introduced in 1994, these diagnoses remained the 
same. Up until the publication of the DSM- 5 in 2013, both men and women 
could be diagnosed with hypoactive desire, although women have consis-
tently been diagnosed much more frequently than men. In the DSM- IV- TR 
(text revision), HSDD was defined as “persistently or recurrently deficient 
(or absent) sexual fantasies and desire for sexual activity.” The 1999 National 
Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) reported that around 32 percent of 
women between the ages of eighteen and thirty- nine were afflicted with low 
desire (as compared to about 14 percent of men in the same age range). A 
nationally representative study conducted in 2008 suggested that 26.7 percent 
of premenopausal women and 52.4 percent of naturally menopausal women 
fit the criteria for diagnosis with HSDD (West et al., 2008), and another study 
suggested that up to 40 percent of women lack interest in sex (K. R. Mitchell 
et al., 2013).
Even within the terms of these studies, these numbers should be qualified. 
The number of low- desiring women reported by the NHSLS study has been 
critiqued as inflated, including by the main researcher on the study. Mean-
while, these percentages are often dramatically reduced when potential diag-
nosees must also be “troubled” or “distressed” by their lack of sexual desire 
in order to receive a diagnosis, a criterion that is built into the new DSM- 5 
diagnosis (i.e., women who are not distressed by their low desire should not 
receive the diagnosis, as some may identify as asexual instead). According to 
most contemporary estimates, the number of women who lack sexual motiva-
tion and who are concomitantly troubled by this experience hovers at around 
12 percent (Shifren, Monz, Russo, Segreti, & Johannes, 2008). Regardless of 
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the details of these studies, the prevalence of low female desire remains a cul-
tural trope, and statistics continue to be cited as proof of the pervasiveness of 
the phenomenon. Although recent estimates do not indicate an increase in 
the actual number of women afflicted with diagnosably low desire over the 
last few decades, widespread attention to women’s desire problems in clinical 
literature, a proliferation of recent reports in the popular media (for examples, 
see Bergner, 2009a, 2009b, 2013a; Elton, 2010; Gottlieb, 2014; Schreiber, 2012), 
and an increase in reports of women who lack interest in sex as demonstrated 
in both clinical settings and on national surveys gives the impression that low 
desire in women is on the rise, at least in the Global North. Further, as pointed 
out by Charest and Kleinplatz (2018), there has been a shift from an emphasis 
on sexual problems as dyadic to the increased pathologization of individu-
als with sexual complaints—and in the case of low desire, this is most often 
individual women.
Hence, in most clinical and popular discourses today, it is widely accepted 
that men and women have very different sexual problems (Basson et al., 2001; 
Basson, Brotto, Laan, Redmond, & Utian, 2005; Brotto, 2010a; Leiblum & 
Rosen, 1988; Tiefer, 1991, 1995). Low sexual desire appears not only to occur 
more regularly in women, it is expected to be a more common experience for 
women. Here, it is important to recognize that many women do in fact expe-
rience themselves as low or lacking in desire, and this experience now cuts 
across race and class lines, among other categories of difference. The ques-
tions I seek to answer in this book do not challenge the reality or validity of 
this highly gendered sexual experience of low desire, but instead, its etiology 
and assumptions: Why are women more likely to be afflicted with this prob-
lem? Do we assume this gendered experience is natural, biological, hardwired? 
What does that assumption look like, or how does it manifest, and with what 
consequences, in our contemporary climate? Unlike much feminist analysis in 
the medical sociology and social psychology traditions, which tends to argue 
that sexuality is socially constructed, and that heteronormative gender expec-
tations influence us to pathologize women’s low desire when it is actually just 
“normal variation”—or, more recently, that women’s desire may not be disor-
dered but simply “responsive” and “receptive”—I want to consider how these 
ideas about receptivity, responsiveness, and even “normal variation” them-
selves become gendered, and how this framing influences men’s and women’s 
lived experiences of desire and their sexual expression more broadly. I want 
to think about how gender differences in desire are carved out in the world, 
in all their specificities, and with what effects, including for women who come 
to identify as either deficient or disordered, or as normal—but receptive and 
responsive. Is there a way to understand low desire as disorder, yet simulta-
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neously to question and complicate its supposed neurobiological or essential 
origins? Is there a way to look beyond both social constructionism and bio-
logical determinism when it comes to sexual difference? Relatedly, is there a 
way to think beyond disability, debility, and disorder as objective, medical, 
and measurable, yet to simultaneously foreground their material and embod-
ied existence? And is it possible to endeavor a deep critique of the racialized 
and gendered nature of scientific and medical discourses while at the same 
time acknowledging that some women are disturbed by their lack of desire 
and want treatment for it?
Theoretical and Methodological Framework
Before beginning my analysis, I posed a number of research questions: How 
do contemporary and historical scientific, medical, and therapeutic discourses 
define sexual desire? How do these discourses (and the experts themselves) 
frame sexual difference? Do they identify gender differences in desire, arousal, 
and sexual behavior? If so, how do they interpret and explain these differ-
ences? Are masculine and feminine desire framed differently across sexual 
medicine, sex therapy, and clinical psychology paradigms over the last two 
centuries? Is anything consistent across these paradigms? And finally, how do 
women themselves understand the machinations of their own desire, or lack 
thereof?
Because I wanted to focus on the low desire diagnoses in the new DSM- 5 
and related feminized responsive desire framework, I interviewed women 
identifying as low or lacking in sexual desire, including those who have either 
sought medical or alternative therapeutic treatments or who have considered 
seeking treatment. However, I chose to include within my study interviews 
with women who had not undergone medical treatment or received a diag-
nosis, for a few reasons. It is actually quite difficult to acquire a low- desire 
diagnosis from a psychiatric practitioner due to obstacles within the US health 
care system, internalized shame about female sexuality, and a variety of other 
factors (additionally, this population is also very difficult to reach due to 
medical gatekeeping). But I was also actively interested in speaking not only 
with women who have received official diagnoses and medical treatment for 
low desire but also with potential consumers of medicine—or of alternative 
therapies such as mindfulness, yoga, tantra, and feminine energy “healing” 
workshops—intended to remedy low desire. In other words, I was interested 
in how not only the low desire diagnosis itself but also the broader feminized 
responsive desire framework I outlined at the beginning of this introduction 
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affects a broad population of women. This study deals with medicalization 
and healthism (to be defined below), but it is not a medical ethnography. I 
am more interested in how the logic of feminine receptivity impacts women 
broadly than in the experience of patients who have been diagnosed with a 
specific disease state or disorder. Or, rather, I am interested in the increas-
ing blurriness of these categories—the diagnosed and the undiagnosed—par-
ticularly as self- medicalization becomes more and more prevalent due to the 
impact of the internet and social media.
The sociological study and critique of medicalization—what Conrad (1992) 
referred to as “a process by which non- medical problems become defined and 
treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses and disorders” (p. 
209)—has been an important subfield within sociology since the 1960s, borne 
out of the symbolic interactionist and sociology of knowledge traditions. 
Early theorists of medicalization included Szasz (1960), who wrote about the 
historical invention of mental illness; Zola (1972), who argued that medicine 
has become an institution of social control; and Conrad (1975), who argued 
that hyperkinesis or attention deficit disorder (ADD) in children, among 
other disorders, were iatrogenically produced.5 These sociologists examined 
how disorders are socially constructed via powerful medical discourses, and 
how they then affect individuals and the “biosocial” communities who take 
them up, contest them, or navigate them in a variety of other ways (Rabinow, 
1996). More recent scholars in this area have focused on biomedicalization 
(Clarke, Shim, Mamo, Fosket, & Fishman, 2003) and healthism or healthi-
cization (Crawford, 1980). These terms reflect a shift in which the dominant 
status of medical professions has diminished under neoliberal capitalism, and 
increasingly, individuals are targeted by corporations; they may self- diagnose 
and self- treat (via online protocols); and alternative, functional, holistic, and 
“Eastern” medicine and extramedical protocols have become more popular, 
both within so- called Western medical arenas and also outside of the clinic.
The medicalization of sexuality—and specifically the project of making 
sexual difference a focal point of psychiatric interest and intervention—has a 
long history in the Global North, particularly in the Anglo- American context. 
Many feminist scholars have suggested that medicine and science, including 
psychology and psychiatry, should be deemed irresponsible not only for their 
 5. Goffman, with his work on institutionalization (1961) and stigmatization (1978), and 
Foucault, with his genealogical analyses of madness (1965), the productive power of expert 
discourse (1972), the development of the clinic and the clinical gaze (1973), and disciplinary 
regimentation within surveilling institutions (1977), are also associated with the sociological 
critique of medicalization. For this project, I am more interested in Foucault’s later work on 
governmentality, regimes of sexuality, and the biopolitical production and management of pop-
ulations, as I elaborate below.
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social control techniques in general, but for their social control of women as 
deviant others in particular (Birke & Hubbard, 1995; Boyle, 1993; Harding, 
1986; Hubbard, 1990; Irvine, 2002, 2005). Feminists of the 1960s and 1970s 
analyzed the legacy of psychoanalysis in this regard, and much of the pathol-
ogization of women’s minds and bodies has been attributed to Freud’s drive 
model of sex, and the concept of penis envy. These scholars further argued 
that the “feminine neuroses”—female masochism, hysteria, frigidity, and even 
eating disorders today—were socially constructed as ways to pathologize fem-
ininity or, alternatively, that they were the tangible and devastating material 
results of the suffocating societal control of women. For other scholars, these 
illness experiences may also be read as radical forms of feminist refusal or 
resistance to patriarchal modes of being (Bordo, 1993; Ehrenreich & English, 
1978).
Today, disability studies scholars such as Garland- Thomson (2002) and 
Kafer (2013), and feminist psychiatric disability and madness studies scholars 
such as Donaldson (2002), Johnson (2010, 2013, 2015), and Mollow (2014) in a 
crip theoretical frame (McRuer, 2006) offer a way of understanding gendered 
and racialized illnesses as being simultaneously real and legitimate (rather 
than just “socially constructed”), yet still emergent as social products and not 
simply forms of refusal. Some feminist and sexuality studies scholars have also 
taken up critiques of sexism and misogyny in sexual dysfunction discourses 
and in the areas of women’s sexual, reproductive, and mental health more 
broadly (Angel, 2010, 2012; Cacchioni, 2015; Labuski, 2015; Moore & Clarke, 
1995; Tiefer, 1995). Additionally, asexuality studies scholars have highlighted 
regimes of compulsory sexuality (Barounis, 2014, 2015, 2019; Flore, 2014, 2016, 
2018; Gupta, 2011, 2015, 2017; Kim, 2014; Milks & Cerankowski, 2014; Przy-
bylo, 2013, 2014), and feminist science studies scholars have unpacked cat-
egories of diagnosis, including in regard to intersex embodiment, exposing 
the heteronormative rhetoric that operates under the guise of scientific objec-
tivity (Fausto- Sterling, 1992, 1994, 2000; Jordan- Young, 2011; Jordan- Young 
& Karkazis, 2019; Karkazis, 2008). As mentioned above, many scholars in 
this vein have importantly highlighted the whiteness of these regimes and of 
racialized sexual difference more broadly (Hartman, 1997; Markowitz, 2001; 
McWhorter, 2004, 2009; Schuller, 2018; Snorton, 2017; Somerville, 1994, 2000; 
Spillers, 1987). I offer an analysis of low desire in women that is in conversa-
tion with all of this scholarship.
Recent sociological critiques of the medicalization of sexuality, including 
prolific critiques of the social construction of female sexual dysfunction and 
low desire, have primarily taken an antimedicalization, antipharmaceutical-
ization or anti–“Big Pharma,” anti- “disease- mongering” stance (Jutel, 2010; 
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Moynihan, 2005; Tiefer, 1995, 1996, 2006). By contrast, I focus on the ways 
in which sexual difference is carved out through clinical discourses, how 
gendered ways of being are thus prescribed within these domains, and ulti-
mately, how discursive regimes for active masculinity and receptive femininity 
become circuitously attached to bodies and lived out socially. In the pres-
ent study, I address these crucial—and too often neglected—components of 
the current context within which “female sexual dysfunction” (FSD) and low 
female desire are constructed, debated, and, by some critics, denounced as 
wholly fictitious. I do not think non-asexual women’s low desire is fictitious or 
purely “socially constructed,” but nor do I think it is simply “normal variation,” 
in the most generous reading, or essential to female sexual constitution, in the 
most reductive reading (it is worth noting that both “normal variation” and 
“female essence” here operate within the logic of a reductive biological frame). 
Instead, I want to turn the gaze back upon the very feminist- identified clini-
cians and scientists who study and work on women’s desire, and show how 
they are complicit with the production of receptive femininity as something 
to be regulated, controlled, and optimized. Women- with- low- desire here is 
produced as a category, as a population to be managed, and the members of 
this population are in many cases produced and managed by self- identified 
feminist researchers and clinicians themselves.
In this vein, my research questions further lend themselves to a theoreti-
cal exploration proceeding from a biopolitical framework. Beginning with 
the work of Foucault in the late 1970s, there has been much attention to the 
dynamics of identity and population production, embodiment, and other 
forms of corporeal politics in late neoliberal capitalism (Clough, 2007, 2018; 
Cooper, 2008; Cooper & Waldby, 2014; Mbembe, 2003, 2019; Murphy, 2012, 
2017; Puar, 2007, 2011, 2017; N. Rose, 2001, 2007; Weheliye, 2014). Scholars 
following and critiquing Foucault began to explore these questions within a 
biopolitical and affective framework beginning in the late 1980s. The primary 
common claim is that neoliberal discourses under late global capitalism—
which are attuned to and productive of race, gender, sexuality, nationality, 
(dis)ability, and other categories of citizenship and governance—manipulate, 
surveil, and affectively control bodies and populations, increasingly through 
consensual rather than disciplinary means. Some of these control mechanisms 
operate through the domains of medicine, science, and psychiatry—and their 
popular instantiations that are now accessible through new media, digital for-
mats, and self- help techniques—and they regulate and manage the health, ill-
ness, capacity, debility, life, and death of various populations and the body 
politic at large. This management is increasingly performed in the name of 
“self- improvement” and individual “health” to the benefit of certain groups 
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at the expense of certain others (all of whom are raced, gendered, sexualized, 
and nationalized). All of these investments are part of a larger neoliberal proj-
ect of submitting social life—including family configurations, sexual relations, 
and other embodied aspects of this sociality—to market logic. My project, as 
it examines the lived experience of racialized and gendered medical and sci-
entific discourses—including those that extend beyond the clinic—and their 
effects on women’s bodies and psyches, and insofar as it focuses on the man-
agement, regulation, and production of certain iterations of feminine desire, 
is firmly situated within this biopolitical framework.
In order to investigate how individuals live out low or responsive female 
desire discourses, I employed a mixed methodological qualitative approach. I 
utilized three different sociological research methods, including critical dis-
course analysis of peer- reviewed scientific and sexual medicine journal arti-
cles, a limited amount of analytic observation6 at medical clinics and sexual 
enhancement workshops, and in- depth interviews with thirty- seven individu-
als. Most of these interviews were with cisgender women who identified as 
currently lacking in sexual desire or who have experienced problematic low 
desire at some point in their lives. I also conducted a small number of inter-
views with a variety of practitioners who do “desire work,” including clinical 
psychologists, sex therapists, yogic/tantric practitioners, sexual enhancement 
workshop leaders, and antimedicalization activists. By analyzing emergent 
themes through in- depth qualitative data- analysis techniques, I was able to 
excavate the parallels and tensions between “expert” discourses on low female 
desire and the experiences of low- desiring women themselves.
How do women think about low desire, receptivity, responsiveness, com-
plexity, and sexual flexibility? How do they experience their sexualities and 
genders? How do they characterize their current and past sex lives? What 
turns them on or off? How could their sexual partners help them increase 
their desire and give them more pleasure? Why do women themselves think 
their desire is low, or has been throughout their lives at different times and 
with different partners? In order to shed light on these questions, among 
others, I conducted in- depth, one- on- one, semistructured, qualitative inter-
views with thirty low- desiring women. These interviews ranged from thirty 
to 210 minutes in length, but most were between one and three hours long. 
Most participants contacted me on the basis of experiencing low desire cur-
rently or because they had experienced troublingly low desire at some point in 
 6. I use the term analytic observation rather than participant observation, as I was not 
actually a participant in any of these spaces. Rather, I conducted interviews in medical and 
alternative therapeutic spaces and was able to observe certain dynamics in these “clinics” dur-
ing the interviewing process.
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their lives; two had participated in medical treatment programs that utilized 
behavioral, therapeutic, and pharmaceutical interventions to treat sexual pain 
and concomitant low desire. They ranged in age from twenty- one to fifty- 
six years, but most were between the ages of twenty- five and thirty- seven, 
and all except for one were premenopausal. These women were of diverse 
racial and ethnic backgrounds, with about one- third of the sample identify-
ing as women of color. They grew up with a multitude of cultural, community, 
and religious backgrounds. Most were born in the US, and almost all had at 
least a college education (or were currently attending college). They were of 
diverse sexualities (most were straight or bisexual; some identified as queer) 
and lifestyles (some were married or in long- term partnerships, some were 
single, some were polyamorous or in open relationships, and only a few were 
pregnant or had children), but all of the women I interviewed who identified 
as low- desiring (or who had previously experienced distressingly low desire) 
had been sexually involved with cisgender men at some point in their lives. 
One participant identified as being on an asexual/pansexual spectrum, and 
one identified as genderqueer/nonconforming. A participant also interviewed 
me, using the same interview schedule I had used with all of the low- desiring 
women I interviewed. See the appendix (Table 1 and Table 2) for full par-
ticipant and expert demographic information. All of the names used for par-
ticipants in this study are pseudonyms. The names in Table 1 (low- desiring 
participants) were chosen by the participants themselves. I selected the names 
in Table 2 (the experts; although some of the experts agreed to use their real 
names, not all did, so in order to be consistent, I gave them all pseudonyms. 
All of the experts are white).
Most of the participants responded to a flyer I posted in a variety of spaces 
around Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan in New York City—including in 
college health centers and other university settings, coffee shops and restau-
rants, grocery stores, yoga and dance studios, and other public places with bul-
letin boards for posting events and activities. The flyer was also disseminated 
to initial participants to email to their friends and post on their Facebook and 
other social media pages, so many of the later participants were recruited via 
snowball sample (Berg & Lune, 2011; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013). I 
also posted the recruitment flyer on my personal blog, Facebook, and Twitter 
pages and made it shareable so others could post it. This type of convenience 
sampling is appropriate given the sensitive nature of the interview topics, and 
is useful for making exploratory grounded theoretical observations that are 
not generalizable to any larger population.7 My sample could be said to be 
 7. Most of the interviews were conducted at my apartment, at the participants’ apart-
ments, or in a public space such as a café or park (in all cases, the participants chose where 
they preferred to be interviewed—and a handful of interviews were conducted via Skype or 
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somewhat disparate, but I argue that this makes sense and is in keeping with 
the scientific literature, as what it means to be a “low- desiring” woman is 
confusing and ill- defined, and the medical discourse itself is confusing and 
ill- defined. There is no consensus in experimental or clinical psychology or 
sexual medicine or sex therapy on what “desire” even is, or what “low desire” 
indicates, and the new female sexual interest/arousal disorder diagnosis attests 
to this, as I will explain in chapter 2.
In the remaining six interviews, which were conducted with clinicians, 
therapists, activists, and yogic/alternative health practitioners, emergent 
themes included these experts’ thoughts on feminine receptivity, innate or 
neurological differences between men and women, evolutionary sexual adap-
tations, and gender differences in mind/body disconnects or alignments (i.e., 
arousal/desire “concordance” versus “discordance”). I also examined how 
practitioners dealt with the same themes that emerged from the low- desiring 
women’s interviews. Different practitioners grappled with these themes dif-
ferently, and they had diverse ideas about the most appropriate and effective 
treatments for low female desire. I utilize these expert interviews sporadically 
throughout the remainder of this book, primarily to frame the textual analysis 
and low- desiring participants’ interview data.
Chapter Overview
In the first half of Diagnosing Desire, I examine historical and contemporary 
formulations of both clinical and popular discourses about femininity, sexual-
ity, and gendered sexual response; in the second half of the book, I turn more 
closely to the interviews and the themes that emerged from them. 
In chapter 1, I examine how femininity, women’s sexuality, and female 
desire have been framed in sex therapy, sex research, and specifically as part 
of conceptualizations of human sexual response, from the nineteenth cen-
tury through to today. I pay special attention to how notions of feminine 
responsiveness and receptivity have been maintained through different sexual 
response models, from early psychoanalytic configurations to more behav-
ioristic accounts to evolutionary psychology formulations of sexual differ-
ence. Although paradigms through which sexuality is interpreted have shifted 
immensely (and much has been lost in the movement from trauma- based 
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic theories to the more reductive evolutionary 
FaceTime) between 2012 and 2014. I did not compensate any of the interviewees monetarily, 
although I did offer to buy them coffee or tea if we were at a café, and if they came to my apart-
ment to conduct the interview, I cooked dinner for them and/or provided food and beverages.
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psychology and behavioristic models), the idea that men and women operate 
on different sexual planes of existence has remained constant.
In chapter 2, I pick up with contemporary behavioristic and evolutionary 
models and focus on the trajectory of the new science of female sexuality as 
it relates to these models, and specifically on the development of the circular 
sexual response cycle as part of the feminized responsive desire framework. I 
show how these models for thinking about women’s sexual response began to 
take hold over the last twenty- five or so years, and came fully into the popu-
lar spotlight during the first decade of the twenty- first century, and I consider 
how the notions of sexual “interest,” “arousal,” and “motivation” have come 
to replace the language of (female) “desire” and have simultaneously come to 
dominate in individualized sex therapy, sexual medicine, and contemporary 
sexology. I further show how this feminized responsive desire framework—
along with experimental psychology research on women’s subjective/genital 
discordance—culminated in the newly gendered FSIAD diagnosis in the 2013 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 
5). The feminization of responsive desire is not only an issue for those who 
are diagnosed with FSIAD, however—because of the far reach of ideas about 
feminine sexual receptivity via popular media, many women have internalized 
these notions, and will self- diagnose and seek treatment, including through 
mindfulness- based sex therapy, or MBST, one of the most popular methods of 
treatment today. I analyze this entire framework as it relates to themes about 
women’s sexuality that have emerged in evolutionary psychology, and consider 
treatments—including mindfulness to enhance desire—through a biopoliti-
cal lens. Members of the population women- with- low- desire are produced 
as such through sexual medicine and treatment protocols and come to regu-
late themselves accordingly. This self- surveillance rehearses antiquated narra-
tives about (white) feminine receptivity and has dire negative consequences 
for women’s sexual agency—which is paradoxical, in that the framework and 
treatments are designed to “empower” women.
Through the qualitative analysis of interview data, several primary themes 
emerged as specifically affecting women who identify as low in sexual desire, 
and they are the topics of the remaining chapters. In chapter 3, I examine con-
cepts associated with the FSIAD diagnosis, such as “interest,” “arousal,” “moti-
vation,” and “receptivity,” and consider how well they apply (or do not apply) 
to the women I interviewed. I also examine how second- wave feminism, spe-
cifically cultural feminist strains within the “psychology of women,” and even 
ideas about women that have emerged from antimedicalization activism, have 
been imported into the feminized responsive desire framework. Today, this 
model of women’s sexual response is offered as “feminist”—however, I argue 
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that it can only be interpreted as such if women’s empowerment is defined nar-
rowly within a white liberal feminist framework. I argue that more in- depth, 
intersectional feminist goals are undercut by the racialized, cisnormative, and 
heterornomative contours of the feminized responsive desire framework itself. 
The primary theme that emerges from my interview data here is the notion of 
sexual difference socialization, or the experience of one’s sexuality (and femi-
ninity) through pervasive scientific, therapeutic, and popular discourses that 
prescribe gender differences in sexual desire and behavior. Here, I consider 
how the category women- with- low- desire is not only produced discursively 
via sexual medicine but also how members of this population are socialized 
into being, through gendered sexual expectations that are part and parcel of 
contemporary sexology and its associated scripts.
In chapter 4, I consider embodied invisible labor in the form of sexu-
alized social reproduction, or what I call sexual carework. This theme from 
my interview data does not only concern the ways women are expected to 
sexually service men under heteropatriachy (although it does concern that). 
I also focus on how the medical and scientific discourses I analyze in the first 
part of the book support notions of feminized sexual carework, which has 
particular import for women- with- low- desire, and even more specifically for 
women of color in this category. Further, I consider how, under regimes of 
compulsory gendered (hetero)sexuality, sexual carework becomes a mandate 
for self- care—for the good of the hetero/cis relationship, the bourgeois family, 
the nation/state, and sometimes the woman’s “own health”; here, alternative 
therapies, including mindfulness, become tools of self- care as self- regulation, 
and femininity becomes a duty. Feminized sexual carework is thus a biopoliti-
cal mandate, and feminine carers are a population to be invested in and who 
are expected to invest in themselves in order to self- appreciate (in the sense of 
accruing value, or making oneself more valuable).
In chapter 5, I analyze the interviews and consider how and why some 
low- desiring women are drawn to submission in bondage and discipline/
dominance and submission/sadism and machochism or BDSM practice, and 
concomitantly interrogate the problem of the missing discourse of trauma 
within the feminized responsive desire framework. In this vein, I consider 
the fraught nature and importance of sexual intentionality—including the 
necessity of actively negotiating sexual taboos and attempting to build sexual 
trust (particularly for women who have sex with men)—in the face of many 
low- desiring women’s frequent experiences with and histories of feminized 
trauma as a result of gendered and sexual violence. Here, I further expose the 
violence inherent in the feminized mandate to sexual receptivity, including 
as it is deployed via the FSIAD diagnosis and mindfulness- based sex ther-
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apy and related discourses. I show, however, that receptivity can be and is 
reclaimed by women, including through mindful and intentional submission, 
for instance via BDSM. This intentional and queer reclamation of receptivity 
via submission throws into stark relief the (ironically) more self- disciplinary 
mandate of enhancing one’s own responsive desire via biopolitical techniques 
such as mindfulness, and thus what I refer to as parasexual pleasure is able to 
be experienced even in the face of compulsory and feminized trauma. Here, I 
add to ongoing conversations about asexuality, demisexuality, and other non- 
normative versions of erotic life.
I bring all of these themes together in the conclusion of Diagnosing Desire 
and consider a different model of care and parasexual agency through the 
lenses of crip theory, critical feminist disability studies, and feminist madness 
studies. Here, I think through the implications of the biopolitical analysis of 
femininity that has been laid out in the book; if the responsive feminine are 
produced as a population, then there may be an experience of vitality to be 
found in “falling apart” or “fracturing” together—rather than self- surveilling 
and constantly seeking to individually enhance under white supremacist, able-
ist, cisheteropatriarchal capitalism. There is revolutionary potential in falling 
apart in the face of trauma and low desire, with others, in radical community, 
rather than using biopolitical techniques in order to simply “get by.”
•
I want to acknowledge a few final things before I go any further. First, while I 
will argue throughout this book that contemporary discourses of femininity 
are framed as universal or are racially “unmarked,” but that they ultimately 
recapitulate ideas about white women’s sexuality (founded in early scientific 
discourses of racialized sexual difference), the one- on- one interviews for this 
this book did not focus on race in an in- depth way. I reflexively acknowledge 
the limitations of this book in this vein; while I did speak with several women 
of color for this project, we did not extensively discuss the many ways that 
race, racism, and white supremacy undoubtedly impact their experiences of 
their own sexuality and desire. To some extent, this was a limitation of my 
interview schedule and the substance of the overarching research question 
that brought these participants to speak with me in the first place (the connec-
tion between gender and low desire), but my own whiteness surely influenced 
how I chose to analyze the interviews and what themes I ultimately centered 
in the final analysis. There is a strong connection between my own work here 
and research that suggests how (sexualized/gendered) trauma and (sexual-
ized/gendered) carework are disproportionately experienced and enacted by 
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poor women, women of color, and folks of other marginalized statuses, and 
I highlight that research throughout the text with a nod to the limits of my 
own project. I take seriously Nash’s (2019) critiques of the burden thrust upon 
feminist scholars of color to do intersectional work and Puar’s (2017) critiques 
of the ways in which (white) new materialist feminist scholars specifically 
have too often ignored an intersectional frame. I hope that my research here 
on the whiteness of the contemporary medical and scientific milieu of sexual 
difference production and regulation can open the door for more in- depth 
analyses of racialization and unmarked whiteness as it travels in this milieu 
(and it is white scholars, including me, who should endeavor to perform these 
analyses).
A few final points I’d like to acknowledge include the time scale of this 
research, the pervasiveness of what may appear to be a narrow discourse, and 
the complexity of the experts I analyze. The science that I have been studying 
moves fast, and narratives and hypotheses offered in experimental and clini-
cal psychology publications have changed quickly since I began this project. 
Thus, this book focuses primarily on a very specific time period: the first ten 
to fifteen years of the twenty- first century, when women’s (receptive) desire 
increasingly came into the spotlight, and the discursive space of “feminism” 
was increasingly occupied by mainstream sexual medicine practitioners, 
researchers, and sex therapists. This book, then, is also a critique of white lib-
eral feminism as it has been taken up in mainstream psychology.
In this vein, one of my goals is to inspire an interdisciplinary dialogue. 
Many popular mainstream psychologists are still primarily working with the 
categories of “males” and “females,” are only recently beginning to examine 
the social construction of gender, and assume universal sex categories without 
analyzing their founding within colonialism and white supremacy. By con-
trast, scholars in critical race and sexuality studies, disability studies, queer 
and feminist theory, and queer of color and crip of color critique have moved 
well beyond social constructionist arguments and forefront white suprem-
acy as undergirding all of our medical and scientific categories. I hope this 
book can promote useful and practicable discussions among these scientific 
researchers and cultural theorists, so that our most cutting- edge science and 
medicine can be informed by our most cutting- edge theories of gender, sexu-
ality, race, and embodiment. These discussions will be imperative in improv-
ing both clinical/therapeutic treatments for marginalized populations, and the 
scientific research upon which those treatments are based.
Finally, it must be noted that this project has been difficult in part because 
of the complexity of the medical figures and experts who have become the pri-
mary characters in this story. While I critique the way their various research 
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projects, treatment protocols, and activist endeavors have come together to 
form the feminized responsive desire framework that I see as ultimately det-
rimental and retrograde, I also recognize that these women are progressive 
and innovative scholars in their fields and have done much to shift the terrain 
of mainstream psychology and sexology. They have moved sex therapy and 
research forward in many invaluable ways, and my intervention here is meant 
in the spirit of feminist dialogue and critical engagement with those projects. 
We are all steeped in our own disciplines and have to navigate the constraints 
therein, and I hope that my argument and analysis in this book will provoke 
a necessary conversation.
29
C H A P T E R  1
Sexual Difference and Femininity in  
Sex Therapy and Sex Research
Examples from the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 
Twenty-First Centuries
In 1931, toward the end of his career, Sigmund Freud published an essay 
titled “Female Sexuality” wherein he lays out his case for sexual difference 
in development—women are naturally more “bisexual” than men (here, he 
means more prone to taking up both “male” and “female” gender orienta-
tions and associated sexual behaviors), they are more sexually receptive, and, 
when properly developed, they are sexually passive (albeit active in terms of 
a maternal instinct). Proper female adulthood is signified by a shift in libidi-
nal energies from the clitoris to the vagina. All of this is “natural”—just a 
part of human psychosexual development, given by body parts and their obvi-
ous uses. By the time this essay was published, psychoanalysis, Freud’s much 
lauded and reviled theory of human psychology, had been in clinical practice 
for more than two decades in the US and Europe. In addition to psychoana-
lytic sessions, variations of psychoanalysis were used to treat a broad swath of 
related and sometimes indistinguishable feminine neuroses, including hysteria 
and frigidity, in quasi-gynecological settings (Ehrenreich & English, 1978)—in 
this way, psychoanalysis was clearly an important moment in the trajectory 
of the development of sex therapy in the Global North. Beginning in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, psychoanalytic theorizations and protocols 
would fall out of vogue, at least among practicing psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and sex therapists, in favor of biopsychiatric, neurobiological, evolutionary 
psychological, and cognitive behavioral frameworks.
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One might have hoped that such universalizing and essentializing theo-
ries of human sexual development would have been abandoned along with 
these irresponsible uses of psychoanalysis (how much Freud condoned these 
usages himself is debated to this day). But, almost eighty years later, promi-
nent experimental sexologists, theorizing sex differences in response to por-
nographic videos shown in a laboratory to subjects whose penises and vaginas 
are hooked up to machines that gauge their physiological sexual arousal, make 
conjectures about gender differences in sexual response that sound remark-
ably similar to those for which Freud was so villainized. For instance, in 
an archetypal article in the preeminent scientific journal Archives of Sexual 
Behavior, some of the most renowned sex researchers of the twenty-first cen-
tury describe differences in male and female arousal, positing that women 
may experience less mental/physiological alignment or “concordance” than 
men do (that is, women’s minds and bodies often do not agree about what 
turns them on) for evolutionary reasons: “Another possible explanation for the 
sex difference in concordance is that men and women are designed differently 
in terms of their physiological and psychological sexual response systems” 
(Suschinsky, Lalumière, & Chivers, 2009, p. 571). In support of this theory of 
evolved sexual difference, the researchers cite sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology forerunner Donald Symons, who argues for the importance of 
mate choice in guiding ancestral women’s interest in sexual activity—which 
could really be boiled down to interest in motherhood (for women, “quality 
over quantity” is the general rule, which evolutionary psychologists claim is an 
adaptation inherited by women today; according to this theory, even though 
women tend to be physically aroused by many things, including bonobos hav-
ing sex or other entities/acts that do not align with their stated sexual pref-
erences, they often are either subjectively unaware of their objective arousal 
or choose not to “follow” it in order to make better mate choices, although 
this is not conscious). The researchers extend this evolutionary psychology 
argument about evolved adaptations—in this case, automatic, rapid, and easy 
physiological arousal in women—to the hypothetical pervasiveness of rape in 
prehistoric environments: 
Reflexive vaginal responding may have been beneficial because vaginal 
vasocongestion results in lubrication of the genital tract, reducing the likeli-
hood of injury and subsequent infection resulting from vaginal penetration. 
Ancestral women who did not reflexively lubricate and who experienced 
unwanted sex would have been more likely to experience injuries or infec-
tions that could have rendered them reproductively sterile or resulted in 
their deaths after sustaining injury during genital penetration. (p. 571) 
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Alongside describing what has since come to be known as “the preparation 
hypothesis” for hardwired reflexive female genital response,1 these research-
ers cite the work of psychologist Roy Baumeister, who argues that women’s 
sexuality is naturally more “erotically plastic” and influenced by nurture, cul-
ture, and the external environment than is men’s sexuality, which is inherently 
more “in-born,” goal-oriented, and biologically driven. So, over the span of 
almost a full century, similar guiding themes regarding feminine complexity, 
receptivity, and responsiveness are maintained, even though the theoretical 
frames doing the guiding are, on their face, very different. This observed con-
tinuity raises several questions: What are the consequences of these univer-
salizing theories of sexual difference on treatments for low desire and sexual 
dysfunction in the twenty-first century? Beyond dysfunction, how do these 
ideas impact how we perceive “healthy” sexuality, desire, and gendered sex-
ual behavior? And finally, even when contemporary experimental sexological 
research produces evidence-based theories and hypotheses, does that mean 
they are sound or worth investing in? How are these hypotheses implemented, 
how are resulting theories utilized, and what ideologies are inextricable from 
even the most replicable and reliable scientific evidence?
This book analyzes the science and medicine of low female desire, and the 
related contemporary notion of “female sexual dysfunction.” That history can-
not be discussed without critically analyzing the corollary notion of feminine 
sexual receptivity—and specifically that receptivity within the framework of 
institutionalized heterosexuality, or what social theorists call heteronormativ-
ity (Fischer, 2013; Ingraham, 2008; Pascoe, 2011; Wade; 2017; Warner, 1991). In 
each of the sex therapy and research paradigms I examine, the story remains 
the same: Female sexuality is murkier, more complex, more flexible, fluid, or 
subject to the influence of “nurture” or the external environment, and thus 
it is more receptive or responsive than male sexuality. A variety of histories, 
including pre-sexological and premodern medical histories, could be places to 
begin this story. In the interest of time and space, and because in the popular 
imagination of contemporary psychology, psychoanalysis is often considered 
to be synonymous with misogyny, I begin with Freud.
 1. At the time of this writing, the empirical status of the preparation hypothesis regard-
ing cis women’s reflexive genital response as evolutionary adaptation still has great import 
and much support, and continues to be a topic of debate in the experimental community. 
For instance, in their in-depth review of studies on related topics since the 1990s, Lalumière, 
Sawatsky, Dawson, & Suschinksy (2020) ultimately conclude that “the evidence presented in 
[their] article suggests that there is a coordinated perceptual, cognitive, emotional, physiologi-
cal, and neural system that facilitates an automatic sexual response to sexual stimuli [in cis 
women]—a coordinated system that may serve protective functions” (n. pag.).
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Just as peculiar female sexuality has consistently posed a problem for 
sexology, sex therapy, sexual medicine, and psychoanalysis, these medical 
frames and associated technologies have been vexing for feminists. The his-
tory of psychoanalysis in this regard is particularly noteworthy; whereas many 
feminist thinkers have taken up psychoanalytic perspectives on gender, from 
Lacanian to object-relations traditions, others have abandoned psychoana-
lytic theory completely and argue that it is inherently sexist, particularly as 
psychology has moved toward what are claimed to be less “theoretical” or 
“political” frameworks in the last several decades. In light of this split among 
feminists, it is useful to consider what Freud actually said about female sexual-
ity, how these notions have been taken up in practice beyond his writings and 
possibly without his consent, and what these ideas have in common with con-
temporary conceptions of sexual difference. This is imperative also as many 
contemporary practicing psychologists, sex therapists, and clinicians (fem-
inist-identified or not) have disregarded Freud while simultaneously main-
taining some of the worst—and most misogynistic—aspects of his theories 
of psychosexual development. That is, in an effort to be apolitical and atheo-
retical (i.e., to distance themselves from psychoanalysis) many contemporary 
psychologists have embraced evolutionary and behaviorist models of human 
sexuality, giving up a focus on trauma and even socialization, and, paradoxi-
cally, they have maintained notions of essential feminine responsiveness and 
receptivity in the process.
Here, I critique early psychoanalytic theories of gender and sexual devel-
opment, while also acknowledging the utility of psychoanalysis as a thera-
peutic framework for understanding trauma—including gendered and sexual 
trauma—and for understanding the impact of early experiences on our psy-
chic lives. Freudian psychoanalysis has become a stand-in—to the point of 
caricature—for all that is misogynistic about modern psychology, a point that 
Angel (2010, 2012, 2013) has elaborated at length. Even in light of warranted 
critiques of Freud’s writings on femininity, not to mention his lack of atten-
tion to difference across race, class, and culture, there are many aspects of 
psychoanalytic therapy that are useful and should be carried forward, includ-
ing psychoanalytic insight into causes of sexual problems, acknowledgment 
of the unconscious and the notion that human behaviors are often guided by 
things that are not directly within our awareness, and acknowledging prior 
trauma as a cause of pathology, in addition to processing this trauma as a 
part of treatment. While vulgar psychoanalytic theorizations (read: narrowly 
Oedipal explanations) are often the focus when Freud is discussed in con-
temporary mainstream psychology, or misogynistic work with “hysterical” 
women is described when discussing psychoanalytic treatment, there is much 
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more to both psychoanalytic theory and associated therapeutic treatments. 
An important positive aspect of psychoanalytic work is its use of narrative 
techniques for uncovering the deeper roots and explanations for understand-
ing sexual desire or lack thereof. Also valuable is the psychoanalytic attri-
bution of dysfunction to experiences of trauma, which has been lost in the 
present behaviorist focus on immediate symptoms and brief treatments. And 
finally, contemporary psychoanalytic conceptions are quite nuanced in their 
renderings of brain-body connectivity (E. A. Wilson, 2015); distributive ontolo-
gies or neurological intimacies are more intersubjective, affective, and trauma-
informed psychoanalytic explications than the ones we might be used to, and 
they allow us to consider the connections between psychoanalysis and neu-
roscience, or to think of “the body in conversation with itself ” (E.  A. Wil-
son, 2004, p. 98)—and in conversation with its environment and other bodies 
therein.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, I analyze the production of feminin-
ity and sexual difference as these have been configured in some of the key sex 
therapy paradigms in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, 
focusing on the major figures that institutionalized these protocols: Freud 
and psychoanalysis, Masters and Johnson and the physiological or behavior-
ist approach, Helen Singer Kaplan and the further instantiation of behavior-
istic sex therapy (but with a renewed acknowledgment of desire), and those 
who implement contemporary individualistic sex therapy techniques, which 
often utilize psychopharmacology, cognitive behavior therapy, and increas-
ingly, mindfulness as treatments for low desire—and who tend to theorize 
about sexuality and gender from the perspective of evolutionary psychology 
(if they theorize at all).2 Even when a clear theorization for gender differences 
is lacking in cognitive research today, evolutionary psychology is often in the 
backdrop (“we became different as cavepeople”), and gets cavalierly thrown 
in as an explanation—if not by the researchers themselves, then by those who 
interpret the research (whether that is other researchers and “experts” or pop-
ular writers and journalists).
For each therapeutic model described below, I ask a series of questions: Is 
it the couple or the individual with sexual problems that is treated? What kind 
of treatment is deemed most appropriate (e.g., psychodynamic, behavioral, or 
pharmaceutical methods, or some combination of these)? Is treatment con-
ceived of as necessarily different for men and for women? A thorough exami-
 2. I do not attend to a deeper history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sexology 
here; ideas about femininity as “inverted” masculinity and the “one-sex” model of human sexu-
ality are fundamental to understanding these contemporary modes, however, and more exten-
sive analyses can be found in Laqueur (1992).
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nation of the legacy of these regimes and treatment protocols for desire and 
behavior abnormalities and sexual dysfunctions is warranted in light of the 
themes that emerged from my interview data; the low-desiring women who 
participated in my qualitative study had much to say about how this history 
and associated notions of femininity and female desire have made it into their 
psyches, bodies, and bedrooms.
Freud and Deficient Womanhood: “The Little Creature 
without a Penis”
Even though these ideas could be traced to well before this time period, pas-
sive femininity and “receptive” versus “frigid” female desire were popularized 
and given broad cultural sway along with the psychoanalytic turn of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the US and Europe, Sigmund 
Freud’s influence on pre–sex therapeutic treatment of women’s sexual prob-
lems was profound, and this was mostly clearly linked to his writings on the 
two (active or “masculine” and passive or “feminine”) phases of female sexual 
development, the female-specific instantiation of the Oedipus and castration 
complexes, and the primarily feminine pathologies, including frigidity, hys-
teria, and other feminine neuroses. Freud was a complicated figure. He is 
also known for his seduction theory, for instance, the proper interpretation of 
which has been debated by feminists for decades. Depending on which stance 
you take, this theory either tells us that young women have been largely trau-
matized by very real sexual violence at the hands of their male elders (see 
Kleinplatz, 2018 for a discussion of this interpretation) or that at the core 
of feminine sexuality is the fantasy of incest, the notion that young women 
masochistically wish to be violated by men, including their fathers and other 
adult male family members or adult men in their lives (see Ahbel-Rappe, 
2006 for a full discussion of both perspectives). Here, I will focus specifically 
on Freud’s later work on female psychosexual development, specifically his 
1931 essay on this topic, as it is this thread that appears to have had the great-
est effect on popular ideas about female sexuality within contemporary psy-
chology, about Freud and psychoanalysis more generally, and about Freudian 
or psychoanalytic theories of sex and gender.
Although Freud believed that both men and women were driven by the 
singular force of the libido, he argued that the libido’s modes of sexual grati-
fication could be either active or passive. Proper human sexual development 
resulted in very different libidinal formations for men and women, corre-
sponding to active and passive impulses—that is, masculinity and feminin-
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ity, or dimorphic yet complementary gender formations and corresponding 
healthy behaviors and desires, along with potential dysfunctions or neuroses. 
According to Freud, human development at its earliest stages is not sexually 
differentiated; in the pre-Oedipus phase, both boys and girls are attached to 
the mother, yet also project sadistic impulses onto her, as she is a frustrating 
denier of masturbation and loathsome disseminator of a variety of other pro-
hibitions. This pre-Oedipal phase of attachment to the mother is significantly 
longer and more complex in girls, though; once “the little creature without a 
penis” (Freud, 1931/1952, p. 259) discovers the truth of her castration—her lack 
of a penis and subsequent horrifying realization that she will never acquire 
one—she quickly comes to blame her mother for this lack, which then results 
in a lifetime of ambivalent and often hostile feelings toward loved ones (i.e., 
the feminine neuroses). For Freud, the sexuality of the young child is ambiva-
lent, as it lacks an object and thus an aim. But this ambivalence is more pro-
nounced, profound, and formative for female children than it is for males due 
to the “biological reality” of penis envy—the feminine manifestation of the 
castration complex, which is characterized by a lifelong sense of “organic infe-
riority” (Freud, 1931/1952, p. 259)—and the fact that surmounting or breaking 
down the Oedipus complex is simply less important to the development of 
proper and healthy femininity than to its masculine equivalent. As a result, 
adult women are less apt to adequately overcome the childish love of their 
fathers and find an appropriate replacement object than men are to overcome 
the immature love of their mothers, and thus, women are always less sexually 
developed and appropriately goal-oriented than are men. In Freud’s formula-
tion, women’s one true and authentic desire is motherhood, which should be 
understood as very different than the sexual desire and concomitant individu-
ated selfhood that defines the distinct ego that healthy men develop.
Freud (1931/1952) writes, “We have long realized that in women the devel-
opment of sexuality is complicated by the task of renouncing that genital zone 
which was originally the principal one, namely the clitoris, in favor of a new 
zone—the vagina. But there is a second change which appears to us no less 
characteristic and important for feminine development: the original mother-
object has to be exchanged for the father” (p. 252). Although Freud acknowl-
edged that the linkage of these two “tasks” was elusive, in this statement he set 
forth a project in which the biological body, gendered behavior, and sexual or 
object orientation become fused. It was not the first time in medicine or sci-
ence that this fusing had been articulated, and it certainly would not be the 
last. What is important and notable about Freud’s formulation is how he links 
a zone of the body itself (the vagina) to an essential kind of energy: feminine 
passivity, responsiveness, or receptivity. Later in the essay, Freud discusses the 
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two phases of women’s sexual development, “the first of which is of a mascu-
line character [and is thus active, and guided by the clitoris], whilst only the 
second is specifically feminine [it is oriented around the vagina]” (p. 255). He 
goes on to state:
Thus in female development there is a process of transition from the one 
phase to the other, to which there is nothing analogous in males. A fur-
ther complication arises from the fact that the clitoris, with its masculine 
character, continues to function in later female sexual life in a very variable 
manner, which we certainly do not as yet fully understand. Of course, we do 
not know what are the biological roots of these specific characteristics of the 
woman, and we are still less able to assign to them any teleological purpose. 
(pp. 255–256; italics added)
This excerpt is crucial to analyze, as it pertains to two specific points that 
relate to contemporary conceptions of femininity and the treatment of female 
sexual dysfunction. First, Freud’s discussion of proper gendered sexual devel-
opment and how it is correlated with teleological, evolutionary reproduction 
in a (cishetero)normative sense has been a running theme through different 
medico-scientific paradigms throughout the twentieth and twenty-first cen-
turies, and it has made a distinct, forceful, and contentious comeback in the 
last forty years with the advent of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and 
gender- and sexual orientation–focused experimental psychological research 
that compares subjective and objective sexual arousal. The second crucial 
point is that here we see the first full instantiation of the enduring scientific 
notion that women’s sexuality is inherently more complex and enigmatic than 
men’s, and that, as a corollary, adult women are more likely to retain their 
originary polymorphous perversity, or the bisexuality that is present in all 
children early on. For Freud, women’s sexual development ought to result in 
“definitive femininity” via the passage from clitoral aggression to vaginal pas-
sivity correlated with desire for the father or the paternal man who replaces 
him. In fact, though, femininity is inherently more circuitous, fraught, and 
less likely to be effectively and completely achieved in the woman than mas-
culinity is to be achieved in the man. Put simply, when it comes to female 
sexual development, there are more chances for things to go wrong. Accord-
ing to Freud, women are innately prone to feel conflict between, on the one 
hand, their drive to be masculine (a holdover from the active phallic state dur-
ing which they first come to experience the forbidden activity of the clitoris), 
and, on the other hand, an essential inferior passive feminine state (and thus 
relegation to a life of receptivity, penis envy, and subsequently, of proper, vagi-
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nally focused, “true” femininity). The irony here is that even though women’s 
sexuality is conceived as more complex and complicated than men’s sexuality, 
due to its multiple steps to normative achievement, this complexity does not 
ultimately indicate that it is more evolved. Instead, male sexuality is equated 
with proper sublimation, internalization of the paternal function, develop-
ment of the superego, and ultimately citizenship within “civilized society” 
(Freud, 1931/1952, p. 256), whereas female sexuality is always inherently closer 
to the ambivalent, immature, and objectless sexuality of the infant, associated 
with an inability to fully emerge from the Oedipus complex into adulthood. 
This fraught, complex, complicated, and less teleological or less evolved sexual 
state has been maintained as the essential characteristic of female sexuality in 
scientific discourses from the heyday of psychoanalysis through to more con-
temporary conceptions of sexuality within the realm of experimental research 
informed by evolutionary psychology, the consequences of which I will elabo-
rate in chapter 2.
What would eventually become an affinity between Freudian notions of 
the feminine and more recent neuro-evolutionary conceptions is also fore-
shadowed at the end of the essay, when Freud states:
Subsequently, biological factors deflect them [libidinal forces in children] 
from their original aims and conduct even active and in every sense mas-
culine strivings into feminine channels. Since we cannot dismiss the notion 
that sexual excitation is derived from the operation of certain chemical sub-
stances, it would at first seem natural to expect that someday biochemistry 
will reveal two distinct substances, the presence of which produces male and 
female sexual excitation respectively. But this hope is surely no less naïve 
than that other one which has happily been abandoned nowadays, namely, 
that it would be possible to isolate under the microscope the different caus-
ative factors of hysteria, obsessional neurosis, melancholia, etc. (p. 268; ital-
ics added)
In our current biomedical and technoscientific landscape, it seems that we 
have returned to this exact “abandoned” project. Testosterone and estrogen 
have become stand-ins for masculinity and femininity in popular renditions 
of scientific discourse (Jordan-Young & Karkazis, 2019; Oudshoorn, 1994), and 
different levels of hormones such as oxytocin combined with how brightly 
various parts of the brain light up on a PET scan or fMRI become correlated 
with gender differences in arousal and desire patterns and with both sexual 
orientation and loving/nurturing behaviors. Thus, the above passage arguably 
demonstrates that the normative project of blueprinting proper sexual devel-
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opment as inherently gendered, binary, and rooted in a hetero-reproduction-
oriented and teleological biology might have been laid out in particularly 
clear terms in the early twentieth century by pioneering psychoanalysts (the 
Freud we love to hate!), but it is a project that has been maintained to this day, 
under myriad and diverse biomedical guises. Feminists have elaborated and 
critiqued patriarchal societal structures, institutions, and social, sexual, and 
reproductive relations as these structures are supported by medical and scien-
tific discourses about sexually differentiated hormones, biology, and gendered 
sexual natures (for examples, see Fausto-Sterling, 1992, 2000; C. Fine, 2010; 
Jordan-Young, 2011; Jordan-Young & Karkazis, 2019), and in subsequent chap-
ters, I analyze what some low-desiring women have to say about how these 
notions have made their way into their experiences of their own sexualities, 
desires, romantic and familial relationships, and current and past sex lives.
Whatever stance one takes on psychoanalysis, we arguably still feel the 
effects today of the later Freud’s writings on femininity, although the scientific 
paradigm for excavating sexual truths has clearly shifted away from psycho-
analysis to cognitive psychology, neuroscience, behavioral biology, and genet-
ics in the past few decades. More recent conceptions of the sexual nature of 
women, rooted in evolutionary psychology and neurocognitive paradigms, 
promulgate very similar themes to those first articulated within early psycho-
analytic configurations—including the notions that women are more sexually 
receptive or responsive than are men; more flexible and fluid; more driven 
toward monogamy and romantic intimacy or attachment (although this is 
currently being challenged in some scientific and popular discourse); more 
reserved or conservative when it comes to their in-the-moment sexual desire 
(which is described as being at odds with their longer-term and more defin-
ing desire to secure a high-quality male mate to father their children and to 
protect them); and, according to some researchers, more likely to be aroused 
by submissive or masochistic sexual acts and dynamics. The diametric cor-
relate of all of these characterizations of femininity is, of course, the pur-
ported activity, linearity, and spontaneity of male sexuality—that is, a high and 
free-flowing sex drive, naturalized as masculinity. What is perhaps most inter-
esting about what Freud introduces in his 1931 essay is thus the notion that 
masculinity and femininity literally consist of different biological substrates, 
or that they operate on different planes. It is this theme that would in some 
ways be challenged by Masters and Johnson and the behavioristic models of 
sex therapy beginning in the 1950s, but would ultimately never fully go away. 
And it is this theme that would eventually make a huge comeback with the 
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology of the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s, and, 
as I will show, that would ultimately be conscripted to do the dirty work of 
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compulsory heterosexuality in the guise of liberal feminism in the 1990s and 
early 2000s by a variety of evolutionary sexologists and clinicians who would, 
to varying degrees, take up the notion that male desire is biological or natu-
ral, whereas female desire is cultural or influenced by the infamous “nurture.”
Masters and Johnson: The Human Sexual Response Cycle 
and the Focus on Behavior
In the 1950s and 1960s in the US, research on sexuality began to take a dis-
tinctly experimental, cognitive-rational, and behavioristic turn, focusing on 
the physiology of the body and sexual response in clinical laboratory set-
tings.3 This type of scientific inquiry is exemplified in the work of William 
Masters and Virginia Johnson—who are now widely recognized as the found-
ers of modern-day sex therapy. Following the program of gathering data on 
human sexuality that Alfred Kinsey began in the ’50s, Masters and Johnson 
began their own study, which culminated in their first publication in 1966—
the now-classic Human Sexual Response. Whereas Kinsey conducted inter-
views with people regarding their sexual behaviors, thus assessing certain 
demographic trends (for instance, regarding fluidity in sexual orientation) in 
the US population, Masters and Johnson conducted research on real human 
subjects performing sexual acts in their St. Louis–based clinic. They under-
stood their research to be explicitly more scientific than psychoanalysis was, 
as their work was founded upon clinical observations of masturbation and 
sexual intercourse. Masters and Johnson believed that their work was thus 
more objective than the “theoretical” ponderings of the Freudian method, and 
that it was more neutral and non-ideological, as it equally assessed male and 
female sexual response in the controlled space of the laboratory.
The most enduring aspect of Masters and Johnson’s research program was 
the development of the four-stage human sexual response cycle (HSRC), con-
sisting of excitement, plateau, orgasm, and resolution. In addition to devel-
oping the gender-neutral HSRC (note the absence of desire as a part of this 
model), their research shed much light on many neglected aspects of sexual-
 3. It is worth noting that Freud and other psychoanalysts in the early twentieth cen-
tury also understood their methods to be experimental, scientific, objective, and medically 
sound in the hypothetico-deductive tradition—but since psychoanalysis began losing its clout 
and authority within the medical profession in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
endeavor has been popularly framed as outside of the realm of testable, empirical, scientific 
analysis. This has been the case in spite of scientific evidence suggesting that psychoanalytically 
informed therapeutic treatments are, in fact, highly effective (for an example, see Shedler, 2010).
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ity, including the extensive capacity for orgasm in women and the unique 
qualities of the human clitoris. Thus, Masters and Johnson ultimately did 
much to challenge the scientific ideas of their day about the sexually differ-
ent responses of men and women to sexual stimuli, including the notion of 
innate feminine receptivity and vaginal passivity. Even so, their research pro-
gram has since been roundly critiqued on the grounds of its lack of generaliz-
ability (it was conducted in an artificial laboratory setting on a mostly white, 
educated, middle- to upper-class, heterosexual sample; “homosexuals” were 
included only to formulate initial hypotheses and ultimately to make con-
jectures about deviant sexuality); its consequent heteronormativity (not only 
were members of the sample largely straight, the research agenda assumed 
that normal sexuality was reproductively oriented and thus focused primar-
ily on penile-vaginal intercourse); and due to the fact that the conclusions 
of the study rendered sexuality a mechanical, linear, and goal-oriented pro-
cess (it primarily focused on orgasm as the key to function, and its lack to 
dysfunction).4 On this last point, a more recent critique is also that Masters 
and Johnson’s research agenda was ultimately a means to pathologize purport-
edly abnormal or inadequate sexual response—this is clear in that their sec-
ond major text was titled Human Sexual Inadequacy and explored “deficient” 
sexual responses (i.e., those that deviated from the linear, orgasm orientation 
of the HSRC). Thus, Masters and Johnson’s research paved the way to an entire 
field of nonpsychoanalytic medicine devoted to treating the sexually dysfunc-
tional or incompetent—or those figured as such in light of so-called healthy, 
penetration-driven, orgasmic response.
Regardless of these legitimate critiques, in their time, Masters and Johnson 
undeniably heralded a revolutionary movement in sexology. These research-
ers made a few moves, all rooted in the premises of science and medicine, 
that are noteworthy and remarkable, in spite of their undeniably heteronor-
mative and, in some senses, conservative agenda. The ambivalence here is 
palpable. First and foremost, they argued that sex was a natural function of 
the human species and nothing to be ashamed of, neither for men nor for 
women.5 They studied the similarities in male and female sexuality, or “the 
parallels in reactive potential between the two sexes” (Masters & Johnson, 
 4. Leonore Tiefer lays out these critiques of the linearity and universality of the HSRC 
clearly in much of her own work, including Sex Is Not a Natural Act and Other Essays, published 
in 1995.
 5. This formulation of sex as “natural” would ultimately be critiqued by sexuality stud-
ies scholars, feminist theorists, queer theorists, and contemporary asexuality studies scholars. 
Although these critiques are warranted, and indeed, this book proceeds from this critique of 
“compulsory sexuality,” Masters and Johnson arguably helped to destigmatize sex during a cul-
tural moment in which it was, in fact, stigmatized—due, at least in part, to the conservativism 
of the 1950s in the US and in the aftermath of a cultural vilification of psychoanalysis (which 
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1966, p. 273) rather than assuming that women are less orgasmic, active, or 
interested in sex than men—a highly provocative move at the time. Masters 
and Johnson also called attention to the cultural neglect and simultaneous 
restriction of female sexuality, as discussed above, for instance by gathering 
scientific data on certain women’s multiorgasmic capacities—from both cli-
toral and vaginal stimulation—and they directly challenged the notion of a 
distinct difference between the clitoral and vaginal orgasm, and the notion 
that the (clitoral and vaginal) structures themselves are separate. They even 
wrote of a “double standard” applied to men’s and women’s “sexual value sys-
tems” in which men have consistently been encouraged to develop their own 
sexualities, as they are afforded the opportunity to explore their sexual urges 
and engage in sex without reprobation. Unfortunately, and somewhat para-
doxically, for all they did to challenge Freudian assumptions about “natu-
ral” feminine receptivity, shedding light on women’s agentic participation in 
sex, the fact that they conducted their research so disproportionately on cis 
men and cis women engaged in penile-vaginal penetrative intercourse and 
assumed that this configuration was the evolutionarily proper and natural way 
to have sex (not to mention that they assumed that the heterosexual popula-
tion they studied were the only people who were having “healthy” or “normal” 
sex) significantly compromised the revolutionary potential of Masters and 
Johnson’s project. Perhaps their ambivalence around sexuality, gender, and 
biological versus sociocultural influences on sexual response is best summed 
up in the following quote from Human Sexual Inadequacy (1970): “Sociocul-
tural influence more often than not places woman in a position in which she 
must adapt, sublimate, inhibit or even distort her natural capacity to function 
sexually in order to fulfill her genetically assigned role. Herein lies a major 
source of woman’s sexual dysfunction” (p. 218). Here, it is clear that Masters 
and Johnson acknowledged the toxic effects of cultural repression on wom-
en’s sexuality, but they simultaneously believed that women’s sexuality should 
be “liberated” primarily so that women can fulfill their naturally ordained 
reproductive duties—to procreate and mother. This theme of sexual libera-
tion as a means toward a heteronormative and gender-reductive end would 
occur again and again over the next several decades in sex therapy discourse, 
through to today. It can be seen in evolutionary sexology in the twenty-first 
century, including in research and treatment enacted under a white liberal 
feminist protocol.
In another notable and less fraught contribution, Masters and Johnson 
studied couples having sex in addition to individuals masturbating, and thus 
had come, perhaps unjustly, to be associated with a certain stigmatization and pathologization 
of sexuality).
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provided a stepping stone toward the inception of the robust field of sex ther-
apy that would develop over the next several decades and that would make 
sexual relationships (rather than individuals) the focus of treatment—includ-
ing, eventually, treatment for low desire. This focus on couples was important, 
as it represented a turn from the sexology that had been in vogue before the 
modern medical period, and also a movement away from the individualized 
focus of early psychoanalysis. Their treatment protocol ultimately lost some 
of its ubiquity closer to the turn of the twenty-first century, with the advent of 
psychopharmaceuticals, biopsychiatry, cognitive behavioral methods, mind-
fulness modalities, and gender-specific group therapies. As Kleinplatz (2018) 
and Kleinplatz, Rosen, Charest, and Spurgas (2020) have noted, the field of 
sex therapy has splintered over the course of the second half of the twentieth 
century into the twenty-first, which occurred alongside a rise in specialist 
sexual medicine, and which subsequently resulted in communication break-
downs among these different specialists. This communication breakdown has 
posed particular problems for the treatment of low desire, as the etiology of 
desire problems is characteristically difficult to identify—especially post–Mas-
ters and Johnson through to today, a time during which the “organic” versus 
“psychogenic” causes of sexual dysfunctions continue to be contested (i.e., 
some specialists focus on biological factors, whereas other sexual medicine 
practitioners and therapists emphasize subjective and psychogenic elements 
in a—still often highly medicalized—“biopsychosocial” model).
Alongside their focus on couples, Masters and Johnson also developed 
short-term behavioral treatments, including “systematic desensitization” and 
“sensate focus” techniques, which are still used with individuals and couples 
today. Desensitization, related to the concept of extinction, emerged from the 
behaviorist tendency developed within classical conditioning or a cognitive 
learning model of psychology—the notion that in order for a pathology to 
be remedied, the patient must be exposed to the aversive experience until it 
is no longer offensive, or rather until it is extinguished (in nonsexual behav-
iorist psychological arenas this may include overcoming a phobia by being 
exposed to a thing one is afraid of until the fear subsides—a form of behav-
ioral learning or training). As applied in sex therapy, it meant doing whatever 
the patient was either unable or unwilling to engage in sexually—until they 
were able to tolerate the act or change their response. For example, in regard 
to the treatment of vaginismus, the patient might be instructed to insert dila-
tors of increasing sizes into her vagina over and over again until she was able 
to relax her pelvic muscles enough to engage in intercourse (see Kleinplatz, 
2018 for a discussion of this “bridging” technique as it emerged from Masters 
and Johnson’s work and influenced the sex therapy of Helen Singer Kaplan). 
Once the patient was able to be penetrated successfully during heterosexual 
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intercourse, the treatment was considered successful. Desensitization-related 
techniques continue to be used in sex therapy today; dilators are still a popular 
method of treating genito-pelvic pain/penetration disorder (GPPPD) and vul-
vodynia, and contemporary mindfulness and cognitive behavioral techniques 
have much in common with this classical conditioning extinction-oriented 
frame. In recent years, classical and operant conditioning techniques have 
also been used to study potential methods of extinguishing “aversive” sexual 
behaviors and desires in male and female patients in laboratories, where sub-
jects are conditioned via positive and negative stimuli—including a sharp pain 
to the wrist as a negative stimulus (for an example, see Brom, Laan, Everaerd, 
Spinhoven, & Both, 2015).
Sensate focus, perhaps Masters and Johnson’s most important technical 
contribution to the field of sex therapy, was originally used with sexually dys-
functional couples to allow them to move past their own performance anxiety 
and focus on exploring one another’s bodies. For Masters and Johnson, the 
touching was oriented more toward the person doing the touching than the 
person being touched, at least in its initial stages. It was a way for a person 
with anxiety around sex to break their own anxiety cycle and stop focusing 
so much on their own performance—for instance, a person who is prone to 
“spectatoring,” or imagining how they look in the moment, watching them-
self as a third party, with a judgmental attitude, might be treated with sen-
sate focus to bring them “back into the moment.” Weiner and Avery-Clark 
(2014) have recently argued that sensate focus has been misinterpreted by sex 
therapists broadly and used in a way that is not true to Masters and Johnson’s 
original framework. This protocol, according to Weiner and Avery-Clark, is 
not about pleasing the partner and instead is about allowing oneself to focus 
on (voluntary) sensations, thus overcoming the (involuntary) dysfunctional 
response. It is more about being in tune with one’s own body and experience 
than with one’s partner’s body and experience (and it is not really about either 
partner’s sexual pleasure, per se). These sex therapists also made the case for 
the compatibility of sensate focus with depth psychology—as an attempt to 
think of sex therapy in a more long-term vein, much differently than the way 
it was originally used at the Masters and Johnson Institute, which was very 
much within a short-term and behavioristic framework.6
 6. Although they developed the now-standard short and intensive treatment protocol for 
sexual dysfunctions, a protocol that focused on the immediate causes of sexual problems (over 
deeper, “remote” psychological issues), Masters and Johnson also noted that the vast majority 
of sexual concerns (in both men and women) were psychogenic or psychosomatic in nature. 
This stands in stark contrast to the way that sexual dysfunctions came to be framed in the fol-
lowing decades, through to today.
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Although sensate focus was initially developed for use with couples (and 
before desire was included in the behaviorist models of sexual response), it 
was later taken up in programs targeted to individual women with low desire, 
as a way for these women to get “back in touch” with their own bodies, desires, 
and sensations—for instance, in the treatment protocol of Heiman, LoPiccolo, 
and LoPiccolo described in their 1976 book Becoming Orgasmic. A version 
of this technique is also used in the self-directed mindfulness protocols of 
the twenty-first century as well (see Brotto, 2018 for an example), in which 
women cultivate their desire by sensually focusing on their own aroused bod-
ies, autonomic sensations, or an external object, such as a raisin, in order to 
let distracting thoughts pass so they can be present, or “in the moment,” and 
thus available for sex. It is clear that in many ways the behaviorist technique 
of sensate focus is a precursor to mindfulness in sex therapy, as both empha-
size reducing distractions, and are thus in some sense part of the brief-but-
intensive treatment approach to sexual problems—and, importantly, both are 
also understood as alternatives to the long-term, narrative-based protocol of 
depth psychologies and psychoanalysis. But why is it that behaviorism and 
psychoanalysis have come to be framed as mutually exclusive when it comes 
to sex therapy, and to psychological interventions more broadly? In what type 
of sociopolitical environment do therapists prescribe methods to reduce dis-
tractions and be more in the moment, and why do people feel so distracted 
in their daily lives to begin with, including in their sex lives? Why are these 
methods so widely utilized, and why do they have such broad appeal? Which 
populations are most heavily targeted as in need of these treatments, and what 
assumptions are made about the individuals under these protocols today? In 
short, why are women so sexually distracted (or assumed to be)? Why are 
women (particularly white, middle- or upper-class, cis women) those who 
are most often prescribed treatments to help them get back “into the present 
moment?” Is this treatment modality and its theoretical orientation to desire 
spreading to other folks as well? Does the treatment come first, or the need 
for it? And finally, how are these treatments feminized (applied to folks who 
are not women or femmes but who are still treated in accordance with the 
feminized logic of ameliorating distractibility while simultaneously cultivating 
desire)? These are the questions I will seek to answer in the rest of this book. 
They are important to address, as sex therapy has a long history of functioning 
as a mechanism of social control—a project that continues in the present day, 
under a new biopolitical protocol, and under the sign of feminism.
Masters and Johnson’s desensitization and sensate focus work with couples 
was taken up in the subsequent research and sex therapy paradigm of Helen 
Singer Kaplan, who arguably did plenty of pathologizing of “deviant” sexuali-
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ties herself, but who also maintained a relational focus on the problems of 
couples rather than putting all of the blame for sexual problems on individu-
als and their purportedly autonomous issues—as is the case more often today. 
Kaplan was also unique for her consideration of both “remote” and “immedi-
ate” psychosomatic causes of sexual dysfunction and for her consideration of 
the intricacies of desire—which she paid attention to rather than maintaining 
the mechanical, cognitive, and behaviorist focus attributed to Masters and 
Johnson, or by focusing only on deep psychic pathologies, as Freud is remem-
bered for doing.
Helen Singer Kaplan: Behavioristic Sex Therapy and the 
(Re)Introduction of Desire
Whereas Freud’s formulation of female sexuality was specifically concerned 
with women’s desire as it was oriented toward or deviated from feminine 
passivity, and Masters and Johnson were primarily concerned with the rote 
physiology of sexual arousal and assumed a sexually differentiated reproduc-
tive drive that inspired it (even as their HSRC was gender-neutral), Austrian 
American behaviorist sex therapist Helen Singer Kaplan’s work on sexual 
disorders and her particular brand of sex therapy techniques in the 1970s 
brought desire—and its absence in both the sexual medicine of the day and 
in many of her sex therapy clients, especially women—back into the clini-
cal spotlight. Building on the work of Masters and Johnson, Kaplan aban-
doned the Freudian focus on “immature” (clitoral) versus “mature” (vaginal) 
female sexuality, and instead looked at the larger mechanics and determi-
nants of women’s arousal patterns. In her classic text, The New Sex Therapy 
(1974), Kaplan states that in formulating her therapeutic project, she strove to 
bring together knowledge from the diverse theoretical realms of traditional 
psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy, behaviorism and behavioral 
therapy, psychosomatic medicine, and group therapies. In the preface to the 
original 1974 volume, she asserts that “modern medical treatment owes its 
power to the adoption of a rational model of intervention” (p. 1; italics added). 
For Kaplan, this focus on rationality, inherited from Masters and Johnson, 
meant that effective therapeutic treatment of any sort must move beyond the 
“grand speculations” of Freud and empirical treatment based on “trial and 
error and untested or unsubstantiated hypothesis” (p. 1) to focus instead on 
specific behaviors and acts and whether or not they elicit desired responses. 
Thus, the “new sex therapy” would utilize the confirmed anatomical knowl-
edge of sexual arousal, response, and basic reproductive and genital anatomy 
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offered in the work of Masters and Johnson, combined with a goal-oriented, 
practical, and behavior or “sexual task”–oriented (hence her use of the term 
rational) approach to the treatment of dysfunction—including low desire and 
arousal, which she referred to, as she observed these primarily in her female 
patients, as “frigidity.” For Kaplan, the goal was a higher frequency of plea-
surable sexual experiences for any given sexually suffering couple. But what 
might be considered pleasurable? And on which partner’s terms was pleasure 
to be measured for the (cisgender, heterosexual, usually married) couples that 
Kaplan treated? These were questions left largely unanswered by Kaplan and 
her followers, in spite of their insistence on a shared responsibility of the cou-
ple—by both partners seeking therapy—to increase sexual pleasure through 
sensate focus and other exercises designed to reconfigure and enhance their 
portfolio of “sexual transactions.”
There was much about this trend in sex therapy that was, in fact, new—
and very exciting. Kaplan’s triphasic focus (developed in her 1979 book Dis-
orders of Sexual Desire) on dysfunctions of desire, excitement/arousal, and 
orgasm in both men and women paradoxically meant that, perhaps for the 
first time in the history of Western sex therapy, women were acknowledged as 
having the capacity for sexual desire to begin with. In the wake of Masters and 
Johnson’s conclusion that clitoral and vaginal orgasms were actually always 
both, that there was really only one kind of female orgasm that incorporated 
the stimulation of both clitoral and vaginal structures, it seemed that women’s 
sexuality was finally about to be taken seriously in the clinic (and hopefully, 
by extension, in the bedroom), that women’s sexual needs were finally going 
to be attended to—instead of being neglected in lieu of a focus on attention 
to male pleasure, as they had been up to that point within clinical and thera-
peutic spaces. In many ways, Kaplan’s model was evidence of a new look at 
sexuality as dynamic and relational, as involving multiple organizing factors in 
its constitution, expression, and aim, and of dysfunction or disorder as involv-
ing many etiologic factors as well. Despite examining the multicausal etiology 
of sexual problems, though, Kaplan’s theoretical orientation was fraught and 
ambivalent, and ultimately did not adequately challenge the notion of women’s 
sexuality as more responsive, receptive, and emotionally driven than men’s 
sexuality. In fact, she added new research to bolster and extend these notions, 
even as she reconfigured the importance of sexual desire in the linear process 
of arousal, adding it as the important first step to Masters and Johnson’s four-
stage human sexual response cycle, and even as she examined contextual fac-
tors that might influence women’s (and men’s) desire.
The notions of desire and sexual response were gender-differentiated in 
Kaplan’s theory; men’s desire was conceptualized as more attached to the phys-
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iological pursuit of sexual pleasure (which was conceived in biological terms 
as easier for men to achieve) and rooted in an evolutionary drive to procreate, 
whereas women’s desire continued to be understood as “more variable than 
the male’s, presumably because it is far more susceptible to psychological and 
cultural determinants” (Kaplan, 1974, p. 33). This notion of the complex nature 
of woman’s desire, which is more receptive to the vicissitudes of her environ-
ment, was in keeping with Masters and Johnson’s analysis, and would remain 
a running theme in sexology and sex therapy through to today. However, even 
more so than Masters and Johnson, Kaplan gives airtime to the cultural pres-
sures to which women are sexually subjected. She briefly elucidates some of 
these potentially influential psychological and cultural determinants in a sec-
tion on female sexual dysfunction, a move that could certainly be considered 
progressive at the time:
Multiple factors can impair the development of sexual autonomy in women. 
In the past we have looked only to psychoanalysis for our answers and have 
paid insufficient attention to the destructive effects of a culture which places 
women in a subservient and dependent role.  .  .  . [U]nconscious conflicts 
about sexuality, fear, shame, and guilt due to a restrictive upbringing, con-
flicts about the female role and about independence and dependency, about 
activity and passivity, fear of men, fear of losing control, fear of rejection and 
abandonment, a hostile and rivalrous marital relationship, and severe psy-
chopathology can all be instrumental in producing any or all of the female 
sexual dysfunctions. (p. 359)
It is clear from this passage that Kaplan has truly considered the social fac-
tors that might influence women’s sexuality, and sexuality in general. Unfor-
tunately, these musings do not influence her approach to sex therapy, an 
approach that (consistent with Masters and Johnson’s approach) tends to focus 
on the amelioration of what she calls “immediate” causes of sexual dysfunc-
tions over a deeper examination of the “remote” causes (“remote” causes here 
mean psychoanalytic causes, not social factors). Although Kaplan recognizes 
that social factors influence sexuality, she gives this little attention in her 544-
page tome, continuously juggling the descriptive “empirical” work of Masters 
and Johnson with the Oedipally focused “theoretical” psychoanalysis of Freud, 
but ultimately coming down on the side of a behavioristic and rationalistic 
approach to sex therapy. Again, psychoanalytically informed investigations of 
desire (and trauma) are relegated to the Oedipal. Kaplan sees utilizing psycho-
analytic and even psychodynamic frames as inherently requiring the explora-
tion of incestuous seduction wishes, infantile transference, penis envy, and 
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castration anxiety, and thus as being too time-consuming and cumbersome 
(in addition to being increasingly passé to a psychology that was increasingly 
seeking to redefine itself as “atheoretical” and “apolitical”). In a particularly 
revealing discussion of Freud, in which she praises him for his discovery of 
the “dark continent of The Unconscious” and subsequent revelation that most 
sexual conflict is beyond conscious awareness, Kaplan (1974) states: “In ret-
rospect, his greatest error was that he ignored all other potential sources of 
sexual conflict except early incestuous wishes of the child toward his parents” 
(p. 138). Statements such as these demonstrate how psychoanalysis came to 
be reduced to the Oedipus complex for post-Freudian psychologists and thus 
relegated to an antiquated past, while behaviorism and associated cognitive 
behavioral treatments were increasingly seen as the way of the future. This 
tendency continues to this day in twenty-first-century psychology, wherein 
sex therapy (insofar as it still exists as a field) and related treatment schemas 
for enhancing desire do not engage with narrative-based interpretations or 
protocols, and “immediate” causes of dysfunction and their quick and mea-
surable alleviation remain the focus.
Helen Singer Kaplan’s (1974) notion of “bypassing” may be the clearest 
example of how, even as she acknowledged cultural constraints on women’s 
sexuality, she ultimately centered brief, rationalistic, behavioral treatment for 
sexual problems in her new sex therapy model—with potentially deleterious 
effects for women’s sex lives. Regarding the importance of rapidly resolving 
“here and now” conflicts that impede sexual performance, she states: “Symp-
tom relief can be obtained by modifying the immediate products of conflict 
without necessarily eliminating the conflict itself. . . . [A]lthough we give rec-
ognition to the deeper source of conflict, sex therapy does not ordinarily deal 
with this deeper structure unless this proves to be specifically necessary .  .  . 
[and] in the majority of sexually dysfunctional patients, basic conflicts can be 
bypassed and defenses built up to allow the patient to function well sexually” 
(pp. 150–151). Kaplan explicitly makes the case that so-called remote causes of 
sexual dysfunction, including traumatic sexual violence, which could result 
in low desire or “frigidity,” are some of the main issues that sex therapists will 
need to be prepared to help their patients bypass. Bypassing trauma sounds 
a lot like using cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) or mindfulness to avoid 
distractions that prevent one from engaging in sexual activity;7 the therapeutic 
point here is that bypassing versus processing trauma are two very different 
ways of thinking about how to manage traumatic experiences that may have 
 7. I thank Peggy Kleinplatz for our discussions of the connection between bypassing and 
mindfulness in sex therapy.
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contributed to sexual problems. In this light, it seems obvious that bypass-
ing, CBT, and mindfulness could potentially have unintended negative effects, 
including in perpetuating cycles of coercion—particularly for women (who 
were and are more likely to be encouraged to use these techniques).
It might be argued that, as a clinical psychologist and sex therapist, 
Kaplan could not have been expected to integrate feminist and sociopoliti-
cal analyses into her treatment protocols. But I want to argue, along with 
Kleinplatz (2011, 2018), among others, that it is imperative that sex therapists 
consider the diverse etiologies of sexual troubles, including the ways these 
troubles can traumatically arise both from personal experience and relational 
history, as well as from structural and cultural influences—in addition to the 
unique ways in which sexual concerns may be manifested by women and 
gender-diverse individuals, and particularly folks of color in these groups, 
in light of their disproportionate experiences of trauma—when designing 
treatments. It is for precisely this reason that sociological, critical, and inter-
sectional feminist analyses of sexuality and gender must be integrated into 
clinical and therapeutic treatment programs. Clinicians must take responsi-
bility for the powerful assumptions they make—and expertly disseminate—
about the bases of sexual difference and behavioral sexual relations between 
men and women.
In The New Sex Therapy, even in light of what seems at times like a revo-
lutionary attention to sociocultural determinants of desire (or its lack), and 
an attention to both immediate and remote causes of dysfunction, Kaplan 
also actively naturalizes women as more emotionally complex, finding in the 
emerging field of neurology evidence for the feminine drive to love, and thus 
promulgating the notion that romance is a purported necessity for female 
pleasure. Although in 1974, Kaplan was not yet writing explicitly about sexu-
ally disparate desire patterns in women and men, she appears to assume this 
differentiation in her discussion of the emotionally charged sexual “flash-
backs” that some of her female patients report (and she makes it clear that 
she has only witnessed this phenomenon in women):
Sometimes the day after they [women] have engaged in a particularly arous-
ing sexual act with an especially loved and desired partner, they experience 
profoundly pleasurable “flashbacks.” These are triggered by memories of the 
erotic experience and are accompanied by intense erotic sensations and feel-
ings of euphoria and love. (p. 44)
In this passage, we see the early formulations of a neurological linking of sex 
and love, for women, specifically. This theme of the importance of romantic 
50 • CHAPTER 1
attachment and sentimentality for women will be reiterated throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century to the present day in medical and scientific 
research on sexuality, and will become a prerequisite—an assumed variable—
within later studies of female desire, which is generally configured as distinct 
from “pleasure-seeking” and “goal-oriented” male sexuality within clini-
cal experiments, quantitative survey research, qualitative social psychology 
research, and eventually in neuroimaging studies. Although Kaplan does not 
explicitly define desire disorders as part of the landscape of potential sexual 
pathology until 1977, her discussion of women’s sentimental sexual feelings, 
emotional erotic life, and romantic “flashbacks” lays the foundation for the 
first reinstantiation of the concept of desire—and its corresponding gendered 
pathos—in the post-Freudian psychiatric and therapeutic milieu of the day.
In articulating the importance of the relationship, partner, and other 
external factors on the health of the body itself, Kaplan demonstrates her 
belief that relational context, erotic environment, or what she calls the “sexual 
system” of the relationship, can affect biology—in a type of feedback loop of 
embodied imprinting or psychic learning. Like many other clinicians during 
this time (including Masters and Johnson, more than is often acknowledged 
in popular representations of their work), Kaplan was very attentive to the 
effects of psychosomatic problems on sexual response and experience, and 
also to how these produced “specific learned inhibitions” or “aversive condi-
tioning” (Kaplan, 1974, p. 63). Her elucidation of how chronic stress, depres-
sion, fear of failure and other performance anxiety issues, and even guilt and 
“threat of injury” can influence hormonal constitutions and the functioning 
of the hypothalamic- pituitary axis (HPA) comes just shy of acknowledg-
ing the physical effects of trauma on the brain and neurocircuitry—and of 
acknowledging the sociopolitical reasons these might affect men and women 
differently, beyond assumed a priori biological differences in sex drive. But 
ultimately, even in her brief discussion of “traumatic early sexual experi-
ence,” Kaplan evades a full engagement with the social, cultural, and politi-
cal traumas that influence women’s sexualities, bodies, and senses of desire, 
constituting them—in specific ways, to different degrees, and in some cases—
as distinct from men’s. She instead distinguishes between the trauma of an 
“immediate obstacle” to successful sex, such as premature ejaculatory tenden-
cies that result in subsequent performance anxiety (here, she focuses on men’s 
trauma), and the “gross trauma” of being the victim of incest, pederasty, or 
childhood rape. She states that the “destructive potential” of these gross trau-
mas is “obvious” (p. 176). Across her clinical writing, gender differences in 
exposure to these different types of traumas are left largely unexplored—or at 
least rarely considered in her theoretical formulations or technical protocol. 
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So, the feedback loops she takes into account only go so far (or deep), and 
Kaplan generally does not take an in-depth approach to trauma in her later 
conceptualization and treatment of “inhibited sexual desire” (ISD). Unfortu-
nately, the casual and cavalier nature of these comments about trauma would 
come to set the tone for the next several decades of research on and treatment 
of sexual dysfunction. In the following chapter, I demonstrate the import of 
this legacy on today’s sexual medicine, experimental research, and sex therapy, 
specifically in regard to a firmly behavioristic turn that can be observed in all 
of these realms.
It is clear that Kaplan is ambivalent regarding her orientation to thera-
peutic treatment, yet she ultimately clings to “atheoretical,” behavioristic, and 
purportedly gender-neutral scientific inquiry in the face of “politics” (another 
trend that will set the tone for sex therapy and sexual medicine for decades 
to come). But what may be most important to take from the work of Helen 
Singer Kaplan is that it very well may have represented one of the last times 
in the canon of mainstream sexual medicine that the intensely complicated 
nature of and feedback loops among psyche, body, sexuality, power, trauma, 
and culture were actively considered—particularly as this project pertained 
to really grappling with psychoanalysis. Not only this, but it may have also 
represented one of the last times the sexual relationship between two par-
ties, or the “sexual system” or “erotic environment,” was seriously taken into 
account when considering treatment rather than the sexually dysfunctional 
individual him- or herself alone.8 As the North American and European clinic 
and research laboratory moved away from psychosomatic medicine—the 
aftermath of Freudian psychoanalysis that is rarely conceived of as legitimate 
nowadays—they moved toward biologically deterministic explanations for 
gender-dimorphic patterns of desire, arousal, and sexual behaviors, motiva-
tions, and proclivities. This shift is particularly clear in light of the swift and 
tenacious move toward evolutionary, genetic, and neurobiological explana-
 8. There are a few noteworthy exceptions to this trend, but these remain the exceptions 
rather than the rule in mainstream sexual medicine. Here, I am thinking of the early work of 
the New View Campaign and their four-tiered conceptualization of women’s sexuality (Work-
ing Group for the New View of Women’s Sexual Problems, 2002), and Kleinplatz’s “Optimal 
Sexual Experience” sex therapy (for an overview, see Kleinplatz, et al., 2009; 2018), in addition 
to the psychoeducation and bibliotherapy of Lonnie Barbach, Betty Dodson, and Gina Ogden. 
Although these paradigms do explore gendered social relations and power, I argue that in 
some cases they reify and essentialize gender differences, and also ignore trauma as they jet-
tison psychoanalytic conceptions of desire. Kleinplatz is an exception to this trend with her 
focus on BDSM, and she also importantly points out that, excluding the trauma-informed sex 
therapy of Maltz and Holman (1987), most trauma-focused clinicians and theorists have tended 
to ignore sexuality, while sex therapists have too often ignored trauma and its impact on desire 
(Kleinplatz, 2018).
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tions for these phenomena—articulated in terms of individual disorders and 
dysfunctions—beginning in the late 1970s in almost all popular, mainstream, 
and, importantly, well-funded studies on these topics.
(Sexually Dimorphic) Desire in Evolutionary Sexology
In the years following the publication of Kaplan’s The New Sex Therapy in 1974 
and Disorders of Desire in 1979, many clinicians and sex therapists began to 
identify “low desire” as one of the most common complaints their patients 
presented with9—particularly their female patients. Desire began to be exam-
ined more closely in this post-psychoanalytic milieu as a key feature of healthy 
sexuality—although as I will show, beginning with Kaplan and in the decades 
since then, it was increasingly framed in more rationalistic and cognitive 
behaviorist terms, and eventually as “incentive” to engage in sex. People, espe-
cially women, might desire to desire; they may note that they had felt desire 
previously, perhaps for a specific partner, and now miss it, as this feeling has 
waned—and this was framed as something they deserved help for. Thus, the 
notion that having sex (and desiring to have sex) is part of a fulfilling and 
healthy life, that it is a “right,” became more commonplace—aided in large 
part by the sexual revolution of the 1960s in North America, which provided 
the backdrop for a newfound interest in sexual desire. The activism of second-
wave feminists, including those who designed sexual and reproductive health 
workshops in the 1970s, also helped foster the notion that women, just like 
men, might want to have sex, and that they should be able to do so. Concomi-
tant with all of this was the notion that not wanting to have sex potentially 
indicated some type of pathology—a trend that paved the way toward what 
scholars now critique as “compulsory sexuality” (Gupta, 2015). Accordingly, 
desire disorders began to be added to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders—the first diagnosis being inhibited sexual desire (ISD) 
in the DSM-III in 1980, renamed hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) 
when it was revised in 1987 (the criterion that the lack of desire must cause 
“interpersonal difficulty” was then added when the DSM-IV was published 
in 1994). Each of these diagnoses was gender-neutral; men and women could 
both be diagnosed, although since the inception of ISD, women have dispro-
portionately been candidates for diagnosis.
There has been much antimedicalization and social constructionist femi-
nist critique following the official recognition of these diagnoses through the 
 9. For one example, see the work of Harold Lief (1977).
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publication of the revised version of the DSM-IV. Antimedicalization feminists 
have also been vocally critical of the shift toward biological and individual-
focused explanations for sexual dysfunctions, with pharmaceutical treatment 
as the accompanying “state of the art.” Much of this type of critique in the last 
two decades, however, has interrogated medical profiteering by “Big Pharma” 
within “Viagra Culture” at the expense of other aspects of the medical and sci-
entific discourse—elements that I believe are just as important to examine. For 
instance, in the backdrop of this individualistic and pharmaceutically oriented 
shift in sexual medicine, we often see either an explicit lack of theorization for 
observed gender differences in desire within a cognitive behaviorist framing, 
on the one hand, or we see an explicit evolutionary psychology theorization, 
on the other hand—often thrown in at the end of published reports on gen-
der differences in sexual expression rather haphazardly, as if the notion that 
“our cavepeople ancestors” were rapists and “mate poachers” is completely 
self-evident. In some cases, this type of evolutionary theorizing guides the 
research, and in other cases, it seems to be included almost as an afterthought. 
And in some cases, when the gender differences are not explicitly theorized 
(as is the case in much experimental sex research that claims to be atheo-
retical and apolitical), other parties utilize an evolutionary paradigm to make 
sense of the findings, in light of this absence of theory. In the late twentieth 
century, into the first two decades of the twenty-first century, there are many 
examples of journalists, media writers, and pop psychologists “filling in the 
blanks” of these undertheorized studies—specifically with popular evolution-
ary psychology explanations. I will examine some of the most noteworthy of 
these contemporary studies on female sexual dysfunction—and their popular 
interpretations—in the next chapter. For now, I look at the impact of popular 
evolutionary psychology motifs on sexology, sex therapy, and sexual medicine 
more broadly over the last few decades.
In the early 1990s, right around the time the DSM-IV was released, many 
psychologists fully diverged from a psychodynamic framework for sexuality 
and began to take up a view of human behavior rooted in a model claimed 
as more “evolutionary” and in line with the theory of sexual selection asso-
ciated with Charles Darwin. This new metatheoretical framework came to 
be known as evolutionary psychology (EP) and was not only based on neo-
Darwinian models of evolution10 but also embraced many of the tenets of 
Edward O. Wilson’s sociobiology (1975)—including his analogizing of human 
 10. The EP version of evolutionary theory I describe here has been critiqued as only loosely 
related to Darwin’s actual thought, and some critics, including biologist Stephen Jay Gould and 
geneticist Richard Lewontin, have further argued that evolutionary psychologists drastically 
misinterpret modern macroevolutionary theory.
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social relations with nonhuman animal behavior. Although EP took off in 
full force in the 1990s, many of its core features can be traced back to the 
1960s and 1970s: its ideas about human behavioral patterns and psychologi-
cal makeup, with their foundation in natural and sexual selection; the notion 
that these are based on ancient, evolved adaptations that fostered our fittest 
human ancestors’ survival and reproduction in prehistoric environments; and 
the theme of similarity between many nonhuman animal species and human 
societies (especially regarding sexual relations). Early evolutionary psycholo-
gists explored themes such as kinship and familial ties (Hamilton, 1964), self-
ishness and altruism (Dawkins, 1976), and sexual difference (Symons, 1979; 
Trivers, 1972) and linked these to an evolutionary drive to genetic perpetu-
ity and reproductive success. Today, these ideas still hold much sway among 
experimental and clinical psychologists who do sex research, even those who 
do not explicitly identify as evolutionary psychologists.
As sex therapy in its dyad-focused and relational Masters-Johnson-Kaplan 
formation became less commonly practiced in the 1980s and 1990s, and was 
increasingly replaced by individualized treatments for sexual dysfunction 
from the realms of polypharmacy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and, eventu-
ally, mindfulness, this popular evolutionary orientation began to impact pro-
tocols for managing sexual problems. Notably, the threads of an evolutionary 
theory of desire—a term which would eventually be replaced with notions 
of sexual “incentives,” “motivations,” and “information [to be processed],” 
particularly in the case of women—can be seen in the writings of Masters 
and Johnson, Helen Singer Kaplan, Harold Lief, and many other researchers 
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. But it wasn’t until well-known psycholo-
gists such as David Buss and Cindy Meston, researchers at the University of 
Texas at Austin, took up the question of gender differences in sexual behavior 
in their popular mainstream research agenda that the impact of evolution-
ary psychology on formulations of healthy and dysfunctional sexuality (and 
the hetero- and cisnormative assumptions about gender differences therein) 
would become clear. Take this discussion of “sperm competition” and its 
impact on sexual decision-making from Meston and Buss’s 2007 article, “Why 
Humans Have Sex”: 
From this [“sperm competition”] perspective, a man whose partner might 
have been sexually unfaithful might seek sex, which functions to displace 
the sperm of the rival male. Or a woman might deplete the sperm of her 
partner, leaving few available for insemination of rival women. None of these 
hypothesized functions, of course, need operate through conscious psychologi-
cal mechanisms. (p. 478; italics added) 
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There is much to question about this theorization regarding (purportedly 
universal) reasons people have sex, but what I think is particularly interest-
ing is the last sentence, where the authors posit the existence of a type of 
evolutionary drive that is said to dictate not only sexual behavior but desire 
itself. The libidinal unconscious of psychoanalysis has been replaced here by 
an evolutionary unconscious. Ironically, the caveperson unconscious that is 
theorized here, and that will become the go-to explanation for sexual behavior 
in mainstream twenty-first-century experimental sexology, is much less open 
to being affected by the environment (or family, or socialization, or trauma) 
than the unconscious of psychoanalysis. It is also more difficult to critique, 
particularly without recourse to the strawman of social constructionism, as 
it is proclaimed to be presocial or even asocial. It seems ironic that 1970s sex 
therapists like Helen Singer Kaplan were reticent to talk about desire in psy-
choanalytic terms and to consider the role of the unconscious, as they believed 
the Freudian conceptions of these were too rigid (i.e., too wedded to a fixed 
Oedipal vision of psychosexual development), but that now, today’s most 
renowned sexological researchers regularly explain complex human behaviors 
and desires via an indestructible and uncritiqueable evolutionary motif. Also 
of note is that this evolutionary unconscious described by Meston and Buss, 
in all of its paradoxical presociality (paradoxical in that it does, in fact, rely on 
a reified and ossified vision of a past social world), is also pre-race, pre-class, 
pre-oppression, and pre-power. The most purportedly “natural” thing in the 
world then turns out to also be one of the whitest, most cis- and heteronorma-
tive, and most bourgeois.
This gendered evolutionary unconscious described by Meston and Buss 
in 2007—to be fleshed out further in 2009 with the release of their popu-
lar psychology book Why Women Have Sex—relied on much older tropes. 
Although sociobiological explanations for human behavior and a “gene’s-
eye view” of evolution (Hamilton, 1964) began to be popularized as early as 
the mid-twentieth century, it wasn’t until the 1990s that EP was linked with 
cognitive neuroscience via behavioral biology and ethology. In 1994, Leda 
Cosmides and John Tooby, citing Richard Dawkins (1976), wrote, “Natural 
selection—an invisible-hand process—is the only component of the evolution-
ary process that produces complex functional machinery in organisms.  .  .  . 
[N]atural selection built the decision-making machinery in human minds” 
(p. 328; italics added). This “invisible [evolutionary] hand,” neutrally guid-
ing human psychology and behavior, also purportedly guides human sexual 
relationships, mating strategies (in addition to “extra-pair” sexual strategies), 
and the expression or inhibition of dimorphic masculine and feminine sexual 
desires—all of which are core foci of many evolutionary psychologists and 
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the clinicians, researchers, and sex therapists who are guided by these same 
tenets.
Why is this extension of evolutionary psychology into sexological research 
so important to consider? For one thing, this discourse is incredibly perva-
sive in the popular sphere. Not only did Meston and Buss’s 2009 book Why 
Women Have Sex receive much attention, but, because it was written by repu-
table psychologists at a research university, ideas like those summed up in the 
book came to be easily interpreted in the mainstream as the simple truth of 
sexuality, and, importantly, of gender differences therein. In their 2007 pre-
cursor article, the researchers claim: “The current research [their own study] 
provided the most comprehensive examination to date of gender differences 
in expressed reasons for engaging in sexual intercourse” (p. 499). One of the 
gender differences they describe through evolutionary psychology discourse is 
the tendency for men to be more invested in their mate’s physical appearance 
and aroused by visual cues, “since physical appearance provides a wealth of 
cues to a woman’s fertility and reproductive capacity” (p. 499). Accordingly, 
Meston and Buss cite fMRI studies (conducted by Emory primate researcher 
Kim Wallen and colleagues) that have provided “neurophysiological [eviden-
tiary] support” for this gender difference in arousal by visual cues via reports 
of a “greater activation of the amygdala and hypothalamus to visual sexual 
stimuli in men than in women” (p. 500).
So, another reason why this evolutionary psychology extension into sexo-
logical research is important is that evolutionary explanations regarding gen-
der differences in sexual behavior are presented as universal and ubiquitous, 
particularly when they are supported with neuroimaging and other contem-
porary medico-scientific technologies (and this is often the case even when 
subsequent studies do not substantiate the original claims). Meston and Buss 
(2007) go so far as to say that the reasons they elucidate for why people have 
sex, including “adventure,” “celebration,” and “opportunity,” “may reflect a fun-
damental universal core of human sexual motivation” (they do acknowledge 
that this would “require cross-cultural research to test”) (p. 498). This asser-
tion, even with their cross-cultural research caveat, is troubling, particularly 
as their sample consists of psychology students at the University of Texas who 
received course credit for completing the researchers’ survey, the majority of 
whom were white, and more than a third of whom identified as “fundamen-
talists” in regard to their religious affiliation. The mean age of the sample was 
nineteen years old, and it was almost two-thirds female. Apparently, ques-
tions about sexual orientation and sexual identity were not asked at all, and 
there is no data on whether or not alternative gender or sex categories beyond 
“male” and “female” were provided as choices on the survey. How much can 
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we really glean about the “fundamental universal core of human sexual moti-
vation” from this sample?11 The answer to that question apparently doesn’t 
matter much to researchers following Meston and Buss, as the 2007 study is 
heavily cited in experimental and clinical research to this day.
The myriad problems with evolutionary psychology have been enumer-
ated by other writers at length (for seminal examples, see Gould, 2002; Lewon-
tin, 1991; McKinnon, 2006; S. Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin, 1984), including on 
account of its lack of generalizability, reliability, and validity, and some scien-
tists have critiqued EP specifically on the basis of its heteronormative ideo-
logical assumptions and flawed logic regarding human sexual relations (for 
examples, see Fausto-Sterling, 1997; C. Fine, 2010; Gannon, 2002; Gowaty, 
2000; Liesen, 2007; Travis, 2003). One of the biggest preoccupations of EP 
researchers and clinicians from the outset has been sex and gender role dif-
ferentiation via sexual selection and how this is indicated by early hominid 
behavioral adaptations or evolved mating strategies, which are posited as neu-
rological or “hardwired” (for an example, see Buss, 1994). In this book, an 
analysis of these themes from EP is crucial for two reasons: (1) These ideas 
about sexual difference are deployed as theoretical backing within some of the 
most prolific experimental research on gender differences in sexual behavior 
and desire, and that research subsequently informs the way sexual dysfunc-
tions are configured and treated. And (2) many of the women I interviewed 
described how they feel their own desires and experiences have been affected 
by exposure to these ideas about femininity and gender differences in sexu-
ality. Not only have women’s sexualities been influenced via this exposure, 
but some participants describe how they believe their (in many cases male) 
partners’ attitudes toward sex have also been influenced by these ideas, which 
has affected the types of sexual experiences the participants are most likely to 
have with these men. Although my sample was small and thus not generaliz-
able, my qualitative study indicates potential themes that might be salient to 
other women, and that should be explored in future research. Rather than 
these evolutionary psychology theories simply explaining universal facts, my 
data suggest a different potential pathway: that, in some cases, it’s the other 
way around—the circulation of these expert ideas, as pervasive forms of social 
discourse, affects how women have sex.
There are many examples from contemporary sexological research and 
related areas that demonstrate the impact of evolutionary psychology. Some 
of the most well-known of these include Roy Baumeister (2000, 2004), who 
hypothesizes that women are biologically more erotically flexible and “plastic” 
 11. For a well-known critique in this vein, see Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010).
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than are men; Stuart Brody, who continues to posit that women who expe-
rience orgasms from penile- vaginal intercourse are healthier, more psycho-
logically stable, and more sexually functional than women who experience 
orgasms only from clitoral stimulation (for a recent example, see Brody & 
Costa, 2017); and Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, who made the case 
in their 2000 book A Natural History of Rape: The Biological Bases of Sexual 
Coercion that rape is not only natural and inevitable due to an unalterable 
biological power imbalance between men and women, but that women in 
fact evolutionarily select for rape behaviors—because these behaviors provide 
evidence of a potential mate’s “strength, endurance, and vigor” (p. 83). These 
researchers publish in scientific journals and their books are either academic 
or have wide crossover appeal; additionally, many popular writers, from the 
early 1990s (e.g., Matt Ridley with The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of 
Human Nature [1993]) through to the second decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury (e.g., Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam with A Billion Wicked Thoughts: What 
the Internet Tells Us about Sexual Relationships [2011]) have continued to 
make the case for sex differences in behavior rooted in evolutionary psychol-
ogy. These include the notion of hardwired gender differences in stimulation 
from pornography or other visual cues, to one of the most popular themes, 
which is the notion that women’s sexuality is less “category-specific,” “tar-
get-specific,” or “object-oriented” than is male sexuality. Women have been 
configured via evolutionary psychology discourse here as more erotically 
plastic, flexible, and malleable, and more likely to be physiologically aroused 
by objects and situations that do not align with their stated sexual prefer-
ences (they are said to be more likely than men to exhibit subjective/genital 
“discordance,” a concept that will be explored further in the next chapter). 
In other words, women are less likely to have a distinct sexual orientation 
than are men. The prominence of these scientists, in conjunction with their 
popular counterparts, suggests how far evolutionary psychology explanations 
can travel, and how much they have affected debates about healthy versus 
dysfunctional sexual desire and behavior—particularly in terms of gender 
differences—in the last few decades.
Perhaps the irony of the neo-evolutionary psychology turn in sexology is 
the ways that it hearkens back to the most misogynistic ideas about feminin-
ity and human development from psychoanalysis—even as it claims complete 
neutrality, objectivity, and rationality. In a series of scientific peer-reviewed 
journal articles published in the earliest years of the twenty-first century, psy-
chologist Roy Baumeister set the tone and the course, in behaviorist and vul-
gar evolutionary terms, for the now widely accepted notion of the essential 
“responsiveness” and “receptivity” of female desire. In a particularly well-cited 
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article (to this day) published in Psychological Bulletin in 2000, Baumeister 
made his case for female “erotic plasticity”:
Female sexuality, as compared with male, is more subject to the influence 
of cultural, social factors . . . [and] male desire is depicted here as relatively 
constant and unchanging, which suggests a powerful role for relatively rigid, 
innate determinants. Female sexuality, in contrast, is depicted as fairly mal-
leable and mutable: it is responsive to culture, learning, and social circum-
stances. The plasticity of the female sex drive offers greater capacity to adapt 
to changing external circumstances as well as an opportunity for culture to 
exert a controlling influence. (p. 347)
One of the most interesting—and alarming—aspects of the “female erotic 
plasticity hypothesis” is that Baumeister seems to have thought he was some-
how untangling the “nature/nurture debate” about sexuality in making his 
argument. This is clear as he goes on: “The present article offers yet another 
conceptualization of the relative contributions of nature and culture to human 
sexual desire [as distinct from both the ‘social constructionist’ and ‘essentialist’ 
conceptualizations]. The point of departure is that there is no single correct 
answer that holds true for all human beings” (p. 347). But clearly Baumeister 
proceeds from an essentializing, biologically reductive, evolutionary psychol-
ogy–informed standpoint in making this very claim that women are more 
open to the influences of “nurture” and “culture” than are men—a reductive, 
universalizing biology is the very framework through which the dispropor-
tionate effect of “nurture” or “culture” on women’s sexuality is understood to 
operate! Baumeister has been critiqued in this vein (see Hyde & Durik, 2000 
for an example), but his argument has carried on in many guises, and it set 
the stage for the contemporary notion that men’s and women’s sexualities lit-
erally exist on different planes, or as different substrates—again hearkening 
back to the worst of Freud. Or, maybe it makes more sense to say that men are 
the only ones who can actually be sexual, per se, according to this paradigm; 
women have something completely different going on, and it clearly cannot 
be defined as sexual, proper. 
Baumeister’s argument for innate female erotic plasticity is hypothesized 
to be the result of a few potential factors, including the fact that men are 
stronger and more aggressive and have held power over women over “the 
course of evolutionary history”; that women play the “gatekeeper role” in sex 
(it is inherent to the “female role” that women are the ones who decide when 
sex will happen, meaning sex occurs “in nature” when females “change their 
vote from no to yes”); and that the female sex drive is simply biologically 
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weaker than the male sex drive. All of these explanations are posed by Bau-
meister in evolutionary terms, and he produces a lengthy, undertheorized lit-
erature review to support these claims. In a follow-up article published in 
2004 in the journal Sexual and Relationship Therapy, he states that he has 
become convinced of the final explanation—that the female sex drive is simply 
“milder” than the male drive, resulting in more flexibility for women, and also 
providing an array of adaptive mechanisms that will ultimately benefit society. 
For instance, if women are more erotically plastic, then they will be more will-
ing to change their behaviors to fit with whatever the circumstances require—
women thus carry the burden of controlling whether there is more or less 
reproduction of the human species, they maintain the sex ratio if it becomes 
unequal, and they protect the population from health risks such as the AIDS 
epidemic (women are likely to become “less promiscuous” in such a situation). 
According to this line of reasoning, women were biologically designed to play 
this malleable role, and are the ultimate protectors of the human race. Quite 
a burden, indeed.
One more theme from this research is worth mentioning, as it comes to 
be a common trope across both the scientific and popular literature: feminine 
“inconsistency.” Baumeister focused on how women are more likely to exhibit 
“attitude-behavior inconsistency” (sexually, they do not always do what they 
say they want to do, whereas men’s sexual attitudes [or desires] and behaviors 
are more likely to align). Baumeister (2000) states: “One reason for female 
erotic plasticity is that women’s role requires them to participate in sex even 
when they do not particularly wish to do so. Having sex without desire is one 
form of inconsistency” (p. 360). This theme of feminine inconsistency between 
attitudes and behaviors will be extended in the years after Baumeister’s ini-
tial publication of his female erotic plasticity hypothesis, into new hypoth-
eses regarding feminine inconsistency between the subjective experience of 
sexual desire and physiological genital arousal—the notion of “discordance,” 
which becomes an important explanation for either healthy female sexuality 
or female sexual dysfunction. However, this function/dysfunction distinction 
really depends on what year it is—both explanations have been posited in the 
literature, at different times. The broader point is that discordance is under-
stood to occur more frequently in women, across studies. Contemporary sex-
ologists love to talk about this phenomenon and it is often (under)theorized 
in evolutionary terms.
Although Baumeister was a particularly vocal example, many other psy-
chologists at the turn of the twenty-first century began to make similar argu-
ments, some of which have been framed as “feminist” in the last two decades. 
SExUAL DIFFERENCE AND FEMININITY IN SEx THERAPY AND SEx RESEARCH • 61
Ideas about female receptivity and responsiveness, for instance, came back 
full circle in the 1990s and early 2000s, and eventually combined the neu-
tral rationality of cognitive behaviorism with a liberal feminist, “sex-posi-
tive” approach. I focus primarily on Baumeister’s work here because while 
he is not a sex therapist, his hypothesis about female complexity/malleability 
brought together many different strands of thinking on gender differences in 
sexual desire, right at a time when lines of thought that would inform the next 
incarnation of the DSM were percolating among sex therapists, clinicians, and 
experimental sex researchers. His combination of a neo-evolutionary psychol-
ogy gendered framework in the guise of objective neutrality, a lack of any 
structural theorizing of desire differences or discussion of trauma, along with 
a cognitive behaviorist focus in terms of treatment for dysfunction, was arche-
typal of the turn sexology and sex therapy were taking at the time. Impor-
tantly, he portends the fallout of this new turn at the end of his widely cited 
paper (2000): “There are clear and important implications for clinical practice. 
The greater plasticity of female sexuality suggests that sex therapists should be 
more effective at treating women than men. In particular, cognitive-behavioral 
treatments and other social interventions should be much more effective with 
female than male clients. The relative inflexibility of males suggests that sex-
ual problems may require more physiologically and biochemically-oriented 
interventions” (p. 370). Remarkably, this comment is situated amidst a dis-
cussion of women’s lower (than men’s) achievability of sexual self-knowledge, 
their restricted capacity for and more tortuous experience of sexual decision-
making, and their greater ability for sexual compromise—“women are better 
able to adjust their preferences and expectations to what is actually available 
to them, and so a compromise gradually ceases to seem like a compromise” 
(p. 370). Baumeister can’t bring himself to really theorize the effects of social 
structure—including cisheteropatriarchy—on sexuality, so he leaves his read-
ers with evolutionary explanations for all of these themes, which continue to 
haunt sexual medicine today.
Men and women are pitted against each other in popular sexual science 
narratives, from the psychoanalysis of the nineteenth century to the evolu-
tionary sexology and behaviorism of the twenty-first, and now, this conflict 
is naturalized—and neurologized—as inevitable. The naturalness of gendered 
conflict is a central theme in popular evolutionary psychology-informed 
literature on sexuality—in which, again, women’s drives are framed as not-
exactly-sexual. This theme has been taken up in a variety of popular outlets, 
and has also been written about by nonscientists, with much import. It could 
even be argued, as Cordelia Fine (2013) has, that the popularization of these 
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scientific studies perpetuates fallacious “scientific jargon-speak for ‘men are 
from Mars, women are from Venus.’”12 And importantly, these themes about 
sexual difference have been popularized amongst the general populace due to 
the “cross-pollination” of scientific and popular discourses (Angel, 2012, p. 3). 
In the remainder of this book, I analyze how these discourses affect women’s 
lived sexual experiences and shape their sexual biographies, and it is clear that 
many women who do not have access to peer-reviewed scientific journals (nor 
the training required to analyze them) do have access to best-selling books, 
blogs and websites, online and print news outlets, and popular magazines.
The antagonistic or violent complementarity espoused via evolutionary psy-
chology and its popularized versions is also incorporated in other domains, 
including in the work of clinicians and researchers involved in designing 
the recently released DSM-5—even though this is perhaps not always inten-
tional. The cross-pollination has a far reach. Sexual dysfunction diagnoses 
have very real and profound consequences on women’s sexual and psychologi-
cal health—even those who are not clinically diagnosed. In order to ground 
the themes that emerged in the interviews with my low-desiring participants, 
I now turn to the immediate context of changes within sexual medicine, 
sex therapy, and experimental research on sexual arousal—all changes that 
occurred from the 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
and that set the stage for the introduction of the newest sexual dysfunction 
diagnosis in the DSM-5, released in 2013. This new diagnosis, female sexual 
interest/arousal disorder, or FSIAD, can by definition be diagnosed only in 
women. In the following chapter, I unpack the significance and implications 
of this new gendered diagnostic schema, and show how it is not as “feminist” 
as it is purported to be (or rather that its feminism is limited by its liberalism).
 12. In this 2013 essay, Fine hearkens back to the 1992 multiweek best seller about men’s 
and women’s innately different communication and relationship styles—Men Are from Mars, 
Women Are from Venus: A Practical Guide for Improving Communication & Getting What You 
Want in Your Relationships—through which pop psychologist and relationship counselor John 
Gray rose to fame.
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C H A P T E R  2
Interest, Arousal, and Motivation in 
Contemporary Sexology
The Feminization of Responsive Desire
“For men to be clueless about women is, of course, routine. But what the scien-
tists and sex therapists seemed to be suggesting is that a lot of women are also 
confused,” wrote Richard Conniff in Men’s Health magazine, a few years before 
the DSM-5 was released, along with its women-specific diagnosis, female sex-
ual interest/arousal disorder (FSIAD). I include this quote here because it’s a 
good example of how the scientific research that provided the basis for the 
change in diagnostic criteria has been popularly interpreted. With the institu-
tion of FSIAD and its supporting discourses, including their popular interpre-
tations, sexual “responsiveness” was brought forward as a metric for healthy 
sexuality in women. Claims regarding feminine receptivity over the last two 
decades have been based, in part, on the findings of experimental research in 
which subjective accounts of sexual arousal are compared with objective mea-
surements of genital response to sexual stimuli. These laboratory investiga-
tions have consistently reported that both sexually healthy and dysfunctional 
women—particularly those who are attracted to men—exhibit a disconnect 
or “discordance” between their subjective and objective sexual states, unlike 
healthy men, who experience more “concordance.” Some researchers (e.g., 
Bailey, 2009) have gone so far as to state that androphilic women (women 
who are attracted to men) do not have a sexual orientation—they are physi-
ologically aroused by stimuli that do not accord with their stated sexual pref-
erences or identities. Two decades into the twenty-first century, these ideas 
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about innate feminine erotic plasticity, flexibility, responsiveness, receptivity, 
complexity, and sometimes confusion, continue to proliferate.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine how racialized, gendered, het-
eronormative, and cisnormative prescriptions for healthy sex and sexuality 
have continued to guide research paradigms, diagnostic schemas, and treat-
ment protocols in the twenty-first century—even as the researchers who con-
duct these studies have sought to distance themselves from their less-feminist 
and less-progressive psychologist forebears. Regardless of the intentions of 
researchers, the wide popular circulation of these tropes means that some 
individuals come to experience themselves as sexually “discordant” or, alter-
natively, “in sync,” and thus live out a medico-scientific production of sex-
ual difference. My research suggests that these discourses of white feminine 
receptivity and responsiveness may even be incorporated into racially diverse 
women’s sexual self-images and practices—an example of how individuals 
internalize and live scientific schemas. This stands in contrast to the notion 
that science simply uncovers the categories as they already exist. Frameworks 
for mind/body relations continue to rely on antiquated and reductive typolo-
gies in the twenty-first century (including when queer and trans folks are 
the objects of study), and there is still much work to be done to move con-
temporary sexology away from reifying ideas about “men” and “women,” 
“heterosexuals” and “homosexuals,” and even “androphiles” and “gynephiles” 
that I discussed in chapter 1. Further, contemporary sex therapy regimens are 
primarily directed toward cis women, who continue to be framed as having 
less desire (in terms of frequency, intensity, and spontaneity) than cis men.1 
In regard to sexual pathology, whereas men have been perceived as dispro-
portionately likely to suffer from physical ailments such as erectile disor-
der, women are still often posited as more likely to suffer from psychological 
blocks to sexual enjoyment—or, in contemporary behaviorist parlance, from 
“lack of motivation.” These perceived differences result in distinct framings 
and treatments of sexual dysfunction for men and women, with gendered 
consequences for sexual health, attitudes, and relationships—among both 
“dysfunctional” and “healthy” populations. And such perceptions also inform 
how we all—as individuals who can never fully escape binary (in addition 
to medicalized, naturalized, and racialized) definitions of gender—come to 
 1. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will not specify that participants in the psycho-
logical research I analyze are cisgender, as it is almost entirely taken for granted and assumed 
by the researchers that participants are cis, and that is what the research is, in fact, predicated 
on. Further, I argue that, in the contemporary psychological imaginary, the presumed subjects 
of both theory and treatment are cisgender.
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understand our own sexual motivations and behaviors within the logic of the 
feminized responsive desire framework.
One thing I would like to make clear, however, is this: “Responsive desire” 
itself is not the problem. All who identify as sexual, or who experience sexual-
ity along a spectrum of intensity, may experience different levels of “respon-
sive” versus “spontaneous” desire at different times throughout our lives and 
in different relationships (and alone).2 What I am concerned with is the sleight 
of hand in which responsive desire has been framed as feminine, while that 
gendering is simultaneously denied by today’s leading scientists, researchers, 
and clinicians. Perhaps even more importantly, I am concerned with how 
responsive desire is framed as uniquely feminine in pop psych and media 
accounts, with dire consequences when men assume women need to be sexu-
ally triggered or primed (and when women assume this about themselves). 
Another issue that I will interrogate in this chapter is how the deployment of 
responsive desire as feminine has been framed as feminist.
Many women do report having low desire, and want treatment for this, 
and many women also report a pattern of responsive desire. But we must ask 
who the women are that report this, and why they experience it. And we must 
also consider who will be most affected and how when these notions are legiti-
mized as the new “female-friendly” model of sexuality (i.e., an intimacy-based 
model that is understood broadly as more accurate for women): Models, of 
course, imply truth. The new wave of feminist-identified sex researchers, cli-
nicians, and therapists undoubtedly have good intentions, and have strived 
to offer a new model of sexuality to contrast with the linear human sex-
ual response cycle (HSRC) of Masters and Johnson. However, in an effort 
to depathologize women’s “low” desire (i.e., “low” in terms of Masters and 
Johnson’s much-critiqued goal-driven model, a carry-over of a caricature of 
Freudian “sex drive”), these well-intentioned researchers have inadvertently 
reproduced and reinscribed the notion that women’s sexuality is more essen-
tially complex, labile, and responsive or receptive than is men’s sexuality. In 
the process, some antimedicalization psychologist-activists have also diluted 
their earlier critiques of the older male-oriented sexology by ignoring the role 
of trauma in configuring women’s experiences of sex (including some women’s 
desire for not-so-feminine things), and by instead taking up a “depathologiz-
ing” stance that seems to offer the relatively un-nuanced: “Women have lower 
 2. To this end, I agree with many aspects of the incentive motivation model (IMM) of 
sexual response as it has been outlined by, for example, Toates (2014)—to be explored below. 
However, current conceptions of responsive versus spontaneous desire, or of “state” versus 
“trait” desire, which reduce sexuality to “interests,” “motivations,” and “incentives,” sorely lack 
a psychodynamic conception of both power and trauma as constitutive aspects of desire.
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[spontaneous] sexual desire than men, and that’s okay, it’s actually normal, just 
leave women alone and stop trying to shove pills down their throats!” Instead 
of thinking through why some non-asexual women who have low desire are 
so uninterested in sex that they only do it “for the intimacy,” a multitude of 
researchers and therapists of different stripes have come together under the 
umbrella of admonishing the strawman of “Big Pharma.” This admonishment 
tends to be framed in the language of “anti-pharmaceuticalization,” with the 
main critique being of the corporate marketing of a drug for female sexual 
dysfunction—the common rallying cry is “Down with Addyi!” By contrast, I 
argue that in order to have an intersectional, trans-inclusive, and truly pro-
gressive feminist response to the production and treatment of women’s sexual-
ity within medicine and science, we need to dig deeper. There is more to the 
story than simply condemning the evils of the Little Pink Pill—when female 
sexuality is produced as more fluid, flexible, and complex, that also leaves it 
open to new forms of management and training. And not all of these new 
forms of discipline are pharmaceutical. How this situation came to be and its 
consequences are what I will explore in the following pages.
Seeking Rewards and Intimacy: The New “Female-
Friendly” Sexual Response Models
Since the late 1970s, a variety of changes have occurred in the research and 
treatment of desire disorders, particularly as they pertain to women, who 
make up the majority of current diagnosees. After an international consen-
sus conference was convened to analyze female sexual dysfunction in 1998, a 
group of conference participants called for more attention to women’s sexual 
issues by clinicians and researchers, particularly in light of the glut of atten-
tion given to male sexual problems such as erectile disorder (ED).3 The spe-
cialists who were involved in the consensus conference—many of whom went 
on to form the International Society for the Study of Women’s Sexual Health 
(ISSWSH) and some of whom later served on the DSM-5 sexual and gender 
identity disorders work group (or who were mentors and close colleagues to 
those work group members)—set forth new criteria for discerning and treat-
 3. Today, ED, or “impotence,” is generally not categorized as a desire disorder; it is instead 
more often considered a physical sexual dysfunction. Although ED may be attributed to psy-
chological difficulties, and as such, it still remains in the DSM-5, its desire-related manifesta-
tion does not reflect culturally common understandings of male sexual difficulty. This shift to 
configuring ED as a “physiological” rather than “psychological” disorder is a relatively recent 
trend, as pointed out by Kleinplatz (2011).
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ing women’s sexual disorders that they hoped would be taken up on a wide-
spread clinical basis (Basson et al., 2001). One of the most notable suggestions 
for a change in protocol concerned the diagnosis of hypoactive sexual desire 
disorder, or HSDD. The consensus committee called for the introduction of 
the criterion of “receptivity” or “responsive desire” for women. This new cri-
terion indicated the group’s belief that a woman shouldn’t be diagnosed with 
HSDD just because she doesn’t spontaneously desire or initiate sex, but only 
if she is also unreceptive to her partner’s advances. This call also reflected just 
one more stage in the process of the gendering of sexual desire and behavior 
within contemporary psychosexual medicine—obviously a process that was 
connected to a long history of sexual difference frameworks within psychol-
ogy, but a particular moment that is notable in light of the fact that it was 
instituted within the new terrain of purportedly apolitical and atheoretical 
behaviorist psychology, and, eventually, in the name of feminism.
This proposed change was a response to mounting criticisms that the stan-
dard conceptualization of sexual response—Masters and Johnson’s human 
sexual response cycle (HSRC), widely publicized in 1966—is based on a spe-
cifically masculine version of sexuality and desire. As described in the previ-
ous chapter, the HSRC only focused on physiological changes that occurred 
once sex (specifically heterosexual intercourse) had already begun, and didn’t 
consider the role of desire (or all of the reasons people might engage in sex—
now framed in terms of the behaviorist “motivations” and “incentives”). Since 
the days of Masters and Johnson, diverse figures—from antimedicalization 
activists to experimental psychology researchers—have argued that women 
are different from men when it comes to sex and sexuality (Basson, 2000, 
2001b; Brotto, 2010a; Heiman, 2002; Tiefer, 2001), although they have posited 
different explanations for this fact. Many psychologists have argued that this 
discrepancy is at least in part due to biological differences between men and 
women, while others—Leonore Tiefer of the New View Campaign being the 
primary example—have attended to sociocultural factors that affect women’s 
sexual expression. For all of these psychologists, however, the lack of attention 
to women’s specifically feminine sexual problems represents, at best, a seri-
ous lacuna in medical practice and research, and at worst, willful (and sexist) 
ignorance by doctors and researchers.
Rosemary Basson, a clinical professor of psychiatry and the director of the 
University of British Columbia Sexual Medicine Program, can be attributed 
with really changing the terrain of the sexual response debates and legiti-
mating alternative models of sexuality in the mainstream. Basson’s qualita-
tive work with Canadian women in the late 1990s, along with the findings 
of plethysmographic research conducted by Dutch researchers during the 
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same period on women’s lack of awareness of their own physiological genital 
response (Laan & Everaerd, 1995, 1998), led her to develop a framework for 
“responsive desire,” which she deemed better suited to describe women’s expe-
riences in long-term (cisheterosexual, monogamous, and romantic) relation-
ships. Importantly, she explicitly devised the model as a way to depathologize 
what she understood to be many women’s different (nonlinear and non- goal-
oriented) experiences of sexuality, and thus to destabilize the dominance of 
Masters and Johnson’s linear human sexual response cycle. Basson’s circular 
framework is often referred to in both clinical and popular literature as the 
“arousal-first” model of desire (Bielski, 2015).
Basson’s (2000) original model was configured on the basis of four claims: 
(1) Women are not biologically driven to release sexual tension in the same 
way men are because they do not have as much testosterone as men. (2) 
Women experience different motivations to engage in sex than men, includ-
ing “incentives” and “rewards” that are not strictly sexual in nature and that 
might be much more important to their willingness to engage in sex than 
any biological urges to do so (e.g., promoting intimacy, pleasing a partner, 
preventing relational discord, etc.). (3) Women experience subjective men-
tal arousal that may or may not be accompanied by genital arousal (or they 
may be unaware of their own genital arousal—that is, they are more likely 
than men to experience subjective/genital discordance). And (4) women do 
not always experience orgasms during sex, even if they are orgasmic are not 
always driven to reach orgasm, and when orgasmic release does occur for 
women, it may take a variety of forms that deviate from the traditional sexual 
release model. In the seminal article in which Basson (2000) initially intro-
duced this new model, “The Female Sexual Response: A Different Model,” she 
states: “Sensing an opportunity to be sexual, the partner’s neediness, or an 
awareness of one or more potential benefits or rewards that are very important 
to them (but not necessarily sexual), women move from a sexual neutrality to 
seeking stimuli necessary to ignite sexual desire” (p. 53; italics added). In the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, Basson’s model (what I will from now 
on refer to as her “circular sexual response cycle,” in keeping with contempo-
rary usage) acquired widespread support and was utilized by numerous other 
researchers. Although one article she published in 2001 in the Journal of Sex 
& Marital Therapy argued that the model could also apply to men, and a brief 
2008 commentary in the Archives of Sexual Behavior reiterated this notion, 
the rest of Basson’s writing on the topic has focused on women, and almost 
all other scientific researchers who have used it have interpreted and referred 
to the model as female-specific since its institution (for recent examples, see 
Giraldi, Kristensen, & Sand, 2015; Ferenidou, Kirana, Fokas, Hatzichristou, 
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& Athanasiadis, 2016). Recently, Basson has gone on record stating that her 
model was misconstrued as being for women only (Barmak, 2018), but regard-
less of whether she intended the model to be a description of women’s sexual 
response, uniquely, it has been framed as such not only by other researchers 
but also in myriad popular accounts—countless popular articles, sex blogs, 
and even the r/sex Reddit have portrayed this model of responsive desire as 
specifically “for women.” I would argue there is good reason for this—the 
model does seem to fit women better than men. My concern is how we inter-
pret this phenomenon—why is it that women are more responsive? And even 
if evidence suggests they are, is it a good idea to codify women’s sexuality this 
way, scientifically? I would suggest that one reason not to codify it in this way 
might be that, because of our Western cultural obsessions with objectivity, the 
truth of behavior, and evolutionary speculation, we run the risk of essentializ-
ing and universalizing femininity with a model like this—albeit in new, more 
female-friendly guises. And this is exactly what has happened since the turn 
of the twenty-first century, when Basson first put her model forward.
Beginning in the late 1980s, largely in the Dutch context, another model 
for sexual response was devised—the “incentive motivation model” (IMM)—
which emerged from classical experimental psychology rooted in neurocog-
nitive orientations within a behaviorist tradition. This model has often been 
cited alongside Basson’s model, particularly leading up to the publication of 
the DSM-5 in 2013, as an alternative to the linearity of earlier conceptual-
izations of “sex drive,” and often alongside evolutionary psychology explana-
tions for gender differences. The incentive motivation model exemplifies a 
purposeful shift away from psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories of 
desire, and it is also theoretically gender-neutral, as is stated in the work of 
Dutch researchers Ellen Laan, Stephanie Both, Walter Everaerd, and Frederick 
Toates; these researchers promulgate the notion that sexual desire (for both 
men and women) can be “situation-dependent,” reflecting different “triggers” 
(e.g., Toates, 2014). The idea here is that all human sexual desire is responsive, 
and involves balancing excitatory and inhibitory internal information, on the 
one hand, with the content and effectiveness of external stimuli, on the other. 
If the stimulus is “competent,” then physiological arousal will be activated 
and then detected, and the individual will then continue to be motivated to 
engage in the sexual act—and to do it again, in the future, if it is rewarding 
enough (including for nonsexual reasons), in a psychophysiological feedback 
loop.4 Here, sexual activity can be explained by how motivated an individual 
 4. This model is now often used in conjunction with the information processing model 
(IPM) of sexual arousal (e.g., Janssen, Everaerd, Spiering, & Janssen, 2000), which focuses 
on how arousal occurs at the level of the organism. The IPM emerges from contemporary 
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is to engage in any given behavior, when comparing costs versus benefits, in 
a “push-pull” framework (the “push” coming from within the individual, and 
the “pull” coming from the external stimuli)—although some of this calculus 
is understood to be beyond conscious consideration (hence the importance 
of noting the evolutionary psychology theory that is often in the backdrop). 
It is via this model of sexual response that the notion that desire and arousal 
co-occur, or in many cases that arousal precedes desire, came to be instituted. 
Eventually, the idea that arousal preceding desire is more descriptive of wom-
en’s sexuality would be inscribed in the FSIAD diagnosis.
In addition to the incentive motivation model often being discussed in 
conjunction with Basson’s circular sexual response cycle (enter the role of con-
scious consideration of nonsexual rewards potentially received for engaging 
in sex, particularly for women), most of the research conducted using this 
framework has been conducted on women specifically.5 The tendency to apply 
the incentive motivation model primarily to women raises questions around 
whether or not the pervasive gendered use of a gender-neutral model has con-
tributed to theorizing male and female sexuality—and masculine and femi-
nine desire—differently. According to researchers who utilize the incentive 
motivation model in their studies, are women naturally and essentially more 
sexually responsive or receptive than men? Or are men likely also receptive, 
but enough research simply hasn’t been conducted on them to warrant the 
label of “responsive desire”? The answer to this distinction is not always clear 
neurocognitive emotion research, which describes a hierarchically organized system in the 
organism in which involuntary, automatic, and autonomic response to sexual stimuli occurs 
first (through a proximate or “direct” neural pathway), followed later, or separately, by volun-
tary, conscious, and controlled appraisal in which meaning is conferred to sexual stimuli. This 
meaning or conscious arousal involves more elaborate cortical processing (through a distal or 
“indirect” neural pathway). Although this is another model in which gender differences have 
been suggested, for example in terms of the multiplicity and importance of sexual “meanings” 
appraised at the emotional or “felt” level, a full discussion of the IPM is beyond the scope of 
my argument for this chapter. Similarly, the dual control model (Bancroft, Graham, Janssen, 
& Sanders, 2009) and state theory of sexual desire, response, and arousal (as opposed to an 
interpretation of these phenomena as sexual traits, which are more stable and fixed than sexual 
states) are both alternatives to “drive” models of sexual response that will not be explored fully 
here as they did not play a key role in the gendering of conceptions of low desire during the 
period that I analyze.
 5. In an interesting twist, Both and Everaerd (2002) penned a response to Basson (2000), 
supporting her paradigm of sexual responsiveness but questioning the notion that it is uniquely 
descriptive of women. Despite this, in the decade following that exchange, the incentive motiva-
tion model also was much more frequently applied to women, including by some of the original 
Dutch researchers who moved the model forward (see Laan & Both, 2008 for an example of 
this gendered application of the IMM in experimental work).
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for the very psychologists who utilize the model.6 It is clear, however, that this 
“cost-benefit,” “rational-motivation,” or “incentive-reward” model is, at least 
in application, thought to be particularly suited to explaining women’s com-
plex and responsive sexuality. Why else would women be almost exclusively 
sampled as participants for these studies? And why have so many studies on 
women’s responsive desire been conducted in the last twenty years? The dis-
proportionate application of the model and associated concepts to women, 
and the sheer number of studies conducted on women’s responsive desire, 
particularly in the first decade of the twenty-first century, has undeniably per-
petuated the notion that women have a completely different sexual reality than 
do men. Certainly many women do have different experiences of sex than 
men, and I also emphasize that point, but my biggest concern with the use of 
the incentive motivation model to disproportionately describe women’s desire 
is that these studies often then lead us to biological, evolutionary explanations 
for this fact (even if these explanations just “fill in the gaps”). As it is a cogni-
tive behaviorist model, this explanation also leads us away from considering 
power—both as a coercive mechanism and in its inflection as desire. This is 
because even as the incentive motivation model is rooted in what researchers 
refer to as a “biopsychosocial” framework, their lack of structural theoriz-
ing—and their emphasis on the “push” of internal biological data that come 
into contact with the “pull” of the external environment—leaves us with no 
analysis of the vicissitudes of desire, and instead with the image of a neutral 
biological organism reacting to its neutral environment. But what happens 
when the environment pushes one to engage in sex? Or when the internal 
psychic experience (e.g., trauma) pulls us back in? Or: Is it even useful to 
consider internal and external stimuli—and pushing and pulling—as separate 
phenomena?
 6. Some researchers have emphasized that men may also be sexually receptive and 
responsive (for examples, see Janssen, McBride, Yarber, Hill, & Butler [2008]; Goldey & van 
Anders, [2012]; and Murray [2019]). This contrasts with much of the literature up to this 
point, though, including the seminal articles by Basson and more recent experimental studies 
that suggest (“androphilic”) women’s sexuality is uniquely responsive and discordant. There is 
much slippage between Basson’s model and the Dutch incentive motivation model, and there 
is a lack of consensus among researchers themselves regarding whether the incentive motiva-
tion model is more appropriate for women. Some researchers suggest conflicting stances in 
this regard, and sometimes in the same article (see Chivers & Brotto, 2017 for an example of a 
publication in which conflicting stances on the “truth” of women’s responsive desire are pos-
ited—in some places in this article, the authors suggest that women’s sexuality is unique and 
that its study requires a “gendered approach” [p. 19]; in other places, the authors argue that 
men and women are similar sexually, including in terms of [responsive or state-dependent] 
sexual desire [p. 15]. Contradictions abound even in the discussion of state versus trait desire, 
however, as the authors also suggest that using state-dependent or context-focused [respon-
sive] measures to assess desire is more appropriate for women). 
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To be clear: I recognize the importance of representing and attending to 
diverse models of sexuality that provide alternatives to Masters and Johnson’s 
four-staged HSRC model of human sexual response. However, it is necessary 
to analyze and interrogate the long-standing cultural obsession with women’s 
sexuality as a deviation from this linear model. What are the potential con-
sequences of marking this kind of deviation as uniquely and innately femi-
nine, and treating it as such? Advocates of alternative models for female sexual 
response argue that many women’s general state of sexual neutrality, their 
need to be sexually triggered due to their receptivity or responsiveness, and 
the importance of nonsexual incentives regarding their participation, interest, 
or “willingness” to engage in sex must be taken into account when assessing 
women’s desire—specifically in terms of whether or not they are to be diag-
nosed as dysfunctional. A crucial aspect of these models is the notion that for 
women, physical arousal is often antecedent to or unaligned with a conscious 
or stated interest in sex. While some of what is put forward here may in fact 
be true about women (and, indeed, scientific data certainly suggest that it is), 
that is not the same as saying that it is natural for women to experience sex in 
this way. The problem with these feminized models of receptivity, then, is that 
they do not take into account how women got this way (bracketing the models 
that vulgarly explain this phenomenon via evolutionary psychology tropes, 
which argue that receptivity is an adaptation to cave-rape, and/or a mating 
strategy). By failing to account for or theorize many women’s receptive sexual 
response patterns in explicitly sociopolitical terms, these models gloss over 
the very inequalities within cis-/heteronormative sex relations implicated in 
women’s “alternative” (i.e., discordant, responsive, receptive, plastic, flexible, 
complex, complicated, circular, etc.) forms of sexual response. To this end, 
as these researchers have sought to normalize women’s responsive desire, I 
want to trouble that normalization. If the reasons for women’s responsiveness 
include lack of sexual agency, regular experiences of coercion, or lack of access 
to pleasurable sex, then this receptivity, and the framework that naturalizes 
it or puts it in the terms of “incentives,” “rewards,” and “motivations,” is not 
normal. Or: It is normal only insofar as gender inequality in sex is normal. 
Further, many of the low-desiring women I interviewed suggested that their 
own experiences of desire do not align with the receptivity framework, or, in 
some cases, throw its very premises into critical relief—they are very aware 
of the concessions they’ve been expected to make sexually, and they want 
something better. In some cases, that might mean actively playing with the 
power inequalities they experience in a cisheteropatriarchal society and mak-
ing them into the stuff of domination and submission fantasies, into the stuff 
of hot, sexy desire—not “motivation” or “interest.”
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Measuring the Gap: Plethysmography and Mind/Body 
Disconnects
Much contemporary experimental sex research seeks to measure gender dif-
ferences in sexual behavior and response, particularly in terms of subjective/
genital “concordance” and “discordance” (for examples, see Chivers, 2010, 
2017a, 2017b; Chivers & Bailey, 2005; Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 2007; Chiv-
ers, Seto, Lalumière, Laan, & Grimbos, 2010; Heiman, 1977, 1980; Laan & 
Everaerd, 1995, 1998), and findings have been used to support the necessity 
of alternative sexual response models for women. In 2004, Meredith Chiv-
ers and colleagues coined the terms “category-specificity” and “category non-
specificity” (used interchangeably later with “target-specificity” and “target 
non-specificity”7) to describe whether a male or female laboratory subject’s 
objective, physiological, genital arousal matches that same individual’s sub-
jective account of how turned on they feel by the “categories” they claim to 
prefer. Frequently, gender is measured as the category of interest—that is, 
does the person’s physical sexual response align with who they say they are 
attracted to, in terms of gender? Are there significant differences for men 
versus women in this regard? In order to assess this gap (discordance) or 
alignment (concordance), researchers use vaginal photoplethysmography (tra-
ditionally, a vaginal probe that measures blood flow in the vagina or vaginal 
pulse amplitude [VPA] is used, although more recent studies also sometimes 
use a labial thermistor clip to detect blood flow and temperature changes in 
the vulva or clitoral photoplethysmography to measure blood flow in the cli-
toris8) and penile plethysmography (using a phallometric gauge that similarly 
detects penile blood flow or erection) and compare physiological measures to 
subjects’ stated arousal as discerned by an “arousometer” that they move with 
their fingers to indicate how turned on they feel. The assessment is usually 
made while subjects watch pornography or neutral films in a clinical environ-
ment. Such devices were popularly used by Masters and Johnson and even 
before them, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, with more sophisticated volu-
metric tools developed in the 1970s. Since the earliest days of this research, 
women have been shown to be less category-specific than men in terms of 
 7. Lalumière (2017) has made a case for using the term “cue-specificity” as a measure of 
the intensity or degree of response discrimination to any given sexual cue and comparing this 
with level of concordance; this was proposed as a solution to perceived measurement problems 
regarding sexual orientation.
 8. See Huberman & Chivers (2015) for an example of a study that uses labial thermog-
raphy and Suschinksy, Dawson, & Chivers (2020) for an example of a study that uses clitoral 
plethysmography.
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their physiological response, and to exhibit more discordance between physi-
cal and psychological arousal states.
Famous for popular assessments that associated her with the notion that 
“women get turned on by everything, including bonobo porn!” (as was sug-
gested by Andy Newman in 2008 and Daniel Bergner in 2009, writing for 
the New York Times), Meredith Chivers, a sexologist at Queen’s University in 
Kingston, Ontario, has become the icon of this contemporary research. In the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, Chivers published multiple articles on 
the lack of “category-specific” sexual arousal in women (some studies sug-
gested that women are even physically aroused by nonhuman primate sex—
hence the above quote about bonobos; see Chivers et al., 2007) in addition to 
the presence of category-specific arousal in trans women or “transsexuals,”9 
with J. Michael Bailey and Ray Blanchard, among other evolutionary sexolo-
gists.10 Chivers and Bailey, along with colleague Gerulf Rieger, also coauthored 
an article in 2005 arguing that “true bisexuality” in men does not exist (based 
on phallometric measures of physiological arousal, which were said to suggest 
that men are physiologically either gay or straight—because they reliably expe-
rience erections in response only to either men or women; see Rieger, Chivers, 
& Bailey, 2005). This last study was picked up by several popular news outlets 
around the same time (e.g., “Straight, Gay, or Lying?” by Benedict Carey in 
the New York Times), and has remained controversial, even after a later study 
coauthored by Bailey (see Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2011) confirmed 
that (surprise!) some bisexually identified men are, in fact, bisexual.
Studies featuring plethysmography span decades (Geer, Morokoff, & 
Greenwood, 1974; Heiman, 1977; and Hoon, Wincze, & Hoon, 1976 are some 
of the earliest big publications on gender differences in genital/subjective 
 9. In the seminal study in which the term category-specific arousal was coined (Chivers, 
Rieger, Latty, & Bailey, 2004), trans women, who are referred to as “male-to-female trans-
sexuals,” were grouped with cis males based on similarity of genital arousal data, and this was 
used to suggest the possibility of a “true sexual dimorphism” in arousal patterns (p. 737). The 
authors state: “Our finding that male-to-female transsexuals show a male-typical [sic] pattern 
.  .  . helps to rule out some possible explanations. [Cis]women’s nonspecific pattern might not 
be fully explained by their lack of visible genitalia because transsexuals show a category-specific 
pattern despite a similar lack. Transsexuals reject the male gender role into which they were 
socialized yet continue to show the category-specific pattern of arousal that is characteristic of 
their genetic sex” (p. 742).
 10. Bailey and Blanchard became infamous in the late 1990s and early 2000s for their 
controversial theories of the two pathways to “transsexualism” in male-to-female individuals, 
which include either “extreme homosexuality” or “autogynephilia” (i.e., the self-obsessed and 
narcissistic fantasy of themselves as women, which constitutes a paraphilia). See Bailey (2003) 
and Blanchard (1989) for more on this notion that “some transsexuals [transgender women] 
are the most feminine of males” (Chivers et al., 2004, p. 742).
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concordance). And even before the newer wave of psychophysiological sex 
research on women’s discordance, arguments about how the “truth” of sexual 
desire could be discerned by comparing subjective accounts to physiological 
measures were put forward by Czech sexologist Kurt Freund, who utilized 
phallometry as a type of sexual polygraph for men; the penile strain gauge was 
initially used to determine whether a military conscript for the Czech army 
was heterosexual or homosexual (i.e., to identify men attempting to avoid ser-
vice by claiming they were gay). The claim here is that men, unlike women, 
are very concordant—their erections are a good measure of what they are 
subjectively turned on by. Later, these measures were used in conjunction with 
conversion therapy under a behaviorist paradigm; via the logic of what Waid-
zunas and Epstein critically refer to in their 2015 article “For Men, Arousal Is 
Orientation” as a technosexual script, the “truth” of desire was deciphered (or 
rather produced) via phallometry, so that so-called abnormal sexualities could 
be changed. Although I focus here on category-specificity as it has been gen-
dered in contemporary research using plethysmography, similar methods of 
making this determination have been used not only to assess heterosexuality 
and homosexuality in all-male samples but also as forensic evidence for pedo-
philia and other sex crimes, as physiological arousal to images of children is 
said to be an important predictor of reoffense (this work is pioneered today 
by experimental researcher Michael Seto). The newest research on women’s 
discordance and lack of category-specificity is thus one moment in a long 
line of technoscientific research in which subjective and objective accounts of 
desire are measured against each other. The difference is that in the past, the 
focus was on physiological arousal as a proxy for desire in men (and it still 
functions this way in research on men), and now, a disjuncture between sub-
jective and objective accounts in women is the focus. Notably, the new wave of 
feminist-identified sex researchers who argue for the normalcy of a feminine 
disconnect have seemingly made this case in order to rescue women from 
the problematic linear model of “arousal equals desire.” However, in doing 
so, they have reified feminine sexual complexity and confusion—and the leg-
acy of using plethysmography as a method of telling the “truth” of sexuality 
continues, albeit in new forms. That is: The mind/body disjuncture itself has 
become the truth of women’s sexuality, and the gendered and forensic history 
of the plethysmograph tells us the truth of sexual difference. 
After publishing prolifically with Bailey, Blanchard, and others, Chivers 
quickly moved into the role of a true trailblazer in the study of the complexi-
ties of women’s desire. During the summer of 2019, the Queen’s University 
website stated: “The results [of Chivers’s] research have exposed a discon-
nection between women’s minds and bodies, making it clear that there is still 
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much to be understood about female sexuality.” A multitude of popular out-
lets have also taken interest in the “new science of female sexuality”—Chiv-
ers is one of a few women sex researchers consistently cited in the media. In 
2010, she conducted a meta-analysis along with four colleagues (Chivers et al., 
2010) to assess continuity in observed differences in male and female sexual 
response. This meta-analysis asserted a statistically significant gender differ-
ence in sexual response across multiple studies over decades, and suggested 
that men demonstrate more subjective/genital concordance than women, and 
also greater category-specificity in terms of their response. In the years prior 
to the release of the DSM-5, this research was used alongside the new alterna-
tive sexual response models to support the idea that women’s sexual response 
is organized fundamentally differently than men’s sexual response.
In more recent research of this type, it has been suggested that certain 
women are more concordant than others.11 Chivers (2017a) suggests that 
“gynephilic” women (women who are attracted to women, but who do not 
necessarily self-identify as lesbians) have the highest rates of concordance 
among women, along with “ambiphilic” women (women who are attracted 
to both men and women but who don’t necessarily self-identify as bisexual), 
who also demonstrate higher rates of concordance across recent experimental 
studies (and interestingly, physical response to female stimuli specifically). In 
her award-winning 2017 review of the existing scientific theory on women’s 
category non- specificity and discordance, Chivers concludes that it is “andro-
philic” women—and especially those who are exclusively androphilic—who 
demonstrate the lowest rates of category-specificity in terms of gender prefer-
ence. This means that women who are attracted to men, and especially those 
who state that they are exclusively attracted to men (but who don’t necessarily 
identify as heterosexual), experience the biggest gap between their subjec-
tive preference and genital response. It is these women who are most likely 
to demonstrate strong genital response to pornography featuring individuals 
of any gender, engaging in almost any sexual act (or in some cases nonhu-
man animals engaging in sex or even humans not engaging in sex but doing 
other things, including “violent nonsexual” acts), yet not self-identify as feel-
ing “turned on.” For these women, stated sexual preference does not align with 
who or what physically arouses them. Chivers (2017a) offers ten hypotheses 
 11. For instance, Chivers, Bouchard, & Timmers (2015) suggested that gynephilic women 
are more likely than their androphilic counterparts to be category-specific, and Velten et al. 
(2016) suggested variability in sexual response across female subjects. In one study, men and 
women were said to be more similar in terms of desire when desire was measured as emergent 
(as a state) rather than stable (as a trait) (Dawson & Chivers, 2014).
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for why this may be the case, some of which derive from evolutionary psy-
chology and brain organization theory. These include 
• the “preparation hypothesis”—women get turned on by everything as 
a “low-cost” adaptive evolutionary protective mechanism so they don’t 
experience physical harm during rape; 
• the “fertility-dependent change” hypothesis—women’s greater receptivity 
is related to hormonal shifts due to their menstrual cycles (ovulation); 
• the “neurohormonal hypothesis”—lack of prenatal androgen exposure 
results in a gender-nonspecific response; and 
• the “non-sexual motivations interact with stimulus prepotency hypoth-
esis”—intrasexual competition over millennia has resulted in women’s 
scrutiny of female competitors for male mates, resulting in nonspecific 
patterns of physiological arousal. 
Out of her ten hypotheses, three suggest broadly social reasons for gender 
differences in desire patterns, or androphilic women’s lower rates of concor-
dance. One suggests that it may be possible that women who are attracted 
to men don’t get as much out of their sexual interactions with men (i.e., in 
terms of orgasm), and thus they do not select strongly for “male cues” (p. 1174) 
(as opposed to gynephilic women, who receive more rewards from having 
sex with women, and thus are incentivized to select for “female cues”). One 
hypothesis is grounded in theory of mind, and describes women’s potential 
capacity to identify with the pleasure of other women as a source of their 
plasticity. Another hypothesis acknowledges that women who are attracted 
to men may get physically turned on by other women because of the wide-
spread objectification of women’s bodies in the media, such that women are 
accustomed to seeing other women’s bodies sexualized and have thus come 
to respond to them sexually, inadvertently and neurologically. I am excited 
to see Chivers engaging with ideas such as these, and I hope she will go even 
further, and consider socialization as a deeper and more complex process, 
rather than leaving even this social analysis within the realm of a reductive 
biology that ignores trauma. This review of the existing psychological theory 
on female discordance seems to be a positive harbinger of potential change 
in mainstream sexology, and it makes me hopeful that some researchers are 
considering explanations for phenomena outside of evolutionary psychology 
narratives (for an example in this vein, see Suschinsky et al., 2020). But, in 
light of the history of how volumetric tools have been implemented to tell 
the truth of desire, I worry about how they are still being used to construct a 
new model for women’s sexuality, one that will invariably produce feminized 
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populations (even if those populations are now more internally diverse—i.e., 
the terms androphilic, gynephilic, and ambiphilic still leave us tethered to old 
categories via their very methodological construction).
Chivers has publicly stated that women’s intense, rapid, and automatic 
physical response to a multitude of sexual stimuli should not indicate that 
they are consenting to sex, nor that they ought to, and also that their non-
categorical, non-gender-specific, and discordant physiological arousal does 
not indicate anything about their sexual identities or subjective desires per 
se. Her work, and the work of other sexologists within this realm, has been 
used to argue a variety of things about women’s peculiar sexuality, along a 
polarity. In some instances, this research has been used to support the pro-
gram of women’s sexual liberation—if it’s natural for women to get turned on 
by everything, then it should be permissible for women to pursue sex with 
women (and men) and get in touch with their essential queerness and fluid-
ity as it is demonstrated via their natural state of discordance (Chivers, 2017b 
describes a reporter suggesting this notion to her about her own research). 
On the other hand, and more frequently, this research has been used to sup-
port the idea that women are “lying” about their sexualities, or that they are 
just disconnected from the “truth” of their desires. This line of thinking has 
been suggested by multiple popular evolutionary psychologists, along with 
journalists, other popular writers, and media pundits. For example, popular 
evolutionary psychologists Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam, in their 2011 book A 
Billion Wicked Thoughts: What the Internet Tells Us about Sexual Relationships, 
link women’s subjective/genital discordance to innate masochistic feminine 
desire, arguing that this must be rooted in differences in male and female 
brains, and cite Chivers’s research as evidence for women’s evolved desire to 
be dominated by men (even if they don’t know it). As is likely clear to readers 
at this point, this is an example of the line of thinking that I am most con-
cerned with in this book, as it raises huge red flags around consent, poten-
tially sets up women for coercion, and thus may continue to pave the way 
for a misogynistic anti-feminist backlash in the post–#MeToo era. Chivers 
(2017b) has stated that this argument about women’s innate mendacity or bio-
logically ordained sexual confusion is not the intent of her research, that she 
hopes instead her work will help women feel relieved to know “their unbidden 
physical response is measurable and demonstrated by other women” (p. 1216), 
and that it will inspire women to explore their “internal playground” (as cited 
in Martin, 2018, p. 46). Still, I am wary of the results of these studies being 
disseminated and popularized, particularly in light of the pairing of findings 
with evolutionary psychology explanations, in a world in which openness and 
flexibility are made modulable—and given how plethysmography and simi-
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lar sexual truth-telling technologies have been used in the recent past. How 
are “women,” as a category, made and remade through this type of research? 
What feminized populations are produced—and how are they left otherwise 
unmarked? And how does this research feed into broader retrograde, misogy-
nistic, and potentially dangerous notions about feminine confusion and com-
plexity? These questions are particularly salient when considering the types of 
diagnoses and treatments this research is used to support. Using a plethysmo-
graph at all raises the question of the truth and who or what is to be trusted, 
and it also reifies mind/body dualisms. This is the case even when the research 
is conducted by self-identified feminist (and self-identified queer) researchers.
Beyond these conceptual concerns, there are some serious methodologi-
cal issues at stake. It is unclear how most of this lab-based research could 
assess anything approximating the intense, powerful, sometimes fragile, 
and very personal experience of desire, as these studies utilize questionably 
operationalized variables to quantify this phenomenon and are performed in 
manufactured experimental settings.12 The sample sizes in these studies are 
often small and homogenous (race, socioeconomic status, and other impor-
tant demographic data have traditionally not been gathered or at least not 
disclosed, although some more recent studies are reporting more on racial 
identification of participants), which makes any statistical findings unreliable, 
at worst, or low in power, at best. Volumetric measurements are assessed in a 
lab, while participants are exposed to a variety of different types of pornog-
raphy, neutral stimuli, and sometimes “non-sexual stimuli with positive or 
negative valences” (Suschinsky et al., 2009). Participants in one such study 
were asked “to respond to the films as naturally as possible, and to avoid con-
tracting their muscles, manipulating their responses, touching their genitals, 
moving, or talking during the films” (Suschinsky et al., 2009, p. 563). The 
pornography in any given study might include male-female, male-male, and 
female-female sexual encounters; women and men exercising in the nude; 
sexual coercion and rape scenes; and sometimes nonhuman animal sexual 
encounters (Chivers & Bailey, 2005; Chivers et al., 2007). Some studies have 
attempted to find erotica that is “woman-friendly” (higher in “intimacy,” etc.) 
to use with women samples (Laan & Both, 2008). But of course, the stimulus 
used in any given study depends on what facet of sexual arousal or “category” 
it is that is being measured (this may be gender differences in masochism, 
sociosexuality, etc.).
 12. For a useful critique of the methods of lab-based sex research and “volunteer bias,” see 
Ussher (2017). It should also be noted that some researchers are now attempting to gather data 
on how similar their clinical research populations are to the general public, and thus how much 
bias they need to account for—and ideally correct for (Dawson et al., 2019).
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As my primary concern here is to expose the ways that men’s and wom-
en’s sexualities are produced as categorically different via this research, I will 
not extensively attend to the obvious critiques of the research methods being 
discussed. But beyond the issues with inadequate sample size, homogeneity, 
and potential problems with reliability, validity, and conceptualization and 
operationalization of assessment measures, there are myriad irresolvable 
issues regarding the generalizability of the experiments, including the fab-
ricated and isolated nature of the experimental setting and the fact that it is 
divorced from any environment in which sexual activities would normally 
take place (the lab itself may be distracting, or arousing); that a device is 
attached to the genitals throughout the experiment, which may produce dis-
comfort or enjoyment outside/beyond the audiovisual stimulus and is thus 
a potential intervening variable; that the neutral or any of the experimental 
audiovisual stimuli—combined with the situation in which they are viewed—
may produce enjoyment, displeasure, or other affects outside/beyond their 
intended effects on the participants (in some studies, participants are shown 
more than fifteen pornographic video clips in succession, and sometimes the 
same ones are shown more than once); the fact that there is no standardiza-
tion across various volumetric instruments and thus no standard unit of mea-
surement by which to reliably compare across populations; and the fact that 
a complicated phenomenon such as desire is being measured by comparing 
“minds” to “bodies” and quantified at all. There are other extra-experimental 
dynamic and contextual issues—such as individual life history; race or eth-
nicity; cultural background; socioeconomic status; sexual history, including 
possible trauma or abuse; relationship status and quality; disability and men-
tal health status; and other interpersonal issues—that seem to be rarely taken 
into account in this research, and that invariably affect the outcomes of these 
studies (or, if any of these data are collected, they are generally not publicized 
in the written reports). Thus, even if the intention is not to do so, this research 
leaves objective and subjective arousal as proxies for desire, the vicissitudes of 
which clearly cannot be captured in an experiment. However, it is interesting 
to consider what unintended effects the experiments may have on subjects, in 
terms of desire and arousal, that are not accounted for in the design.
Volumetric research has also been used to make arguments about the con-
nection between female discordance and sexual dysfunction, with most stud-
ies suggesting that women who experience low desire and arousal are even 
more discordant than sexually functional women (Chivers, 2010). Accord-
ingly, “women with sexual arousal problems report lower subjective sexual 
arousal to sexual stimuli in the laboratory, but do not show significantly lower 
genital responses when compared to women without sexual arousal problems” 
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(Chivers, 2010, p. 412). Here, it seems that the diagnosis of sexual dysfunc-
tion in women is tied to their lack of awareness regarding their bodily state, 
as receptivity and responsive desire are increasingly normalized for women. 
If both sexually functional and dysfunctional women are said to experience a 
disconnect between their psychology and physiology, is the difference that a 
normal (i.e., responsive) woman can recognize and be receptive to her (always 
already aroused) physical state, whereas the task of recognizing and being 
receptive to her body is more difficult for a sexually dysfunctional woman?
One recent study suggests that mindfulness-based sex therapy (MBST, to 
be explored in the next section of this chapter) is a potential way to bridge 
the gap: 
A top-down mechanism in which women deliberately focused attention on 
emerging, moment-by-moment sensations over the course of treatment, 
likely led to their contemporaneous detection of genital arousal in the labo-
ratory setting, thereby increasing sexual concordance. . . . [G]iven evidence 
that negative affect during sexual encounters may significantly predict sexual 
difficulties (Nobre & Pinto-Gouveia, 2006), it is possible that women expe-
rienced an improved ability to regulate such emotions and thereby tune into 
and accept their visceral sensations. (Brotto, Chivers, Millman, & Albert, 
2016, p. 1918) 
Although this study ultimately concludes that improved concordance mani-
fests as increased subjective arousal predicting increased genital arousal, the 
mechanism of improvement lies in women being more “in tune” with their 
bodies. And according to some of the most recent studies, women with desire 
problems are now—perhaps predictably—too concordant. Suschinsky et al. 
(2019), for instance, report that low-desiring women are actually more concor-
dant than women with normal levels of desire—is it that these women need 
more mental stimulation to motivate themselves to have sex, because they are 
not attuned enough to their bodies? Is the assumption that these low-desiring 
women are unreceptive and unresponsive to their aroused genitals, too caught 
up in their heads—and this now puts them in the category of dysfunction-
ality? If this is the case, is discordance now understood to be healthier for 
women? Is receptivity now women’s natural, healthy state?
Recent developments in the empirical investigation of sexual response 
include a multitude of techniques utilized to assess dysfunctions and gender 
differences, including tests of visual attention to sexual stimuli via methods 
like eye-tracking (for an example, see Dawson & Chivers, 2018). In particular, 
neuroscientific imaging techniques such as fMRI and PET are used more and 
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more frequently to explore sex differences in desire and have affirmed the 
same conclusions regarding discordant female sexuality as have other types of 
experimental psychological research (Karama et al., 2002; Maravilla & Yang, 
2008; Safron, Sylva, Klimaj, Rosenthal, & Bailey, 2019). Researchers have 
argued for a number of sex differences in arousal-related brain activity. For 
example, recent studies purport that during the processing of sexual stimuli, 
brain areas associated with emotional inhibition in the anterior cingulate cor-
tex are activated among women, whereas men have greater control over their 
genital response as demonstrated by activity in the prefrontal cortex (Laan, 
2007 as cited in Chivers et al., 2010; Laan, Scholte, & van Stegeren, 2006); the 
level of perceived sexual arousal is significantly higher in male than in female 
subjects as indicated by hypothalamic activity when viewing visual erotic 
stimuli in a lab setting (Karama et al., 2002); and differences can be observed 
among men and women and between healthy women and those with sexual 
interest/arousal disorders based on “overall brain activation” as determined 
by fMRI (Maravilla & Yang, 2008). In addition to experiments that directly 
compare men’s and women’s neural sexual processing, other studies examine 
sex differences by analyzing neural correlates of parental and romantic love 
(Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2004) and conclude that women and men also differ in 
these realms. What can be gleaned from these studies is questionable at best, 
as many unstated narratives about sex differences in cognition, sexuality, and 
desire abound and inform hypotheses and experimental design—before the 
research has even begun. In any case, this research, along with the psycho-
physiological studies described above, has exploded in recent years, and has 
reinforced the purported need for an alternative model of sexual desire for 
women, including in the rhetoric of the DSM-5 low-desire diagnoses—which 
are now different for men and for women.
Frigid or Burning Up? Gendering Low-Desire Diagnoses 
and Sexual Dysfunctions in the DSM-5
At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the new alterna-
tive response models and the results of plethysmographic studies were in the 
sexological spotlight. All signs were pointing to the need for a new framework 
for understanding women’s sexuality, and for diagnosing women’s unique sex-
ual difficulties. Accordingly, in her description of the rationale for changes to 
the low-desire diagnosis for women in the DSM-5, powerhouse sex therapist, 
researcher, women’s health expert, and mindful-sex guru Lori Brotto (at the 
time also a member of the DSM-5 sexual and gender-identity disorders work 
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group and a close colleague of Rosemary Basson) made a case for the nor-
malcy of responsive female desire. In a research review and explanation of the 
proposed criteria for a new low-desire diagnosis for women, Brotto (2010a) 
highlighted the utility of the incentive motivation model in considering wom-
en’s desire patterns and further solidified the notion that women are more 
likely to experience this responsive, receptive, or “triggerable” desire, in addi-
tion to experiencing less “target specificity” than men when it comes to their 
physiological arousal, and more genital/subjective discordance. Brotto, along 
with Cynthia Graham (another member of the DSM-5 sexual and gender-
identity disorders work group), stated that research verifies that many women 
have a hard time distinguishing arousal from desire, or that these states tend 
to co-occur in women (see Brotto, 2010a; Graham, 2010). All of these ideas 
resonate not only with the alternative response models and psychophysiologi-
cal research that had become so popular in studying women’s sexuality in the 
1990s and early 2000s, but they also have an unfortunate resonance with some 
of the foundational tenets of evolutionary psychology—that male and female 
sexuality are organized very differently, constructed via entirely different sche-
mas, and seemingly existing on different planes of reality. Brotto’s and Gra-
ham’s discussions of the rationale are thorough and evidence-based; it is clear 
that they do not identify as evolutionary psychologists, and instead draw from 
quantitative and qualitative data drawn from clinical and community samples. 
But the framing of women’s sexuality in Brotto’s 2010 rationale, for instance, 
sounds too much at times like Baumeister’s (2000, 2004) female erotic plas-
ticity hypothesis and other arguments for evolutionary gender differences 
in sexual desire. She utilizes Basson’s circular sexual response cycle and the 
incentive motivation model to describe female interest and motivation for 
sex, and cites Meston and Buss (2007) in a description of the nonsexual, inti-
macy-oriented nature of these rational feminine incentives. And there is little 
attention paid to power dynamics that may influence these phenomena, even 
as the intended point of the diagnostic change is to recognize the variability 
in women’s sexuality, and to depathologize women’s responsive desire. This 
is another place where we see an evolutionary psychology hangover, even as 
the feminist-identified researchers of this era (who are now some of the most 
reputable and well-known in the world) seemed to have genuinely sought to 
understand, explain, and accommodate women’s distinct experience of sex.
After several decades of research on women’s lack of target-specific physi-
ological arousal and their subjective/genital discordance, hypotheses about 
women’s innate erotic plasticity and lack of sexual orientation, plenty of other 
evolutionary psychology tropes about an overriding drive to motherhood, and 
the institution and deployment of a few different alternative models for female 
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sexual response guided by the tenets of classical and operant conditioning and 
behaviorism, we arrive at the newest instantiation of female sexuality with 
the release of the DSM-5 in 2013. In this latest edition, low female desire is 
diagnosed as female sexual interest/arousal disorder (FSIAD), which took the 
place of hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in women and also incor-
porated the DSM-IV diagnosis of female sexual arousal disorder (FSAD). The 
revision subsumes the following criteria:
Lack of, or significantly reduced, sexual interest/arousal as manifested by at 
least three of the following:
1. Absent/reduced interest in sexual activity.
2. Absent/reduced sexual/erotic thoughts or fantasies.
3. No/reduced initiation of sexual activity, and typically unrecep-
tive to a partner’s attempts to initiate.
4. Absent/reduced sexual excitement/pleasure during sexual activ-
ity in almost all or all (approximately 75%–100%) sexual encoun-
ters (in identified situational contexts or, if generalized, in all 
contexts).
5. Absent/reduced sexual interest/arousal in response to any inter-
nal or external sexual/erotic cues (e.g., written, verbal, visual).
6. Absent/reduced genital or nongenital sensations during sexual 
activity in almost all or all (approximately 75%–100%) sexual 
encounters (in identified situational contexts or, if generalized, 
in all contexts). (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 433)
Whereas FSIAD is a female-specific diagnosis, low-desiring men are still diag-
nosed with HSDD (now male hypoactive sexual desire disorder, or MHSDD) 
under this new protocol. For comparison, I include the entry for MHSDD 
here, for which there is only one diagnostic criterion:
persistently or recurrently deficient (or absent) sexual/erotic thoughts or 
fantasies and desire for sexual activity. (American Psychological Associa-
tion, 2013, p. 440)
Regarding the new terminology for FSIAD, Brotto (2010a) reported that 
“interest” is a better descriptor than “desire” because it “emphasizes a broader 
construct than the more biological ‘drive’ connotations of sexual desire and it 
[a diagnosis of low sexual interest] reflects the lack of motivation [to engage in 
sex]” (p. 234). In this discussion of the diagnostic criteria, she does acknowl-
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edge that “interest” may not be an ideal term, given that some may feel that it 
is “devoid of any sexual meaning” (p. 234).
Given the moment in which this diagnosis was instituted, in light of the 
incredible popularity of plethysmographic research (the notion of female dis-
cordance is now a scientific truism), and the new sexual response models, it is 
appropriate to ask: What assumptions about female sexuality appear to under-
gird the FSIAD diagnosis? And what happened to desire here? Further, how 
did we end up at a place in the beginning of the twenty-first century wherein 
cognitive rational behaviorist models of sexuality seem more appropriate for 
women, whereas more traditional drive models continue to be applied to 
men? As a reminder: Interest (a stand-in for “desire” but with connotations 
that imply cognitive, incentive-based, and reward-seeking behavior—a ratio-
nal construct that is quite different from traditional formulations of the lusty 
and impetuous nature of desire) and arousal (physiological changes in genital 
response, including vaginal vasocongestion and lubrication) are understood 
as often out of sync for women, are often scientifically framed as unrelated 
facets of women’s sexualities, yet are simultaneously merged in this diagnosis. 
In fact, the merging of HSDD (low desire) and FSAD (low arousal) was based 
on research that suggests that many women have a hard time distinguishing 
arousal from desire. The architects of FSIAD have stated that what is actu-
ally being merged here is “desire” and “subjective arousal” (one’s own experi-
ence of one’s physiological arousal). But if research suggests that women tend 
to be unaware of their own physiological response, then, according to this 
logic, under what circumstances would they even have “subjective” arousal? 
The endless parsing of terms feels contradictory and the addition of subjective 
as a qualifier to arousal only solidifies the notion that confused, complex, dis-
cordant women need to be triggered to experience a sexual subjectivity that is 
not fully theirs to begin with.
These contradictions and paradoxes are alarming, and I worry that, even if 
it is unintentional, bringing together desire and arousal in this diagnosis, and 
highlighting “receptivity,” potentially perpetuates the notion that, for many 
women, it is actually the case that arousal precedes and perhaps even governs 
sexual willingness or interest—or at least that it does in sexually functional 
women. At the same time, the framing might lead one to believe that will-
ingness and interest are often nonsexual experiences for women, and that if 
they do precede arousal, are in many cases cognitive or rational in nature, 
divorced from the sexual body and divorced from an agentic want or need for 
sex itself (outside of a woman’s partner’s wants and needs). Amidst these tor-
tuous narratives of feminine interest and motivation, physiological response, 
and subjective arousal, desire—seemingly now passé, or even offensive—is 
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increasingly left out of the discussion completely. But how and why did a 
term associated with wanting become such a dirty word?
While the presumption of a singular, decontextualized, biologically based, 
testosterone-driven desire or “sexual urge” (Brotto, 2010a, p. 227) is arguably 
hegemonic and certainly worth questioning, setting up a binary between this 
masculine “urge” and an incentive-based feminine sexual “interest,” “respon-
sive arousal,” or set of “motivations” may be equally problematic. For one 
thing, a now-codified notion of healthy feminine receptivity implies that the 
woman who suffers from FSIAD (or at least a diagnosee who fits criteria #1 
and #3) is potentially dysfunctional for being uninterested in creating inti-
macy through sex with her partner, and she runs the risk of being patholo-
gized for being unreceptive to his attempts to initiate sexual activity—or, even 
if not diagnosed, she may understand herself this way. For another, it insinu-
ates that it is abnormal for a woman to not be concerned with the rewards she 
would otherwise receive by placating her partner or by laboring sexually to 
create a conciliatory environment in the relationship.13 Even if these ideas are 
not directly spelled out in the diagnosis, it is easy to see that the trajectory 
of how this diagnosis came to be tells a different story, and the concern that 
women and men may interpret the diagnosis to suggest these things is thus 
warranted.
FSIAD was borne out of the desire to stop pathologizing women for not 
having a linear sex drive, in accordance with the purportedly male-oriented 
mandate of Masters and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle. It was borne 
out of an attempt to reassure women that their responsive desire is normal, 
that they are not dysfunctional just because they don’t have spontaneous 
desire. But does the newest framing of women’s sexual response promoted 
in this diagnosis simply create a new set of criteria against which women will 
measure themselves? If women are not receptive, responsive, or triggerable, 
will they feel pathological? Like they are failing?
The researchers charged with creating this diagnosis have stated that the 
polythetic criteria of the diagnosis allows for the possibility of (a lack of) 
either spontaneous or responsive desire, and that the multiple criteria account 
for the variability in women’s sexuality (Graham, 2016). I acknowledge their 
 13. According to the new DSM-5, women will only be diagnosed with FSIAD if their low 
desire causes them “clinically significant distress,” thus ruling out those who are asexual. This 
is arguably an improvement over the old criterion of “interpersonal difficulty,” but I suggest 
that “significant distress” in many cases may very well be caused by “interpersonal difficulty” 
(i.e., a [tacitly male] partner’s frustrations over his female partner’s lack of desire, or, rather, his 
own lack of sexual satisfaction on account of this, not to mention a woman’s potential feelings 
of inadequacy for not being responsive enough when sexuality feels so compulsory in Global 
North societies).
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intentions, but again, my point here is not to suggest that those who designed 
the diagnosis are malicious misogynists, but rather to outline the troubled 
trajectory of research (including research conducted in the name of feminism) 
that led up to FSIAD’s institution, to highlight the scientific background (i.e., 
apolitical/atheoretical behaviorism combined with evolutionary psychology) 
within which it resides, and to point to the way this diagnosis clearly looks 
on paper. Further, the polythetic diagnostic criteria that are meant to sug-
gest the variability in women’s desire reify the notion that women’s sexuality 
is complex and complicated—which may very well be true for some women. 
But, if it is true, we have no good explanation in the DSM-5 or its supporting 
discourses for why it is the case. What we do have, however, is one diagnosis 
that looks quite complex and confusing (the one for women), juxtaposed next 
to another that is very streamlined and simple (the one for men).
Many gendered assumptions are directly spelled out in the language of the 
full FSIAD diagnostic entry, and this contrast between textual instantiations 
of masculine and feminine desire is particularly evident when comparing 
FSIAD to MHSDD.14 The terms interest and responsiveness are not used in the 
MHSDD “Diagnostic Criteria” at all, whereas in the section entitled “Diagnos-
tic Features” (which directly follows the “Diagnostic Criteria” for all diagnoses 
in the DSM) in the entry for FSIAD, these terms are articulated throughout:
In one woman, sexual interest/arousal disorder may be expressed as a lack 
of interest in sexual activity, an absence of erotic or sexual thoughts, and 
reluctance to initiate sexual activity and respond to a partner’s sexual invita-
tions. In another woman, an inability to become sexually excited, to respond 
to sexual stimuli with sexual desire, and a corresponding lack of signs of 
physical sexual arousal may be the primary features. (American Psychologi-
cal Association, 2013, pp. 433–434)
Here, the notion that even women with “normal” levels of interest and arousal 
are presumed to not feel sexual until their partner “invites” them to “respond 
with desire” is instantiated. In contrast, in the MHSDD diagnosis, sexual 
“receptivity” or “responsiveness” to a partner’s advances are not discussed in 
the beginning of the entry in either the “Diagnostic Criteria” or the “Diagnos-
tic Features” sections, and are instead not mentioned at all until the “Asso-
 14. For men, desire and arousal disorders were retained as separate entities, although it is 
worth noting that Brotto (2010b) suggested they may be brought together, and that responsive-
ness may also be normal for men. It is unfortunate that Brotto’s recommendations were not 
taken up in the final version of the DSM-5. More recently, Murray (2019) has suggested the need 
for a different framework for men’s sexuality and desire.
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ciated Features Supporting Diagnosis” section, much later on in the entry. 
When these constructs are introduced, it is with a qualifier regarding men’s 
situational preference for their partner to initiate sex (thus their own respon-
siveness is not framed as a core component of male sexuality):
Although men are more likely to initiate sexual activity, and thus low desire 
may be characterized by a pattern of non-initiation, many men may prefer 
to have their partner initiate sexual activity. In such situations, the man’s lack 
of receptivity to a partner’s initiation should be considered when evaluating 
low desire. (American Psychological Association, 2013, p. 441)
Later in the entry, in the “Gender-Related Diagnostic Issues” section, this 
notion of “initiation” or “invitation” as a thoroughly masculine sexual trait is 
rearticulated very clearly:
In contrast to .  .  . sexual disorders in women, desire and arousal disorders 
have been retained as separate constructs in men.  .  .  . [M]en do report a 
significantly higher intensity and frequency of sexual desire compared with 
women. (pp. 442–443)
Throughout the diagnostic terminology, the disproportionate use of the lan-
guage of the incentive motivation model specifically for women is evident. 
Elements of the feminized receptivity discourse of Basson’s circular sexual 
response cycle for women, in addition to notions of gender differences in sub-
jective/genital concordance, have also been imported into the diagnosis. Men’s 
and women’s sexual dysfunctions—and thus their healthy states, as counter-
parts—are framed as disparate. If we trust that Basson’s clinical research and 
Chivers’s experimental research are scientifically valid and replicable, we 
might still ask: Where do these gender differences come from? How do they 
manifest? And what do they indicate in terms of treatment for sexual prob-
lems—for cis and trans men and women, for agender and nonbinary individu-
als? For queer- and straight-identified folks?
There are many other important divergences in the diagnoses of MHSDD 
and FSIAD, including how sexual and erotic thoughts or fantasies are framed 
in each (these are framed as more central for men), what constitutes an “adap-
tive response to adverse life conditions” and would thus preclude a diagno-
sis (the example offered for MHSDD is of a man whose desire has suffered 
because his partner becomes pregnant at the same time that he is planning 
on ending the relationship [!], while no example of an “adaptive response” is 
offered for women), and the role of psychophysiological data in understanding 
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dysfunction (for FSIAD, plethysmographic research is cited that suggests that 
dysfunctional women, like normal women, have high rates of physiological 
arousal even if their subjective arousal does not match this state; postulations 
about male concordance are thus insinuated by proxy, but are not explicitly 
included in the MHSDD criteria). Further, “severe relationship distress,” such 
as “partner violence,” is mentioned as a possible reason to not diagnose a 
woman with FSIAD, but this arguably neglects many forms of complex, every-
day, banal, and insidious traumas (Cvetkovich, 2003) that may be comorbid 
with low desire yet are not discussed in the diagnosis (for more on the impor-
tant role of trauma in sexual desire and its dysfunctions, see Spurgas, 2016a, 
2016b and chapters 4 and 5 of this book).
In the wake of and leading up to the publication of the DSM-5, many clini-
cians expressed concerns about the “lumping together” of arousal and desire 
for women, and also of what they saw as an “ideological” importing of Bas-
son’s circular model into the female-specific diagnosis (see Balon & Clayton, 
2014; DeRogatis, Clayton, Rosen, Sand, & Pyke, 2011). In addition to doctors 
and sexologists being divided on the new diagnosis and associated framework, 
sociologists, therapists, and other scholars have also registered concerns about 
the naturalizing of women’s responsiveness. Narratives about an essential fem-
inine proclivity to seek out sexual rewards and benefits may be harmful to 
women who identify as having low desire, a point that Tyler (2009) has eluci-
dated. Regarding the formulation of feminine receptivity as a “willingness to 
proceed [with sexual activity] despite absence of sexual desire at that instant” 
(as cited in Basson, 2002), Tyler (2009) makes the case that “using receptiv-
ity as a benchmark for women’s sexual desire may actually reinforce male 
sexual demands, and promote coercive sex in heterosexual relationships” (p. 
41). Przybylo (2013) has made similar points regarding the precarious position 
that the notion of low female concordance puts asexual women in, specifically 
stating that this “sleeping beauty model” of receptive female sexuality “sug-
gests that women are in a sense incapable of being asexual” (p. 236)—as they 
are understood to be always on the precipice of noticing, and perhaps pursu-
ing, their physiological arousal, thus disqualifying them from a “true” asexual 
identity. And Flore (2016) describes the FSIAD diagnosis itself as a framework 
for sexual training, as a way for patients to fashion their own sexual subjectiv-
ity, with the burden of this management falling on women.
Kleinplatz (2011) has also expressed concerns about the resignation of 
women to substandard sex that they do not really want to engage in. She 
states, “We often proceed as if low frequency of desire were evidence of psy-
chopathology whereas it may instead be evidence of good judgment” (p. 7). 
She goes on to describe how patterns of low desire can become relationally 
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sedimented for women, through distasteful and unsatisfying experiences with 
sex, and how women ultimately learn that they should be receptive to their 
partners’ advances:
The usual pattern . . . involves increasing episodes of mediocre sex, leading 
to lowered arousal during sex, which results in low satisfaction after sex. . . . 
[M]any [women] choose to continue engaging in sex out of commitment to 
relational harmony .  .  . even though this entails having sex without sexual 
desire. Or sometimes, they follow the “just do it” approach because they 
have read that women’s desire tends to be receptive rather than coming from 
within (p. 8)
Here, Kleinplatz elucidates the ways this pattern of sexual servicing comes 
into existence in a heterosexual relationship, throwing the circular sexual 
response cycle into stark relief. She frames this not in terms of coercion per 
se, but contributes a sad vision of extremely bland and thoroughly annoy-
ing, frustrating, and lackluster sex that some women feel they must endure to 
make their partners happy. Rather than attributing this notion of sexual ser-
vice to women’s natural receptivity and responsiveness in essential or biologi-
cal terms, or sugar-coating it by suggesting it as a normative way for women 
to enjoy sex more, Kleinplatz exposes how women learn to provide sexual ser-
vices to their male partners, and explains why this leads to unenjoyable sex for 
both parties. Thus, she provides a much-needed corrective to the dominant 
discourses about responsive feminine sexuality.
Louise, a psychologist and activist I interviewed, also contributed a cri-
tique of Basson’s circular sexual response cycle:
I don’t feel that it’s an escape from the box. I think it’s probably a more 
female-friendly box, but I think it’s a box. It doesn’t describe a lot of women 
I know who have a different thing going on, and I think it’s too prescrip-
tive, as in really not as descriptive as you would think—it’s more prescrip-
tive. I think it’s become popular because it sounds good, but it’s too narrow, 
it doesn’t take enough factors into account, it doesn’t take enough diver-
sity into account, diversity that I understand to be part of people’s sexual 
makeup.  .  .  . I’m not crazy about her [Basson’s] model, and I’m not crazy 
about any model, because I don’t think there is a model.
Beyond these practical and clinical critiques of responsive desire as they 
pertain to heterosexual relationships and women’s sexual identities, I am 
concerned with the overarching tales that this logic promotes and deploys 
INTEREST, AROUSAL, AND MOTIVATION IN CONTEMPORARY SExOLOGY • 91
regarding femininity, female sexuality, and heteronormative gender relations 
more broadly—including with how these might affect individuals of diverse 
gender identities, sexualities, and lifestyles.
Two of the low-desiring women I interviewed for this study had been 
treated in a program designed to help women with female sexual dysfunc-
tions, including vulvodynia and comorbid HSDD in women (their treatment 
was prior to the publication of the DSM-5 and thus the institution of the 
FSIAD diagnosis). One of these participants, Astrid, had deep criticisms of 
the program, and specifically of aspects of the treatment protocol that were 
clearly implementations of Basson’s circular sexual response cycle and incen-
tive motivation model as these are applied to women:
That’s where I began to hear about this cycle. . . . [T]hey explained that in the 
course of a normal relationship, a heterosexual relationship just understood, 
that perhaps when you first start out that both the man and the woman 
might experience this “spontaneous desire” for sex with each other but as 
time would go on the man might still experience that but the woman would 
no longer experience the spontaneous sexual desire but what she would 
experience instead would be sort of a willingness to engage in sex. So like for 
reasons of increasing the intimacy levels or whatever, like “we get to cuddle 
at the end” and stuff, that we would have been willing to respond to the 
advances of our husbands or the men in our lives, and that this is kind of 
how normal relationships go.
In Astrid’s comments, the heteronormative bias of the feminized responsive 
desire framework—as it is produced through sexual difference narratives in 
evolutionary sexology, alternative female sexual response cycles and diagnoses, 
and clinical protocols that treat women based on ideas about their essential 
“discordance”—is clearly exposed. It is also clear how, through this treatment 
program, women were taught what the normative framework for female desire 
is—a framework that is based on receptivity, responsiveness, and a willingness 
to be seduced or coaxed into sex by an initiating male partner. They were also 
tacitly taught that the kind of sex they were not going to naturally or sponta-
neously desire, but that they should be receptive to engaging in for their male 
partner’s benefit, likely involved penetrative intercourse with accompanying 
male pleasure (and male orgasm). Thus, women in this program were taught 
not only what their own desire (or lack thereof) should feel like, but what kind 
of sex they were meant to be engaging in, and for whose enjoyment.
These clinicians’ and patients’ critiques of FSIAD and its associated dis-
courses support my previously stated concerns about the trajectory of the new 
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science of female sexuality and the feminized responsive desire framework. 
Here, an emphasis on feminine responsiveness, receptivity, flexibility, and 
complexity does not sound so liberating for women. This is particularly so 
when feminine complexity and flexibility are juxtaposed against masculine 
desire’s stability, constancy, activity, and (dependable) spontaneity. Many of 
those who have argued most vehemently for a different model of female sexual 
response have done so in order to challenge the rigidity and normativity of 
earlier conceptions of desire: something it has been argued time and again that 
women simply do not have in the same way that men do. FSIAD reinforces 
this notion of feminine lack. In the new FSIAD diagnosis, we see the formu-
lation that for women, sexual interest often follows physical arousal, desire 
is no longer even part of the equation, and, for more than a quarter of the 
premenopausal female population in the US (Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; 
West et al., 2008), getting the psyche in line with the body during any given 
sexual experience may require quite a bit of coaxing. So, although a critique 
of the traditional, linear HSRC may be timely and worthwhile, it is important 
to consider the retrograde gendered implications of this diagnostic shift—par-
ticularly in light of the rising prevalence of experimental research on gender 
differences in sexual behavior and desire, the deluge of media spotlighting of 
and public attention to women’s responsive desire, and the explosion of treat-
ment protocols for female patients who present with desire troubles. In the 
twenty-first century, these protocols extend well beyond the clinic.
Bringing Bodies and Minds into Line: Brain Drugs and 
Mindfulness-Based Sex Therapy
Since the blockbuster success of Viagra—the little blue pill to enhance erec-
tion, rolled out by Pfizer in 1998 in the US, with many other locales soon to 
follow—there has been increasing investment in treatments for “female sexual 
dysfunction,” or FSD. This amorphous catch-all category, and how it came 
to be, has been critiqued extensively elsewhere (for examples, see Cacchioni, 
2015; Kleinplatz, 2018; Kleinplatz et al., 2020; Moynihan, 2005; Moynihan & 
Mintzes, 2010; Tiefer, 2006, 2012). But the most important part, for my story, 
is how the aspect of female sexuality that was eventually determined to be the 
most useful to home in on, invest in, and ultimately modulate is low desire. 
Over the last several decades, low desire has increasingly been framed as 
women’s number-one sexual problem.
In 2010, the neuro-drug flibanserin went through US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) trials but was not approved (D. Wilson, 2010), in 
INTEREST, AROUSAL, AND MOTIVATION IN CONTEMPORARY SExOLOGY • 93
part due to protest by a critical outpouring of members of the anti-FSD New 
View Campaign15 along with other antimedicalization activists who argued 
that the drug had been created to fix a problem that didn’t exist, solely for 
the purpose of making a profit (for these activists, it was the quintessential 
modern example of “disease-mongering”). But a few years later, in August 
2015, flibanserin was finally passed by the FDA, due in part to a purport-
edly “grassroots” movement of women advocating gender equality in regard 
to pharmaceutical treatments for sexual problems—many of whom had been 
paid by Sprout Pharmaceuticals, the company that then bought the rights to 
the drug. Flibanserin, now brand name Addyi, is a neurotransmitter drug 
that works on the central nervous system, specifically by decreasing serotonin 
uptake while increasing dopamine and norepinephrine, purportedly enhanc-
ing libido in women (Stahl, Sommer, & Allers, 2011). Newer additions to the 
neuro-pharmaceutical lineup are Lybrido and Lybridos, which are currently 
still undergoing field trials (Bergner, 2013a). And most recently, in the sum-
mer of 2019, bremelanotide (brand name Vyleesi), which works by activating 
melanocortin receptors in the brain, was also approved by the FDA. Phar-
maceutical treatments for women’s desire problems have been referred to as 
“pink Viagras,” but to analogize these treatments with Viagra is inappropriate 
for a number of reasons. Conceptually comparing the ways the drugs work 
illustrates the differences.
In their critiques of the cultural and medical fixation on Viagra in the 
early 2000s, Mamo and Fishman (2001) and Loe (2004) elucidated the com-
pulsory heterosexuality prescribed by pharmaceutical technologizing of the 
male erection. They argued that by focusing all attention on the mechanical 
workings of the penis—or lack of this function, in the case of erectile disor-
der—Viagra and the culture surrounding it perpetuate the notions that male 
desire never falters and is available in a never-ending supply. Thus, Viagra 
posits male sexual problems as generally physical rather than psychological, 
and concomitantly legitimates heteronormative penile-vaginal intercourse as 
the proper, healthy, and ideal way to have sex.
Much of the feminist antimedicalization critique that was once (in the 
1980s and 1990s, specifically) directed at deconstructing DSM diagnoses, 
associated gender-essentializing research on sexuality, and other pathologiz-
ing medical discourses has now been redirected somewhat myopically toward 
attacking the pharmaceutical industry (Angel, 2012, 2013; Spurgas, 2013a, 
2013b). Leading up to the publication of the DSM-5, there was no antimedi-
 15. “FDA Hearing on Flibanserin,” New View Campaign website: http://www.newview-
campaign.org/flibanserin.asp
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calization activist critique of the new feminized sexual response models or 
impending FSIAD diagnosis, and all of that energy instead went to tearing 
down Big Pharma. However, it seems self-evident that if sexual responsiveness 
is now part of the framework for healthy sexuality in women, and via the logic 
of plethysmographic studies and the circular sexual response cycle women are 
understood to be always already aroused/arousable (physiologically)—they 
just have a hard time getting “motivated” and are thus often discordant—then 
altering their brain chemistry via drugs would be an obvious targeted treat-
ment option. Popular medical discourses concretize the notions that Viagra 
brings the (disordered) body into line with the (intact, normal, and sexually 
healthy/functioning) mind for men, while neurotransmitter drugs like fliban-
serin bring the (disordered) mind into line with the (intact, normal, and sexu-
ally healthy/functioning) body for women. In men, the problem is framed as 
hydraulic, mechanical, and easy to fix, whereas in women the problem is in 
the organization or design of the system itself: There is a computational error. 
Thus, that flibanserin (a drug that had previously been used as an antidepres-
sant) is sometimes referred to as the “pink” or “female” Viagra is actually very 
misleading, as the mechanism of action is entirely different.
I think it is more useful to critique the gendered foundation upon which 
these sexual dysfunction drugs operate than the marketing of the drugs or 
corporate “profiteering.” I say this for a few reasons: (1) Critiques of capitalism 
are certainly warranted (this book includes that type of critique), but there is 
much more to be wary of under capitalism than “corporate industry” (e.g., 
neoliberal governmentality and regimes of biopolitical self-enhancement). 
(2) These critics don’t consider the queer off-label ways that drugs are taken 
beyond their intended use (e.g., gay men who use Viagra to maintain erec-
tions for longer—see Race, 2009 for more on this). (3) Building on the last 
point, these critiques assume a natural body that is modified by drugs in a 
way that other techniques (such as mindfulness) do not modify that body, and 
that drugs are somehow more “harmful” to that body. And (4) these critics 
position women in such a way that they must not engage in drug treatment if 
they are to be “good feminists.” It is thus a purist argument. More than that, it 
has functioned as a strawman so that critics of a variety of stripes could band 
together “against FSD” (anyone who is “anti–Big Pharma” is now an “activist” 
and a “feminist”), and in this way, it has diluted robust dialogues around the 
medical construction and management of women’s sexuality.
In fact, flibanserin’s mechanism of action functions fully within the logic 
of female receptivity that I have been outlining. This may seem paradoxical, 
as there has been much activist outcry against the drugs by the same people 
who support the feminized responsive desire framework. But I want to place 
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the development of neuro drugs to enhance women’s desire squarely within 
the rest of the history I have put forward in this chapter. It is part and parcel 
of the shift, since the late 1990s, toward measuring the gap between women’s 
subjective and genital arousal (with the physiological generally understood 
to be fully functional and ready to go even as motivation might lag), toward 
conceptualizing women’s sexuality as on a completely different plane than 
men’s sexuality (and often in apolitical, atheoretical, or biologically essential-
ist terms), and toward postulating evolutionary psychology–derived explana-
tions for gender differences in sexual “interests,” “motivations,” “incentives,” 
and “rewards.” Flibanserin and the feminized responsive desire framework are 
two sides of the same coin.
In addition to pharmaceutical management of female sexual dysfunction, 
other therapeutic treatments are becoming more and more popular. As psy-
choanalytic and psychodynamic explanations and treatments for sexual prob-
lems have fallen out of vogue in the past decades, cognitive behavioral therapy 
(CBT) techniques have taken their place. CBT is a psychotherapeutic theory 
and practice in which goal-oriented, explicit, and systematic procedures are 
utilized to change one’s thinking or relationship to thinking, so that behavioral 
changes may follow. It can be conceived as a method of self-directed behav-
ioral training. While CBT has been used to treat sexual dysfunction, mindful-
ness-based techniques are increasingly used today. Both techniques focus on 
awareness of thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations, but they proceed from 
slightly different principles. While CBT is geared toward defusing and ulti-
mately changing negative or biased thoughts, mindfulness-based techniques 
focus on helping patients sit with negative thoughts “nonjudgmentally” while 
eventually letting them pass, rather than attempting to change them. Mind-
fulness has been described as the “third wave” of behavior-based therapies 
(Brotto, 2011), with its focus on awareness, bodily attunement, and acceptance.
Mindfulness as part of a scientific and medical enterprise made its popu-
lar entrée in the North American scene in the 1990s, and fully took off with 
the publication of Jon Kabat-Zinn’s Full Catastrophe Living: How to Cope with 
Stress, Pain and Illness Using Mindfulness Meditation in 1990. Kabat-Zinn had 
been developing his approach to mindfulness and applying it with patients 
with chronic pain, stress, anxiety, and depression since the late 1970s—in 
a protocol now known as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). By 
allowing patients to sit with their pain and acknowledge it nonjudgmentally, 
this technique was shown to be effective at reducing the accompanying nega-
tive affects associated with pain (if not pain itself) and with helping suffer-
ers cope. The technique was implemented more fully for depression with the 
publication of Segal, Williams, and Teasdale’s Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
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Therapy (MBCT) for Depression in 2001, and it has also been applied to the 
treatment of borderline personality disorder (BPD) and associated symptoms 
via dialectical behavior therapy (DBT). In her 2018 Better Sex through Mind-
fulness: How Women Can Cultivate Desire, Lori Brotto, of the DSM-5 sexual 
dysfunctions work group, describes how she learned about mindfulness at 
the turn of the twenty-first century and began strategizing how it might be 
applied to women with low desire and other sexual disorders. Over the next 
couple of years while working alongside Rosemary Basson at the University 
of British Columbia, Brotto would design one of the most successful contem-
porary nonpharmaceutical treatments for sexual difficulties in women. And 
in a milieu in which it seems that one can only be either on the side of “Big 
Pharma” or against it when it comes to the treatment of female sexual dys-
function, Brotto’s technique was lauded—and has been branded as a feminist 
alternative to the “little pink pill.”
The protocol, now known as mindfulness-based sex therapy, or MBST, 
emphasizes the notion of “being in the present” and is rooted in the concept of 
mindfulness as it appears in Buddhist spiritual practices (in addition to Kabat-
Zinn, Brotto references the work of Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh as an 
important inspiration). Many of the other practitioners who were involved in 
designing FSIAD and/or who have conducted plethysmographic research or 
research on the circular sexual response cycle for women have supported the 
use of MBST as a therapeutic tool to improve the low-desiring woman’s sexual 
response. MBST is often used within a therapeutic setting involving multiple 
women who experience low desire or other sexual dysfunctions, in the con-
text of psychoeducational (PED) interventions that may integrate elements of 
sensory training, body scans, and mindfulness meditation (Brotto, Basson, & 
Luria, 2008). Patients engage in “self-observation” and “touch” exercises as 
homework assignments that challenge them to imagine themselves as “com-
petent, sexual, feminine, and sensual” (Brotto, Krychman, & Jacobson, 2008, 
p. 2743). They also engage in group activities, some of which involve concen-
trating on the sensual qualities of an object, such as a penny or a raisin, over a 
period of several minutes, in order to train themselves to remain focused on 
one thing, in the present, and to notice it in a new way.
Via MBST, women are taught to utilize these meditation and mindfulness 
techniques to become more aware of their physiological arousal, most often in 
the context of heterosexual relationships where female desire has waned, thus 
creating problematic “desire discrepancies.” They may use a variety of sensate-
focus-style techniques to bring their bodies and minds back into line—in fact, 
Brotto has explicitly stated that Masters and Johnson, with their tool of sen-
sate focus, were really the first to apply mindfulness in sex therapy (Brotto, 
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2018). What is interesting now is that women are expected to, at least as a 
first step, do this work on their own rather than with a partner—so sensate 
focus has become individualized here. Brotto also links MBST specifically to 
Basson’s circular sexual response cycle (this model and women’s responsive 
desire are generally themes at the mindfulness sessions and are taught to par-
ticipants) and to plethysmographic research that highlights female genital/
subjective discordance, and she states that part of the goal of mindfulness is 
to help women “tune in” to their physiological arousal, in order to ignite or 
“cultivate” their own responsive desire. In her 2018 popular self-help book, 
she states:
We have evidence that, in general, women’s concordance between their self-
reported and physical sexual response is low, and that training in mindful-
ness significantly increases the degree of mind-to-body communication and 
improves self-reported interoceptive awareness. . . . [M]indfulness teaches 
women to become more aware of their internal bodily sensations, includ-
ing sexual sensations, and this may improve their motivations for sex and 
increase their tendency to notice sexual arousal and have that arousal trig-
ger sexual desire. (p. 154)
Meditation has become a very popular technique for naturally or holistically 
treating all types of ills today and is clearly effective for many ailments. But 
my data raise concerns that utilizing mindfulness in this particular fashion 
potentially sets up women to push through or at least accept traumatic feel-
ings and even to have sex in the name of being responsive and receptive, and 
promoting relational harmony (M. Barker, 2013 also raises this concern). This 
line of research, diagnosis, and treatment protocol together exemplify how 
women’s sexuality is configured within contemporary sexual medicine and 
outside of it in alternative and self-help health spheres, a deployment that 
arguably perpetuates the naturalization of female receptivity and the notion 
that women should work on themselves sexually. CBT is explicitly intended to 
challenge “irrational” beliefs about sexuality. As the third wave of behavioral 
therapy applies to sex, mindfulness-based sex therapy is intended to increase 
sexual interoception, or one’s ability to perceive one’s own embodied sexual 
response, including genital arousal “in the present,” rather than becoming 
consumed with negative thoughts about the past, future, or any other distrac-
tions (including, implicitly, past traumas or experiences of violence). Chivers 
and Brotto (2017) state: “Mindfulness training induces functional changes in 
the insula (an area of the brain associated with awareness of body states), and 
it decreases activation of the amygdala and areas of the ventromedial pre-
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frontal cortex (Holzel et al., 2011) associated with emotions” (p. 17). Brotto 
has elsewhere been quoted as stating that mindfulness-based sex therapy can 
change the very “structure of the brain” and its processes, and that in this 
way, it is similar to the drug Addyi.16 Thus, while MBST is popularly framed 
as more female-friendly than taking a drug to increase one’s desire, I wonder 
how similar the two actually are. In both cases, sexual problems are individu-
alized17 and women ostensibly alter their brain chemistry in order to get in 
touch with their natural and free-flowing objective physiological arousal from 
which their minds have become disconnected. The burden of working on sex 
falls on women, and, in the case of mindfulness meditation, there’s actually 
quite a bit of work to do.
Kelly, one participant in my study, succinctly explains the problems with 
using behavioral techniques in a clinical setting as a form of receptivity man-
agement. In the program she attended to treat genital pain and low desire, she 
had been encouraged to utilize both vaginal dilators and mindfulness (MBST 
was in its nascent stages when she was in the program) to ease her pain and 
enhance her desire:
The idea was [to use behavioral techniques] so that I could continue to have 
sex, which is kind of weird because if I didn’t want to have sex, why am I 
doing exercises so I can continue doing it? So that was kind of strange—and 
male-focused! Because if I wasn’t enjoying sex at the time, then it’s some-
thing that I’m doing almost just so that my boyfriend can still have sex with 
me; it wasn’t something that would help me with my own pleasure.
Astrid further describes her experience with being instructed to relax and 
be responsive toward her male partner, and to use behavioral techniques to 
do so:
So [the idea was that] like in the beginning, you have mutual desire that’s 
like, you see each other and you desire each other, but as things go on the 
dude still has that but the lady doesn’t have that anymore, and so she’s I guess 
like more willing to be seduced. . . . [Later in the course of the program,] the 
men [male partners] were given a chance to talk about how frustrated they 
 16. Video interview on Dr. Justin Lehmiller’s Sex & Psychology blog: https://www.lehmiller.
com/blog/2018/4/23/better-sex-through-mindfulness-an-interview-with-dr-lori-brotto-video
 17. See K. Barker (2014) for a discussion of mindfulness meditation as “do-it-yourself 
medicalization of every moment” and Gregg (2018) and Purser (2019) for further critiques of 
mindfulness as part of the neoliberalization of self-care under late capitalism and for discus-
sions of how the technique is often used to individualize care in the name of productivity.
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were, then they were educated in this “response cycle” thing.  .  .  . [T]hat’s 
exactly what they were taught about, that we had also been taught about: 
“Well, you might feel spontaneous desire for her, but she may need to be 
coaxed into it” kind of thing.
Here, we see these ideas that are put forward in the feminized responsive 
desire framework—including notions of women’s complexity, their receptiv-
ity or responsiveness, and a feminine desire that is motivated primarily by 
cost-benefit analyses for nonsexual rewards—thrown starkly into the spotlight 
via the technique of MBST. Kelly’s and Astrid’s comments make it clear that 
although all of this research and treatment is done in the name of helping 
women, in some cases, it becomes a prescription for work and even coercion, 
it further confuses the murky notion of consent, and it encourages women to 
assume that there is a specific way they should be having sex and that they 
should be having sex for specific reasons. Using MBST in this way thus has the 
potential to compound women’s existing sexual traumas, or even to retrauma-
tize them, iatrogenically.
Brotto herself acknowledges that sexual dysfunction is highly correlated 
with sexual trauma (which is notable given that post-traumatic stress disor-
der [PTSD] is not discussed as comorbid in the FSIAD diagnosis—a point I 
have discussed at length elsewhere; see Spurgas, 2016a and also Yehuda, Leh-
rner, & Rosenbaum, 2015 for more on this comorbidity). In a 2012 article that 
analyzes the relationships between sexual dysfunction and childhood sexual 
abuse, Brotto, Seal, and Rellini state: “Despite the presence of (sometimes 
strong) physical sexual sensations, her mental awareness may have deliber-
ately gone to a nonsexual fantasy world, leading to repeated experiences of 
physical arousal paired with dissociation” (p. 2). Here, the fact that sexual 
trauma often leads to dissociation in sexual abuse survivors is a critical coun-
terpoint to the notion that women—particularly androphilic women—are 
“naturally” discordant. And the treatment options become even more suspect 
when we question whether discordance is (at least in some cases) the product 
of trauma or whether it is part and parcel of “natural feminine receptivity.” 
This requires critical ethical consideration, especially when one of the most 
popular techniques for remedying women’s discordance (or maybe it’s disso-
ciation?) is now most certainly MBST.
While the benefits of being “in the present,” mindful, and attuned to one’s 
body and experiences are undeniably beneficial to some women (and men) 
broadly, the pairing of a technique such as this with discourses of female recep-
tivity—receptivity of the psyche to the body, and receptivity of a woman to her 
initiating partner—is potentially harmful. It is because men and women are 
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posited as inherently different kinds of sexual beings that the use of CBT and 
MBST techniques to alter sexual experience becomes worrisome. In assessing 
these technologies and their use in the current moment, we must responsibly 
inquire: What are the goals of these techniques? What is the underlying theory 
regarding masculine versus feminine sexuality that is espoused within this 
framework? What forms of desire are encouraged, and which escape, or which 
are produced but go unaccounted for or are neglected in these interventions? 
MBST is increasingly used in therapeutic settings in which women learn 
to maintain awareness and eventually let go of the “negative” thoughts that 
might prevent them from harnessing their responsive desire or from taking 
advantage of an opportunity to be sexual in their everyday lives (for instance, 
when stimulated by an initiating partner). Brotto (2018) uses the word training 
throughout her book to describe the practice of learning mindfulness. How is 
this technique a type of gendered desire training, and what are women being 
trained (and training themselves) to experience or to engage in? To enjoy? To 
ignore? And to what end? Within a framework in which feminine desire is 
discursively absent; in which “interest” is framed as cognitive, rational, and a 
cost-benefit analysis; in which “arousal” is often read as physiological; and in 
which interest and arousal are posited as often out of sync for women—mind-
fulness appears to be more about bringing the frigid mind into line with the 
lustful body than with simply bringing the two into harmony. This arrange-
ment lends itself too easily to a potential service requirement of the feminine 
to their tacitly masculine partners, and betrays the assumption that, within 
these discourses, the truth of (feminine) desire is produced as originating in 
the aroused body—or possibly outside of it, in the (cis male) partner and his 
sexual needs or more broadly within normative and compulsory heteropatri-
archal conceptions of sex.
Implications of Shifting Diagnoses: Behaviorism and 
Sexual (Self-)Management
In an effort to free female desire from the prescriptions of linear, goal-oriented 
“drive” or “deficit” models, the contemporary science of female sexuality has 
created a new set of prescriptions. This was not the result of malintent of any 
specific actors, but rather the result of a variety of discourses and practices 
coming together in a specific moment to form the feminized responsive desire 
framework. A taxonomy for healthy and dysfunctional feminine desire is pro-
duced via FSIAD, in the new sexual response models, via plethysmographic 
research on female discordance, with new drugs and mindfulness treatments 
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for desire cultivation, along with activism to promote a new view of women’s 
sexuality—and, taken together, all of this has made femininity newly produc-
tive and moldable in the twenty-first century. The gap of feminine discordance 
itself is now a site of modulation, and receptivity and responsiveness are the 
new bywords of sexual production—or sexualized social reproduction—under 
neoliberal capitalism. Femininity here is complex and complicated, responsive 
and receptive, discordant and disconnected—and thus perfect for mining, cul-
tivating, and putting to work. This is the heart of the biopolitics of femininity.
How bodies, lives, and relationships are modulated and made productive 
through the biopolitical discourses of public health, epidemiology, psychiatry, 
medicine, and technoscience is of key concern in understanding biopolitics. 
For Foucault (1978), the most important site of modulation through these 
discourses is unequivocally human sexuality. We can understand sex as the 
nexus between the public and private, the population and the individual, the 
species body and the body-as-machine. In his discussion of the deployment 
of sexuality, Foucault (1978) elucidates a shift from the disciplinary or “deduc-
tive” (p. 136) power of the sovereign to the “regulatory control” (p. 139) of a 
cluster of powerful relations that took the form of an apparatus of govern-
mentality, or what Deleuze (1992) would later call a “control society.” One of 
the most important characteristics of this shift is that regulation is no longer 
focused on the domination and punishment of the individual transgressor, but 
is rather framed as a means of protecting the larger populace from “biologi-
cal dangers” (Foucault, 1978, p. 138) that, if not preemptively guarded against, 
could potentially destroy the human race or species body. This guarding must 
come in the form of both surveilling and policing others—in addition to our-
selves. Foucault (2000) and followers of his later work have emphasized that 
within this shift to governmentality, prescriptions for how individuals can and 
should regulate their own behavior are brought to the fore, and these prescrip-
tions for leading a healthy and productive lifestyle are always asymptotic (they 
are impossible to reach, and thus we are always striving to be better citizens 
within a framework of constantly shifting prescriptions). The speculative logic 
through which debilitated sexuality registers as a biological danger also has a 
flip side, wherein sex is framed as a site of optimization useful for securitizing 
populations and for generating productive subjects, perpetually in search of 
“the good life” (Berlant, 2011).
In this case, the best life is always sought, as subjects maintain optimism 
regarding how good sex could or should be (i.e., it can always be better). Our 
contemporary cultural formulations of these mechanisms of (self-)control and 
(self-)optimization are evidenced by a proliferation of media accounts that 
espouse a keen interest in healthy sex as a mode of producing healthy citizens, 
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and we see these accounts particularly in women-targeted magazines and on 
self-help websites (for an example, see Jones, 2011). These regimens are not 
purely medical—they may come to us increasingly in the form of “alternative” 
medicine and “lifestyle” medicine (Clarke et al., 2003; Frank & Jones, 2003). 
The feminized sexual self-optimization that I describe in this book resonates 
with notions of compulsory sexuality (Gupta, 2015; Gupta & Cacchioni, 2013) 
and its adjacent aspects, including compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1980), 
compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer, 2006), and other sexualized, gendered, 
raced, and otherwise embodied citizenship protocols (Ahmed, 2010; Barounis, 
2019; Borck & Moore, 2019; Cacchioni & Wolkowitz, 2011; Cossman, 2007; 
Preciado, 2013; Repo, 2016). The racialization of regimes of sexual difference 
must also be forefronted (Schuller, 2016; Snorton, 2017)—as the receptive fem-
ininity that is prescribed here is not only cisgender and heterosexual but also 
white and bourgeois.
In her discussion of erotic and orgasmic reconditioning via behaviorism 
in the 1950s (and its infamous use to reconfigure the sexual orientation of gay 
men), Jagose (2013) describes how, given its relatively short duration of active 
use, the protocol would have seemed more like a passing fad, “if its funda-
mental learning principles and clinical techniques were not still being keenly 
pursued in relation to two vastly different demographic profiles, the wholesale 
behavior modification of which is widely seen as a social good: sex criminals 
and heterosexual women” (p. 123; italics added). Here, Jagose alludes to how 
behaviorist sex therapists such as Masters and Johnson trained women to have 
coital orgasms. The women, of course, wanted this treatment—they sought it 
out. While the behaviorist protocols of today, including MBST, do not seek 
to train women to have vaginal orgasms, they do capacitate femininity—they 
seek to make otherwise-debilitated femininity useful and productive while 
at the same time tethering it to regimes of self-improvement and pleasure.18 
What Jagose then reminds us is that the dominant frameworks of the time, 
which are today often related to self-help via medical or extra-medical proto-
cols, influence our desires, and that pleasure can be bound up with biopolitical 
control and the harvesting of (our own) potential.
The release of the newest version of the DSM is notable in light of our 
cultural reliance on codified medical discourses, and because how we define 
pathology has implications for how we understand what is normal (Foucault, 
1973). The diagnosis of FSIAD in women is worthy of investigation because 
codes for race, gender, and sexuality are part of what is prescribed by the 
 18. My use of the terms capacitate and debilitate here draw on the biopolitics described by 
Puar (2017).
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DSM, and these have particular import in a world in which sexual regulation 
is an exemplary tool of governance. Racially unmarked feminine receptiv-
ity is now pervasive in psychological and popular discourses, and the notion 
that women are disordered if they don’t respond appropriately to their sexual 
partners’ advances informs how we understand healthy femininity. Some psy-
chologists have argued that men and women may experience sexual receptiv-
ity, triggering, or “incentive-motivation” (Brotto, 2010a, 2010b), but the female 
specificity of the FSIAD diagnosis suggests otherwise, discursively and via 
the gender-specific experimental and clinical research, practices, and treat-
ments on which it is based and that it supports.19 Narratives about women’s 
fraught mind/body relations, and their proclivity to respond or receive, also 
lend themselves easily to corollary narratives about women’s need for sexual 
guidance—or their essential desire to submit.
Although psychoanalytic explanations of feminine masochism are out of 
step with current trends, the notion of feminine submission is now natural-
ized and promoted through pop neuroscience and neo-evolutionary psychol-
ogy. While stories about the innateness of receptivity and submissiveness for 
women are perpetuated and also explicitly theorized through the notion of 
ancestral genetic survival as espoused within evolutionary psychology, they 
are also perpetuated through the language of the FSIAD diagnosis and its 
associated practices, but not theorized. This lack of theorization is actually 
quite pernicious—we are left with tacit support for notions of feminine recep-
tivity, responsiveness, and submissiveness but have no explanation for why 
women are like this or how this situation has come to be, as psychoanalytic 
explanations are actively disregarded. This is a problem with models of behav-
iorism more broadly, and it is arguably how they end up reiterating some of 
the tenets of evolutionary psychology as background theory (see Toates, 2014 
for an example of this trend). The responsiveness criterion and female speci-
ficity of FSIAD suggest that these feminine tendencies are innate, or at least 
they suggest that describing differences in male and female desire patterns 
is more important than considering the etiology of those differences. Here, 
 19. At the time of this writing, MBST is still used primarily with low-desiring women. 
Bossio, Basson, Driscoll, Correia, and Brotto (2018) recently conducted a pilot study with men 
who used mindfulness for erectile disorder, and Koscis and Newbury-Helps (2016) work with 
couples but orient mindfulness toward relationship therapy rather than solely sexual improve-
ment. Brotto (2018) discusses the possibility of using MBST with men, and includes a chapter 
on how to use mindfulness with couples (seemingly as a way for women to “take what they 
learn” home to their partners). But the vast majority of published studies twenty years into the 
twenty-first century have been conducted on individual women using mindfulness to enhance 
desire or alleviate genital pain, and the protocol was developed, in conjunction with Basson’s 
circular sexual response cycle model, for use with women.
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I argue, description is violent, as analyses of power, of historically oppressive 
relations between men and women, and of the devaluing of femininity, are left 
unexamined. Questions regarding why women would need to find reasons to 
be interested in (heterosexual) sex or to be responsive to their (male) partners 
outside of their own desire are not engaged with, let alone answered. Ques-
tions concerning the inequities and systems of internalized domination that 
might produce this unequal sexual situation are similarly ignored.
In this context, applying models of responsive desire disproportionately 
to women reessentializes and rebinarizes human desire, producing it once 
again as sexually disparate, dichotomous, and even dimorphic, and, as these 
models are situated on the same stage as evolutionary psychology in our cur-
rent context, as neurobiological and teleological in their gender essentialism. 
Proponents of circular models of responsive desire for women claim to pres-
ent an alternative to a masculinist psychonanalytic conception of “sex drive,” 
but this claim rests upon an oversimplified vision of psychoanalysis. Not only 
is this framing of desire not in accordance with the totality of psychoanalytic 
and psychodynamic conceptions of desire, but it also ignores all of the psy-
choanalytic theorizing since Freud, from the sexual fantasmatics of Laplanche 
(1976), to object-relational theory in the work of Klein (2002), to Benjamin’s 
(1988) nuanced accounts of desire as bound up with heteronormative gender 
relations and domination, to investigations of the imbrication of race, gen-
der, and sexuality under colonialism and white supremacy (McClintock, 1995; 
Musser, 2014; Stockton, 2006; Stoler, 1995). Relational psychoanalytic accounts 
of intersubjectivity and mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1988) are especially 
useful in thinking about sexuality from a clinical perspective, but proponents 
of FSIAD and associated discourses do not embrace these concepts, and 
instead (re)emphasize sexual complementarity, which in their framing may 
be paradoxically antagonistic and brutal, or at the very least, conceived of as 
provocation/reaction, and normatively on white masculine terms (i.e., male 
as provoker, female as responder).
The dismissal of psychoanalytic accounts of desire by those who have 
paved the way to FSIAD is not only a rejection of psychodynamic accounts of 
one-on-one sexual interactions, it is also a denial of the broader theorizations 
about sex and domination that contemporary psychoanalytic and psychody-
namic practices have proved so useful at accounting for. Indeed, behavior-
ist sexual improvement techniques (including MBST, strangely enough, as 
it is intended to be about nonjudgmental awareness and living in the pres-
ent moment) are based on neurobiological explanations for behavior that 
are more rationalistic and masculinist in their very form than are many psy-
choanalytic or psychodynamic explanations. Mindfulness-based sex therapy 
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appears to suggest the utility of an internalized system of (self-)domination 
and (self-)submission (the body dominates the mind, or should, but the mind 
has to train itself to get in line with this! Which is the sub and which is the 
dom?!), and ultimately denies or ignores sociocultural and psychodynamic 
explanations, proclaiming instead the importance of “taking control” of one’s 
own thoughts and behaviors as a means to an end—that is: a (hetero/homo)
normative sexual relationship in which “successful” sex is privileged. Race-
analytical, feminist, relational, and object-relational psychoanalytic accounts 
have instead emphasized intersubjectivity, mutuality, and, simultaneously, 
power and trauma, and the ways in which the social and dyadic context of 
sexuality inform sexual experience and thus should inform treatment (the 
concept of treatment itself is also broadened in this field—it’s not just about 
instituting a regimen for individual bodily attunement, but about consider-
ing social, cultural, and broadly political analyses of desire). Although the 
treatment protocols for FSIAD allow for some of this psychosocial/dynamic 
evaluation (i.e., in some psychoeducation materials there is a discussion of 
relationship satisfaction and partner’s level of desire), the language and prac-
tical utilization of the DSM-5 discursively produce a less dynamic system of 
analysis and a restrictive narrative around sex. Further, the use of MBST as a 
training of desire paradoxically indicates an internalized (and individualized) 
dominating and objectifying orientation toward one’s own sexuality. Follow-
ing the “brief ” protocol set forth by Masters and Johnson and Helen Singer 
Kaplan, including the notion of bypassing deeper or remote issues deemed 
irrelevant to the proximate sexual concern at hand, contemporary disorder 
language and behaviorist interventions for women’s low desire do not account 
for the patient’s full psychic history (except as it specifically concerns the 
immediate reasons why she doesn’t want to have sex and how she can over-
come this problem), nor do they account for the social context in which men 
and women end up with such disparate patterns of desire, and are, in fact, 
produced as sexually different.
If receptivity, responsiveness, reactivity, lack of spontaneous interest, and 
in some accounts, even submissiveness are implicitly or explicitly formulated 
as essential feminine traits, and this assignment goes untheorized and unad-
dressed, then this modulation of feminine desire within the field of sexual-
ity (particularly among women with male partners) might become a form of 
husbandry. Women who are produced as specific kinds of sexual beings live 
out these identities with their partners (and their partners experience them 
as such). Labels and experiences interact, in a feedback loop, and this process 
cannot be described simply in terms of “social construction.” It is about the 
living of embodied hierarchies, sexual categories, and ways of being in the 
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world, which take shape within fields of power. We modulate our sexuali-
ties through drugs, behavioral training, mindfulness, and other therapeutic 
interventions, in accordance with the logics of optimization and securitiza-
tion, and conceptions of the health and wellness of the population, within 
“regimes of happiness” (Martínez-Guzmán & Lara, 2019)—all of which are 
presented in the form of medical and scientific expertise. In this milieu, it is 
easy to see how desire—the most subjective, elusive aspect of sexuality—may 
now be the most worthy of investment, as improper or unproductive desire 
might be conceived of as dangerous, or, at the very least, unhealthy and bad 
for society as a whole. Within the omnipresent discourses of evolutionary 
psychology, behavioral biology, and clinical and experimental psychology, 
feminine desire is produced as uniquely enigmatic and mysterious, or in need 
of direction. Current psychomedical discourses reinforce the purported natu-
ralness of sexual difference, while simultaneously prescribing and deploying 
proper gender relations and forms of social reproduction. When desire and 
its peculiar feminine incarnation are framed as potential to be harvested—is 
husbandry on the horizon?
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C H A P T E R  3
Women-with-Low-Desire
Navigating and Negotiating Sexual Difference 
Socialization
Regina, a bisexual twenty-five-year-old white woman, tells me: “The way that 
we as a society talk about the way that males and females are is not necessarily 
true to how males and females are. That is a story that we tell ourselves, that 
men are more sexual creatures and have a more simplistic sexuality—and it 
might be self-perpetuating, too—as soon as you start telling the story, people 
start identifying with it.” We are sitting in front of a box fan she has placed in 
the window of her tiny midtown Manhattan apartment, which she shares with 
several other people in their twenties. We have been talking for hours about 
her life. On the recruitment flyer for my project, brandished with a stock 
image of a lipstick kiss mark with the overlaying text “Not in the Mood?” I 
implored women with “low sexual desire” to tell me about their experiences 
with this, but Regina and I have been talking about a lot of other things, too. 
Rent in the city is expensive and it’s so hot and gross in the summer. We drink 
ice water and we sweat, and she moves back to her unmade bed. I stay on the 
floor, taking notes and playing with her cat. Shedded fur sticks to my thigh; I 
think there is some in my eye. It isn’t until at least halfway into our more than 
three-hour interview that Regina tells me that she also experiences pain with 
sex sometimes. She is frustrated that her partners don’t understand why she 
doesn’t want to do it. She wishes they would be more creative with sex—like 
more playful and willing to incorporate more oral stimulation. She wants it 
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to be more fun. She is tired of doing all the work (including a brief stint with 
using vaginal dilators). She’s not really sure if she should be dating cis men.
The conversations I had with women about their sex lives were alternately 
funny, intimate, heartbreaking, and stimulating. Many of them had com-
monalities with the one I describe above with Regina, and many participants 
shared similar insights about how we learn to have sex in gendered ways. 
In this chapter, I focus on that qualitative data and place them within the 
frameworks of queer feminist phenomenology (e.g., Ahmed, 2006; Grosz, 
1994; Huffer, 2013) and feminist psychoanalysis (Irigaray, 1985; Kristeva, 1982; 
Mitchell & Rose, 1985), critical trauma studies (e.g., Malabou, 2012; Wert-
heimer & Casper, 2016), feminist psychiatric disability and madness studies 
(e.g., Donaldson, 2002; Johnson, 2010, 2013, 2015; Mollow, 2014), renewed 
critical investigations of neuroscience and brain/body/environment connec-
tivity (Pitts-Taylor, 2016; E.  A. Wilson, 2004, 2015), and the production of 
“cerebral subjectivities” (Vidal & Ortega, 2017). How might we understand the 
social, psychological, and biological as co-constitutive, to the point where it’s 
impossible to disentangle them? In order to consider this, I execute multiple 
levels of analysis. First, I examine how feminist psychologists have responded 
to dominant scientific discourses, including “drive” models of sexuality and 
Masters and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle (HSRC), illuminating 
how these counter-interpretations have relied on liberal and cultural femi-
nist tropes about white cisgender femininity. Then, I examine how some low-
desiring women of diverse races and ethnic backgrounds respond to both the 
dominant discourses (such as the HSRC) and to the feminist counter-inter-
pretations of these discourses (including the circular sexual response models 
within the broader feminized responsive desire framework). Through these 
analyses, I analyze low-desiring participants’ experiences of sexual difference 
socialization.1 In light of the current experimental climate of research on and 
treatment for low desire in women, including FSIAD, with its “receptivity cri-
terion,” it is imperative to listen to what diverse women have to say about 
their own sexual interest, desire, and arousal—and how these link up, or don’t, 
for them, personally. How have ideas from science and medicine made their 
way into women’s experiences of sex? Do women think of their own sexuali-
ties in terms of “interest,” “arousal,” “incentives,” and “motivations”? Do they 
feel that their own sexualities are responsive, receptive, flexible, and fluid? 
If so, where do they think this comes from? Or is there more to their sexual 
 1. Tolman and McClelland’s (2011) notion of “sexual socialization” has a kinship here; 
however, rather than considering only how women are socialized into sexual scripts, I empha-
size phenomenological, affective, and traumatic experiences as productive of specific formations 
of femininity—and center how women navigate medical and scientific rhetoric about sex and 
gender (rather than how they navigate social forces broadly).
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imaginaries (Labuski, 2015), and, if so, what do these consist of? I argue that 
women are affected by the circulation of evolutionary, biological, and psycho-
logical ideas about white receptive femininity, sex, and desire, even as these 
discourses claim to make objective observations about the genders, sexuali-
ties, and desires of the human beings they interpret. My notion of sexual dif-
ference socialization does not rely on an a priori account of the biological 
body as sexually differentiated, and instead seeks to understand how bod-
ies and populations are produced as masculine and feminine in relation. To 
this end, I elucidate how women navigate, live out, sometimes take up, and 
in some cases reject evolutionary and biological narratives about their own 
sexualities and their relationships to their sexual and romantic partners. The 
chapter concludes by exploring women’s descriptions of the forces that have 
influenced their experiences of femininity, sexuality, and desire, and elucidates 
how women understand the relationship between their psychology and biol-
ogy, or between their own minds and bodies. Here, I utilize crip theory and 
madness studies to consider bodyminds2 as informed by trauma, as a correc-
tive to the framing of minds and bodies as separate in both dominant sexual 
medicine discourse and in the liberal and cultural feminist counter-responses 
to that dominant discourse.
While evolutionary narratives of sexuality and gender are often couched 
in universalizing terms, it is imperative to acknowledge that these “caveman/
cavewoman” sexuality narratives are actually very much historically specific 
(i.e., they are not only heteronormative but also cisnormative and white). 
However, feminist counter-responses to dominant scientific discourses also 
uphold certain hegemonic ideals—including the whiteness that inheres in 
nonintersectional and universalizing models of receptive and responsive fem-
ininity. Contemporary research on women’s sexuality plays into white racial 
tropes that designate femininity as responsive/receptive while it ignores the 
ways women of color, particularly Black women, have been framed and treated 
(i.e., as aggressive, hypersexual, and to be experimented upon) via sexological 
discourse and within OB-GYN settings, historically (Fausto- Sterling, 1994; 
D. C. Owens, 2017; Roberts, 1997; Washington, 2006). Of course, do-it-your-
self (DIY), sexual- and reproductive-focused, women-led activist movements 
have participated in white supremacy as well, and also in the neoliberal bio-
political management of women’s bodies.3 We must acknowledge that feminist 
 2. With the term “bodyminds,” I draw on Clare (2017), who offers novel ways to con-
sider the inextricable imbrication of minds, bodies, and the social; this framing moves us 
beyond traditional formulations of the psychosomatic, toward relational and often traumatic 
ontologies.
 3. For an example of biopolitical investments within the “women’s [reproductive] health 
movement” in the US beginning in the 1960s, see Murphy (2012).
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activism and feminist psychology have both been complicit in perpetuating 
not only essentializing discourses that reify women’s “receptive/responsive” 
desire but also racism and white supremacy. So this part of my story will 
begin with the cultural feminist turn of the 1960s, which arguably propa-
gated all of these things, and also set the framework for the contemporary 
field of the “psychology of women” and its investment in white femininity. 
The medical, scientific, and psychological discourses I examine here are defi-
nitely cishet, bourgeois, and white, but not all of these participants are—my 
sample includes many women of color and not-so-feminine-identified folks 
who describe how they have had to navigate sexual difference deployments 
of all types. It is clear how even those women who do not fit into normative 
categories of whiteness and receptivity have to grapple with these discourses. 
My goal is to make space here for them to speak back.
Research on Women’s Sexual Psychology in the 
Aftermath of Cultural Feminism
There is a long history of theorizing the constraints on women’s sexuality in 
Western or Global North feminisms, discussions that picked up swiftly with 
the advent of second-wave cultural feminism in the 1960s—and that eventu-
ally made their way into the subdiscipline of institutionalized and academic 
psychology that came to be called “the psychology of women.” As second-
wave feminism and the “women’s liberation movement” gained momentum 
through the second half of the twentieth century, scholars’ and activists’ cri-
tiques of the repression of female sexuality—particularly as female sexuality 
was constrained by compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1980) and by the insti-
tution of patriarchy more broadly (Rubin, 1975)—reached a fever pitch. In the 
mid-1970s, many feminist theorists described how domestically inclined, het-
erosexually oriented, and self-sacrificing women are produced as such within 
a system that negates their desire. According to Gayle Rubin (1975), “At the 
most general level, the social organization of sex rests upon gender, oblig-
atory heterosexuality, and the constraint of female sexuality” (p. 40). Adri-
enne Rich (1980), writing around the same time, also described this system 
in which women are socialized to “feel that male sexual ‘drive’ amounts to a 
right” (p. 638), and argued that under patriarchal social relations, male power 
is wielded against women, who are framed as “frigid” if they don’t capitulate 
to the institution of heterosexuality and concomitantly deny same-sex love or 
the possibility of “lesbian existence.” Radical feminists like Andrea Dworkin 
and Catherine MacKinnon further inveighed against the violent institution-
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alization of heterosexuality at all levels of US society and especially against 
the production of heterosexual intercourse as specifically oriented toward not 
only men’s pleasure, but women’s annihilation. Later, as activists, Dworkin 
and MacKinnon held pornography accountable for duplicitously portraying 
women as taking pleasure in sexual scenarios that were in fact examples of 
patriarchal domination (Dworkin, 1987; MacKinnon, 1982). Although their 
earlier writing, as separate from their political lobbying against pornogra-
phy, was arguably more critical of the legal and cultural institutionalization 
of heteronormative relations than of heterosex itself (Dymock, 2018), Dwor-
kin and MacKinnon have been caricatured as everything that is wrong with 
feminism—man-hating, essentializing of sex and sexuality, and even holding 
a myopically pastoral and naïve view of sex as redeemable through egalitari-
anism. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, all of these feminist criticisms 
of social relations between men and women were met with a conservative and 
reactionary backlash (as documented by Faludi, 1991) alongside the advent 
of sex-positive feminism, which celebrated the queering of gendered sexual 
power relations (Califia, 1994).
In the 1970s, second-wave feminism shifted toward a vision that came to 
be known as “cultural feminism,” exemplified by the writing, in the US, of 
Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich (according to Alcoff, 1988). Cultural feminists 
viewed masculinity and femininity in essentializing, almost spiritual ways; not 
only did they critique patriarchal repression of women’s sexuality and bodies, 
but they argued that women were imbued with essential positive feminine 
traits—such as cooperation, compassion, attunement, perceptiveness, empa-
thy, sympathy, and nurturing—which were inherently better or more valuable 
than corresponding (and dimorphic) masculine traits. Importantly, many of 
those associated with this feminist strain were white women. Daly (1978/1990) 
went so far as to argue that women should govern men, as women are clearly 
superior to men due to their “essential biophilic life-loving energy” (p. 355). 
The whiteness of cultural feminism is key in understanding how receptiv-
ity is framed in psychology today. As Audre Lorde (1979/2015) pointed out 
in her “Open Letter to Mary Daly,” the “feminine culture” that is most often 
celebrated in this moment in feminism is based in a spiritual vision shaped 
by and for white women, even as it appropriates Black women’s culture and 
claims inclusivity for all women.
The self-identified feminist psychologists influenced by this cultural turn 
played a key role in developing theorizations of responsive sexual desire in 
women, as they described feminine development as essentially distinct from 
masculine development—thus there is a through line from this work to con-
temporary notions of feminine erotic plasticity (Baumeister 2000, 2004) 
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and sexual fluidity (Diamond, 2008). These psychologists also inherited 
some foundational aspects of the US-based cultural feminist psychoanaly-
sis of Nancy Chodorow (1978)—including a focus on the essential complexi-
ties of femininity, the importance and natural goodness of motherhood and 
mother-child relations, and a liberalism infused within pastoral framings of 
(the potential for) egalitarian parenting, gender relations, family-making, and 
sex (described by Grosz, 1990).4 Two practical exemplars of this cultural femi-
nism–infused approach to the study of gendered psychological development 
and the “psychology of women” were Jean Baker Miller and Carol Gilligan.
In 1976, Jean Baker Miller, a practicing psychiatrist at Boston University 
School of Medicine and later at Wellesley College, instituted her specific brand 
of female-focused psychology with her widely read book Toward a New Psy-
chology of Women. Here, she explored the power-laden relationships between 
men and women, and explained how these unequal dyads of “dominants” and 
“subordinates” affect women’s psychological development. Miller’s work was 
indeed revolutionary for focusing on diversity in human psychological devel-
opment, for taking power and inequality into account, and thus for deviating 
away from hegemonic models of universal and normative development that 
had held sway up until that time. But her research also continued a proj-
ect of gender essentialism by alluding to the idea that differences between 
men and women were in many ways indisputable or indelible. She argued 
that “open knowledge about sexual matters is a pressing need, as is a redefi-
nition of female sexuality in women’s terms rather than as it is perceived by 
men. An important aspect of this . .  . is the elimination of the role of sexual 
object and a greater emphasis on the connection among sexual, personal, 
and emotional meanings” (J. B. Miller, 1976, p. 24). She goes on to highlight 
emotionality, participation in the development of others, cooperation, and 
“everyday,” “personal,” and “humanity-shaping” creativity as attributes specific 
to female psychological development. Although Miller consistently referred 
to the importance of social conditioning in women’s inclinations in these 
domains, and illuminated the feminization of empathy as it relates to psy-
chological and embodied carework (she did not use these terms, as they were 
not yet in parlance), she also tended to speak of feminine proclivities in these 
ways as natural.
 4. Andrea Long Chu (2019) has described the quintessential cultural feminist irreconcil-
ability of hope and disappointment as the essence of all feminism, in that it encapsulates femi-
nism’s ontological impossibility—feminism is impossible insofar as it is the political project of 
attempting to change affects, attachments, and the structure of desire itself, to overcome disap-
pointment in the name of hope, even with the full knowledge that gender relations can never 
be egalitarian, and thus that heterosex (but also all sex) can never actually be “good” in the way 
we want it to be (but secretly also don’t want it to be). Here is the paradox.
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Feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan also contributed to the institution 
of studies of women’s psychological developmental as a subfield within psy-
chology, and although she has said much about women’s “resistance” to social 
structures that condition their sexualities and desires, she has also continued 
the cultural feminist project of framing women as more emotional, coopera-
tive, and caring than men in essentialized or naturalized terms. In her 1982 
book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, 
Gilligan documented “the disparity between women’s experiences and the rep-
resentation of human development” (p. 1), thus critiquing the normative and 
universalized descriptions of growth, separation, and autonomy that individu-
als are expected to experience as they mature into adulthood, which charac-
terized the post-Freudian field of developmental psychology at that time (and 
which Gilligan understood to be male-oriented and privileging of masculine 
relational styles—which were, in her view, not very relational at all). Even 
with an important attention to gendered power differentials, Gilligan’s early 
work slips between a model based on social conditioning and one that makes 
naturalized assumptions about essential femininity—specifically women’s dif-
ferent and seemingly superior capacity for moral reasoning and judgment. 
This slippage would be common to much of the feminist social psychology 
literature in the ensuing decades. Not only has this work in social psychology 
been founded upon essentializing ideas about masculinity and femininity, but 
it has also focused primarily on women’s identity formation and psychological 
development at the expense of a full elaboration of the embodied and rela-
tional experiences of desire, pleasure, trauma, and power.
Contemporary critical feminist social psychologists have sought to rectify 
this trend (for some important examples, see Fahs, 2011; M. Fine, 1988; Gavey, 
2005; McClelland, 2010; Meana, 2010; Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007; Tol-
man, 1994, 2005, 2006; Tolman & McClelland, 2011; Ussher, 2011; Van Anders, 
20155) and, in some cases, researchers I have identified as complicit with the 
 5. Neuropsychologist Sari van Anders’s research is unique in this arena. In the first 
decade of the twenty-first century and beyond, van Anders and colleagues have studied 
responsive desire from an explicitly gender-neutral perspective, focusing on state-dependent 
desire, contextual cues, and the effects of a variety of stimuli including solitary versus part-
nered sexual acts, with diverse experimental research participants, including men and queer 
women. Through this research, along with her “sexual configurations theory (SCT)” (2015), 
van Anders has worked to bring a focus on nonbinary understandings of sex, gender, and 
“gender/sex”; intersectionality; self-knowledge; and divergent experiences of eroticism and 
love, via what she calls a “sexual diversity lens,” to sexological research. She promotes “dyna-
mism rather than fixedness” (p. 1185) in research on sexuality through an explicitly queer, 
feminist perspective. This project is to be lauded. However, I ultimately agree with the criti-
cisms of Subramaniam and Willey (2016), who suggest that even SCT still suffers from a cer-
tain ahistoricism of its categories of study, and that the implementation of SCT in sexological 
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development of the feminized responsive desire framework and FSIAD diag-
nosis have been involved with what may be considered more critical projects 
(for examples, see Brotto, Heiman, & Tolman, 2009; Graham, Sanders, Mil-
hausen, & McBride, 2004). Much research (both quantitative and qualitative) 
straddles the line in terms of a cultural feminist agenda. But the vicissitudes 
and embodied relations of desire continue to be ignored within mainstream 
psychology of women, including by many of the most renowned researchers 
studying gender and sexuality today. In this vein, themes regarding essential 
femininity derived from cultural feminism have also been taken up broadly 
in the neo-feminist sexology research described in chapter 2 of this book, 
in addition to much of the feminist-branded sex therapy post–Masters and 
Johnson. Again, I argue that this is a direct result of the jettisoning of psycho-
analysis; feminist psychologists who have eschewed psychoanalytic frames are 
less likely to consider desire as structural yet internal, and they ignore how 
trauma informs desire (in complicated and sometimes unpredictable ways). 
To this end, psychologists influenced by the cultural feminist turn analyze 
gender but not in a way that is adequate to theorizing the mimetic, iterative, 
and uncontrollable qualities of desire, even when they do acknowledge gender 
inequality.
Alongside all of these developments in the psychology of women, includ-
ing the publication of the groundbreaking Hite Report (1976), which publi-
cized (some US) women’s desires for more intimacy and emotional closeness 
in their sex lives (and also the fact that the vast majority of women in the US 
do not experience coital orgasms), there was also a momentary explosion of 
feminist sex therapy protocols and activism oriented toward the enhancement 
of women’s sexual pleasure. These efforts ran the gamut in terms of their ori-
entation to the motifs of cultural feminism. Sex therapists and educators like 
Betty Dodson, who focused on the “liberation” of female masturbation, some-
times in group workshops (1987), and Lonnie Barbach, who referred to women 
who had never orgasmed as “preorgasmic” (1974) and constructed workbooks 
for women to enrich their sex lives on their own and with partners, arguably 
deviated in some ways from the cultural feminist model. This was particularly 
evident in their practical skills–oriented approach, in lieu of an emphasis on 
the essences of femininity. In Becoming Orgasmic: A Sexual Growth Program 
for Women (1976), Julia Heiman and Leslie and Joseph Lo Piccolo also articu-
lated a program for enhancing women’s sexual pleasure, based in cultivating 
responsiveness and receptivity. At this point in the mid-1970s, these research-
research would ultimately be a form of “harm reduction”: “SCT will merely proliferate sexual 
identities (no doubt an improvement on our current world) rather than de-naturalize sexual-
ity as such” (p. 514).
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ers were still working within Masters and Johnson’s four-staged, linear, unisex-
ual response model. But their discussion of women’s desire as being distinct 
from men’s, possibly in need of triggering, and oriented toward sensuality and 
emotionality, was part of a project of interacting with Helen Singer Kaplan’s 
theorization of (low) desire in women alongside the newer trends in explo-
rations of women’s “unique” psychological development posited by thinkers 
like Miller and Gilligan. All of this work can be considered part of a specific 
moment in the trajectory of compulsory sexuality as well—the idea here was 
that sex is healthy and orgasms are important, and women should work on 
optimizing their own pleasure, in specific, healthy, and, importantly, natural 
ways. For instance, Barbach (1980) defined the “preorgasmic” woman as one 
who is “unable to reliably masturbate to orgasm with her hands” (p. 59). This 
purism often took the form of arguments for the “naturalness” of certain ways 
of being sexual, and thus we can see it as a nascent form of DIY biopolitical 
investment in sexual difference and gendered and racialized sexual pleasure, 
as it was also oriented toward white women, with white women’s biggest sex-
ual concerns at the time in mind.
Many of these cultural feminist themes are still alive and well in sexol-
ogy, sexual medicine, and sex therapy today. Contemporary sex therapist 
Gina Ogden’s (2001) “four-dimensional model” of sexuality represents a cer-
tain cultural feminist hangover, particularly in her emphasis on spirituality in 
women’s experiences of sex and desire. This is also evident in the promotion 
of “natural” approaches to the treatment of women’s low desire (framed as 
superior to “unnatural” pharmaceutical approaches), for instance, in Brotto’s 
mindfulness-based sex therapy today. And Basson’s circular sexual response 
cycle—although developed and implemented officially only in the last twenty 
years or so—has been decades in the making (in addition to the use of the 
incentive motivation model to disproportionately describe women’s sexual 
response). Basson’s model in particular appears to have its early foundation 
in the cultural feminist–infused developmental theory of social psychologists 
like Miller, Gilligan, and others, and it was also fleshed out in the sex therapy 
protocols of second-wave cultural feminists. All of these strands together are 
aspects of the long trajectory of biopolitical and compulsory investment in 
(white) women’s sexual pleasure, particularly as it is purported to be oriented 
toward receptivity, responsiveness, intimacy, and sometimes spirituality. In 
this vein, we might think of this network of investments as a form of what 
Murphy (2012) calls “protocol feminism”—a feminism “invested in the poli-
tics of technique” (p. 22), self-help, and DIY enhancement of the self, and one 
that often seeks to obscure its constitutive relationship with neoliberalism, 
racism, and hegemonic biomedical technologies. Accordingly, the therapeu-
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tic program and sexual response paradigm that has emerged at the nexus of 
these currents is oriented toward female sexuality as essentially responsive 
and receptive.
On the other side of this cultural feminist approach to sexology, sex ther-
apy, and sexual medicine is, of course, the corporate doctors and pharmaceu-
tical companies invested in treating women’s sexual problems.6 And since the 
success of Viagra in 1998, particularly, there has been much feminist activism 
against these trends—as the prediction of many activists was that this cor-
porate investment would begin to focus on women (a prediction that proved 
correct), and that pharmaceutical treatment was, uniformly, not the correct 
path to take in treating women’s sexual problems. Among the groups most 
keen to speak out against the medicalization of women’s sexuality (Tiefer, 
2001; Working Group for the New View of Women’s Sexual Problems, 2002), 
was the New View Campaign, led by New York City–based psychologist-
activist Leonore Tiefer. Tiefer became an especially vocal critic of the phar-
maceutical investment in women’s sexuality in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
but she had been writing about her concerns with the reductionist framing 
of sexual dysfunctions in the medical sphere, the DSM as a “text of gender 
politics” (1995), and the “male-orientedness” of Masters and Johnson’s linear 
four-stage human sexual response cycle (1991) since the late 1970s. Taking 
on a self-proclaimed “social constructionist perspective” on gender, sexuality, 
and the trappings of medicalized sexology, the New View’s campaign took 
off in full force around 2000, when a working group put together a docu-
ment to protest the medicalization of women’s sexual problems in the soon-
to-be-released DSM-IV (text revision). Critiques included that contextual and 
sociopolitical factors have not been fully addressed in the American Psycho-
logical Association’s premier diagnostic manual, and that the full spectrum 
of reasons that women have sexual problems and low desire include many 
things beyond diagnosable psychomedical issues (including intimate partner 
violence, conflicts over money, and discrepancies between a woman’s sub-
culture or culture of origin and dominant cultural norms around sex) and 
thus cannot be captured in any medical diagnosis. Although Tiefer’s work 
is rooted in a social constructionist approach and the New View’s critiques 
forefront social inequalities and their effects on women’s (low) desire, I argue 
 6. As this book interrogates the feminized responsive desire framework, I do not elaborate 
a longer history of how women’s sexual problems have been configured and treated in West-
ern medicine (see Kleinplatz, 2018, for an excellent review of that history), nor do I critique 
the pharmaceutical investment in treating women’s sexual problems or the medicalization of 
women’s sexuality (see Cacchioni, 2015; Canner, 2009, for excellent reviews of the story of how 
“female sexual dysfunction” came into existence, and how the pharmaceutical industry has 
capitalized on this diagnosis).
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that Tiefer’s work, taken as a whole (and the orientation of the Campaign 
in its full trajectory), has had an ambivalent and fraught relationship to the 
cultural feminism of the feminist sex therapy movements and adjacent dis-
courses, from the 1960s’ orgasmic liberation workshops through to Basson’s 
circular sexual response cycle in parlance today. This ambivalence is particu-
larly evident in the near-total shift to critiquing the pharmaceutical industry 
and its “disease- mongering” in the early 2000s, concomitant with an absence 
of activist resistance and targeted critique leading up to the publication of 
the DSM-5 in 2013—specifically, an absent critique of the FSIAD diagnosis. 
I argue that the New View Campaign, although important and timely at its 
inception, has ultimately been complicit in the creation and institutionaliza-
tion of the newest instantiation of receptive female desire within the broad 
feminized responsive desire framework.
What I think the cultural feminist–informed models of women’s respon-
sive desire (along with the antimedicalization/anti–FSD/anti–Big Pharma 
activism) miss, and what I seek to draw attention to in what follows, are 
the voices of women with desire problems themselves. These women have 
been conspicuously absent in much of the current female sexual dysfunction 
debates. There has certainly been some qualitative (and plenty of quantitative) 
research conducted on low-desiring women, including by self-identified femi-
nist psychologists, but the question of how women feel about the discourses 
themselves has been less frequently asked. Instead, most psychologists of a 
variety of stripes seem to ask women questions, and then apply their mod-
els (i.e., models of responsive desire, incentive-motivation, intimacy-seeking, 
etc.) in interpreting women’s answers. I have no doubt that many women 
describe their desire as “responsive” and that they seek “intimacy” and want 
their sexual experiences to be more “emotional” and “connected.” But I also 
argue that women are expected to say these things, and they bring those expec-
tations with them to clinics and laboratories. And so it seems that certain cul-
tural feminist tendencies have become tautological here, in the “alternative” 
sexual response model itself; receptivity is the very heuristic framework by 
which women’s sexualities are interpreted, and thus the notion that women 
are responsive is reinforced and reified, over and over again. Responsiveness 
has become its own hermeneutic, and gender is produced, in a certain (white 
hetero cis) way, recursively. Further, as is suggested by the fact that design-
ers and facilitators of mindfulness trainings present women with data on the 
circular sexual response cycle and on women’s subjective/genital discordance 
(described in Brotto, 2018 and by my participants Astrid and Kelly who have 
been through treatment), women also literally learn about receptive feminin-
ity in clinical and increasingly in extra-clinical settings (i.e., via the internet, 
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social media, and other popular outlets). And finally, as my own data suggest, 
some women feel distressed about a lack of desire, but want something dif-
ferent—they don’t necessarily feel that their experiences can be made sense of 
in terms of naturalized feminine responsiveness. I argue that desire cannot be 
reduced to stimulus/response, and that situating women’s experiences of “low 
desire” in terms of receptivity is likely not helpful for many women—particu-
larly when it is that very framework that constrains and produces their desire 
as such. And so it is through all of this that women-with-low-desire7 is con-
structed as a clinical category—and as a population to be managed. I now turn 
to members of that population to shed light on its production.
Desire? Interest? Arousal? Linkages and Lacunae in 
Embodied/Psychic Sexual States
In order to gain insight into the new DSM-5 diagnosis of FSIAD, I asked my 
participants about how their desire, arousal, and interest link up (or do not). 
Here, I am directly in conversation with the terms of the FSIAD diagnosis 
and with the circular sexual response cycle as it is applied to women—how-
ever, my goal was to find out more about how women feel about the ideas 
encapsulated in the diagnosis/model, and about the diagnosis/model as a pre-
sented framework for understanding female sexuality, rather than to utilize 
the diagnosis/model per se. Although most of the women I interviewed were 
not aware of the content of the newest edition of the DSM, they were cer-
tainly aware of scientific tropes about female receptivity, responsiveness, and 
flexibility; they had complex thoughts about the notion of a feminine discon-
nect among cognitive, emotional, and embodied states; and they were able to 
articulate very clearly the (important) place of desire in their own sexualities 
and sex lives (even as they described their desire as, at some points, “low”).
Many of the women I interviewed stated that the linkage of desire, interest, 
and arousal is, in fact, driven by context, and that in certain specific instances, 
they may feel physically aroused before they “realize” they want to have sex (in 
keeping with the feminized responsive desire framework, including the circu-
lar sexual response cycle). But, in general, they stated that desire comes first—
which challenges the idea that for most women, arousal and desire co-occur, 
or that arousal precedes desire. One very important aspect of desire that many 
 7. I thank Monica Casper for urging me to flesh out this notion of “women-with-low-
desire” as a category and population configured via the mutual constitution of discourses of 
femininity, low/responsive desire, and psychosexual medicine.
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participants emphasized was the need to feel truly stimulated by and attracted 
to a partner—but this experience could not be reduced to “incentives” to have 
sex. Most of the women who spoke with me said it was hard for them to get 
turned on physically if their desire was not already in motion. This sentiment 
is clearly expressed by Tiffany, who explains, “For me, it is always desire first. 
I have to be attracted to the person in one way or another,” and by Lola, who 
states, “I’ve never been aroused and then it made someone seem more attrac-
tive to me.” Sam reiterates this when I ask her to describe her problems with 
arousal and desire, and whether she has ever begun to experience desire for a 
partner after already feeling physically turned on:
Sometimes [I have trouble getting lubricated], but if I want to [have sex], if 
I am into it, then no. . . . [M]ost of the time I don’t have a problem getting 
aroused, but if I’m not super into the guy, like “Okay, I’m just going to have 
sex now,” then I might have that problem. . . . I also feel like desire has to do 
with wanting something, whereas arousal seems more physical, something 
that is physically happening to me or my body.  .  .  . I don’t think it always 
has to go A then B then C, it’s just that for me that feels like maybe the more 
natural thing.
Here, Sam makes it clear that even though she has experienced arousal pre-
ceding desire on occasion, that chronology doesn’t really feel right or “natu-
ral” to her. She also expresses that arousal preceding desire might characterize 
most of the casual sex she has had, but that ultimately, those experiences were 
not satisfying:
I think that would count for most of the one-night stands I’ve had, where 
maybe the desire is not there, then you start making out with somebody and 
become aroused, and then fornicate . . . but they would probably have had 
to be persistent.
The experience that Sam describes here explicates her view that when she 
feels physical arousal first, the sexual act that results is not the most pleasur-
able experience for her, and one that she tends to feel ambivalent about. It 
also usually occurs only because the (in this case, cis male) partner involved 
has been particularly insistent. Obviously, this does not paint a picture of the 
most consensual or pleasurable sexual encounter. Notably, Sam’s description 
also challenges the standard logic that “arousal-first” desire is more common 
in long-term relationships, as Sam states that it is more likely to characterize 
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her one-night stands. Regina also articulates that for her, desire tends to come 
first—or, at least, that she prefers it that way:
Arousal for me usually comes after quite a bit of a lead-up, so the desire 
part would really have to be there first before I would ever get to a place 
where my body would want to be aroused.  .  .  . I think of arousal as being 
the physical part and desire as being the social, interpersonal, psychological 
part. But for me I think it’s a thing where the desire comes first, and then I 
can feel arousal.
Later, Regina describes the disconnect she sometimes feels between her physi-
cal sense of arousal and the desire to engage in sex (or to avoid it). She clarifies 
that the issue for her isn’t finding a way to align her subjective desire with her 
physical arousal, it’s that if she’s not fully “into it,” aligning them is not some-
thing she wants to do. This notion of preference—preferring desire to come 
first, rather than experiencing arousal and then engaging in sex—was reiter-
ated by Elizabeth, who is a survivor of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) and 
describes a sense of dissociation in the form of depersonalization (a feeling 
of not being connected to her body, or of watching the sexual act occur from 
a disembodied perspective) during many of her sexual experiences. When I 
ask her how she interprets this experience of dissociation in relation to desire, 
arousal, and interest, she states: “I feel like it was just like my body couldn’t get 
there if my brain couldn’t.”
Most of the women I interviewed said that sex doesn’t really work if they 
are not “into it”—which implies a type of desire that can’t be reduced to “moti-
vation.” The model of arousal preceding desire does not make sense for many 
of these women, experientially, nor do they identify with it. In fact, this model 
of responsive desire registered, for them, as distinctly undesirable: The idea of 
cognitively or rationally inducing a sense of being receptive or “in the present” 
(such as might be induced via mindfulness-based sex therapy, in accordance 
with the logic of the circular sexual response cycle) in order to tune into a 
physical response and thus go forward with a sex act made them uncomfort-
able. They expressed particular concerns about coercion and lack of consent. 
Annie, who is a survivor of sexual violence, explains:
If I’m not really into it, it doesn’t usually work that well; I’ll have a harder 
time getting wet and actually aroused and excited. . . . [T]hat has happened 
to me before [experiencing physical arousal before desire]—but it’s not really 
my preference. I tend to be controlling in my sexual relationships; I like to 
call the shots in terms of when we have sex.
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Many participants similarly expressed the desire to be in control of the terms 
of sex, of not wanting physical arousal to dictate desire or guide a sexual expe-
rience. And notably, almost all participants stated that they did not enjoy sex 
nearly as much when physical arousal preceded a clear sense of desire, and 
that sex was much better for them when they felt a true longing, wanting, 
or desire for their partner. These notions of enjoyment and preference for a 
certain sequence of events (in this case, for desire first, then physical arousal) 
are absent in the clinical literature on women’s (low) desire, even though the 
possibility of a preference for responsive desire is included in the MHSDD 
diagnosis for men (American Psychological Association, 2013). This lack of 
a “preference criterion” for women seems highly problematic, particularly in 
light of what these particular low-desiring women told me in our interviews.
Women who had experienced sexual abuse also expressed that sex is bet-
ter when desire precedes physical arousal—and their experiences drive home 
the necessity of taking this preference seriously. Molly, for instance, expresses 
a similar sentiment about not enjoying sex if she is not truly interested in, 
desiring of, and engaged with her partner:
A lot of times I feel very dissociated. Like my body is turned on, but my 
mind is not. So physically I have a reaction, like I get wet—but mentally I 
don’t feel like I am really there. My body is showing all the signs of being 
turned on, but I don’t feel turned on . . . so a lot of times I just go, “Well, I’m 
wet, might as well have sex,” and it’s okay, but it is not that much fun. But 
it’s easier than not having sex, in my weird way of looking at things, because 
I have such a hard time saying no to men.  .  .  . [E]ven with [a partner she 
trusts] there have been times where I have gone, in my head, “Why am I 
doing this?”—where I have felt really disconnected and thought, “I don’t 
want to do this anymore” . . . and that is what started to get me really turned 
off, that feeling of like my body responding, when my mind is not. . . . [T]hat 
is a turnoff because I feel like it kind of increases the dissociative state. . . . I 
know that your body can respond at times, even when you are being forced 
to do things.  .  .  . I don’t know if that’s what happened with [the man who 
abused her as a child], I don’t remember, but sometimes I wonder if that’s 
where some of that comes from, in terms of getting turned on physically but 
not feeling good about that unless my mind is incorporated.
Molly’s story of disconnection, dissociation, and trauma, outlined above, is 
one example of why the diagnostic logic of arousal co-occurring with or pre-
ceding desire potentially amounts to a strange sanctioning of blurred consent, 
and perhaps even a medicalized endorsement of one partner’s sexual wishes 
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governing another’s, which is potentially dangerous—particularly in that so 
many women have experienced abuse, rape, or some kind of sexual violence 
over the course of their lives (or will at some point during their lives8). Coer-
cive experiences range from overt violent infractions by strangers on the street 
to less clearly defined situations in which consent was not adequately acquired 
from an intimate partner, date, acquaintance, or friend (or, instead, in which 
women were pressured to have sex that they “consented” to by not saying “no,” 
but did not feel comfortable with and thus did not feel was ultimately truly 
consensual) (Fahs, 2011, 2016; Gavey, 2005; Peterson & Muehelenhard, 2007 
have also examined this “gray area” regarding consent/nonconsent and the 
blurriness of everyday sexual coercion).
If some low-desiring women are keenly aware of the possibility of dissoci-
ating during sex, and feel uncomfortable with the idea of allowing their physi-
cal arousal (even if it has become “subjective arousal” insofar as they noticed 
it) guide a sexual experience, then it may be unethical to promote models of 
responsive/receptive female desire in addition to concordance-enhancing or 
mind/body “alignment” techniques such as MBST to them. These protocols 
could be interpreted (including by women themselves) as medically legiti-
mized methods prescribed to women to induce them to overcome a mental 
state of not being fully “into it” and to instead follow the lead of the aroused 
body, or worse, an aroused partner. Although MBST has been used with low-
desiring women survivors of childhood sexual abuse who are now in consen-
sual relationships—and was deemed successful in that their genital/subjective 
concordance was increased post-treatment (Brotto et al., 2012)—I have seri-
ous concerns about promoting such a method to this population. One rea-
son for my concern is that for many sexual abuse survivors, consent is not 
always so clear-cut, and another reason is that fully consensual relationships 
do not exist as entirely separate from relationships where consent is some-
times breached, including by trusted partners—these two types of relation-
ships do not fit into neat, discrete boxes, as some psychological research on 
this topic would purport. Thus, Brotto et al.’s (2012) analysis of trauma is of 
a specifically white, cis, middle-class trauma—a trauma that is thought to be 
anomalous or extraordinary, that begins and ends at distinct points in time, 
and that can be overcome with therapy (including “brief ” or focused behav-
iorist treatment protocols).
Cvetkovich (2003), Berlant (2011), and others have made a case for “insidi-
ous traumas” or “crisis ordinariness” and thus demonstrate the everyday expe-
rience of a range of traumas enacted against marginalized populations. This 
 8. According to RAINN (Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network) statistics: https://www.
rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence
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point is especially clear when considering how many cis and trans women, 
including women of color, poor women, queer women, and women with dis-
abilities, are often traumatized over and over again, both in their primary 
relationships and structurally, out in the world (Piepzna-Samarasinha, 2018; 
we may also include nonbinary and gender-nonconforming folks, and many 
trans men here, as well). In this light, it is inadequate to relegate sexual vio-
lence, which might produce dissociation, solely to stranger rape or childhood 
sexual abuse. Molly’s story, described above, illuminates why we should be 
concerned about the hypostatization of sexualized and gendered violence as 
exceptional. Sarah (who is not a CSA survivor) shares similar ideas, and artic-
ulates them specifically in terms of consent, when I ask her how desire, inter-
est, and arousal are connected for her:
It’s like if I have the desire, then I am aroused; if I don’t have the desire, then 
I am not aroused.  .  .  . [Arousal preceding desire] does not sound like con-
sent. . . . [I]t’s like when I was hooking up with [kissing] this dude, thinking 
that maybe I didn’t want to do it, but I was like, “Should I just keep doing 
this, and then maybe I’ll get into it?” and I kept doing it .  .  . but I think I 
would not do that with sex, because for me it’s like literally like it [his penis] 
won’t enter [my vagina]! It’s not gonna happen if I’m not turned on. If I have 
already shut it off in my brain, it’s shutting off “downtown,” too.
Sarah’s thoughts make it clear that even women who are not survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse have concerns about consent and coercion in their 
day-to-day sex lives, and they also elucidate the quotidian milieu of sexual-
ized violence. Most of the women I spoke with (regardless of whether or not 
they identified as survivors of abuse) articulated sentiments about the need for 
trust and safety during sex—and many shared their stories of partners intro-
ducing sexual acts or scenarios (particularly around pain and domination) 
during a sexual encounter when the women had not expressed interest in this, 
and described how they were uncomfortable with it (importantly, this was 
also true for women who were actively interested in or involved with subbing 
in BDSM, which will be explored in chapter 5). They also made it very clear 
that they do not feel that receptivity or responsiveness defines their sexuality, 
that they have very strong sexual desires outside of responsive physical arousal 
(even though they are currently experiencing or have previously experienced 
low desire), and that they are very much subjectively aware of their body’s 
physiological arousal when it occurs—and sometimes actively do not desire 
to follow it. This is important to note, as “arousal” and “interest” are brought 
together in the FSIAD diagnosis and the circular sexual response cycle for 
women. The women I interviewed clearly distinguished desire as a unique 
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experience, and as something not always related to their own perception of 
their body’s vasocongestive arousal response. For them, desire is often rela-
tional, but not always responsive. And it is not simply a cognitive or rational 
construct; desire is not necessarily experienced as spontaneous or untriggered, 
but it is also not something they need a partner to “awaken” in them or some-
thing that is reactive. In fact, the women I spoke with were uncomfortable 
with this conceptualization of being sexually triggered by a partner, as their 
preference is to feel in control of—and clearly consenting to—any given sexual 
experience. This is particularly true when they are with cis male partners, and 
for women who have experienced gendered or sexual violence (and most of 
my participants had endured self-identified traumatic sexual experiences at 
some point during their lives, regardless of whether or not they identified as 
survivors of childhood or adult sexual abuse). Tiffany links these issues of 
safety and trust to her experience of being a woman in a society in which her 
body is regularly threatened: “I’m just trying to be a little bit more conscien-
tious of my decisions in that regard [i.e., sexually] to protect myself.” This is a 
sentiment that numerous other women echoed, and one that I will return to 
in my full discussion of violence, trauma, and desire in chapter 5.
Opening Up “Receptivity”
Many of the women I interviewed also spoke of how notions of receptiv-
ity, responsiveness, and passivity do fit into their sex lives—but in ways not 
captured by the circular sexual response cycle or the feminized responsive 
desire framework. Participants who had been treated in medical programs for 
women with genital pain and comorbid low desire had specific and cutting 
critiques of these types of programs and associated treatments—including the 
use of mindfulness-based sex therapy, or MBST, to enhance desire and subjec-
tive/genital concordance. When I ask her if the program she attended allowed 
her to experience any more pleasure upon sex with her male partner (the per-
son she was married to at the time), Astrid states:
I didn’t get the sense that sexual enjoyment was any goal of this program. 
Not having it be impossible to be penetrated because of excruciating physical 
pain was the goal. We were taught “You have to be receptive to sexual atten-
tion, you have to be willing to receive sexual advances from your partner.” 
Not that you should enjoy sex or that sex should be an exciting orgasmic 
experience or something like that—that wasn’t even hinted at!
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Beyond critiques of medical programs, some participants (who had not been 
medically treated for low desire or pain) expressed the ways they feel they 
have been socialized to be sexually receptive and responsive over the course 
of their lives. When discussing why she enjoys sex more now that she has been 
able to take up a more dominant position with her current partner, Valdivia 
tells me:
Maybe this idea of being able to be a sexual aggressor, rather than just a 
receiver of sex, which is what I think I was indoctrinated to think that sex 
was supposed to be like .  .  . it’s interesting how it might mess with your 
brain if you’ve been taught to feel that women who are delicate, and wear 
makeup, and do their nails, and all of these things are not sexual aggressors. 
But I guess that’s not true! Maybe [I don’t mean] aggressor, but initiator. . . . 
I come from a culture where I am supposed to be a “lady” and that implies 
a lot of passivity.
Here, Valdivia explains how she is able to experience herself as both femme 
and sexually dominant, but that being able to understand these aspects of 
her sexuality as compatible took a lot of work—specifically as she was raised 
between two cultures in which femininity and sexual dominance are some-
times posed as mutually exclusive (Valdivia identifies as Latinx and grew 
up in the US, and she explains how both her home culture and US culture 
instilled these ideas in her). Valdivia’s experience also highlights the simul-
taneous expectation and silencing of the sexual desires of Black, Brown, and 
Indigenous women, and suggests that white supremacy further imperils and 
complicates the sexual experiences of low-desiring women of color.
Some participants spoke of receptivity, responsiveness, and passivity in 
our interviews, and elaborated on how these inform or do not inform their 
senses of their own sexuality and femininity—often in creative, unconven-
tional, and provocative ways. Natasha outlines how what she experiences sex-
ually could likely be medically classified as “low sexual interest/arousal” but 
that it might be better characterized as a type of active passivity:
There is some kind of uncanny overlap between active masochistic desire 
and passivity . . . wanting to be tied up, and just lying there not doing any-
thing because you’re not into the experience, have a certain superficial 
resemblance. Which I think is complicated for me, because I do sort of like 
being [tied up]—I think that my instinct is a fairly passive one, and I don’t 
know how much of that is just that I am like, “I am not that into this, you 
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are the one who is starting this” and how much of it is that I really actively 
like being in the position of having things done to me.
In this passage, Natasha points to the resemblance between the active desire 
to “have things done to her” and what might otherwise appear to simply be 
“low desire.” Although she states that she is sometimes unclear about which 
camp she falls into, her articulation of the problem exposes that sometimes a 
woman’s “responsiveness” does not represent a cognitive, rational, desexual-
ized choice to engage in a sexual encounter at the behest of her own vasocon-
gested genitals or a persistent partner, nor to maintain her long-term romantic 
relationship or enhance intimacy, but it can instead evidence a highly erotic, 
charged, and actively sexual desire to receive, and to agentically control the 
terms of that “being done to.” This has much in common with discussions 
of queer femme receptivity, for instance as described by Cvetkovich (2003). 
Annie articulates a similar sentiment about her own sex life with her partner:
My partner and I definitely have times where even if he is sort of initiating 
the, “Hey, I’m feeling this desire,” then I’m like, “Okay, I’m into it, I’m not 
having this strong desire right now, but I could be into it, so okay, go ahead! 
Arouse me!” And then it becomes more like he initiated it but I’m still kind 
of like directing what’s happening to get to the place where I’m aroused and 
then we can have sex.
Annie’s statement suggests that sometimes low-desiring women might “direct” 
their partners to arouse them, and thus are still “calling the shots”—almost 
like a challenge or a playful game that becomes incorporated into the sexual 
landscape and subsequently becomes arousing in itself.
Many of the participants I spoke with articulated that women are social-
ized and learn to be receptive and responsive in a way that most men are not. 
In fact, “receptivity,” “responsiveness,” and “low desire” are in some cases the 
only frames available for interpreting one’s own sexual, gender, and desire 
problems if one is a woman—hence the pertinence of the category women-
with-low-desire. In the previous quotes from Natasha and Annie, we see how 
some women turn this learned responsiveness into a form of agency, how-
ever—through active passivity or active receptivity. This conceptualization of 
receptivity, as it specifically attends to power, seems quite different from the 
kind that is cultivated in desire training programs that utilize the circular 
sexual response cycle with low-desiring women and that incorporate mind-
fulness-based sex therapy within the feminized responsive desire framework.
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Spontaneous Desire and “Me Time”
Throughout our interviews, it became clear that many of the women I spoke 
with have plenty of “untriggered” sexual desire, just not for their current part-
ners, nor in the context of a routinized sex life that had become characteristic 
of many of their long-term monogamous relationships (this phenomenon is 
also explored by Meana, 2010; Perel, 2006, 2017; and Sims & Meana, 2010, 
among others). In these cases, desire becomes a special realm, “just for them,” 
outside of the relationship. For these women, lack of interest in a specific part-
ner does not equal “low desire” (even though many participants had come to 
believe that it must mean that, which is why they were talking to me). Almost 
all of the women I spoke with had very active fantasy lives, frequently felt 
attracted to strangers (often women), watched pornography and/or read erot-
ica regularly, and thoroughly enjoyed masturbation and made time for it in 
their day-to-day lives. These same women still felt like something was wrong 
with their desires, with their bodies, with their sexualities. Although these 
women’s desires are not necessarily spontaneous, in that they are not fully 
internal (as drive models would suggest), they cannot be characterized as sim-
ply responsive or receptive either. Natasha, for instance, states that she feels 
that her strongest desires almost categorically cannot be requited—meaning 
she sometimes feels that a gulf separates her desire and the fulfillment of that 
desire, or at least a fulfillment by her partner:
[Desire] is sort of a wanting feeling that I really associate with unrequited-
ness, with absence. . . . [I]t seems like what would be nice would be to be able 
to bring that sense of desire into my lovely, stable, harmonious relationship 
. . . but it seems like there is some kind of gulf that separates them.
Corinne also expresses a sense of feeling like her desire lives in its own world, 
apart from her monogamous heterosexual relationship. But, like most of the 
other women I spoke with, she enjoys masturbating and has a very active fan-
tasy life. She explains that she experiences the most sexual satisfaction when 
she is alone, because that is when she feels the freest to mobilize whatever 
fantasies she wishes:
There are definitely times where I’ve been out doing stuff and I’m like “Oh! 
I know! I’m going to go home and masturbate because I can!” [laughing] So 
there is definitely that odd sort of excitement about it, I kind of enjoy doing 
it outside of [the relationship]. .  .  . [I]t’s like, “You know what? It’s just not 
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going to happen” [fulfilling sex with her partner, in this moment], so this 
[for her, BDSM fantasies] is what I can think about when it’s “me time.”
Valdivia describes a similar security in her desires during masturbation, 
which she has historically not always felt comfortable sharing with partners: 
“I masturbate a lot even when I’m dating people. I think the healthiest and 
longest- standing sexual relationship I’ve ever had is with myself, hands down.” 
Valdivia describes how she often felt that she had to hide her self-pleasuring 
habits from (cis male) partners, but now that she is pursuing more “inten-
tional,” queer relationships, she feels comfortable integrating masturbation 
into her sex life with certain partners. Valdivia also acknowledges the role 
of personal fantasy in her sex life with her partner; she states that she often 
thinks about other people and other scenarios when having sex with her part-
ner, and that she doesn’t understand this as something that reflects negatively 
on their sex life (it doesn’t indicate that she is unhappy). Tiffany also feels a 
great deal of satisfaction and directs much of her own desire into self-pleasur-
ing, and shares Corinne’s sentiment that when she is masturbating, she feels 
freest to explore any fantasy she wishes:
I definitely do have those strong desires, especially when I’m alone. I let my 
mind wander more, whereas when you are with a certain person, you are 
kind of targeted into having that with them, but when I am alone and think-
ing my own thoughts, my mind can wander either from person to person 
or scenario to scenario . . . and because it’s just me, there are no restraints, 
and I know I can make myself come, I don’t have to wait on anyone else.
At the extreme end of the spectrum of “spontaneous” versus “receptive” desire, 
Astrid describes how her desires were actively negated in the context of medi-
cal treatment for sexual pain and low desire. At the time of treatment, she 
was in a relationship with a cis man, whom she was not attracted to and did 
not desire, but to whom she felt a responsibility to be sexually receptive. She 
describes how she had plenty of sexual desire for women, and regularly fan-
tasized about them while she masturbated, but was too afraid to reveal this 
to the treatment program’s directors or to her partner, which resulted in a 
complete schism between her fantasies/desires and the sex acts she actually 
engaged in—or, rather, desperately avoided:
I was masturbating and stuff but I would never tell him [her partner] that, 
I kept that a secret .  .  . and to this day I can have great orgasms. My body 
works. To me, I’m not sexually dysfunctional, I can come, I can have great 
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sex, I couldn’t be physically penetrated but I was still masturbating, I was 
fantasizing, but I couldn’t say that to her [the treatment program director], 
so I just lied and said I wasn’t interested in sex. He [her partner] was there 
[in some of the treatment sessions], so I told her that I wasn’t interested in 
sex anymore, that I felt sexually dysfunctional. I was lying. But I couldn’t say 
anything else because he was right there.
Astrid’s story is particularly alarming, and it spotlights the dangers of the 
feminized responsive desire framework as it is taken up practically in clinical 
sexual medicine. Due to economic constraints, heteronormative expectations, 
and a variety of contextual factors, Astrid felt that she had to keep her desires 
(for women) hidden from her partner and the clinicians who were “treating” 
her—so instead, she avoided sex when she was able to, but sometimes engaged 
in it only at her husband’s behest, and always at the expense of her own desires 
(which were very real and active).
What these women’s comments illuminate is that the image of feminine 
desire that the FSIAD diagnosis and the circular sexual response cycle put 
forward doesn’t adequately capture the lived experience of many low-desiring 
women’s sexualities and desires. The women I interviewed don’t necessarily 
always desire sex with their partners, and they don’t always desire the kind 
of sex their partners want—but they are not lacking in desire, by any stretch 
of the imagination. These observations suggest that the FSIAD diagnosis is 
actually a relational diagnosis and thus should not be applied to individu-
als (categorically, women), and suggest why the “receptivity/responsiveness 
criterion” (and its female specificity) is clinically inappropriate and, in some 
cases, dangerous. It might be argued that the only people who will actually 
receive the FSIAD diagnosis are those women who seek it out, and who thus 
feel they truly have low desire and consider this lack to be a problem, but 
even if only a small subset of women will be treated for FSIAD, the diagnosis 
has a far reach and implications for all women because of the pervasiveness 
of the discourses that are used to support it. Under its shadow, women may 
pathologize themselves for not serving their partners adequately. And in the 
most extreme cases of medical treatment gone awry, some women might end 
up in treatment programs and receive a diagnosis because they feel they are 
not adequately meeting their partners’ needs. Thus, this diagnosis and asso-
ciated naturalizing discourses about feminine responsiveness and receptivity 
are of great concern simply because they circulate in the world, promulgat-
ing claims about women’s discordant sexuality, and instantiating antiquated 
notions about innate sexual difference and disparate masculine and feminine 
desires. These discourses and regimes are also concerning because in our cur-
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rent self-medicating moment in late neoliberal capitalism, medical discourses 
are pervasive and easily accessible and thus women are regularly urged to label 
themselves, or, as is expressed by Astrid above, might even be coerced into 
this labeling and associated treatment protocols by insistent and demanding 
partners (or doctors).
Nurture Is for Women, Nature Is for Men: Learning 
Sexual Difference via Science and Medicine
Contemporary sexual medicine continues to support the notion that women’s 
desire is organized in a fundamentally different way than is men’s desire—
masculinity and femininity, according to this logic, belong to incommensu-
rable paradigms. In a sense, masculine desire is the only kind of desire that 
is sexual, per se. The association of women with the desire for intimacy, 
emotional closeness, and nonsexual rewards (shapeable by nurture and cul-
ture) and the concomitant association of men with a true sexuality (driven 
by nature and biology) proliferates in many guises, and still haunts sexology 
today—including in its feminist instantiations. This asymmetry of masculine/
feminine desire is instituted in the notion of innate “female erotic plastic-
ity” (Baumeister, 2000, 2004) and is reified and codified in the FSIAD diag-
nosis and supporting research, including in the near-uniform application of 
Basson’s circular sexual response cycle to women, in the disproportionate use 
of MBST techniques with women, and in the continued attempt to excavate 
the truth of the gap between female subjective and genital arousal in experi-
mental psychophysiological research. In relation to this broad feminized 
responsive desire framework, several themes emerged from my interviews 
that low-desiring women report grappling with: the widespread notion that 
penetrative sex is the only “real” sex; the idea that women have more “com-
plex” and “emotion”-driven sexualities than men; the “obviousness” or visibil-
ity of certain body parts and cycles and how these inform experiences of the 
gendered body; and that feminine sexuality is associated with what one par-
ticipant called the “pathologizing-healing dialectic,” whereas sex itself is pro-
duced as a realm for men. All of this comes together in the summative notion 
that women are taught how to be “certain kinds of sexual beings”—sexual 
difference socialization—including through popular medical, scientific, and 
psychological self-help discourses (a point also noted by Gupta & Cacchioni, 
2013). Many participants described these various themes adding up to a sexu-
alized nature/nurture asymmetry, wherein masculinity becomes tethered to 
nature and activity, while femininity is associated with nurture and receptivity. 
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They stated that they often feel that they have to navigate this asymmetry in 
the context of their sexual relationships—which is in some cases compounded 
by other relational asymmetries.
Penetrative Sex as the Only “Real” Sex
One theme related to gender differences in the experience of sex was what 
participants and practitioners referred to as a social emphasis on the penis, 
including the consummation of sex being equated with men’s sexual satisfac-
tion and ultimately male orgasm, and even defining “sex” itself as penile-vag-
inal heterosexual intercourse. Kaye (2011) analyzes the conflation of sex with 
heterosexual intercourse, arguing that the naturalness of penile-vaginal inter-
course is so taken for granted that “it has become the proverbial ‘it’ in ‘doing 
it’” (p. 113). Gavey (2011) and Loe (2004) extend this point in their discussions 
of Viagra and the “coital imperative” within cisgender heterosexual relation-
ships, and Labuski (2015) and Cacchioni (2015) also illuminate these norma-
tive themes as they relate to women’s experiences of (hetero)sex and desire.
Many participants expounded upon men’s expectations, stating that men 
themselves perpetuate the idea that “real sex” is sex that involves penile-vag-
inal penetration, because that is what they (men) desire and what they have 
come to expect from an “authentic” sexual encounter. Evie describes how this 
socialization configures men’s and women’s experiences of heterosexual sex—
and desire for it—much differently:
Normative sex is men getting off; it’s less focused on the woman. And so I 
do think that our sexuality and our [men’s and women’s] desires are differ-
ent. There’s not really an emphasis on pleasing a woman, it’s pleasing a man, 
because that’s what heteronormative sex does. . . . I don’t think it is biological 
by any means—men are probably socialized to think that that is what sex is, 
and that it’s good for everyone, because it’s good for them.
Sarah, Regina, Astrid, and Kelly—all of whom experience mild to intense 
intermittent pain during intercourse—described how they had suggested to 
cis male partners that they might incorporate nonpenetrative acts into their 
sexual repertoires, only to be met with protest from partners who believed 
that sex that did not involve penetration was somehow less “real.” Regina sums 
up this sentiment: “I would sometimes suggest nonintercourse things, oral sex 
or things like that, and it seemed for my partners, that that was fine and good, 
but that it wasn’t like ‘real sex,’ that it was only half good, for them.”
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The practitioners I spoke with also described this social emphasis on inter-
course as antiquated and limiting. Betsy, the director of a medical center for 
the treatment of low female desire, describes how penile-vaginal intercourse 
is emphasized at the expense of other kinds of sex, a heteronormative cultural 
construct that makes sex less enjoyable for both men and women:
Somehow the erection is such a central part of our Amer[ican culture]—like, 
the penis is what it’s all about. It kills me! If you ask a person “What is sex?,” 
they will say to you “Man puts penis inside vagina, man ejaculates, that’s 
what sex is.” Why doesn’t anybody say “Man massages woman’s clitoris until 
she has an orgasm”? Why have we decided to become so androcentric? The 
penis is the be-all and end-all. That’s what people think when they think of 
men’s sexuality, but it’s not true! It’s a very unsophisticated way of looking at 
men’s sexuality, because men also have [problems with] desire, arousal, abil-
ity to ejaculate, premature ejaculation, delayed ejaculation. All those things 
are huge issues for men as well.
Here, Betsy suggests that the emphasis on the erection and penetration 
is harmful to men’s sexuality as well as to women’s sexual experiences. She 
explains that although the notion that men’s only—or at least primary—
sexual problem is erectile disorder is prevalent in our culture, men actually 
have multifaceted sexualities and can suffer from complex problems, just as 
women can. Annette, a clinical psychologist, also agrees that sex is too unilat-
erally focused on male performance and pleasure—which tends to be assessed 
through their erections:
In the research on men there was so much focus and hype around pharma-
ceutical products and treatments of erectile dysfunction, that these bigger 
concepts about how do men define desire, how do they experience sexual 
excitement, were kind of left in the shadows. And most of the funding has 
been pharmaceutically based. And from Pharma’s perspective, their primary 
mandate is in developing an effective medical treatment.
Annette links this phallocentric focus on the erection to the rise, prolifera-
tion, and cultural pervasiveness of Viagra. This is a sentiment that Louise and 
Betsy share as well, one that many of the women I interviewed suggested, and 
one that Mamo and Fishman (2001) and Loe (2004) also describe. It is clear 
that various technologies and discourses (including those produced by the 
pharmaceutical industry) support phallocentric views on sex, and also sup-
port the construction of penile-vaginal penetrative intercourse as authentic or 
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“real” sex. These discourses continue to reproduce (cishet white) “men” and 
“women” in certain ways, and undoubtedly also negatively affect people who 
do not fit into those normative categories.
How Women Learn about Their “Complex” “Emotions”
Participants and practitioners also expressed that discourses about women’s 
emotionality, relationality, responsiveness, sentimentality, complexity, moodi-
ness, and generally complicated nature were pervasive cultural tropes, and 
were often internalized by women (and by men, regarding women) from a 
very young age. Most participants disputed these tropes’ biological basis, 
although some did describe them in terms of innate differences. Regarding 
her thoughts on women’s socialization into the role of being “emotional,” and 
about the feminization of the circular sexual response cycle, Louise, a psy-
chologist and activist, states:
It [the circular model] sounds girly! It sounds feminine, emotional. For a 
long time the idea was that women’s sexuality was more emotional and con-
nected and related, that whole line of thinking, “fundamental gender differ-
ences.” . . . I think that the [model] has a kind of stereotypic female language 
about “relatedness” and “connectedness” and “responsiveness” that’s part of 
the hegemonic view of women, and I think a lot of people subscribe to that. 
You know, “Women are tender and sensitive because they are maternal” or 
whatever.
It is notable (and demonstrates a contradiction) that Louise acknowledges 
the contemporary feminization of the circular sexual response cycle, but still 
characterizes the notion that women’s sexuality is “responsive” as antiquated. 
Amelia, who worked at a “sex-positive” sex toy store and led workshops on 
locating and stimulating the G-spot, among other methods of enhancing 
women’s sexual pleasure, shares a similar sentiment about the cultural pro-
duction of feminine emotionality and complexity:
And like the fact that it [sex] is [supposedly] “emotional” [for women] is 
a huge piece, too. Sex is [construed as] like “biological” for men, it’s like 
somehow more primal or something, like, “This is this technique that you 
use and you just like jerk a dude’s dick off,” you know? But with women it’s 
like “cracking a code” and it’s like “emotional” and somewhat more, some-
thing. . . . [I]t’s just this code or like this thing that people can’t possibly figure 
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out, that men can’t possibly wrap their brains around, because it’s so hard! 
[laughs sarcastically]
In this passage, Amelia, like Betsy and Louise, shares her frustrations about 
the way sexual difference is produced via discourses about the “primal” and 
“biological” nature of men’s sexuality as opposed to the “complicated” and 
“cryptic” nature of women’s sexuality. All of these practitioners, regardless of 
their level of involvement in normative sexual medicine versus alternative or 
nonmedical forms of sexual enhancement, expressed that these beliefs are a 
disservice to people of all genders and sexualities, and that they perpetuate a 
cultural focus on penile stimulation, cisnormative heterosexual intercourse as 
the only “real sex,” and men’s pleasure over women’s pleasure.
Some participants expressed how these ideas about women’s and men’s 
divergent sexualities influenced their own orientations to sex—including in 
regard to their expectations of their partners, and even their expectations of 
themselves. Astrid describes how before she was able to articulate her attrac-
tion to women and claim the kind of intentional sex life she wanted to have, 
she also “bought into” narratives about women’s sexuality as they are perpetu-
ated through these socializing discourses, and ultimately came to believe (for 
a period of time earlier in her life) that she was not supposed to enjoy sex:
I felt very much like I would do what he wanted, and that was like—again I 
feel in some ways I bought into that like “Men have sex because they want 
to have sex, women have sex because they want to cuddle afterwards” sort 
of narrative that you hear, like, or “Women are gonna have sex because we 
want the intimacy.” . . . I just heard that from sort of, even from the media, 
like, “Men love sex, and women love cuddling,” and so I thought, “Okay, this 
is normal. I give him sex and then he will cuddle with me.”
Astrid was eventually able to express her very active desires for women and 
claim her own queer sexuality and a genderqueer/nonconforming identity, but 
for much of her adult life, she had a great deal of difficulty with sex, due to 
what she describes as an experience of being socialized into a set of very spe-
cific gendered sexual scripts and expectations for behavior, desire, and expres-
sion. Her story makes it clear that sexual difference socialization is extremely 
powerful, and that the beliefs it produces are profound, psychic, embodied, 
and, ultimately, very difficult to overcome. Unfortunately, being treated in a 
medical setting for sexual pain and low desire did not help her either, and, in 
fact, iatrogenically harmed her and made her situation worse.
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Visibility, “Obviousness,” and Phenomenological Experiences 
of the Gendered Body
Another important aspect of sexual difference socialization includes coming 
to experience parts of the body and bodily processes as gendered—including 
through an evolutionary or biological lens that is white and hetero-/cisnor-
mative. Phenomenological writing on “[cis] female body experience” (Young, 
2005), productions of sexual difference (Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994; Irigaray, 
1985), and heterosexual and queer “orientations” toward (or away from) other 
bodies that are gendered and raced (Ahmed 2006, 2007) are all of import 
here. I draw on this work, focusing on how medical discourses about sexual 
difference come to influence individuals’ psychic and affective experiences of 
themselves as members of—in this case, feminized—populations. Embodied 
experience is social and relational (Merleau Ponty, 1962/1995; Oliver, 2001), 
and this phenomenological coding of the world is productive of forms of 
bodily difference (de Beauvoir, 1952/1989; Weheliye, 2014).
The practitioners I spoke with had much to say about gendered bodily 
coding and subsequent phenomenological and psychosocial experiences that 
result from this coding, but they were more likely than low-desiring partic-
ipants to characterize these differences in biological terms. Betsy discusses 
the “obviousness” of erections and what they imply about differences in male 
and female sexuality and sexual dysfunction, again considering the impact of 
Viagra:
People think Viagra because it’s on television, and because erection is sort of 
a dramatic, something you can see, whereas desire isn’t something you see, 
which for women, again, arousal isn’t something you can see, orgasm, you 
know, everything seems to be more visible in a man. Erection is more vis-
ible. Ejaculation is more visible. Orgasm is more visible. . . . I think it is more 
situated, but given that, I still think that women are slightly more complicated.
In our interview, Betsy further alludes to how erections become evidence of 
masculine desire, spontaneity, and activity, while premenstrual syndrome or 
PMS and menstruation become instantiations of feminine complexity, moodi-
ness, and cyclical ambivalence. These bodily coding schemas are fraught for 
the women I interviewed; women are often aware of the fact that they have 
internalized these essentializing notions, and move quickly between espous-
ing their beliefs in these notions as the “truth of biology” and rejecting them 
as hierarchizing social scripts with no real or natural basis. But, regardless 
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of how much these women identified with or rejected these coded parts and 
processes, they ultimately described how deeply they felt the impact of these 
systems of meaning—in their bodyminds and behaviors, which were indel-
ibly marked by these schemas. Sexual difference socialization is thus enacted 
in part through gendered conceptions of arousal, which is understood to be 
more easily detectable in men, versus “hormonal cycles,” which are purported 
to be more easily detectable in women. This comparison of the visible or obvi-
ous provides an interesting entrée into a phenomenological explanation for 
how men get coded as more desiring via their (potentially) visible erections, 
whereas women get coded as more complicated via their (potentially) vis-
ible menstrual cycles—and also how gendered individuals code themselves 
accordingly. That these phenomena happen on completely different time scales 
perhaps further solidifies notions of male spontaneity and female receptivity 
(men’s desire is cast as immediate, pressing, and positive, whereas women’s 
desire is framed as slow, cyclical, and negative—and more often oriented to 
reproduction). The notion of what is visible, and what this visibility means, is 
something that came up over and over again in the interviews. In this vein, 
Zola illustrates her fraught feelings about divergences in male and female 
embodiment and experience:
I think it is different, just because of the differences between us [men and 
women]. We go through different things, our cycles are different . . . [and] 
the monthly hormonal influxes do not help! But I am very sure men experi-
ence some type of “menstruation” inside of themselves, because there’s no 
other way to explain some of the hissy fits my ex-husband used to throw 
[laughter]. . . . [I]t’s just that all of their stuff is internalized. . . . [I]t is very 
hard as a woman to keep these things inside, it takes a lot of strength to keep 
your stuff suppressed.
What Zola relates here is a very complex imbrication of social, psychological, 
and embodied experience that she describes as different for men and women. 
It is clear that she believes some of these differences between men and women 
are purely “biological,” but she also espouses a phenomenological explanation 
for divergent embodied experiences, based in socialization and lived experi-
ence of the coded body. Interestingly, she also reverses the sexual difference 
logic that emphasizes the externality and visibility of male erection-as-desire, 
for instance, by focusing on men’s “internalized” or “suppressed” emotions. 
Lisa expands this notion of the experience of sexual difference based on 
bodily coding:
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I think there is something to say for emotional cycles in men that I am curi-
ous about and I don’t think is studied enough, because men aren’t having 
their periods or ovulating—my [female] roommate and I would sometimes 
have these moments where we would be like, “I don’t know, everything just 
seemed really hard today, and I burst into tears!” and I’d be like, “Didn’t you 
say you are about to get your period?” And she’d be like, “Oh yeah!” [laugh-
ter] or it would happen exactly in reverse. My male roommate was like, “I 
kind of wish that I got my period because I wish I could justify my crazy 
cycles according to something beyond my control! I wish I had something 
to blame it on because I’m also feeling that way but it’s not as obviously hor-
monal!” So I think that men don’t get credit for having emotional cycles, but 
they obviously do.
These statements about the visibility of body parts and bodily functions are 
provocative, because they suggest that psychosocial and phenomenological 
experiences of the body and its processes—which are always marked and 
coded, and always experienced in relation to other bodies and their pro-
cesses—are not innate or unchangeable, but are simultaneously very real. 
Thus, the lived experience of gender is absolutely biological, in that it is part 
and parcel of embodied awareness, but it is not essential, innate, originary, 
a priori, or presocial. This is something that the participants I interviewed 
tended to agree upon.
Femininity and the “Pathologizing-Healing Dialectic”: How Sex 
Is Produced as a Realm for Men
Many participants described their belief that despite the narratives about gen-
der and sexuality that are put forward through visibility discourses, men do, 
in fact, have psychological problems related to sexuality—their issues simply 
don’t get labeled or pathologized in the same way that women’s do. Accord-
ing to the individuals I spoke with, it’s almost easier for women to acknowl-
edge their issues with low desire and other psychosexual problems because of 
expectations about femininity as “complicated.” Participants articulated that 
these conceptualizations have a negative effect on men’s sexuality, in that it 
becomes performance-driven, goal-oriented, and that any issues that they 
have are characterized as purely physiological—which puts a lot of pressure on 
men to maintain their erections, and their (heteronormative) desire (see also 
Murray, 2019, for more on this theme). This is an inversion of the phenom-
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enology described in the last section; here, women have an easier time seeking 
out treatment for low desire because “it’s obvious” that they ought to do so.
Annie refers to this gendered system as the “pathologizing-healing dia-
lectic” when she describes a cis male friend of hers with low desire who has 
had a difficult time “coming out” as having these issues or seeking treatment, 
because of expectations about masculinity:
I don’t see him going to a doctor or getting really into the sort of like “pathol-
ogizing-healing dialectic” like women do. But I feel like he does [have simi-
lar issues]—if he were a woman in a [sexual] relationship, he would have 
some sexual difficulty. . . . [L]ike, I could see him getting—in a relationship 
context—if he was the woman?!—it would probably get labeled that way [as 
low desire or sexual dysfunction].
Taja expresses a similar view of the gendered nature of self-medicalization, 
which might be described as part of this “pathologizing-healing dialectic” or 
the feminized trajectory of seeking out diagnoses that one can then attempt to 
treat. When I ask her if she thinks there are gender differences in the sexual 
issues that people commonly experience, Taja states:
Men are just as obsessed as women are, the difference is that they do not 
medicalize it. . . . [T]hey are worried about it, but it is different than the way 
I am worried about it somehow. . . . I’m all concerned about it being some 
deep psychological dysfunction . . . [but] I don’t think men are worried about 
some big psychological problem. They’re like, “Oh, it must be a physical 
problem.” . . . [M]en just aren’t as in touch with their emotions, I think they 
aren’t trained to be in touch with their emotions, so they are not trained to 
assume that it is emotions.
Many participants echoed similar ideas about the “pathologizing-healing dia-
lectic” and self-medicalization as something that women are more likely to 
experience and engage in than men. Elizabeth, Corinne, Lisa, Tiffany, Rose, 
and Valdivia all expressed the notion that it is “easier” for women to iden-
tify low desire and other psychosexual issues, whereas it is easier and more 
acceptable for men to stick with the narrative that their problems are purely 
physical. They also shared their beliefs that these gender differences are pro-
duced—including a generally “less complicated” orientation to sex for men, 
in spite of pressures to perform—through sexual difference socialization pro-
cesses. Gendered phenomenological experiences of embodied states indicate 
different expectations for men and women around sexual concerns and dys-
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function—and come to be experienced and lived in correspondingly differ-
ent ways. Through these processes, sex is produced as a realm for men, that 
participants felt women are excluded from—or at least a realm wherein their 
roles are constructed very differently.
Lola describes this phenomenon of the masculinizing of sex itself as 
something that hinders women from asking for—and getting—what they 
want sexually: “I feel like dudes can just be like, they can say that they need 
sex, whereas I’m not comfortable articulating that.” She explains this in terms 
of women being socialized to not pursue their own sexual desires, or not to 
even understand sex as something they have a stake in. Elaine supports this 
notion: “I feel like men are really told that any level of pursuit or enthusiasm 
[in sex] is okay for them. And I think it just makes it less complicated for 
them.” Penelope reiterates this sentiment about sex being “less complicated” 
for men:
I think in general it is easier for men to just perform the act of sex and feel 
really amazing physically and have no emotional connection to their part-
ner; I think it is much harder for women to do that . . . and in terms of just 
the level of desire, I guess it’s connected because you [men] are encouraged 
to go out there and desire lots of women, or you [women] are encouraged 
to be with one person. . . . [T]hat would contribute to the level of desire and 
also the connecting emotionally to your sexual partner, because if you are 
just supposed to be with one person, that’s your person, but if you are sup-
posed to be with lots of people, why should it matter how you feel towards 
them, I guess?
Generally, participants stated that sex is produced as the domain of men—
or that it is culturally constructed and coded as such, through media repre-
sentations, in popular medical and scientific narratives, and through other 
discourses that they learned about at early ages from their families, from reli-
gious institutions, and at school. In this context, women are understood to 
have a different domain that they are expected to tend to and that is important 
to them—one that is characterized by emotionality, intimacy, domesticity, and 
caretaking. Or, alternatively, they are framed as having a different orientation 
to or role within the sexual landscape, but that it is not a place to cultivate 
their own fantasies, desires, or intense sexual feelings. Instead, women are 
socialized to experience sex as something they should engage in and even 
enjoy primarily as a service—a framing that ignores women’s own subjectivi-
ties as sexual beings or that produces women as very specific kinds of sexual 
beings, always in relation to men.
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How Women Are Socialized to Be “Certain Kinds of Sexual 
Beings”
Many participants described how they have come to experience themselves 
as “certain kinds of sexual beings.” This production and pursuant experience 
of femininity is a crucial aspect of sexual difference socialization—which, in 
some cases, happens at the hands of the very clinicians who are in charge 
of helping women to get in touch with their own sexualities. Astrid illumi-
nates her experience with being “coerced” into a “certain kind of femininity” 
through her participation in the treatment program. To her, it represented 
this messaging taken to an extreme, coercion legitimated through science and 
medicine: “But in terms of sexual function, I can’t even imagine going back 
to those freakshows, because I feel like they were telling me that I needed 
to work through my ‘sexual dysfunction issues’ to become a certain kind of 
sexual being.” When discussing sexual development with Elaine, she states:
I think that [biology] relates more to men, and I think for women it’s more 
sort of social and psychological, these issues of desire, and for men, it’s 
more sort of biological and medical, they are less affected—maybe not less 
affected—but affected differently by the social and psychological factors. . . . 
[I]t [socialization] tends not to suppress [men’s] desire in the same way that 
it does for women.
Elaine’s framing here is intriguing; she suggests that men’s sexual issues—
including men’s physiological and phenomenological experiences of these 
issues—are produced as “medical” or “biological.” According to Elaine, it’s 
almost as though sexuality is allowed to be “biological” for men, whereas 
women are socialized into their own complex and emotional experiences of 
sex, which are ultimately more “social” and “psychological.” Elaine describes a 
very complicated and nuanced view of the material-discursive production and 
concomitant embodied experience of sexual difference, including of gendered 
sexual disorders and dysfunctions.
Throughout the interviews, participants expressed a certain ambivalence 
and cynicism around questions of “biology” versus “socialization”—the notion 
that even if men’s and women’s sexualities are ultimately more similar than 
they are different, even if we “start out the same” (in Marianne’s words), the 
dominant narrative that masculinity and femininity are dimorphic persists, 
and that difference is ultimately lived out among real people in the world, and 
becomes a force in itself. Regina sums up this sentiment:
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I generally do not like explaining things by like a male-female dualism, but 
I don’t know? I perceive them [her ex-boyfriends] as having very high sex 
drives.  .  .  . [I]t’s not that they didn’t have those [psychological/emotional] 
issues, but maybe their awareness didn’t match the level of awareness I was 
giving to my own issues. . . . [W]e definitely have the stereotype of men as 
being much more quick to be aroused, you hear of teenage boys having an 
erection when they don’t want to and even grown men not being able to con-
trol that thing! I could not imagine a world in which that happened to me 
.  .  . but the way that we as a society talk about the way that males are and 
the way that females are is not necessarily true to how males and females 
are. I believe that that is a story that we tell ourselves, that men are more 
sexual creatures and have a more simplistic sexuality—and it also might be 
self-perpetuating, too, as soon as you start telling the story, people start iden-
tifying with it.
In this rich quote, with which I also began this chapter, Regina elucidates 
feedback loops among our bodies, psyches, relationships, discourses, and the 
world around us. She also returns to the notion that women are more inclined 
than are men to self-pathologize or self-medicalize (the feminized “patholo-
gizing-healing dialectic”) and that sex is produced as a realm “for men.” She 
articulates the notion that it is difficult to disentangle different forces (the 
“physical,” “social,” and “personal”) as discrete phenomena; so, as much as bio-
logical forces may produce a certain type of embodied experience, the stories 
that we tell ourselves and each other about biology have specific embodied 
and psychic effects as well. If this is the case, then how useful is measuring 
the gap between the subjective and physiological, as is endeavored in psy-
chophysiological plethysmographic research? What do gendered narratives 
of sexual concordance and discordance offer us? What do these experimental 
measurements, for instance, of the disconnect between the “subjective” and 
the “physiological,” actually offer us?
Embodied Feedback Loops among the Biological, 
Psychological, and Social
Discordance (between genital arousal and subjective desire) is a key frame 
within twenty-first-century sex research on women. I argue that the way it 
has been pervasively disseminated and deployed is damaging to women, and 
that it perpetuates the notion of specifically feminine sexual responsiveness 
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or receptivity. However, notions of concordance and discordance, or of mind/
body connections and disconnects, are worth exploring phenomenologi-
cally—particularly in the context of trauma-related dissociation and women’s 
experiences of their bodies “shutting down” during certain sexual experiences. 
In this last section, I focus on trauma and the special questions that trauma 
raises for theories of mind/body relations, intersubjectivity, and the social. 
Insofar as they provide frameworks for understanding a certain process of 
feminization that is embodied but not essential, critical disability studies, fem-
inist psychiatric disability and madness studies, critical trauma studies, and 
asexuality studies offer us a better way to understand how bodies and minds 
link up (or don’t) than the cultural feminism–informed psychological para-
digms I began this chapter by describing. They also provide alternatives to 
the more rigid and essentializing technologies associated with the feminized 
responsive desire framework that I have analyzed in this book so far—includ-
ing those that use behavioristic protocols as a means to an end.
In her 2018 sexual self-help book, Brotto describes the different ways that 
female discordance can manifest. In a chapter wherein she discusses “how 
mindfulness works” (i.e., by promoting concordance, or aligning the body 
and mind), she makes it clear that women’s biological tendency toward eas-
ily activated and powerful physiological arousal, including when a woman 
does not subjectively feel turned on, should never be used as evidence of the 
fact that she secretly “wanted it”—specifically citing cases of sexual violence, 
wherein the fact that a woman became lubricated or even had an orgasm 
does not indicate anything about her desire. Brotto deplores this notion, stat-
ing that “a woman’s self-report of how she feels is the ultimate reporter of 
her experience and the only way that consent can be given” (p. 139).9 I have 
often wondered why—if a woman’s word is the only thing that matters—so 
many contemporary sex researchers continue to explore female discordance, 
why research that quite literally probes this gap has exploded so much in 
the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and why it continues to be 
the gold standard in sexual science and medicine today. More importantly 
here, though, I am interested in how clinicians and researchers frame other 
types of discordance and concordance (and why they are less likely to attend 
to these). In this same section of Brotto’s popular book, she describes how 
mind/body discordance “can happen in the other direction, too”—when one 
feels turned on but “the body says ‘No!’” (p. 139). To illustrate this example of 
 9. This is also mentioned in a toolkit available on the #debunkingdesire social media 
campaign’s website (https://1d0dfd67-9812-43f7-a73f-9bc624a65f9a.filesusr.com/ugd/1f8b67_96
7a13a8f5374d17bcbc839861a9e509.pdf), wherein the importance of consent is highlighted after 
a discussion of Basson’s circular or “arousal-first” sexual response cycle and its applicability to 
women’s desire enhancement. 
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what she calls “reverse discordance,” Brotto describes how many women who 
have had pelvic surgeries (for instance, following gynecologic cancer) might 
feel turned on mentally but lack sensation in their bodies. While this “reverse 
discordance” is hypothesized as an example of another type of discordance 
some women might experience, it is also broadly understood to be a much less 
likely scenario in sexually “healthy” women—rapid and intense genital arousal 
without subjective desire to match is what is instead regularly documented in 
almost all of the published studies of female discordance (i.e., women experi-
ence free-flowing physiological arousal even if they can’t detect it subjectively; 
according to “the preparation hypothesis,” they can be physically ready to go 
at pretty much any moment but are less likely to report subjective mental 
desire to match).10 “Reverse discordance” in women is thus an anomaly within 
the scientific lexicon, and this is borne out in the fact that it is significantly less 
frequently studied (specifically in regard to women who have not undergone 
pelvic surgeries).
While “reverse discordance” may be one interesting counterpoint to the 
overarching logic of feminine responsiveness and easy genital arousal, my 
research suggests that there are others; bodies, psychologies, and the social 
link up in all kinds of complex ways. One way is when the body shuts down 
because the mind does not want something, a very different type of concor-
dance, which shores up a taboo topic in contemporary psychology and sexol-
ogy: the unconscious. Yet we need not enact a full psychoanalytic discussion 
of the unconscious here in order to analyze embodied subjectivity in this vein. 
Some of my participants describe how their bodies enact things almost on 
their behalf, and thus they force us to grapple not only with the notion of 
the unconscious but also with that of hysteria. As Labuski (2015) noted with 
her participants with vulvodynia, an enactment of hysteria in the context of 
trauma—whether physical, psychological, or both (and it generally is both)—
is simultaneously produced via raced, classed, gendered, and sexualized codes 
and experienced viscerally at the level of the body. Reckoning with hysteria 
 10. Lalumière, et al. (2020) explain what they see as the practical utility of disseminating 
knowledge about “the preparation hypothesis” (that women’s easy lubricative and vasoconges-
tive response is an adaptive mechanism evolved in prehistoric environments to protect the 
vagina against injury during sexual assault)—the idea is that having a scientific theory in place 
for why women become physiologically aroused even when they are being sexually assaulted 
may help destigmatize women’s automatic genital response and can be used in the vein of 
forensic evidence and education with police and in the courts or criminal justice system. Fol-
lowing Chivers (2005), they also suggest that knowing that other women also became physi-
ologically aroused when they were raped may be reassuring to some survivors. It is one thing 
to tell women this fact; it is another to provide an explanation for it rooted in evolutionary 
psychology. And of course, we would not need this type of forensic education regarding a 
theory of cave-rape if we didn’t automatically distrust sexual assault charges made by women.
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here may offer a crip (McRuer, 2006), cripistemological (Johnson & McRuer, 
2014), or criphystemological (Mollow, 2014) standpoint through which we 
might make sense of embodied experiences that bring populations together, 
thus theorizing both hysterical subjectivities and hysterical populations.
In 2014, Johnson and McRuer posited “cripistemologies” as a way of think-
ing through how a “crip” (McRuer, 2006) standpoint is a place from which 
to theorize, a way to make sense of disability and debility as both culturally 
coded and viscerally experienced in the world. This work has moved us away 
from thinking of disabilities as purely medical or as socially constructed—
but instead, as political, relational, and always embodied (Kafer, 2013). In the 
same journal issue in which “cripistemologies” was introduced, Mollow (2014) 
described hysteria from this standpoint, arguing for an embodied perspective 
on hysterical subjectivity that takes pain and trauma into account. My partici-
pants offer a cripistemological intervention—the low-desiring feminized (and 
often traumatized) subject may now be a revolutionary figure who offers a 
new way of thinking about race, class, gender, sexuality, minds, bodies, desire, 
and dysfunction. The low-desiring woman as a potential FSIAD diagnosee 
exposes the limits of the “social” and “biological”—she has been socialized via 
sexual difference discourses and is produced as such within them; however, 
she is always at risk of failing at femininity. Some may experience this failure 
as liberating in its sabotage, some as a painful condition that requires treat-
ment—but for many of us, it will always be both.
Several of the women I spoke with had experienced sexual abuse or some 
type of gendered or sexualized violence at some point during their lives. They 
were clear that regardless of any other biological or social factors, this fact 
alone had deeply influenced their experiences of sex, and the substance of and 
ability to pursue their own desires. They spoke of a variety of ways that they 
believe their brains have been affected by trauma, and then additionally by 
the types of drugs they’ve used to treat those conditions. Molly, who is a sur-
vivor of sexual abuse and who now helps other women who have experienced 
sexual violence, discusses her own embodied experience of trauma:
There are times where I will have a very physical reaction, or feel something 
physical, but I’m not able to say, “Okay, I feel this because he did this spe-
cific thing to me.” . . . [I]t’s frustrating to not be able to say, “I know that this 
happened, and I know that that happened and that that other thing hap-
pened.” . . . [A]nd then certain weird things can trigger it, trigger sort of a 
flashback. . . . [I]t’s like the stuff that I can’t deal with in my head comes out 
in my body.
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Annie also shares how her experience with sexual abuse as a child has deeply 
influenced her embodied responses to sex today, focusing specifically on how 
she believes her neurocircuitry has been affected by trauma and then by tak-
ing selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to alleviate her symptoms:
A situation that might elicit a kind of “fight” response for me would elicit 
a kind of like “hiding” or “fleeing” response in someone else, or vice versa, 
and I would say that’s common and kind of the underlying biological piece 
of having a post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD] diagnosis. So that’s the 
starting point for it, and then enter the medication to treat that, in addition 
to the fight-or-flight thing influencing my interactions with sexual partners; 
the medication [an SSRI] adds this other layer of then having difficulty with 
orgasms, maybe having less sexual desire, and having frustration and tension 
around control over sex and having orgasms.
Here, Annie highlights the iatrogenic perpetuation of her low desire through 
her own experience of treatment for PTSD; the drug of choice for women with 
depression and anxiety (including women who experience these because of 
trauma) is often an SSRI. SSRIs are known for their sexual side effects, includ-
ing a general lowering of libido and anorgasmia. Annie describes how being 
abused affected her neurochemistry and “fight-or-flight response,” which led 
her to take an SSRI to treat this condition, which subsequently negatively 
affects her sex life and desire, which then affects her relationship with her own 
body and her relationships with partners. Annie has a particularly nuanced 
and complex analysis of this feedback loop of embodied-social interaction, 
which she believes is common to the way many low-desiring women experi-
ence sex. It exemplifies the thoughtful and deeply intricate ways the women I 
interviewed think about the interactions among social events (including trau-
mas), personal psychology, and embodied states.
Some of the participants who experience pain upon penetration concom-
itant with their lowered desire had similarly sophisticated analyses of how 
trauma has affected their bodies and sexualities. Sarah discussed how her 
chronic pain condition, which is not specifically vaginal but which does make 
penetration uncomfortable for her, has deeply affected her desire to have sex 
(or rather, to avoid it)—with men, particularly. She explains how her body 
has become so accustomed to experiencing pain that she almost automat-
ically “shuts down,” often before the experience has even begun, in antici-
pation. Regina, who experiences pain upon penetration, describes a similar 
phenomenon:
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I went to a physical therapist, she gave me these dildo-looking things—you 
go up in size to stretch and things like that and I did find that if I used that 
the day before, or a couple of hours before I was going to have sex, then that 
did help things.  .  .  . [T]hen we [she and her partner] kind of made it part 
of our thing, that I would do this, or maybe take a bath to relax things . . . 
but this all gets to be very mechanical—it is not the playful spontaneous sex 
that is fun and enjoyable, it starts to be like, “Okay, how can we get it so that 
Regina’s vagina does not revolt?” Like every time we had sex I had all these 
chores to do in order to be able to have sex.
This notion of her body “revolting” against penetration is one that other par-
ticipants with genital pain expressed. Maya, who has not been diagnosed with 
dyspareunia or vulvodynia, but who has begun to experience more intense 
vaginal pain in the context of her marriage, describes her thoughts on the 
etiology of the problem:
It was always a little bit painful, but now it is just excruciatingly painful and 
I think it is because I am totally not into it. . . . I think I turn it off because 
it is one thing to be aroused, and another to know that the arousal will go 
through a complete process and you will end up having sex, and I don’t want 
to be aroused only to have pain.  .  .  . I have totally told myself that I don’t 
want to do this anymore, and because of that, my body is devising ways of 
making it easier for me to prove that I cannot do it.
Both Kelly and Astrid, who have been diagnosed with vulvodynia and who 
completed a treatment program to help alleviate their physical pain and simul-
taneously treat their low desire, shared similar sentiments about the possibility 
of a psychophysiological materialization of their trauma and lack of desire as 
physical pain. Kelly discusses her experience with treatment:
KELLY: We all had pain and low desire.  .  .  . [W]hich came first? I don’t 
know.
ALYSON: Do you have any speculations in your own situation around which 
came first?
KELLY: At first I thought it was just the pain that came first and the low 
desire was a by-product of it, because naturally you don’t want to do 
something that hurts, but looking back, the guy I was with definitely was 
not the right person for me in a lot of ways, so part of it may have been 
not really wanting to have sex with him.
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Astrid’s story is particularly alarming, as she describes her body as literally wag-
ing war against a way of being sexual that she could simply no longer tolerate:
I think my body stepped in where my mind wasn’t willing to step in or was 
incapable of stepping in at the time and said, “This isn’t right, I don’t want 
to be submitted to this practice of being receptive to this kind of abusive 
treatment, this heteronormative—” . . . I really believe that my body just said 
“No!” and sort of drew a line in the sand. . . . [T]his “disorder”—it changed 
everything for me, it made it impossible for me to continue to engage in this 
very dysfunctional relationship where I traded sex for security at the expense 
of my own identity and my own politics. . . . I feel like my nonconsensual sex 
turned from only an emotionally painful sex into also a physically painful 
sex and that that became a physically impossible sex over time, to the point 
where I was no longer able to engage in that abusive, nonconsensual sex, just 
because my body made it impossible. . . . [B]ut [in the treatment program], 
we were told, “It’s because you’re in pain that you developed this uninterest 
in sex”—rather than the other way around.
These women’s stories provide a sobering counternarrative to the tales evo-
lutionary psychology, FSIAD, and the feminized circular sexual response 
cycle tell about the embodied “truth” of female desire. Rather than the female 
lubrication- swelling response being an indication of a woman’s evolved physi-
cal proclivity to become aroused, instead we have evidence of the body shut-
ting down as a form of embodied revolt or resistance. As we have moved away 
from psychosomatic medicine and into the terrain of neurologically based 
differences with “organic” etiologies and essentialized attributes, these narra-
tives may seem atavistic, anachronistic, or anathema. They certainly feel out of 
place in our current neoliberal technoscientific moment, characterized as it is 
by neurocognitive behaviorist framings. But these accounts raise the question 
of the psychosomatic, they hearken back to Freud’s hysterics and neurotics, to 
Anna O., to Dora, and to psychoanalytic conceptualizations that might have 
previously been framed as frigidity, hysteria, or peculiarly feminine neuro-
ses. But these phenomena, experiences, processes, and practices might also be 
interpreted as subconscious or unconscious political acts, forms of revolt or 
resistance, and reclamations of bodies and identities that have been colonized 
and oppressed (Bordo, 1993 Cixous & Clément, 1975/1986). With this in mind, 
might we consider certain enactments of low desire among the feminized, and 
their physiological manifestations, as potentially political, subversive, or even 
as insurrectionary?
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C H A P T E R  4
Embodied Invisible Labor, Sexual 
Carework
The Cultural Logic and Affective Valorization of 
Responsive Female Desire
In 2014, Los Angeles psychotherapist Lori Gottlieb published an article in the 
New York Times titled “Does a More Equal Marriage Mean Less Sex?” This 
article reported on a study conducted on the relationship between household 
division of labor and sex frequency among heterosexual couples, and con-
cluded that the less “gender differentiation” between two parties in a romantic 
partnership, the lower the frequency and quality of sex they will have. Got-
tlieb’s take is only one of the most recent to proclaim that egalitarianism in 
romantic relationships, particularly among heterosexual couples, dampens 
desire (see Roiphe, 2012 for another example, which I will examine in chap-
ter 5). The standard logic is that feminism has had an unfortunate side effect; 
women might feel more equal to their partners in all kinds of ways nowadays, 
but that equality was only acquired at the expense of their desire—and a hot 
sex life. At the same time, the concern that women still describe doing more 
of the most traditionally feminine domestic duties—including some that are 
sexual, sensual, and affective—is easily rendered passé in a purportedly post-
feminist climate. In light of the popularity of media accounts and research 
suggesting an inverse relationship between gender egalitarianism and exciting 
sex, and alongside the feminized responsive desire framework that I have out-
lined in this book thus far (which includes the circular sexual response cycle, 
the new female sexual interest/arousal disorder [FSIAD] diagnosis, myriad 
reports of female genital/subjective discordance, and biopolitical regimes 
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such as mindfulness-based sex therapy [MBST] to cultivate women’s desire), 
it is imperative to consider the persistent feminization of sexual, sensual, and 
caring work, including within the often-gendered terrain of romantic and 
marital partnerships. How does performing this work affect women’s desire 
and experiences of sex? How do medicalized and extramedical protocols for 
feminine sexual responsiveness and receptivity influence, frame, and delimit 
women’s experiences of providing care? In the twenty-first century, do we see 
new demands for relational caretaking in light of these protocols? If so, what 
do they consist of?
In this chapter, I analyze the gendered configurations of intimacy and 
sexuality that remain hidden beneath popular accounts of “lackluster” and 
“unsexy” egalitarianism, linking them to more traditional forms of care-
work and also to biopolitical self-care regimes under late capitalism. Extend-
ing analyses of the social organization of care more broadly, my data from 
low-desiring women suggest that many intimate relationships—particularly 
wherein there are gendered desire discrepancies between partners—involve 
what I call “sexual carework.” With this concept, I am in dialogue with Hoch-
schild’s analysis of “emotional labor” and “feeling rules” (Hochschild, 1985; 
Hochschild & Machung, 1989); for Hochschild, emotions are social, performed 
for others, and people of different (race, gender, class, and other) statuses are 
expected to perform them in different ways. More so than Hochschild, how-
ever, I find Weeks’s (2011) attention to the naturalization, feminization, and 
racialization of socially reproductive care via the idealization of the nuclear 
family most useful. It is also imperative to examine carework’s colonialist, 
racist, and classist contours in terms of how these affect women of color, 
immigrant women, and poor women, across national borders (Collins, 1998; 
Francisco-Menchavez, 2018; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2002; Kang, 2010; MacDon-
ald, 2015; Parreñas, 2002; Wingfield, 2015). Other recent conceptualizations 
focus on the care that women with low desire and sexual pain perform (Braks-
majer, 2017; Cacchioni, 2007, 2015; Labuski, 2014, 2015). I add to these analyses 
by placing “sexual carework” within a broader medicalized frame of female 
receptivity and responsiveness, and by attending to the biopolitical invectives 
that result, in terms of mandates to care for the self. This type of analysis of 
feminized sexual carework helps to shed light on the relational production of 
women’s “low desire,” as examining medical, scientific, and popular discourses 
that revolve around the broader feminized responsive desire framework illu-
minates the deployment of women’s low desire and helps to clarify the work 
this configuration of receptive femininity performs at a cultural level.
There are two different formulations of work underwriting my analysis 
here. The first form of labor is in line with the typical work of liberal capi-
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talism, in which a woman services her partner (including, in some cases, by 
putting on a certain kind of affective performance, often within the context 
of a power imbalance). Cacchioni’s (2015) conceptualization of women with 
low desire and pain who perform sexualized “labors of love,” and Braksma-
jer’s (2017) analysis of sexualized care as a form of obligatory compliance that 
women with dyspareunia must navigate, are both situated within this formu-
lation. Similarly, Labuski (2015) also describes the relational and embodied 
work that women with vulvodynia execute as part of a regime of intimate care 
and both sexual orientation and gender identity protection. All of these theo-
rists focus on heteronormative expectations for sexual service that women 
engage in for the benefit of their (often cis male) partners. My own concep-
tualization of sexual carework, in regard to this form of labor, has much in 
common with these framings.
The other aspect of sexual carework I describe in this chapter is an exam-
ple of Foucauldian governmentality (2000) and a form of biopolitical (1978, 
2003) labor under neoliberal capitalism—it is the labor that a woman directs 
inward, to make herself more enjoyable, appealing, or optimal to others, but 
that also includes an expectation that she will do this labor to and for herself. 
This type betrays the mandates of neoliberalism (including its sexual impera-
tives), in which femininity itself is understood along an axis of debility and 
capacitation (Puar, 2011, 2017), and in which self-care, self-optimization, and 
pleasure itself become work. Not only do the low-desiring women I inter-
viewed describe laboring in this second, self-optimizing or biopolitical way, 
but this theme emerges in medical, scientific, therapeutic, and consumer dis-
courses—including in the feminized responsive desire framework described 
throughout this book. The logic of self-optimization as compulsory has been 
theorized at length (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011; McRuer, 2006), as have its 
sexual components (Barounis, 2019; Gupta, 2011, 2015; Gupta & Cacchioni, 
2013; Milks & Cerankowski, 2014; Przybylo, 2013). But my analysis makes clear 
that there are specifically gendered facets of this labor that can be examined 
as particularly relevant in the case of women-with-low-desire—members of a 
population who are expected to work on themselves and conjure up a desire 
for the sake of their lovers, themselves, and even the nation, the public, and 
the population or species body. If sexuality is compulsory, it must also be a 
type of work. Under this model, those who cannot work are thus debilitated; 
they ought to work on themselves, or allow themselves to be worked upon, 
with an eye toward their own (in this case, gendered and sexual) capacitation.
The heart of this chapter, then, is to add this deeper biopolitical theo-
rization of sexual care; consider how this type of service operates over the 
life-span for many women and how they are socialized into it; and to analyze 
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sexualized, sensualized, and affective forms of gendered neoliberal citizen-
ship—a form of what Cossman (2007) refers to as “sexual citizenship.” In this 
vein, Cacchioni (2015) describes three different aspects of what she calls “sex 
work”1—“discipline work,” “performance work,” and “avoidance work.” Both 
“performance work” and “discipline work” involve self-improvement strategies 
that develop one’s “sexual capital” (p. 85) and thus have implications for gov-
ernmentality. I am in conversation with Cacchioni’s framing but take this Fou-
cauldian analysis a step further, via two moves—(1) I consider sexual carework 
as a mode of compulsory self-optimization or self-care (as a form of anato-
mopolitics) as elucidated above. And (2) I analyze it as a mode of population 
production (as a form of biopolitics)—those who perform care in this way 
are produced as part of a responsive, receptive, feminized population. So, in 
addition to qualitative analyses of low-desiring women’s narratives of pressure 
to provide sexualized care, and the gendered logic of receptivity they describe 
learning at young ages, I also illuminate discursive productions of femininity 
as receptive, reproductive, valorizable,2 and always ready to labor—including 
as these are found in psychomedical discourses and popular accounts. This is 
necessary, as the feminized responsive desire framework does not only impact 
women who are formally diagnosed with desire troubles or sexual pain; its 
impact, in fact, goes much further—as it has been taken up in alternative 
health and wellness circles, other popular self-help accounts, and under the 
guise of sex positivity and feminism. Here, the logic of receptivity contours 
the logic of care.
In analyzing these two forms of labor, I engage with a revised Marxist 
feminist critique of heterosexuality, social reproduction, and gender rela-
tions under capitalism, specifically framing it alongside contemporary cul-
tural narratives about the purportedly negative effects of gender equality, and 
bringing the medical and scientific discursive logic of feminine receptivity 
to the forefront. Building on the scholarship of pioneering theorists of gen-
dered carework, the social organization of care, and the undervalued labor of 
women, particularly women of color, in global production and social repro-
duction more broadly, I argue that intimate relationships themselves involve 
 1. Cacchioni’s (2015) notion of “sex work” is not to be confused with paid sex work—sex 
work proper—that involves providing sexual services in exchange for money. Her terminol-
ogy is drawn from Duncombe and Marsden (1996), who use the term sex work to describe 
unpaid sexual labor in long-term relationships. I dislike this term, as I understand sex work 
to be a paid service that requires a separate analysis in terms of precarity, vulnerability, and 
economic justice for sex workers. I will discuss sex work proper briefly later in the chapter 
and explain what it does and does not have in common with the concept I develop here: 
sexual carework.
 2. Here, I mean valorizable in the Marxist sense—simply, to make valuable or profitable.
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sexual carework. Primarily, this duty falls upon women in heterosexual dyads 
to maintain harmony in their relationships by using their bodies to provide 
certain kinds of sex, at certain times, and in certain ways, to their male part-
ners—but this socialization process begins early and thus extends beyond 
heterosexual monogamy. Women are, of course, socialized to be sexual care-
takers—their role in sexualized social reproduction is not naturally given. Yet, 
women who labor in this way are not simply victims of false consciousness or 
ideological dupes. As Cacchioni (2015), Labuski (2015), and Braksmajer (2017) 
also found, low-desiring (and sexually pained) women’s sexual care is often 
very much considered, concerted, methodical, creative, and strategic, and it is 
something that many of the women I interviewed ultimately derive pleasure 
from—albeit not necessarily orgasmic pleasure of the type that is generally 
associated with sex and sexual desire.
Let me be clear: Not all gendered and sexualized work is the same. Paid 
sex work is not the same as sexual carework in the service of others, which 
is not the same as the work of self-optimization. Different groups of women 
are targeted to perform and are affected differently by doing these types of 
work. As Grant (2014) and Mac and Smith (2018) articulate, the work that sex 
workers perform should never be conflated with carework, nor should the sex 
worker’s experience be made to stand in for the “experience of all women”—
“for this person, sex work may be sex—but it is also work, in a world that 
allows no alternative” (Mac & Smith, 2018, p. 39). However, we may also fruit-
fully consider the ways that sex work is devalued precisely because it is inter-
preted within frames of gendered and racialized care and essentialized and 
naturalized feminine responsiveness. Similarly, paid nonsexual domestic and 
caring work is also gendered and racialized, and performed disproportionately 
by women of color, immigrants, and poor women working under heteropatri-
archal cisnormative white supremacist capitalism (Collins, 1998; Weeks, 2011).
Outside of paid sex work and paid nonsexual domestic and caring work, 
the medicalized logic of feminine receptivity that informs unpaid sexual care-
work also impacts marginalized low-desiring women disproportionately—
and so there is a paradox here. This is because while the work of self-care 
or self-optimization, with its biopolitical implications, works within a white, 
middle-class, hetero-/cisfeminine logic, as does the feminized responsive 
desire framework writ large, the day-to-day banal work of care—including 
sexual carework as a form of social reproduction—often falls disproportion-
ately upon low-desiring women of color, poor women, Indigenous women, 
immigrant women, women with disabilities, and trans women (more so than 
middle-class, able-bodied, cishet white women). So, while the medicalized 
EMBODIED INVISIBLE LABOR, SExUAL CAREWORK • 153
logic of feminine receptivity targets all women, it does not affect all women in 
the same way. I will attend to this tension between who the logic targets, and 
who is affected most in the day-to-day experience, throughout the analysis but 
especially at the end of this chapter.
Social Reproduction, Receptivity, and Feminized Labor
Today, carework is a common term among social scientists and conveys the 
type of work done, usually by women, in the home or other domestic realms 
(DeVault, 1991; Hochschild, 1997; Hochschild & Machung, 1989). Carework 
encapsulates housework, sexual reproduction, and child and elder care, and 
some feminist scholars have argued for a sexualized component as well, 
beyond sexual reproduction per se, but in terms of the provision of sexual 
pleasure. In order to fully elaborate the relationship among sexual carework, 
other forms of gendered carework, and social reproduction, it is crucial to 
look at the Marxist history of these concepts. Marx (1990) only briefly men-
tions the processes involved in what he refers to as reproduction (sometimes 
called social reproduction)—or the notion that in order for the worker to be 
productive, to effectively produce saleable commodities, he (and importantly, 
it is a “he” in Marx’s formulation) also requires the maintenance and repro-
duction of his body, his labor power. For Marx, social reproduction is the 
process by which the worker, in a capitalist economic system, is cared for—
generally within the home—so that he may continue to work. Marx (1990) 
states: “Just as on the first day of his appearance on the world’s stage, man 
must still consume every day, before and while he produces” (p. 272). But 
what happens before, during, and after production is a crucial aspect of work 
that Marx largely neglected, and a lacuna in his analysis that has been roundly 
critiqued by materialist, Marxist, and autonomist feminist scholars for many 
decades (for examples, see Dalla Costa & James, 1972; Federici, 2004, 2012; 
Fortunati, 1995; Mies, 2010). These critiques reached a fever pitch in the 1970s 
after the publication of Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963), and with the 
International Wages for Housework Campaign (WfH), which drew attention 
to the unpaid work women do to sustain the family (and the capitalist wage 
relation) within the larger political economic system.
The International Wages for Housework campaign, a global social move-
ment that grew out of the autonomous Marxist tradition in Italy in the early 
1970s, had a deceptively simple core tenet: Women’s domestic work ought to 
be paid. The Wages for Housework critiques primarily focused on the unpaid 
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work women do to supplement and sustain the family within the larger politi-
cal economic system; the type of work usually considered part of the social 
reproductive economy and that creates an environment sustainable for the 
(male) worker to go out and earn the real “family wage” included cooking, 
cleaning, childcare, shopping, and other quotidian duties. Importantly, these 
activists took up this framework not because they actually wanted housewives 
to make money for their duties, but rather to draw attention to the insidious 
and methodical way capitalism exploits a certain type of work, naturalizing 
it as feminine, disguising its racialization, and as such, not treating it as work 
at all. WfH activists believed that illuminating this fact would highlight for 
the working class how they have been held apart and hierarchized by this 
sexual division of labor, and suggested that it would ultimately create a space 
for women to refuse this work while simultaneously refusing to partake in 
the capitalist system of exploitation, which would result in the fracturing and 
ultimate collapse of capitalism (see Weeks, 2011 for a full analysis of this goal 
of the refusal of work in WfH’s platform).
The emotional, affective, and embodied labor involved in providing a 
“happy home,” clearly crucial to any worker’s sustenance, is an integral aspect 
of social reproduction. Von Werlhof (1988) argues, regarding women, and 
particularly women of color, who are colonized and designated as “nature” 
under capitalism: “The labor of these people is therefore pronounced to be 
non-labor, to be biology: their labor-power—their ability to work—appears as 
a natural resource, and their products as akin to a natural deposit” (p. 97). S. 
James (2012) writes that women have always “service[d] those who are daily 
destroyed by working for wages and who need to be daily renewed” (p. 93). 
Federici (2012) extends von Werlhof ’s analysis of the naturalization of wom-
en’s work and James’s notion of women being at the “disposal” of men, framing 
the work that women perform in intimate settings as something that has been 
“transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, 
an internal need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from the depths of our 
female character” (p. 16). She goes on to explain how women are socialized 
into this role: “From the earliest days of your life, you are trained to be doc-
ile, subservient, dependent, and most importantly, to sacrifice yourself and 
get pleasure from it. If you don’t like it, it is your problem, your failure, your 
guilt, and your abnormality” (p. 17). Federici also describes how multifaceted 
the labor performed by women in intimate settings is, as they are expected 
to service the male worker “physically, emotionally, and sexually” (p. 17). In 
a provocative essay entitled “Why Sexuality Is Work” (originally published in 
1975), she comments on the reasons for women’s particular experience within 
the “schizophrenic character of sexual relations” under capitalism:
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[Women suffer most] not only because we arrive at the end of the day with 
more work and more worries on our shoulders, but additionally because we 
have the responsibility of making the sexual experience pleasurable for the 
man. This is why women are usually less sexually responsive than men. Sex is 
work for us, it is a duty. The duty to please is so built into our sexuality that 
we have learned to get pleasure out of giving pleasure, out of getting men 
aroused and excited. (Federici, 2012, p. 24).
Even with the recent rise of the #MeToo movement, this particular analysis 
may seem outdated. After all, even as a certain kind of (white liberal) femi-
nism has been mainstreamed, we continue to live in a highly individualistic 
neoliberal moment, in which sexuality has purportedly been liberated, and 
is celebrated as something that everyone should naturally have the right to 
enjoy. We are all aware of the number of women who have joined the work-
force; of the “equality” with which women can now access the public sphere; 
of the rising number of countries around the world, including the US, that 
have legalized gay marriage; and of the supposed tolerance of queer sexu-
alities, as evidenced in media portrayals and other public discourses in the 
Global North. But what remains salient about Federici’s and others’ analyses 
cited above—particularly for my current project—is the attention they focus 
on the simultaneous biologizing and feminizing of care, and of feminine 
sexual receptivity. This is important in light of new trends in scientific sex 
research and sexual medicine (and their popular depictions), through which 
sexuality is configured in terms of essential gender difference, and through 
which masculine and feminine behaviors, desires, and expressions continue 
to be discursively produced and essentialized, in new and ever more insidious 
guises—what Preciado (2013) might call a form of technogender or what Repo 
(2016) would consider a disciplinary and normalizing deployment.
With the rise of childless straight white couples today—especially among 
those who identify as middle class in the US—carework is now increasingly 
framed as a less pivotal or useful category of analysis. According to many pop-
ular and social scientific accounts (Gottlieb, 2014; Kornrich, Brines, & Leupp, 
2012), the “new” family dyads are egalitarian, with each member of a couple 
or reproductive unit (regardless of that couple’s sexual orientation) contribut-
ing to the earned income and sharing in the housework. Not only should this 
be critiqued as a white middle-class framing that purports to be neutral, it 
also conflicts with the findings from my data with low-desiring women. The 
women I interviewed for this study suggest that there is still an invisible and 
gendered element to the social reproduction of a home and a family—specifi-
cally when the home consists of a cis male and cis female partner—and that 
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the division of labor is not so egalitarian. According to my participants, this 
embodied invisible labor involves sexual carework—an aspect of sexualized 
social reproduction and also an aspect of sexual difference socialization (as 
defined in chapter 3)—in the form of embodied and energetic sustenance that 
the female or feminine partner most often provides to the male or masculine 
partner. My participants described long histories of providing sexualized or 
other forms of affective caring labor over the course of their lives—and many 
of them described learning early on that their mothers had also provided it 
to their fathers, or that other women in their lives provided it to the men in 
theirs. They also described a hegemonic cultural (and scientifically instanti-
ated) ideology that supports the notion that the feminization of this care is 
“natural.”
In our contemporary moment, the relegation of the housewife to an alien-
ated domestic enclosure, an undisputedly gendered division of housework, 
and a rigid romantic relationship that necessarily involves childrearing or 
that involves a male-identified and a female-identified partner, are no lon-
ger assumed nor expected when it comes to cohabitation, family, and home. 
Much has changed since the inception of the International Wages for House-
work campaign, but it is also the case that many cis women still do find them-
selves in monogamous, long-term partnerships with cis men, and that this 
type of family or some variation of it, of this core economic and reproductive 
unit, is the norm—or, alternatively, it is a normatively raced, classed, and 
heterosexualized ideal that many folks aspire to (or are pushed to aspire to). 
However, boundaries between work and leisure must increasingly be recon-
figured (DeVault, 1991), not only due to the “second shift” that many women 
describe taking on (Hochschild, 1997; Hochschild & Machung, 1989) but also 
because what it means to work is being reconfigured—work must now be 
understood in terms of affect, performance, biopower, and other circulations 
that extend beyond the workplace, and that cannot be relegated to the “public 
sphere,” but that are absolutely social (Clough, 2007; Foucault, 2003; Hardt & 
Negri, 2000, 2004). In light of this reality, it is necessary to (re)explore the 
gendered configurations of embodied labor that still circulate within intimate 
settings and the effects these configurations have on women’s sexuality. As 
these prototypes have cultural sway and maintain a hegemonic persistence, 
they have import for gender-nonconforming and trans folks and for queer 
sexualities and relationships, as well as for hetero- and homonormative cis 
partnerships.
Beyond the gendering of production and reproduction historically, we 
must also consider how these (productive and reproductive) categories of 
labor are increasingly collapsed under neoliberal imperatives toward self-
branding, self-appreciation, and self-valorization (Feher, 2009, 2018), and 
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also how desire itself is reified under regimes that deploy sexuality, quantify 
and schematize behaviors and expressions, and put sexuality to work—ideo-
logically and materially (Floyd, 2009). These schemas of optimization, and 
the simultaneous way in which they encourage self-modulation (anatomo-
politics) and population production (biopolitics) (Foucault, 1978, 2000, 2003), 
are examples of how we might understand work in contemporary biopolitical 
terms. Taking up this type of analysis, Ruído (2011) argues that contempo-
rary work must be reconfigured not only in light of social reproduction, but 
in regard to affective economies, performances, and circuits of pleasure and 
desire:
Defining work and its limits in abstract terms at the present time, where 
the times and locations of production become blurred and extended, is not 
an easy task. However, experiencing its consequences on our bodies seems 
to be less complicated, especially if we consider a definition of work that 
goes beyond the economistic view (whether neoclassical or Marxist) and, 
especially, if we understand our sustainment of a daily life and our daily 
incorporation of personalities and social actions as spaces and (re)produc-
tive efforts. Everything that tires, that occupies, that disciplines and stresses 
our body, but also everything that constructs it, that takes care of it, that 
gives it pleasure and maintains it, is work.
These nuanced accounts of work provide an entrée into my own intervention, 
as they bring together autonomist/Marxist feminist and biopolitical analyses. 
Work is relational and social, it is something we learn and experience phe-
nomenologically and psychically, and it is written on our bodies and into our 
intimate relations with others. It can feel like a violation or a chore; it might 
be gendered, raced, or otherwise forced upon us through powerful discourses; 
it can be pleasurable, or we may feel like we are failing at it (and, importantly, 
these experiences can all occur at the same time). This unique intertwining 
of coercion, pleasure, failure, and desire might be particularly descriptive for 
those who are socialized—and sexualized—into receptive femininity, and so I 
will now explore sexual carework through participants’, clinicians’, and other 
healers’ and educators’ narratives about these processes. It must be acknowl-
edged that the low-desiring participants in this study inevitably experience 
sex as more of a “chore” than do women who have never experienced low 
sexual desire. But, these low-desiring women’s narratives, while not general-
izable to all women, still reveal something important about what feminized 
sexual carework looks and feels like, because in a circumstance of low desire, 
the work cannot be ignored. Thus, it’s not so much that these women are an 
exception to the rule, but rather that they throw into sharp relief the extent 
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to which women more broadly are expected to approach sex as carework. 
Their stories also shed light on a certain spectrum of ambivalence: For these 
women, performing care sometimes felt pleasurable, yet at other times, it felt 
deeply coercive, and like it must be refused.
Feminine Socialization and Sexual Carework
The participants that I interviewed grappled with the heavy burden of the inti-
mate labor that they know falls on their backs as individuals in the category 
of women-with-low-desire. For some, the specifically feminized indoctrina-
tion into this work—the way that it involves a necessary power imbalance, a 
mandate to please someone else, and in some cases an imperative to excavate 
and bring forth their own pleasure (or at least a performance of that plea-
sure)—was striking. Rather than solely providing pleasure in the form of ser-
vicing their partners’ bodies or providing their own bodies as a service, some 
of my participants spoke of how they work to produce an experience that feels 
“authentic,” and described a socialization into this type of socially reproduc-
tive work beginning at an early age.
Early Experiences with Embodied Invisible Labor: “Giving 
Daddy Five Kisses a Day”
Feeling as though they had to perform affective, embodied acts of labor from 
very young ages, specifically for their fathers, other male relatives, or family 
friends, was a common theme among participants. They contrasted this to the 
experiences of their male siblings, whom they believe were not expected to 
perform in the same way. Rose, a straight, thirty-three-year-old Black woman, 
describes this type of experience while we sit across from each other at my 
kitchen table. Rose’s parents divorced when she was very young, and she only 
saw her father once or twice a year after that, as he lived in another country. 
But when he did visit, she was expected to “give him kisses” and perform for 
him in other ways that felt disorienting to her, even at the time:
He would say, “I miss you so much, I love you so much, you have to give me 
five kisses a day!” And I would like negotiate with him. I’d be like, “No, I’ll 
give you three kisses today, I don’t want to give you five!” because I didn’t 
like it, I didn’t like being physical, hugging him .  .  . because I didn’t really 
know him. . . . [I]t’s funny, because he was a cool guy, he was fine, he used 
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to like to cook a lot, he always wanted to do fun things, so I thought he was 
a cool guy, but we just didn’t have that relationship .  .  . and I think you go 
along with it out of guilt, because you’re like, “Well, he’s my dad, he’s sup-
posed to do that.”
Rose elucidates the ambivalence she felt for her father, and also the ambiva-
lent and transient place he had in her life. She only saw him once a year, but 
when she did see him, she was expected to be physically affectionate with 
him. Researchers and writers of color have documented the ways in which the 
burden of various types of emotional labor falls disproportionately on women 
of color (Collins, 1990, 1998; Lorde, 1984/2007; Piepzna-Samarasinha, 2018), 
but much of the contemporary research has focused on how that burden is 
enacted in the workplace, for instance through racist double standards regard-
ing “body labor” and “feeling rules” (Kang, 2010; Wingfield, 2015). Collins’s 
(2004) seminal work on sexual violence enacted against Black women has 
opened up a space to consider how this coercion takes many forms, and my 
own research suggests how the intimate, sensual labor that women of color are 
expected to perform from young ages may also feel coercive to them—espe-
cially when they identify as low in desire and are also regularly exposed to 
other forms of gendered and racialized structural violence.
Although this theme may resonate particularly for Black women with 
low desire (including as they experience coercion and intimate transgres-
sions at the hands of white people), other low-desiring women of color and 
white women I interviewed also described experiences with early expecta-
tions for emotional, sensual, and embodied forms of labor. Across racial back-
grounds, low-desiring participants articulated a similar dissonance that Rose 
describes—their fathers were emotionally unavailable and distant, yet these 
young women were still expected to be physically affectionate with them when 
they were around. This tension was something that many participants did not 
know what to do with; they described being “too young” to simply say no to 
physical affection they did not want to provide. They felt uncomfortable being 
physical with men they were not close to, including their own fathers, but at 
the same time, did not experience the request for physicality as an outright 
violation. This is part of the murky terrain that young women find themselves 
in at early ages regarding expectations of their bodies and the provision of 
physical expressions of care and love. Many participants who described expe-
riences like those of Rose were not victims of child sexual abuse or molesta-
tion (Rose was not either), and in some cases, they expressed this ambivalence 
even if their parents were not divorced—even if their fathers were “around,” 
they did not feel particularly close to them, yet were expected to perform 
160 • CHAPTER 4
affectively and physically for them. This fraught experience is crucial to ana-
lyze, as it occupies a space just to the side of what we would normally deem 
sexually inappropriate.
Participants also described learning about sexual caretaking at young ages, 
often from their mothers, who felt it was a duty they had to perform for their 
husbands and boyfriends. Maya describes learning about sexual carework 
from her mother early in life. Maya’s mother told her that she did not enjoy 
sex, and that it was something that wives “just do” for their husbands, like 
a chore. She describes how her mother made it clear, when Maya was very 
young, that sex was never going to be something that she would enjoy, because 
most women just don’t enjoy sex: “My mom made that very evident, that that 
was her experience, that it was something that men liked to do; women don’t 
like to do it.” Jill also describes her experience with learning a woman’s role in 
invisible sexual labor from her mother and illuminates her own experience of 
providing care for a father whom she felt conflicted about. Jill’s mother told 
her how she never wanted to have sex with her own husband, Jill’s father, and 
how she regretted that she had never had the chance to experiment sexually. 
Jill states that she thinks that this lack of sexual experimentation negatively 
influenced her mother’s desire, and speculates that her mother “passed that 
trait on” to her:
I don’t know if that’s why [I have low desire]. . . . I think that maybe she just 
didn’t have orgasms with my dad, and that’s why she never wanted to have 
sex. . . . [S]he told me that she just never wanted him, she never wanted to 
be with him sexually. . . . I don’t know if that affects me somehow.
Like Jill, Taja describes a complicated circumstance in which she not only 
learned about sexual caretaking from her mother, but also feels that she inher-
ited some of her mother’s experience of sexual trauma (even though Taja her-
self does not identify as a childhood sexual abuse survivor):
I have trouble getting aroused all the time. I’ve pinpointed it as being about 
dissociation .  .  . but I think it’s also related to my mother’s sexual trauma 
as a child. She was sexually abused, and I have had several shrinks tell me 
that I “think” [i.e., her body “thinks”] that I was abused, but it is purely that 
I absorbed all of this [trauma] from my mother. She imprinted on me in 
such a distinct way. . . . [S]he told me that men were not safe, she told me 
that I was never safe, she was always yelling my name, terrified that some-
thing had happened to me—she is a very anxious woman—I just inherited 
all of it.
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Later in our interview, Taja describes how she had to balance this constant 
anxiety with a conflicting sense of being responsible for men’s feelings and 
experiences, including sexually, which ultimately made extra work for her in 
her present-day life. It is important to recognize that these women do not 
identify as CSA survivors and all of them come from purportedly “intact” 
families and homes. Rose is the only one whose parents are divorced. These 
are women who learned unhappy lessons early on about relationships between 
men and women, and they describe how many of their expectations in this 
regard—which they learned from their fathers’ persistence and/or their 
mothers’ warnings—were borne out in their relationships with men as they 
progressed through life. Rather than pathologizing these specific parents as 
teaching their children antiquated or coercive lessons about sex, we might 
instead consider the framework within which little girls come to know them-
selves as affective providers and, ironically, as caretakers—for adult men—at 
such young ages, and in which at least some mothers teach their female chil-
dren to guard their bodies, to protect themselves, and to consider “the sexual” 
as a realm that will never be fully theirs to inhabit.
“Men Only Want One Thing”
The low-desiring women I spoke with expressed their beliefs that dominant 
Western cultural expectations regarding men’s and women’s sexuality—or gen-
dered assumptions about who sex is for, how it should be done, and why these 
ways are “natural”—are still rampant today. These participants—like Jill, Maya, 
and Taja cited in the previous section—stated that they learned at early ages 
that sex was not “for them,” or at least, not for them to enjoy. They expressed 
that they had learned—not only from parents and caretakers but also in their 
schools, from their peers, and through media accounts and representa-
tions (including representations of scientific and medical research)—that, as 
women, their roles in sex would necessarily be fraught and ambivalent. They 
described conflicting messages around being encouraged to be sexy, volup-
tuous, and enticing, while at the same time being expected to guard against 
the advances of men—who “only want one thing.” For these women, it is dif-
ficult to navigate this terrain and to find a place for one’s own desire. Valdivia 
describes feeling confused about what her role in sex was to be as a young 
woman, as she was taught that women don’t enjoy sex, but only “trade” it:
I think we are taught to mask our sexuality, or to look at sex as something 
that you trade. You trade sex for respect or for dignity or for class position-
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ing or security. Sex is the price you pay to have someone who’s going to 
respect you or be with you for the rest of your life. And [this idea has] never 
been able to account for the person that I am, which is someone who wants 
to be like, “You’re hot, and hopefully you respect me . . . that would be nice if 
you respected me, but . . . you’re hot!” . . . [S]o my cultural education on sex 
has not only been extremely unscientific, oppressive, but it’s taken out desire, 
it’s taken sexuality out of the equation, it acknowledges sex as this thing 
that you have to keep safe because “men only want one thing from you.” . . . 
[T]hat’s how I was raised, “men only want one thing” . . . but it’s like, “What 
if I want that thing, too? What if I only want that one thing? Then what?!”
In this statement, Valdivia highlights the notion that sex is constructed—
through discourse and embodied learning and experience—as a realm for 
men, and a space that women are generally excluded from, unless they are 
playing a very specific role within the barter system. This notion rearticulates 
the tenets of the feminized responsive desire framework in which femininity 
operates in accordance with its own receptive logic—a logic in which women’s 
desire is never a driving force on its own, and never sexual, per se. But Valdiv-
ia’s narrative also makes it clear that she very much desires sex, and that she 
does not feel comfortable trading it in a system in which men are purported 
to “only want one thing.” She does not desire sex on these terms, but she does 
experience a great deal of sexual desire. Her experience challenges the logic 
of medicalized feminine receptivity. Later in the interview, I ask Valdivia if 
she experiences desire in her current relationship (with a female partner), in 
light of her experience of self-identified low desire throughout her life. She is 
able to characterize her sexuality more clearly and explain how she thinks that 
cultural narratives about women serving men are perpetuated through sexual 
difference socialization processes (see chapter 3 of this book for more on this), 
and how they have affected her own sense of guilt and resentment around sex:
I hate it when I feel like it’s something I have to do. No one is forcing me, 
thankfully, but it’s more like I have this internal thing that’s like, “Well, you 
should have sex.” . . . I hate that. I try to be really cognizant of it, like “Why? 
Why should I?” But it’s like, “It’s been five days, your partner is going to 
feel bad.” . . . [L]uckily I date someone who doesn’t take it personally. She’ll 
be like, “I want you to touch me” and I’ll be like, “I’m not feeling very sexy 
right now, sorry” and we’ll cuddle, but I feel that’s something I’ve never had 
before, the ability to be like, “Sorry, I just don’t feel sexual.” . . . [I]n the past 
I’ve never felt able to say that because usually, specifically with guys, it would 
make me feel like I would lose their interest. Or because I’m negotiating sex 
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in exchange for your respect or your love, if I don’t give you sex, then why 
would you stick around? So it’s a nice thing that when I’m not feeling sexual, 
I get to negotiate that now.
Valdivia describes the internalized pressure she has always felt to have sex, 
even when she didn’t want to or wasn’t feeling “sexy,” but states that she always 
succumbed out of fear of losing a partner’s love or attention. This was a com-
mon theme expressed by many participants. Valdivia is currently dating a 
woman and feels that some of this pressure has been removed, but impor-
tantly, even in her current queer relationship, she hasn’t been able to fully 
shake this narrative about women’s roles in sexual carework—it is clear that a 
certain barter logic also extends beyond heterosexual relationships. She links 
it to being raised in a culture in which women are taught to “mask their sexu-
ality” (she was raised in a Latinx American household but also states that she 
adopted potent ideas about sexuality in a hegemonic white US context) and 
also to admonitions she heard about sex from the woman who raised her, her 
primary caretaker, growing up:
My primary female caretaker taught me to never depend on men because 
she was abandoned by her husband, and her way of surviving was to com-
pletely forgo men.  .  .  . [T]he way she raised me was like, “You need to get 
an education, you need to work, don’t depend on anyone, especially men!” 
It was this independent mentality tied in with like “because men only want 
one thing from you.”
In this last passage, Valdivia expresses how she was taught to protect herself 
from men, and to live as independently as she can, as a mode of survival. 
Other participants, including Maya, describe how many young women are 
raised to believe this, often by mothers or other female caretakers who are 
framed as having had a different experience when they were coming of age, 
during a time when some women still had no choice but to be housewives, or 
were tied to men because of economic dependence. However, it is clear that 
the economic vulnerability of being a white housewife is very different from 
the financial precarity experienced by many women of color who have always 
had to work. The specific admonitions of Valdivia’s caretaker (an immigrant 
woman of color) might offer a unique reading of how the “men only want 
one thing” logic operates differently for immigrant women, women of color, 
and poor women, or those from working-class backgrounds—with a focus on 
independence and self-sufficiency. This is consistent with Nelson, Cardemil, 
and Adeoye (2016) who illuminate how women of color are often socialized 
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to be “strong” and “independent” in the face of widespread racism and sex-
ism—and it is a theme that has been put forward by many women of color 
feminist theorists for decades (for one example, see Moraga & Anzaldúa, 2015, 
especially the essay “La Prieta” by Anzaldúa).
When I asked the participants about their current sex lives, most did not 
tell a story of complete liberation from some of the very pitfalls that Valdivia’s 
caretaker described to her. It is also important to note that although Valdivia 
does not identify as a survivor of sexual abuse, she does experience regular 
harassment and verbal assault. Most of the women I spoke with had experi-
enced some type of sexual abuse, assault, or other violent experiences at some 
point in their lives. This gendered violence—which spans a spectrum from 
quotidian microaggressions in the form of harassment, catcalling, and inap-
propriate touching to more extreme sexual violations, including child moles-
tation and incest (described, for instance, by Fahs, 2016)—is clearly a variable 
that is correlated with “low desire,” but it is unfortunately and shortsightedly 
a variable that is not often cited in mainstream clinical and experimental psy-
chological literature on gender differences in sexual response.
“Doing It Anyway”
The women I spoke with for this study described how sometimes they would 
go through with sexual acts—including penetrative penile-vaginal inter-
course—even when they did not want to (i.e., when they did not want to as a 
result of their own sexual desire for their partner). They cited many different 
reasons for this. As Valdivia alludes to in the passage above, a common reason 
is simply that they feel they should, that they are expected as women to per-
form sexually, and that they have known their whole lives that this expecta-
tion falls upon them. This is consistent with the findings of Cacchioni (2015), 
Labuski (2015), and Braksmajer (2017). Many low-desiring women initially 
had no explanation for why they engaged in sex even when they did not want 
to, many explained that they simply felt they “couldn’t say no,” and many did 
it for their partner’s benefit or for “the good of the relationship.” Importantly, 
these phenomena (and many of the reasons women report having sex) are 
also described by Basson (2000, 2001b, 2002) in the design of her circular sex-
ual response cycle, further solidified in the receptivity criterion in the FSIAD 
diagnosis and in the feminized responsive desire framework more broadly. 
To restate one of the main premises of this book: While Basson and other 
sex researchers who study women’s responsive desire usefully note this ten-
dency that women have to engage in sex as a duty to the relationship, they 
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do not critique it. Instead, they too often leave this discussion in the realm 
of the descriptive, and because of the presumed objectivity of contemporary 
sexual medicine and technoscientific explorations of sex more broadly, that 
description becomes a truth (women’s desire is inherently more responsive 
than men’s) and eventually a prescription (women ought to be responsive, and 
this is how they can enhance their receptivity). So, while this service orienta-
tion to sex may be true of many women—and I agree with Basson and others 
that it is—I want to consider why some women have this orientation to sex so 
as to explicitly denaturalize it, and to consider where it comes from, why it is 
not necessarily good for women, and how we can rethink treatments for low 
desire in light of it. In the absence of this rethinking, I argue that description 
is violence. The stories of the women in this chapter bring home the gravity 
of the need to rethink the feminized responsive desire framework, and they 
illustrate how the mandate of feminine receptivity is particularly pernicious 
when it is codified in purportedly “apolitical,” “atheoretical” medical and sci-
entific discourse.
On this point, when I ask Sadie if her partners had ever experienced her 
low desire, interest, or arousal as a problem, she tells me: “I don’t think they 
ever noticed. Meaning that I was having sex with them [anyway] .  .  . they 
thought everything was all good.” Annie similarly states:
There have been times that I kind of just did it to please my partner, and I 
feel like there have been times where they have been able to get off and be 
okay with it and I’m just kind of like, “Aah, I’m not really that into this . . .” 
And it’s a little distressing sometimes, you know, having sex when you’re not 
really super into it. . . . [T]here have been times that are sort of like in that 
middle space . . . where I sort of just dissociate a little bit, and I’m just like, 
“Okay, this is happening, and that’s fine, and great, and . . . it’s done.”
Here, Annie’s story throws into critical relief the assumptions of the cir-
cular sexual response cycle and the incentive-motivation model as these 
are embedded in the FSIAD diagnosis as part of the feminized responsive 
desire framework. At least in some cases, when women are in that recep-
tive, responsive, “middle space” of “sexual neutrality” (in which they are 
said to be easily swayed into being sexual by a partner—if they are sexu-
ally functional as women, that is), they never do get to a place of full-on 
desire, arousal, or enjoyment (as the circular sexual response cycle would 
suggest). In some cases, they may continue to participate in an act simply 
because they have already started, and they feel like it would take too much 
energy to stop. This is the ugly side of feminized responsive desire—wherein 
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these response models do not make sense for some low-desiring women, and 
become, instead, a prescription for coercion (or, at the very least, a prescrip-
tion for mediocre and service-oriented sex). Rather than rocking the boat, 
or disrupting the moment, many of the women I spoke with dissociate and 
continue to “go through the motions.” Rose gives an example of what this 
might look like:
The problem is, I have sex when I don’t want to. The guy that I dated last 
year, at one point I said, “Why is it that we automatically have sex like every 
time we hang out?” And I think it totally caught him off guard and he was 
like, “Well if you don’t want to, we don’t have to . . .” but I had also been on 
certain occasions like, I did not really want to—he had a friend over once 
who was sleeping in the living room, and I was like, “I don’t really want to 
have sex right now because your friend is in the living room,” but he like 
kept pushing it and I just kind of went along with it.
And Molly, a survivor of childhood sexual abuse, makes the problem particu-
larly clear. She describes how she sometimes has sex with men to make them 
happy, to placate them, or because she is afraid that if she says no their “feel-
ings will be hurt.” She links this inability to tell her partners what she wants 
(or doesn’t want) to her experience of sexual trauma, and describes certain 
present-day experiences as a form of retraumatization. When I ask her if any 
of her partners have experienced her low desire as a problem, she tells me 
a story about her experience of performing sexualized labor when she was 
working at the beach one summer:
I don’t think so, because even when I have no desire, I still have sex with 
them. I have never said no to sex. So I’m sure from their perspective it’s 
not really an issue.  .  .  . [T]here was this one time, when I was younger, I 
was hooking up with this really hot guy, we went down to the beach and 
had sex, and he came, and I did not, and then I gave him a blow job and he 
came again, and I still had not come, and he was like, “Oh thanks, I really 
needed that!” and he was done, and that was it. And he was like, “So, should 
I walk you back to your house?” and I was just like, “What?!” . . . [B]ut there 
is somehow this idea that women exist to service their needs, and our needs 
don’t even register a lot of the time. . . . I felt like, “Wow, I am just a stress 
reliever for you! Thanks!” [laughs sarcastically]
Molly paints a complicated picture of the sexual terrain in which mutuality, 
consent, desire, and pleasure must be navigated—or, in which they are not 
always adequately navigated—at each and every sexual encounter. Unfortu-
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nately, what she suggests is that the intersubjective context of sexual relations 
is sometimes not given adequate attention, and rather than mutuality being 
actualized, one person functions to serve another’s needs. It is important to 
recognize that this is not a clearly coercive situation; it is not the case that 
these low-desiring women are being actively violated or abused, but rather, 
that long-held assumptions—and traumas—have become so deeply ingrained 
that some of these women are left feeling voiceless, unimportant within, 
and ultimately detached, disconnected, and dissociated from certain sexual 
experiences.
Many of the women I spoke with did not feel voiceless, though, and clearly 
articulated why they chose to have sex, in spite of their lack of desire. Some 
participants described this in terms of feeling like they wanted to make their 
partners happy, or because performing this work was their responsibility. 
DeVault (1991) highlights how other forms of gendered carework, including 
food preparation and provision, are perceived as a responsibility that women 
feel they have (often to their cis male partners, and to their families). The 
notions that much of this gendered labor is paradoxically invisible yet highly 
necessary to the functioning of a cisheteropatriarchal white supremacist cap-
italist society, and that it is naturalized as feminine, are similar themes in 
DeVault’s work on women’s caretaking and in my own conceptualizations of 
sexual carework here (and its concerted, thoughtful, and intellectual enact-
ment on the part of the feminized laborers). It is important to note that all of 
this work also indirectly results in surplus value, and thus services capital. Jill 
explicates this perspective of performing sexually because she feels it is her 
feminine responsibility, but one that she chooses to enact only for specific 
partners:
It was like a chore for me, to have sex, and I was staying at his apartment 
a lot and I was just thinking, “I would rather be at my place with my com-
puter, with my book, or hanging out with my friends rather than hanging 
out with him,” so I decided that I can live without him as a boyfriend. .  .  . 
[B]ut I was in a relationship with one guy, a very successful guy, but I never 
told him “I don’t want to have sex tonight” because he did a lot of things for 
me, he bought me a lot of stuff, we were traveling, we did a lot of cool things, 
and I thought, “Well he’s doing so much stuff for me, I could definitely have 
sex with him and not reject him, even though I don’t want to [have sex]” 
. . . like a favor. And it worked for some period. . . . I did not enjoy myself 
that much, but I was like, “It’s only fifteen minutes, it’s only twenty minutes, 
half an hour, and then that’s it!” and he’s happy, and then he makes me feel 
happy. . . . [B]ut with just regular guys, I would rather say, “No, I just don’t 
want to.”
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In this statement, Jill articulates how sexual carework is something she some-
times provides, but only to very special (in this case, “successful”) men, to 
partners that she cares about, and whom she really wants to make happy. This 
experience is complicated for her by the fact that—at least in the situation she 
describes above—some of these special men also provide for her financially. 
Her comments are reminiscent of Valdivia’s thoughts on women trading sex 
for security, respect, and class positioning, although her perspective on this 
is not a critical one. Regarding feeling like she needs to have sex to make her 
husband happy, Penelope states:
I instigate it sometimes, but sometimes it’s just because I feel like, “God, we 
haven’t had sex in a while, I feel like we need to, so I need to instigate this.” 
. . . I think for him it is not that satisfying because it doesn’t last that long but 
I’m like, “Okay, good, you came.”
Penelope makes it clear that it is not just her husband’s expectations of her, but 
also social expectations that compel her to have sex with him: the feeling that 
it’s “been too long—we should have sex.” Penelope’s statement is in line with 
Valdivia’s thoughts on her responsibility in terms of sexual frequency to her 
partner, articulated above. Corinne states that she feels the need to fulfill “her 
end of the bargain” in her marriage, and Elaine likewise describes her sense 
of sexual responsibility to her husband, linking it to her religious identity and 
beliefs:
If I can just get interested enough, then he can kind of just do it, and that 
doesn’t sound very nice but on some level I do feel—and this is going to 
sound negative but it’s not—or at least not in my sort of world view—that 
I do have an obligation to provide my husband with a certain amount of 
sexual satisfaction, I believe that is part of my sort of Christian worldview 
and I don’t think that’s demeaning. I just think that’s part of the agreement. 
And if I can just—it comes to the point where my feeling is, “If I can just 
get interested enough . . .” then we can have a sexual experience, and it’s not 
too fraught, it’s not horribly uncomfortable. . . . [B]ut that’s the thing that I 
really have the trouble with . . . just raising that interest sufficiently to sort 
of go through with it.
Penelope, Elaine, Corinne, and Maya all describe feeling pressures to have 
sex—either to fulfill their “wifely duties,” to make their partners happy, or 
because of more abstract reasons such as societal expectations placed on 
women to please men, or in line with the notion that “that’s what happy 
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couples do.” These normative conceptions about sexual frequency and qual-
ity—or injunctions or imperatives to have great sex and lots of orgasms—is 
something many participants discussed. But what is striking about the four 
women mentioned above is that although they express experiencing low 
desire with their partners, and feel like they have to really push themselves 
to get “interested enough to go through with it,” they also describe having 
an abundance of intense, free-flowing, and even spontaneous sexual desire 
in other contexts and moments in their lives and/or for other people. These 
women’s stories also illustrate my concerns regarding nonconsent and the 
feminized responsive desire framework, and suggest that tuning into the 
aroused body and tapping into “responsive desire” is not the answer for many 
women with low desire. But these narratives also raise the question: If the 
problem is interpersonal and structural rather than individual and medical, 
how can it be fixed?
“Faking It” and Affective Performances of Pleasure
Many of the women I spoke with explained how they labor affectively to per-
form a certain kind of sexual pleasure for their partners. Rather than just pro-
viding pleasure in the form of servicing their partners’ bodies, they instead 
talk about how they work to produce an experience that feels authentic. 
According to them, this notion of authenticity is crucial to successful sex, yet 
it is an experience that can be difficult to create, particularly in light of con-
flicting ideas about women’s roles in sex (the familiar virgin/whore dichot-
omy outlined initially by Freud). My analysis of “faking it” here resonates with 
Duncombe and Marsden’s (1996) theorization of “deep acting,” Cacchioni’s 
(2015) extension of this into what she calls “performance work,” and Fahs’s 
(2011) description of how women use their bodies and voices to make the role 
more “convincing.” Molly states that she does her best to “play the part”:
ALYSON: So when you’re having sex with these men, sometimes maybe 
you’re doing it just because you are not saying no?
MOLLY: Yes, and secretly planning my Christmas shopping list in my head! 
[laughter]
ALYSON: Are you acting like you are into it?
MOLLY: Yeah, sometimes. I’m so worried about them feeling bad, that a lot 
of times I think I just go along with it. . . . I definitely don’t just lay there, 
doing the 1950s housewife kind of thing. [i.e., she performs an experi-
ence of sexual pleasure]
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Some participants who described performing pleasure for the benefit of 
their partners also characterized their agreement to engage in sex with their 
partners at all as a performative act of reassurance involving considerable 
embodied and affective labor. Regina describes sex with some of her long-
term partners as a constant source of conflict, in large part because for her, 
intercourse tended to be painful, and doing it was something she avoided. 
She explains how this ambivalent situation became particularly problematic 
with one partner after an alleged episode in which she cheated on him at the 
beginning of the relationship (in her view, they were not yet officially together 
and thus it wasn’t cheating), and then she felt like she had to constantly “make 
it up to him” or “reassure him”—including by having sex with him when she 
didn’t want to:
I wouldn’t want to [have sex], so I would never initiate it, and then I would 
go along with it sometimes, and then feel bad and not want to, so then try to 
make it be a little bit longer before I gave in the next time. I remember hav-
ing a conversation with [him] like, “You have no idea what it’s like to feel like 
not wanting to sleep with someone but feeling like you have to and doing it 
anyways. How can we even be having this conversation when you have no 
idea what that feels like?!”
Maya expresses a similar sentiment regarding feeling like she has to reas-
sure her husband that she loves him by having sex with him, even though 
she generally does not enjoy the act itself and also finds intercourse painful. 
She laments the lack of passion in her sex life with her husband but feels con-
flicted, because she also deeply cares for him, and wants to make him happy. 
She articulates how part of the “marital contract” includes not only having sex 
when she doesn’t want to, but doing it in a way that makes it seems like she 
does, in fact, enjoy it—via an affective performance of pleasure:
Apparently, the other night I let out an exasperated sigh, and he was 
destroyed! This poor man, I feel for him, he is not unattractive, he’s not 
uncaring, he is a wonderful human being, but I cannot bring myself to be 
interested! I feel bad and that’s why I often have sex just to be like, “Oh, poor 
guy, let me make him feel like I love him,” but oftentimes I really do just feel 
like, “Oh god, really?! It is 10:30, I am tired!” And it’s not just me pretending 
to be tired—sex requires mental energy, too! It’s like, “What am I doing, how 
do I please this person, am I acting like I care?” In order to coexist—and we 
do love each other—so to make that work better, I feel like it is one of the 
things I have to get myself to accept. Because it is part of the bargain.
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For Maya, this performance of pleasure and her experience of the embodied 
and affective carework that she provides are very fraught. She feels ambivalent 
about the role she plays in her marriage. On the one hand, she loves her hus-
band and honestly does want to make him happy—that is something that she 
desires. She also desires to hold up “her end of the bargain”—she feels that she 
agreed to be sexually intimate with her husband for life and wants to fulfill 
that agreement. But she also feels that there is an imbalance in the relation-
ship because she does not derive pleasure from the type of sex her husband 
wants to have:
If there is no physical pleasure, there is no incentive to do it, it’s all one-
sided, I’m not getting—why would I go through the motions, if I’m not hav-
ing pleasure? I really despise this idea of marriage as a sexual contract, you 
just do it and you fake it, and that’s part of life as well as baking cookies. . . . 
[S]o if there’s nothing in it for me, I don’t like this idea of me always giving 
just to please him.
Comparing the above two passages illuminates Maya’s ambivalence—as much 
as she loves her husband and is thus willing to care for him sexually, she also 
can’t help but feel resentful toward him at times, as she feels the deal is so 
“one-sided.” Labuski (2015) also found that women who experience pain with 
intercourse still had sex with their partners—with mixed affects. Sometimes 
they engaged in intercourse to solidify their feminine heterosexual identi-
ties (and counter the idea that they weren’t “real” women—also described by 
Ayling & Ussher, 2008 and Kaler, 2006) or to please a partner—but they often 
resented their partners while doing so. This theme of a deeply rooted psychic 
and embodied ambivalence around sex is a common theme in my research 
with low-desiring women, as in Labuski’s work with women who experienced 
sexual pain, including vulvodynia, and it also appears in Cacchioni’s (2015) 
analysis of the conflicted place that women who feel compelled to have sex in 
spite of pain—who “stick it out” (p. 88)—find themselves in.
Valdivia discusses “faking it” as well, and explains how women are caught 
in a double bind regarding their affective sexual performances. She explains 
how women are “demonized” for faking it (orgasm), but are simultaneously 
and paradoxically expected to perform pleasure:
People really demonize women who fake it. They put you in a place where 
you are like “dishonest,” you are a bad person. There was a time where main-
stream media talked a lot about faking it, and I remember it really touching 
a part of me, because I was like, “I fake it . . .” And I didn’t fake it because I 
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was trying to deceive anyone, I think I faked it because I thought something 
was wrong with me . . . because I couldn’t get off.
Valdivia explains here how she also faked it because she felt abnormal for 
not enjoying sex more—in this case, penile-vaginal intercourse with cis men. 
She states that she performed in this way not only to please her partners, but 
because she thought that she should be experiencing that same kind of plea-
sure herself.3 She goes on to explain how she eventually learned that other 
types of sex with different partners would offer her more pleasure, and this 
allowed to her to stop feeling compelled to fake it:
I feel like sometimes we treat people who fake it in an unfair way. I think 
we are told that all you need is a dick, and then the dick is in you and you 
have this really incredible communion with this person, and you sigh a lot, 
and then some kind of music happens, and then you come together! Or at 
least that’s what movies have told me . . . but that’s what movies tell you! And 
that’s what I thought was going to happen. . . . [I]t was either that, or like [it 
is in] really bad porn. . . . I thought that one of those two things was going 
to happen for me, and neither happened!
In this quote, Valdivia explains that she “faked it” because she thought some-
thing was wrong with her for not having orgasms from the kind of penetrative 
heterosexual sex she had experienced up to that point with cis male partners. 
She explains that she always thought that she should be able to enjoy sex in 
the same way that her male partners did, because of portrayals of sex in mov-
ies and porn—the main type of “sex education” most participants say they 
received (especially those who grew up in the US). It wasn’t until she deter-
mined that sex takes work in order to be enjoyable that she was able to really 
“get off ” and finally be in a place to stop faking it—which she had done for so 
long in the hope that something would ultimately fall into place and allow sex 
to become pleasurable for her (the way it appears to be in movies and pornog-
raphy). What does it mean that the solution to low desire is to realize that sex 
 3. Jagose (2013) describes the “counterdisciplinary” potential of fake orgasm as “an inno-
vative sexual practice that makes available a mode of feminine self-production in a constrained 
field of possibility” (p. 196). I find this interpretation provocative in that it challenges the nor-
mative impulsion to “authentic” sexual experience and reveals disciplinary aspects, particu-
larly within the broader field of cis/heterosexuality. But for the participants in this study who 
“faked it,” even though fake orgasm may have operated as a practice of self-production and thus 
offered a certain kind of control or agency, it was contoured by their deep disappointment with 
heterosex (at least in their lives at the time of the interviews). They seemed to have less (cruel) 
optimism about heterosexuality than Jagose might expect, then.
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takes work? How might we understand this type of work as being far different 
from sexual carework as it has been described thus far? And if mindfulness-
based sex therapy also constitutes a type of sexual carework, how and why has 
this work become so feminized and individualized?
Other women discuss what happens when it is impossible to fake it, 
including the deleterious effects this impossibility can have on a relationship. 
Zola describes how, when she was depressed, she could not muster the affect 
that her husband ultimately seemed to need her to mobilize when they had 
sex:
ZOLA: He would complain all the time and I would just be like, “If you want 
to have sex, go find somebody to have sex with!” and he would be like, “I 
don’t want to have sex with anybody else, I want to have sex with you!” 
And I’d be like, “Well, I don’t want to have sex. I am not feeling it. I’ll 
do it if you want me to do it, but I just don’t feel like it,” and he would 
be like, “I want you to be into it, I don’t want you to just feel obligated 
because you are my wife,” and I would be like, “Well, that’s how I feel. I 
don’t want to touch you, I don’t want to be touched, but I will sit through 
it, I will let you do whatever you are going to do so you can get your 
rocks off, and I can go to sleep, or finish my day, or do whatever it is . . .” 
and so that used to be a big problem for him.
ALYSON: When you would have sex, did he know that you were not into it?
ZOLA: Oh yeah.
ALYSON: But he would do it anyway?
ZOLA: Yes, we would have sex anyway.
All of these stories suggest that both women and men are led to believe that 
sex should be “easy,” that it should come naturally, that it should not require 
any time or work or effort, and that somehow, all of this magic will happen 
from penile-vaginal intercourse alone (this is consistent with many of Tief-
er’s critiques, for instance in Tiefer, 1995). What these low-desiring women 
describe is all the (ideally mutual and reciprocal) time and work and effort it 
actually takes to make this event happen, and how they feel that the labor is, 
in practice, often one-sided; they perform and tend to the occasion, whereas 
they feel that their (cis male) partners often do not put in as much effort. 
Importantly, the sexual landscape these women illuminate is not something 
that is the effect of “natural kinds” of desire; it cannot be reduced to the inter-
play between an innate biological male drive to have sex and an innate bio-
logical female drive to care or be empathetic—or, in line with the feminized 
responsive desire framework, to be receptive. Instead, what is being described 
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is an aspect of sexual difference socialization (discussed in chapter 3), in which 
women have been taught to play a certain role and take up a certain share of 
the work, whereas men are generally taught to have expectations regarding 
their own pleasure and that these expectations will be met. 
Feminized Sexual Carework beyond the Bedroom
Masculinity requires its own type of labor in terms of performance (Murray, 
2019), but here, I want to put forward the notion that sex requiring work is a 
given, that it is (or should be) obvious, and I want to focus specifically on the 
feminized side of this sexual division of labor. According to Penelope: “We 
[women] are not taught to go out and get a bunch of men, we are taught to 
attract them and do things that make us attractive to them, we are taught to 
love and take care of them.” This eloquent statement sums up the feminiza-
tion of sexual carework that these low-desiring women experience. Penelope’s 
statement also suggests that sexual carework, the invisible embodied labor 
that is also always affective and performative, often extends to the entire rela-
tionship, family, and home, for women. The participants that I interviewed 
often grappled actively with the heavy burden of the intimate labor that they 
know falls on their backs as feminine subjects. On this point, Ava states:
In my relationships, I’m very much a caretaker, I buy people meals, I buy 
them presents, if they’re sick I make them soup. In my past relationships 
that’s put me at a disadvantage. . . . I’ve always been really submissive in my 
sexual and personal life—whereas in my public life, like in school and with 
friends, I’m very loud, people know me as kind of assertive, I’m a bitch, I say 
what’s on my mind, and I stand up for what I believe in, so there are these 
two very different sides of me depending on whether I’m in an intimate rela-
tionship with someone or if I’m not.
In this passage, Ava explains how she enjoys caring for her partners, but also 
feels like she has to keep her guard up, lest she be taken advantage of by men 
who expect her to perform sexual and relational carework out of obligation, 
or to play a certain role to accommodate them. Elaine also discusses the work 
that she does for her husband (and plans to do in the future) within the con-
text of their sexual relationship, but in this account, it doesn’t concern his 
sexual pleasure, specifically. In her case, having children will be part of the 
(reproductive) responsibility she enacts to care for her husband, an obviously 
feminized form of care:
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I am ambivalent [about having kids], but my husband really wants to, and so 
we’re negotiating that terrain right now, but realistically we will have them in 
the next year and a half to two years. . . . [H]e comes from a family of four 
children and all of his aunts and uncles have multiple—it’s just a big—it’s 
important to him.
Ava, Elaine, and other participants describe their intimate relationship to cul-
tural narratives about women’s responsibility to engage in carework, and the 
ways in which it is sexualized but also extends to other domestic duties within 
families and households. This work has been responsibilized (Cossman, 2007; 
Murphy, 2012) in a managerial sense—the burden of intimate maintenance is 
pushed on to women, who become sexual, sensual, and affective managers of 
the home. As this work is also part of social reproduction (and sexual repro-
duction, in Elaine’s case), it is useful to consider all of these different forms of 
work as part of a kind of feminized affective labor—around which the women 
I interviewed felt much ambivalence. This affective labor can also be linked to 
the feminized responsive desire framework: If women are consistently framed 
as responsive and receptive, it makes sense that they would feel ambivalence 
around providing care. There is a paradox here, as a type of activity is man-
dated within this receptivity—feminine responsiveness becomes work in itself 
that is both naturalized and prescribed. Women are expected to open up in an 
active way, a way that entails work, and thus a deep ambivalence runs through 
the experience of performing feminized affective labors—from sexual care-
work to other forms of social reproduction—as these fit within the essential-
ized logic of feminine responsiveness.
Carework as Coercion
In the most extreme and troubling cases of women performing sexual care-
work in domestic relationships, low-desiring women have sex because their 
partners materially and economically support them, because their partners 
are coercing them, or because they feel they have no choice but to have sex. 
Astrid explains how she felt compelled to sexually perform for her ex-hus-
band, because she was so young when they were married, and because she was 
completely dependent on him:
I had sex because he wanted to have sex. That was it. From the very begin-
ning of our relationship . . . sex was what I did to make myself useful, or like 
worthy of that [his economic support], I guess? Because we did get together 
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when I was so young, and I like moved in with him while I was still in high 
school and stuff. . . . [A]nd yeah, I guess, I felt like sex was kind of like—sex 
was something that I did as a trade-off for benefits I got in our relationship, 
like he paid our rent, he paid for our groceries, things I did in return were I 
made him dinner and I let him fuck me. Like, that was my role, you know? 
So yeah, like when I became sexually nonviable [because of sexual pain], 
I had to deal with it, right? Like, I mean, there was no alternative to that.  
I wasn’t of any use if I couldn’t have sex.
In this quote, the fraught terrain around consent and coercion that many par-
ticipants describe becomes disturbingly stark. Although Astrid’s example is 
not representative of the type of sexual carework most of the women I spoke 
with performed on a regular basis, it is still a deeply disconcerting example 
of how this type of care sometimes manifests as particularly coercive and vio-
lent—specifically within a system in which women are configured as naturally 
or essentially receptive and responsive, and in which men are configured as 
“only wanting one thing” in a way and to a degree that is beyond their control.
The Biopolitics of Sexual Carework: Medicine, Science, 
Therapy, Capital
One way sexual carework protocols become feminized in the present day is 
through medical and scientific discourses that perpetuate notions of female 
sexual responsiveness, receptivity, flexibility, and fluidity. This is specifically 
apparent in some of the contemporary clinical and experimental psychology 
research, diagnoses, and treatment protocols that I analyzed in chapters 1, 
2, and 3. The medicalization and feminization of receptivity—including the 
widespread notions that women “just don’t really like sex” or that they are 
“hard to get off ”—are questioned by some of the clinicians I interviewed and 
also by low-desiring women themselves. Betsy, the director of a holistic clinic 
that treats women with low desire, tells me that many doctors (doctors who 
are not associated with her clinic) seem to expect women to “grin and bear it” 
when they have pain or discomfort during intercourse—a common problem 
among the low-desiring women I interviewed:
[At the medical center, we would tell women:] “We’re going to put you on 
the following medications to see if we can get your body in better shape, 
and we’re going to see you in a month or two. . . . [O]nce we feel like your 
body is a little bit more responsive, then we’ll say, ‘Okay, now we want you 
EMBODIED INVISIBLE LABOR, SExUAL CAREWORK • 177
to try these sensate focus exercises, we want to schedule sex with you and 
your husband, we want to introduce specific sexual activities.’” If you try to 
introduce those sex therapy activities when a woman’s body is not ready for 
that, that’s just like, it’s so enraging, when the woman says, “I don’t have any 
desire!” and the doctor says, “Oh, just do it!” like “Take one for the team!”
Betsy expresses her frustration over this type of treatment model, which she 
describes as antiquated and misogynistic, but which she says is unfortunately 
still prevalent in sexual medicine. For instance, pop therapist Michele Weiner-
Davis made the case that low-desiring women should “just do it”—have sex 
for the sake of their marriages—in her 2003 best seller The Sex-Starved Mar-
riage. In making this argument for what she calls “Nike sex,” she cites Bas-
son’s circular sexual response cycle as a way for women to achieve this, and 
as a reason why it should be easy for women to do this (a point also noted by 
Cacchioni, 2015). The fact that this mentality is still alive and well is further 
instantiated by Astrid, who experiences pain on penetration along with low 
desire and who previously sought medical treatment (at the behest of her part-
ner) to help her deal with these issues:
One of the gynecologists I saw literally said, “Put this anesthetic cream on 
a cotton ball and put it into your vagina ten minutes before you have sex so 
then you don’t feel it,” and I was like, “Um, but what’s the point of sex then?” 
and he was like, “Well, what do you mean?” He just didn’t understand how 
that was weird, to like numb all feeling before you have sex!
The women I spoke with who had been treated in medical therapeutic pro-
grams for sexual pain and low desire had many specific critiques of this type 
of program and associated treatments—including those that were arguably 
oriented toward enhancing female receptivity and responsiveness. Kelly, who 
had been enrolled in one of these treatment programs, expresses similar con-
cerns around the medical treatment of vaginal pain, and questions for whom 
the remedies are actually designed:
KELLY: It was kind of weird—because it wasn’t supposed to have anything 
to do with sexuality, it was just like, “When you are reading your book, 
put this thing in” [here, she is referring to a vaginal dilator], just to kind 
of get your vagina used to having something in there. . . . [I]t was awk-
ward and strange.
ALYSON: Did they ever actually say, “This is so that you can continue to have 
sex with your boyfriend?”
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KELLY: Not outright. But . . . that’s sort of where it was going. . . . [T]he only 
reason I could think of is so that I would still be able to have [penetra-
tive] sex even though I didn’t want to.
All of these examples show how women experiencing low desire and pain—
specifically if it interferes with their ability to be penetrated—becomes framed 
as a problem for men within dominant medical and therapeutic paradigms. 
Similar to the findings of Kaler (2006) and Labuski (2015), my research sug-
gests that, in certain medical treatment programs, women are taught how to 
use their bodies for sexualized service. And here is where the older (liberal 
capitalist) form of work and the newer (biopolitical) form bleed into each 
other—in both instances, the work is about heteronormativity and service, 
but the newer version is also about the purported self-care benefits of experi-
encing this type of responsive femininity (i.e., service to oneself, partner, fam-
ily, and even the broader population in the name of “therapy”). In this way, 
more traditional heteronormative medical frameworks provide the foundation 
for the biopolitics of sexual carework. At the time of their enrollment in the 
program, neither Kelly nor Astrid was interested in having penetrative inter-
course with their male partners. Yet, in the program, it was always assumed 
that part of their treatment for low desire would include maintaining the abil-
ity to engage in heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse—and both Kelly and 
Astrid stated that no clinician ever asked them how they identified sexually or 
if, how, or with whom they liked to have sex.
It is not only within clinical medicine and therapy that these imperatives 
to feminine receptivity and their linkage to sexual carework surface; these 
norms circulate in alternative healing and educational spaces as well. In fact, 
in a “biomedical” (Clarke et al., 2003) milieu, wherein medicalization becomes 
neoliberal self-medicalization and enhancement, these alternative wellness 
spaces are where we see the biopolitics of feminized sexual carework really 
take shape. I interviewed a small number of women who worked in sex toy 
stores that sold products and also held workshops designed to enhance desire 
and sexual pleasure. Amelia describes what it was like to work in such a space, 
and how she felt about leading workshops:
AMELIA: I didn’t realize that the content of the workshops that I would be 
leading would be all male-centered. I had an understanding of [the store] 
that I think was something different.
ALYSON: But why were those the ones you would be teaching?
AMELIA: Because those were the ones that were repeated with the most fre-
quency. They were the ones that brought in the money. We had work-
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shops about BDSM bondage rope-tying stuff but we’d get five people, 
whereas “How to Please Your Man” and “How to Give a Blow Job” 
routinely sold out. There was another one called “How to Please Your 
Woman” and we never sold out of that one [laughing]. . . . I thought the 
workshops I was going to be teaching were going to be for women—
’cuz that’s what I thought [the store]’s modus operandi was, that’s what 
I thought the store was about . . . but it wasn’t necessarily—not because 
[the store] philosophically isn’t about that but because that’s not what 
sold.
Amelia describes how even at a purportedly sex-positive, feminist sex toy 
store, women still took up the bulk of the work of making sex pleasurable—for 
themselves and their partners—whereas heterosexual cis men routinely did 
not take such an interest. Notably, the workshop leaders themselves were also 
most often femme-identified, nonbinary, or genderqueer, so the educational 
labor was also less likely to be performed by cishet men. Here, the relation-
ship between sexual production and consumption is worth examining in its 
own right.4
Linking this heterosexual imperative (Gavey, 2005; Loe, 2004) with fem-
inine receptivity under protocols of capacitation (Puar, 2017) and within 
regimes of sexual citizenship (Cossman, 2007), it is also illustrative to analyze 
some of the data I gathered from Celeste, a yogic, tantric, meditation-based, 
and spiritual healer who focused on sexual enhancement techniques designed 
to increase desire and pleasure, primarily for women. Celeste expressed partic-
ularly strong views of the plight of women’s sexuality in our current moment. 
She explained to me that women’s desires are being dampened by too much 
work outside of the home, and too much alienation from their innate femi-
nine sexual energy. In Celeste’s view,
Men evolve and grow spiritually and emotionally by ordeal, by going out into 
battle. Women grow by being adored. Women need to be worshipped.  .  .  . 
[W]hen the woman is happy, the whole household is happy. When the 
woman is not happy, in a household with family, with kids, if the woman is 
bitter and resentful and dried up and stressed out, everybody suffers! When 
the woman is soft and open, and enjoying life, everybody feels that around 
her! That’s what I always say to the women in my training—that is women’s 
work. Forget about whether or not it’s supposed to be women in the kitchen 
 4. Comella (2017) elaborates the capitalist tensions involved in running a sex-positive 
feminist business, and similarly speaks to the difficulty of navigating the heterosexist demand 
involved in programming.
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or whatever—it’s women’s work to be sensual and to be in love with life, and 
then everybody benefits from that! . . . So that is what my work is, it’s help-
ing women to realize how high the stakes are. This is not just about, “Oh, 
reclaim a great sexual relationship”—this is your life! This is the life of the 
planet! The same thing that is happening to us, it’s happening to the planet, 
we are burning it up!!!
Here, Celeste links the gendered provision of sexual carework to women’s sen-
sual nature and natural receptivity and makes a case for the feminine duty to 
provide not only a comfortable home but a type of cosmic equilibrium. She 
goes on to state: “Women are so stressed and pulled in every direction, we 
have no time to be voluptuous. And I mean that in the sense of just volup-
tuous, soft and pleasurable, and loving life. That’s the woman’s job.”
It is imperative to highlight Celeste’s words here next to the words of par-
ticipants who spoke in the previous section about the carework they perform 
“beyond the bedroom,” in their relationships more broadly, and to interro-
gate the feminization of this relational work. Celeste’s framing of the feminine 
responsibility to not only be sexually receptive but to be “voluptuous,” “soft,” 
and “pleasurable,” and implicitly to be sensual, empathetic, responsive to oth-
ers, and nurturing—while making this entire production appear carefree and 
natural—clearly resonates with many of the women I spoke with. But many 
of these low-desiring women did not see carework—sexual or otherwise—as a 
naturally ordained feminine duty, and it was something they felt much ambiv-
alence around (even when it involved caring for people they loved).
Celeste describes this feminine sexual responsibility in terms of maintain-
ing a certain kind of energy, sensuality, voluptuousness, and capaciousness—
something that women in our contemporary society have lost because they 
do not have time to be “in love with life.” When I ask Celeste to describe how 
this energy imbalance affects women and their families, she explains: “Really, 
what that translates into is that we don’t get to indulge in those feminine 
pleasures anymore. Those are the societal pressures, and that’s what I meant 
when I said that it’s up to women to be that way. Because men biologically 
won’t indulge in that.” Here, again, Celeste encourages us to consider that 
women’s capacity to be so nurturing is founded in an innate biological drive 
to conviviality, and further prescribes the feminine duty or responsibility to 
not only sexually satisfy one’s partner but to sexually satisfy oneself—“to love 
life”—in order to provide a happy home, to create a welcoming and hospitable 
environment in a relationship and for one’s family, and, potentially, to save the 
planet. Celeste thus illuminates a different kind of sexual carework—a type of 
work that is the product of biopolitical imperatives under neoliberalism; her 
narrative spells out the mandate toward pleasure, or the work of self-care, self-
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optimization, self-capacitation, and ultimately of self-valorization, in bluntly 
gendered terms. If we link this back to the way carework was discussed earlier 
in the chapter in regard to race and class, locating it within white supremacist 
and colonialist capitalism, and also consider its cultural feminist underpin-
nings within contemporary feminist psychology today (discussed in chapter 
3), it is easy to see how this biopolitical framework will affect different popula-
tions very differently. Which women will be able to afford to optimize? Which 
will be accepted into the valorized fold? Which will be excluded based on race, 
class, nationality, disability, or their status as genderqueer, nonconforming, or 
trans, before they even get to the capacitation/debility threshold? Who will be 
expected to labor in the older service-oriented way, while simultaneously still 
being held to the standards of self-optimization under a regime of “volup-
tuous” femininity?
Capacitating Femininity
Sexual carework, as part of an embodied and affective system of invisible 
labor performed within intimate settings, including the home, is a complex 
enactment. The low-desiring women I spoke with were well aware of the 
“stakes” of reclaiming their “natural” feminine energy—the receptive respon-
sibility that has been prescribed to them through scientific and psychomedi-
cal discourses, sex therapy, popular culture and media accounts, and now 
via alternative, holistic, and “Eastern” medicine, or yogic and tantric healing 
protocols. Narratives and expectations about how great sex can be—or should 
be—inform women’s desires to engage in sexual acts just as much as “wanting 
to get off ” (or to get someone else off) affects their desires to engage. And it 
is unsurprising that some women, particularly the low-desiring participants 
I interviewed, feel that the sexual labor dynamics in their own households 
or intimate relationships are fraught and one-sided (this might be especially 
unsurprising when those relationships are with cis men, for all of the reasons 
I have outlined above). Narratives about women’s inherent drive to be sen-
sual, the feminized requirement to produce an embodied and affective ambi-
ance in a sexual relationship, and the notion that women have a responsibility 
to be responsive and receptive are found in diverse discourses and domains 
in our contemporary world—even when there is so much apparent sexual 
freedom. This circulation itself undoubtedly influences women’s desire—or 
lack thereof.
In light of the turn in queer and biopolitical theory to reexamine bodies 
as information (Clough, 2007, 2018; Terranova, 2004), which make up popula-
tions produced and managed through (self-)governing modalities and citizen-
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ship regimes, it is imperative to continue to consider how the “old” categories 
of gender, sexuality, race, and labor are reinvented in a neoliberal context. It is 
important for queer theorists, feminists, critical theorists of race, and disabil-
ity scholars and activists to consider the biopolitical productions, structures 
of regulatory control, and possibilities for transgression within these regimes 
that are characterized by a sexual imperative to pleasure, but gendered and 
racialized affective labor must be attended to as well—as there is a very spe-
cific version of white receptive feminine pleasure mandated in the biopolitical 
carework protocol I identify. This feminine pleasure is part of an apparatus 
in which participation in sex becomes bound up with sexual citizenship. In 
this context, female sexual refusal becomes not only a barrier to full citizen-
ship, but refusing feminine subjects (or even potentially refusing feminine 
subjects) run the risk of being posited as intransigent, as debilitated, of being 
counted as “killjoys” (Ahmed, 2010), or as a population to be worked upon, 
to be made more productive, more capacitated, more capacious—always 
already asymptotically closer to seamless self-governability, self-appreciation, 
and self-valorization. This feminine capaciousness (and here, I am not only 
talking about sexual receptivity but about feminine hospitality more broadly) 
has a special relationship to the biopolitical mandate of sexual optimization, 
as feminine receptivity is an essential aspect of neoliberal governance strate-
gies of rejuvenation and reinvigoration—not only of the feminized subject, 
but of the larger populations to which she is held responsible. The receptive 
feminine citizen will not only rejuvenate and reinvigorate herself, according 
to these mandates, it is her duty to rejuvenate and reinvigorate the world. As 
the words of my participants—first and foremost, Celeste—and these accom-
panying biomedical, therapeutic, and popular discourses suggest, feminine 
receptivity offers the promise of unification, of harmony, of solidification—of 
the (cishet romantic) relationship, the (nuclear) family, the (bourgeois) com-
munity, and the socius or species body at large. Thus, the woman who refuses 
receptivity is herein produced as not only an enemy of mankind—she is an 
enemy of The State. She is an enemy of humanity itself, of democracy, free-
dom, and progress. Here, feminine capacity/debility take on a specific tenor 
and weight, and they expand and extend well beyond the bedroom. This par-
ticular white-hetero-cis-gendered version of the sexual imperative also shores 
up the specter of that old liberal concept, what Marxist feminists call social 
reproduction, or the unpaid labor of care, of pleasure, of happiness—both 
the mandate to please others and the mandate to please oneself—which are 
so invaluable to capital today. If neoliberalism has indeed collapsed the space 
between private and public, spirit and market, reproduction and production, 
as Feher (2009, 2018) suggests—so that we are all self-governing nodes within 
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ever-productive populations—what can we say about this mandate to sexual 
receptivity and its white, bourgeois, hetero, and cis gendered prescriptions? 
Further: What regimes of capacitation do we have in store for us as we trudge 
forward through late capitalism? What new forms of husbandry are on the 
horizon as we move into a moment in which various sexual and nonsexual 
desires and pleasures are prescribed and proscribed, according to affective 
delimiting within populations, but also sharply in “real live” sexual scenes?
During the course of our time together, Astrid revealed to me that after 
finishing the treatment program for low-desiring women with sexual pain, she 
finally left her husband, started having sex with women, and embraced a queer 
and genderqueer/nonconforming identity. Within a paradigm that explicitly 
links feminine competence with receptive and responsive sexuality and sensu-
ality, Astrid’s story may be one example of the potential of queer failure (Hal-
berstam, 2011; Hoskin & Taylor, 2019). Avowed incompetence, in the form of 
feminine refusal, may be one of the most subversive strategies in a neoliberal 
workplace in which our sexualities are increasingly optimized and our bod-
ies are made more and more capacious. Further, if we consider the spectrum 
of ambivalence, from pleasure to refusal, that structures experiences of femi-
nized affective labor and sexual carework, it is possible to see how Astrid is 
not such an outlier, at least not among the population of women-with-low-
desire. While refusal of this work may be one avenue for sabotage, a type of 
(direct) work action, it is imperative to remember the ways in which different 
populations are treated differently when such boundaries are transgressed. So: 
While refusal may be the only option for some, it is also a dangerous option 
for many. Given this, the best form of resistance may be to sabotage together.
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C H A P T E R  5
Reclaiming Receptivity
Parasexual Pleasure in the Face of Compulsory 
and Feminized Trauma
I think that experience of being fucked and feeling like a technology of a 
penis, like a vehicle or vessel, is a very common experience for women who 
have sex with men . . . but submission is also something I’m drawn to [that 
isn’t unique to me]. . . . [I]t can be really hot if it’s with someone you trust 
and who wants to make you happy sexually.  .  .  . I’ve realized that lots of 
women have that experience and I think it’s tied in really closely with bond-
age and that it’s about some kind of “soul-shattering” thing or something 
[laughs]. . . . I do find sex soul-shattering whether it’s good or bad, because 
if it’s bad it’s shattering in one way, and if it’s good it’s kind of shattering in a 
different way, because I feel really vulnerable and open. . . . [I]t’s kind of too 
much .  .  . and I haven’t trusted men my whole life. I really haven’t trusted 
men my whole life, that is very true. (Mallory, thirty-two years old, white, 
bi/queer)
A few years ago, when I was conducting interviews for this project, one of 
my participants asked me if anyone was going to interview me for the study. 
At first, I was taken aback. I identified as a very sexual person, as someone 
who did not have “low desire.” But, pretty quickly, I realized that I’ve had all 
of the same issues that most of the women in this study describe—includ-
ing many times wherein I didn’t feel sexual at all. Like many of the partici-
pants who have been introduced throughout this book, I had primarily but 
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not exclusively dated cis men up to that point in my life. I had at one point 
identified as straight. I had come to eventually identify as a queer femme,1 
but I had been socialized into thinking about sex in very cisnormative and 
heternormative ways (including in regard to my absent—at times—desire). 
I had a very whitewashed view of sexual difference and feminine receptiv-
ity. I had also alternately internalized and rejected discourses about the way 
women are sexually. I had performed sexual and sensual carework, includ-
ing from a young age. I had experienced violent sexual experiences, some of 
which I didn’t label or understand as violent at the time, and I lived with what 
could only be described as some kind of trauma. Sometimes I dissociated 
during sex. But I was also becoming more and more interested in BDSM, and 
particularly in being submissive in these scenarios—including in some cases 
with men. I literally laughed out loud when I realized I had not seen myself 
in this project in this way. And the “reverse interview” commenced a couple 
weeks later. Like all of the other interviews, it felt a bit like a verbal account 
of my “sexual biography” or what one participant called a “queer intake” (as 
opposed to a more conventional psychomedical intake). I didn’t transcribe 
that interview for a very, very long time. And when I did, it made me cry.
This chapter examines the nuances of desire and fulfillment as they are 
framed within women’s own narratives, focusing specifically on their experi-
ences of receptivity, submission, consent versus coercion, and sexual intention-
ality. Participants, like me, articulated how sexual enjoyment is complicated 
for them by concerns around trust and safety, due to the widespread experi-
ence of sexual violence that is disproportionately afflicted against women and 
femmes. During the course of our interviews, the women I spoke with elabo-
rated a variety of desires and fantasies that had not been met, specifically by 
the cis male partners they had over the course of their lives. They described a 
multitude of reasons why these fantasies had not been fulfilled—including a 
lack of trust, safety, and intimacy in their relationships, which these women 
would require in order for fantasies to be acted out. Many spoke of fantasies 
involving BDSM, and they had diverse desires about their own roles within 
these power/play scenarios and disparate ideas about what they most wanted 
from different partners in regard to the enactment and exertion of power. At 
first glance, it may seem that there is something paradoxical about the place 
 1. Long before I began this project, a friend referred to my gender as “andro-femme.” 
I found this term quite fitting and as this project has progressed, I have embraced it even 
more, and come into a more nonbinary identity. It is unclear whether or not this experi-
ence is related to conducting this research, but of course doing this work has affected me 
in all kinds of ways, and so my shifting experience of my own gender subjectivity toward a 
nonbinary femme-of-center identity is at least a worthwhile autobiographical and reflexive 
sidenote.
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of power in fantasy here, and indeed, almost all women spoke of how they 
required a safe environment to explore certain fantasies, particularly those 
involving BDSM. At the same time, though, they explained how too much 
comfort could “ruin” the fantasy, in some cases was associated with routiniza-
tion and boredom, and was thus framed, in those cases, as unappealing. Their 
accounts suggest a delicate balance at work between taboo and trust, novelty 
and comfort, and subversion and safety, often held in a complex state of ten-
sion. Upon further analysis, it is apparent that most of the women I inter-
viewed actually did not experience this tension as a paradox, though; the key 
to upholding safety while also allowing sexual taboos to be explored involved 
carefully implementing an environment of trust, intentionality, and consent. 
In fact, it seemed as though consent was produced in the context of trust (rather 
than trust being produced in the context of consent). Creating this environ-
ment and ambiance takes care and work—something many participants felt 
their (particularly cis male) partners did not readily contribute.
The women I interviewed had many ideas for the best ways to alleviate 
their low desire, and almost all had strong critiques of what they identified as 
conflicting and ambivalent social expectations for women, double standards 
for men’s and women’s sexual behavior and desire, and the problems that 
people inevitably encounter when they “learn how to have sex” from watch-
ing pornography—as they claimed was the case for many people. In general, 
participants seemed to have lots of desire, contrary to even their own self- 
characterizations as “low-desiring.” Through our discussions, in fact, many 
women identified this self-diagnosing trend and revised their initial self-diag-
nosis, stating instead that they do, in fact, experience sexual desire, just not 
for the type of sex they are expected to have, and, in some cases, not for the 
type of sex that their partners want to have with them. This phenomenon evi-
dences how the hermeneutics of “low female desire”—and now the “natural-
ness” for women of “receptive/responsive desire”—are really the only frames 
of reference women have available to interpret their experiences if they don’t 
like the sex they are having. The feminized responsive desire framework thus 
dictates how women register—and interpret—their own sexual complaints, 
including when these complaints are actually about gender relations or gender 
itself (for instance, the receptive femininity that has been forced upon them). 
Here, we have another example of how the category and population—women-
with-low-desire—is produced and lived out by those who are socialized into 
femininity.
Participants also identified many nonsexual desires, which seem to bor-
der on the sexual in a larger sense, and which, in fact, push the boundar-
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ies of and urge us to question what the sexual may or may not incorporate 
(Kleinplatz, 2006). This experience of pursuing nonsexual desires via sex is 
not to be confused with the “non-sexual rewards,” “incentives,” and “moti-
vating factors” described in Basson’s (2000, 2001b) circular sexual response 
cycle, however; instead, the nonsexual desires I describe might be associated 
more with Kleinplatz’s (2006) “lessons from the edge”—including “unconven-
tional” intimacy, self-knowledge, delving deep into experiences of trauma and 
power, provoking intensity and intensification of sensations, and playing with 
affect regulation, more broadly. In thinking about “motivations” in this new 
way, we might also consider psychoanalytic and queer investigations of sex 
that are similarly nonpastoral, nonredemptive, and certainly not romantic, for 
instance in the vein of what Cvetkovich (1995, 1998, 2003) describes regarding 
butch/femme sexualities, including active or agentic femme receptivity and 
butch untouchability, and also in terms of Bersani’s (1986, 1987) self-shattering 
or disintegration via sex as “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, and 
antiloving” (Bersani, 1987, p. 195) (specifically, for Bersani, this is experienced 
via the “humiliation” of receptive anal sex). Some low-desiring women in this 
study describe experiencing submission during BDSM encounters as a form 
of meditation (LaMorgese, 2016) and/or as therapeutic (Lindemann, 2011), a 
notion that I argue opens up a radical potential for a form of parasexuality—a 
set of subversive and queer practices, sometimes associated with BDSM, that 
is beyond or beside the sexual as it is currently configured in contemporary 
psychomedical discourse. To this end, BDSM reveals possibilities that are very 
different from those associated with mindfulness-based sex therapy (MBST), 
as BDSM, unlike MBST, forefronts a full engagement with all of the psychic 
and social structures of desire, including with trauma, taboo, and power rela-
tions, more broadly. Research from psychoanalysis and cultural studies that 
considers the phenomenology of the Freudian death drive (Bersani, 1986, 
1987; Brothers, 2008; Cvetkovich, 1995, 1998, 2003; Hart, 1998), in addition 
to BDSM-positive sex therapy (Moser & Kleinplatz, 2006; Rogak & Connor, 
2018), asexuality studies (Milks & Cerankowski, 2014), and queer theory and 
phenomenology that engage with negative affects such as shame and abjec-
tion (Kristeva, 1982; Ngai, 2005)—especially those that attend to racial inflec-
tions within biopolitics and formulations of desire more broadly (McClintock, 
1995; Musser, 2014; Nash, 2014; Stockton, 2006; Stoler, 1995)—can all help us 
rethink feminine responsiveness and receptivity as active or agentic, outside of 
the power vacuum of contemporary sexological discourse (which includes the 
feminized responsive desire framework), and without the trappings of essen-
tialized femininity inherent in today’s mainstream psychology of women as 
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it is informed by the white cultural feminism of the 1960s (and white liberal 
feminism, today). I argue that it is possible to interpret femme receptivity 
as agentic without idealizing, romanticizing, or pastoralizing it, and without 
assuming that power relations in sex can somehow be recuperated or recast as 
pure or egalitarian. Instead, my data suggest that justice-seeking and radical 
care need not negate sexual domination and submission, and that parasexu-
ality might inform and be informed by nuanced conceptions of asexuality 
beyond normative discourses of sexual rights, health, intimacy, eroticism, and 
ability/capacity (see the essays in Milks & Cerankowski, 2014, and specifi-
cally for this project, Kim, 2014 in that volume, for nuanced and sophisticated 
analyses of asexuality with which my concept of parasexuality finds much 
common ground).
Questions of trauma, power, and agency were raised again and again in 
these interviews, and it is my project in this chapter to tease apart these com-
plicated themes around the sexual experience of the low-desiring women 
with whom I spoke. One of the most important conclusions derived from 
my qualitative analysis is that the medical and scientific discourses I ana-
lyze—including the feminized responsive desire framework as it includes the 
new female-specific low desire diagnosis (FSIAD) in the DSM-5, plethysmo-
graphic research on female subjective/genital discordance, the circular sexual 
response cycle, and biopolitical training protocols such as mindfulness-based 
sex therapy—simultaneously both require and erase women’s and femmes’ dis-
proportionate experience of trauma. These discourses thus perpetuate insti-
tutionalized sexual and gender-based violence, including iatrogenic violence 
within the medical and scientific sphere itself. I will elaborate on this impor-
tant theme and describe how it emerged at greater length in the conclusion 
chapter of this book.
Popular Depictions of Feminine Sexuality: Receptivity, 
Submission, Masochism
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, much popular journalism 
focused on the problem of women’s low desire. But popular work has also 
taken up the themes of feminine responsive desire (Basson, 2000, 2001b), sex-
ual fluidity (Diamond, 2005, 2008), and erotic plasticity (Baumeister, 2000, 
2004). Most recently, popular writers (some of whom are also clinicians and 
academics) with the intention of reaching broader audiences in the vein of 
self-help, have deployed these scientific findings to make arguments for wom-
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en’s disproportionate experience of responsive/receptive desire (Brotto, 2018; 
Nagoski, 2015), women’s potentially hardwired tendency toward insatiable lust 
(Bergner, 2013b), and the surprisingly common experience of female infidel-
ity (apparently also driven by insatiable lust) (Martin, 2018). Women, in these 
popular works, have even been described as “super freaks” (Martin, 2018, p. 
45) with “anarchic arousal” (Bergner, 2013b, p. 5). In this interesting turn, we 
see a simultaneous eschewing of some of the core tenets of evolutionary psy-
chology (such as the idea that women’s truest drive is toward motherhood), 
combined with the maintaining of other core tenets (such as naturalizations of 
female subjective/genital discordance via “the preparation hypothesis,” or the 
notion that as an evolutionary adaptation, women are biologically “prepared 
for anything”—including rape—in the words of sex researchers Suschin-
sky & Lalumière [2011]; as a reminder from previous chapters, this has been 
offered as an explanation for why women become genitally vasocongested and 
lubricated by literally any stimuli deemed “sexually relevant,” including, infa-
mously, bonobo sex). All of this emphasis on feminine sexual anarchy then 
appears as receptivity in a new guise—and the old virgin/whore dichotomy is 
dressed up in some nice new clothes.
As we have seen, much of the clinical and experimental literature on the 
subject over the past two or more decades has continued to paint a picture of 
women as more complex than men when it comes to sex and sexuality. The 
notion that women’s sexuality is not only complicated and complex but also 
receptive, responsive, and even submissive remains a mainstay in contempo-
rary popular interpretations of sexual medicine. And the theme of respon-
siveness easily lends itself to notions of inherent masochism or submissive 
tendencies, even as this sits uneasily next to new trends that frame female 
desire as lascivious, hedonic, and salacious. It is via the truism of female geni-
tal/subjective discordance that both arguments—unbridled female concupis-
cence, on the one hand, and the more demure feminine responsiveness and 
receptivity, on the other hand—are maintained. As I have argued in previous 
chapters, the purported disconnect or gap between women’s minds and bodies 
has been instrumentalized—it is literally made useful or put to work in these 
discourses. The mind/body gap is ripe for exploration and excavation, and it 
is overdetermined—it can be and has been made to suggest a number of dif-
ferent things about women and femininity. 
Importantly, the instrumental work of the gap is evident in arguments 
that ultimately link female discordance, prurience, and hardwired desire for 
submission. For example, in a series of blog posts for Psychology Today (2012a, 
2012b, 2012c), clinical psychologist Leon Seltzer describes how, even as it may 
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seem “mystifying” “ how a woman’s mind and body, sexually speaking, can 
be at war with one another,” (2012c) this conflict is evolutionarily pragmat-
ic.2 Regarding women’s biologically ordained attraction to “alpha males” who 
exhibit “status, confidence, and competence,” in addition to being “distant, 
brutal, and untamed,” Seltzer states: “Male authority, or ascendance, is what 
most women appear hard-wired to be susceptible to, as well as willing to sub-
mit to” (2012b, italics in original post). He goes on to discuss popular inter-
pretations of Meredith Chivers’s plethysmographic research and claims that 
women’s innate subjective/genital discordance may be evolutionarily prag-
matic, but that it also leads to a lot of confusion for both women and the men 
who want to have sex with them. This is because women are programmed with 
two conflicting drives: one to submit sexually to men, and one to be choosy 
with their mates. Their long-term and short-term “mating” impulses are thus 
essentially in conflict. Through discourses like Seltzer’s, the naturalization of 
female genital/subjective discordance becomes quickly and easily correlated 
with biologically adaptive and neurologically ingrained feminine submis-
sion. Further, a feminized mind/body disconnect and women’s unconscious 
desires to be dominated are rhetorically linked. And this essentialization of 
feminine dissociation, naturalization of female submission, and concomi-
tant neglect of gendered sociocultural violence is particularly problematic in 
light of uncritical discussions of the best-selling status and warm reception of 
women-targeted submission fiction such as Fifty Shades of Grey (E. L. James, 
2011)3—which has recently been criticized not on account of its portrayal of 
women’s submission, but for its romanticized heteronormativity and lack of a 
real discussion of consent (Downing, 2007, 2013; Dymock, 2012, 2013).
As mentioned previously, evolutionary neuropsychologists Ogas and Gad-
dam (2011) (who Seltzer cites heavily in the above blog posts) have also made 
a link between the feminine mind/body disconnect and women’s unconscious 
desire to sexually submit to male domination:
 2. As a related facet of the aforementioned “preparation hypothesis,” female discordance 
is said to serve another adaptive purpose; it is in the best interest of the fitness of the human 
race if women don’t know when they are turned on physically, because if they were aware of 
this, they might be less selective with their mates and thus have genetically inferior offspring 
(see Buss, 1994, for more on this evolutionary psychology hypothesis).
 3. There is nothing inherently sexist or misogynistic about portraying women’s sexual 
submission as enjoyable in a fictional work; my concern instead is with the placement of this 
type of prolific fiction next to increasingly popular neuroscience-based and evolutionary psy-
chology-informed studies that suggest that women are submissive by nature—and particularly 
when an adequate conversation around sexual ethics, consent, and communication is sorely 
lacking in the contemporary public sphere.
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Study after study has demonstrated the erotic appeal of male dominance. 
Women prefer the voices of dominant men, the scent of dominant men, the 
movement and gait of dominant men, and the facial features of dominant 
men. . . . [S]cientists believe that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex may be 
responsible for processing cues indicating social status or dominance, and 
it appears that almost all female brains are susceptible to dominating cues. (p. 
96; italics added)
These researchers make the case that women have a “primordial” urge to be 
dominated, and quote Chivers, who speculates that female coercion fantasies 
are about “the wish to be beyond will, beyond thought .  .  . to be all in the 
midbrain” (p. 115). What Chivers says here sounds plausible enough, but the 
authors then go on to extrapolate, “In such fantasies, it often seems like some-
thing is going on other than the mere desire to be irresistible” (p. 116), and 
describe an exemplary hypothetical/anecdotal woman who abashedly likes 
“the rough stuff ”—pornography in which a woman is being violently coerced 
or exploited by a forceful man—but is too ashamed to tell her husband about 
her rape fantasies. According to Ogas and Gaddam, this innate masochistic 
feminine desire must be rooted in the deepest recesses of the “unconscious 
subcortex,” in the hypothalamus and the midbrain.
Importantly, these discourses about female discordance and feminine 
masochistic hardwiring often take shape as a reaction formation to modern-
day feminism. As in chapter 4, in the contemporary context in which female 
sexuality is framed, there is a tendency to highlight the purported problems 
that egalitarianism within romantic relationships presents, specifically for 
cisheterosexual couples—and particularly when it comes to their sex lives. 
A 2012 Newsweek cover article titled “Working Women’s Fantasies” by Katie 
Roiphe is one example of a cultural fixation with women’s low desire as a 
problem resulting from “too much political correctness”—particularly follow-
ing the popularity of Fifty Shades of Grey (E. L. James, 2011) and other forms 
of what Roiphe and others refer to as “mommy porn” (depictions that almost 
always involve women as “bottoms” or “submissives” in BDSM scenarios). 
Roiphe (2012) states:
It is perhaps inconvenient for feminism that the erotic imagination does 
not submit to politics, or even changing demographic realities; it doesn’t . . . 
peruse feminist blogs in its spare time; it doesn’t remember the hard work 
and dedication of the suffragettes and assorted other picket-sign wavers. The 
incandescent fantasy of being dominated or overcome by a man shows no 
sign of vanishing with equal pay for equal work, and may in fact gain in 
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intensity and take new, inventive—or in the case of Fifty Shades of Grey, not 
so inventive—forms.
Similarly, Jan Moir (2012) questions: “Is this sudden and widespread female 
thirst for bondage and sadomasochistic sexual fantasy a sign that, tired of the 
struggle for equality, women want to take refuge in being bossed around in the 
bedroom by a man?” The main themes in these hot takes in the wake of Fifty 
Shades of Grey appear to be: (1) Women are overworked, (2) Their lives are too 
much like those of men, and (3) They want to “surrender to” and “be seduced” 
by men—this will put them back in touch with their essential receptive or 
responsive desire. When these interpretations that operate under the sign of 
antifeminism are placed alongside clinical and scientific research that reifies 
female discordance and “arousal-first” desire (and their popular interpreta-
tions), it is not difficult to see how we end up with a naturalization of not only 
female receptivity, but feminine submission. And when examined critically, 
these depictions don’t seem so different from early psychoanalytic conceptions 
of feminine masochism (the same ones that contemporary psychologists and 
sexologists have gone to such great lengths to distance themselves from). It is 
worth questioning why Roiphe, for instance, seems to want to claim that the 
fact of women participating in BDSM and the experience of female submis-
sion are somehow “unfeminist,” while simultaneously leaving readers with an 
empty or facile analysis regarding if, how, and why women are drawn to sub-
mission. I am not arguing that (some, perhaps many?) women are not drawn 
to submission (my data and my own experience suggest that some, particu-
larly those with low desire, are drawn to it); instead, I argue that this reality is 
not incompatible with a feminist analysis, and that we need not assume some 
natural or biological basis for this phenomenon in order to understand it. 
Essentializing female submission does us more harm than good, as it negates 
other, more complex and nuanced explanations (i.e., those that are sociologi-
cal, psychoanalytic, and otherwise rooted in analyses of power, trauma, and 
racialized, gendered, and sexualized violence).
Furthermore, there is an irony here: Contemporary medical and scien-
tific discourses of female receptivity and responsiveness are often posited as 
feminist (insofar as they are framed as part of more female-friendly sexual 
response models), while there is a simultaneous eschewing of the ills of femi-
nism within popularized evolutionary accounts of feminine submission. This is 
a strange concoction, indeed, and one that demonstrates how useless the lan-
guage of “feminism” has become in medicine, science, and popular instantia-
tions when it comes to expectations and prescriptions for women’s sexuality. 
A consideration of the range of ways in which self-identified feminist schol-
ars and activists (from radical “sex-negative” feminists to third-wave “sex-
RECLAIMING RECEPTIVITY • 193
positive” feminists) since the 1970s have framed sexual relations, including 
relations wherein women submit sexually, complicates things even further. 
My point here is not to claim that there is a proper feminist analysis of femi-
nine receptivity, responsiveness, submission, or masochism; instead, I seek 
to emphasize how these terms have come to have very different valences. I 
also want to illuminate what their very different inflections tell us about our 
cultural obsession with the truth of female desire. In what follows, I interro-
gate this cultural obsession with naturalized gendered sexual power relations, 
especially as it exists alongside a simultaneous refusal to responsibly analyze 
or theorize race, class, gender, and other differences in this domain.
Feminism and BDSM: Social Debates about Sexual Power 
Relations
In addition to considering current trends in popular, clinical, and scientific 
discourses about women’s sexuality and how these might affect women today, 
it is necessary to examine historical debates around female sexuality, plea-
sure, and trauma from within the realms of critical feminist response. Explicit 
enactments of power in sex, particularly as these occur between cis men and 
cis women, have been the subject of much feminist contention. Radical femi-
nism of the 1970s into the 1980s has been broadly associated with the strong 
critique of not only pornography but also of BDSM, and of heterosexual 
intercourse itself.4 The essays published in Against Sadomasochism: A Radi-
cal Feminist Analysis (Linden, 1983) represent the way this critique has largely 
been taken up by those within the “anti-pornography” or “anti-SM” tradition. 
As Hart (1998) identifies, these critiques have tended to rely on “analogical 
thinking” (p. 84) in which BDSM—particularly scenarios in which women are 
dominated by men (or by other women, which devolved into its own fraught 
debate)—is framed as akin to atrocities as diverse as the Holocaust and the 
Jonestown massacre in their duping effects on naïve victims.
 4. Although Bersani (1987) argued that Dworkin and MacKinnon were guilty of framing 
receptivity during penetrative sex (for Bersani, an inherently violent and unrecuperable act, 
which is exactly what gives it the transformative potential for self-shattering) as potentially 
redeemable outside of heteropatriarchy, I instead associate that type of redemption and pasto-
ralism with cultural feminism (discussed in chapter 3), including with models of the “psychol-
ogy of women” developed in the ’70s and ’80s through today. In this reading of Dworkin and 
MacKinnon as actually more proto-queer and exemplary of the “antisocial” or “negative” turn 
in queer theory, I am indebted to Alex Dymock’s excellent essay on this topic (2018) and to the 
work of Anne Cvetkovich (2003). Andrea Long Chu’s (2019) discussions of the “impossibility 
of feminism” here are also invaluable.
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This conservative strand of radical feminism has argued that women being 
sexually dominated (or doing the dominating) is never safe, never consen-
sual, and certainly never feminist. However, a disparate tendency emerged in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s to counter this notion. Some feminists associ-
ated with this “pro-BDSM,” “pro-sex,” or “sex-positive” feminist movement 
have argued that BDSM is actually safer and more consensual than so-called 
vanilla sex because it involves explicitly negotiating power relations, rather 
than assuming that the best or most natural sex does not involve eroticiz-
ing power or sexual hierarchies (and thus ignoring the damaging potential of 
these hierarchies and power relations, particularly under heteropatriarchy). 
This trend also questioned the idea that there can ever be any type of sex that 
does not involve the negotiation of power (Langdridge, 2011). Many writers 
associated with this trend frame BDSM as liberating (for some examples, see 
Califia, 1994; Hollibaugh, 2000; Rubin, 1984), and some argue that it is specifi-
cally a form of liberation from, or that it can provide a way to master or trans-
form, sexual trauma (this notion is found particularly in the work of feminist 
and queer theorists such as Hart and Cvetkovich who have taken up the work 
of author Dorothy Allison on her experience of incest and her subsequent 
emergence into lesbianism and BDSM subcultures).
This notion of mastery over trauma via masochism, self-destruction, or 
self-shattering can be traced through various strains of psychoanalysis and 
critical theory, including in the works of Freud, Battaile, and Deleuze. It can 
also be attributed in its practical, contemporary form (i.e., in BDSM as thera-
peutic practice) to the early formulations of Heinz Kohut, as described more 
recently by Doris Brothers (1997). BDSM is understood by some contempo-
rary practitioners as liberating, and communities have formed around this 
notion, but the limits or uses of BDSM in this vein have also been raised and 
questioned in the works of contemporary critical, poststructuralist, and queer 
theorists (Bersani, 1987; Cvetkovich, 2003; Halberstam, 2011; Hart, 1998), 
who have tended to be less interested in arguing for BDSM’s liberating (or 
oppressive) potential and who have been more interested in how question-
ing the “truth” of BDSM has become a battleground upon which wars over 
sexuality are waged in public discourse—including within the feminist “sex 
wars” of the ’70s and ’80s. Further, some theorists have looked to the political 
economy, social structuring, and biopolitics of BDSM scenes and communi-
ties (Weiss, 2011) thus helping to further remove BDSM from debates over 
“morality.”
Feminist contestations over BDSM have also been compared to other 
debates around embodiment and women’s agency. For instance, Pitts-Taylor 
(2003) documents the pathologization of women’s body modification in many 
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medical and wider cultural discourses, which occurs alongside its celebration 
by many of those in the alternative communities who practice this type of 
self-inscription of their own bodies. Pitts-Taylor (2003) describes how many 
of those who practice body modification see it as a form of self-mastery, a way 
to gain and exhibit control over their own bodies, and notes that some of these 
individuals are the survivors of previous traumatic experiences, including sex-
ual abuse. Questions of bodily ownership, integrity, and control are critically 
raised in relation to these practices, and those who take a Foucauldian or 
poststructuralist feminist stance tend to critique the binary in which women 
are produced as (and reduced to) “dupes of culture” or “rational actors” within 
this framework (Pitts-Taylor, 2007). Instead, these feminists look to the larger 
power structures through which self-inscription and sexual submission are 
discursively framed. In this vein, asexuality studies scholars (Barounis, 2019; 
Kim, 2014; Milks & Cerankowski, 2014) have also challenged these dichoto-
mies by making (compulsory) sexuality itself the object of scrutiny, and rais-
ing questions around power, consent, desire, and embodiment outside of and 
beyond the sexual. I will return to these themes at various points throughout 
the remainder of this chapter, but I go now to the stories participants told me 
about their own sex lives, including how and why desire is lacking (or has 
been lacking at some point) within them, in light of these larger questions 
around receptivity, responsiveness, discordance, dissociation, submission, 
domination, violence, power, and trauma.
Taboo, Trauma, and Trust
The historical relationship between feminism and BDSM—particularly of 
women submitting in these scenarios—is not an easy or comfortable relation-
ship. It has been suggested that the desire to bottom or submit is linked to sex-
ual trauma (at least as one possible avenue)—as a way to regain control over 
not only specific traumatizing experiences but also the daily and more “insidi-
ous traumas” (Cvetkovich, 2003) that women endure against their bodies and 
psyches (including via street harassment, objectification, sexual coercion by 
intimate partners or acquaintances, and “date rape”). Gendered violence runs 
the gamut from these more casual, everyday violations and microaggressions 
(which many women may understand as normal) to more clear and obvious 
forms of sexual violence, including child sexual abuse and “stranger rape.” 
Valdivia describes the everyday, quotidian, almost banal experience of gen-
dered violence, and explains how she experiences this as a perpetual potential 
threat, as a constant nagging at her body and psyche, and as a pervasive ambi-
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ance of insistent inquiry as to whether or not she will give consent—concomi-
tant with a felt disregard for her answer. She frames this foreclosure of consent 
as a deep, constitutive aspect of her own experience of femininity, and some-
thing that she learned and has lived from a very young age:
One of my first sexual experiences was when I was thirteen, my first French 
kiss, it was a super big deal, this intrusion of bodies, there was a tongue 
involved, there was groping involved, and it was sexual, it was definitely 
sexual, even if it wasn’t called that. And I remember that this person didn’t 
ask me.  .  .  . [T]hat’s the thing, consent has only made its way into my life 
very recently . . . and consent is a thing that is so nebulous, it is frightening 
to me how nebulous it is. . . . I can’t find anything sexier than consent at this 
point, but that French kiss began a long career of nonconsent.
In light of Valdivia’s comments, it is also important to note that some survi-
vors of sexual abuse describe providing a service—not only to their abusers, 
but to a society that relies on imagery and narratives of “valid,” “authentic,” 
and “exceptional” sexual abuse in order to excuse everyday, mundane, and 
casual aggressions toward women and others who are feminized.5 As long as 
we have “legitimate” victims of child and sexual abuse, who have suffered at 
the hands of the “authentic” criminals who are pathological and ill, individu-
als who enact violence all the time in more insidious and mundane ways can 
be absolved (and the pervasive phenomenon itself can be absolved). Here, we 
have an affective economy in which one type of violence is authenticated, and 
is thus made to excuse other types. This system—as it promulgates a narrative 
of child sexual abuse and “stranger rape” as idiosyncratic occurrences primar-
ily perpetuated by the pathological, deviant, and “mentally ill”6—simultane-
ously exotifies and fetishizes these more obvious violences, making it appear 
as though they don’t happen every day, all the time, and are actually part of 
the quotidian landscape of many women’s lives (and, importantly, part of a 
spectrum of gendered violence—a spectrum in which instances at one end 
are not necessarily considered violent at all, and, in some cases, are even con-
sidered natural). Fahs (2016) has made a similar argument regarding this 
 5. I use the term women in this chapter, again as it is mainly about participants, who, 
at the time of the interviews, identified as such. However, I am clear on the fact that this 
experience extends well beyond cis and trans women, and that many non-binary, gender- 
nonconforming, genderqueer, and AFAB folks also experience this violence disproportionately. 
Part of my argument here is that this violence is feminized, even if those who experience it do 
not always identify as women or femmes.
 6. It is also important to note the overt ableism demonstrated in assigning the perpetra-
tion of sexual violence specifically to those who are “mentally ill.” 
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hypostatization of sexual and gendered violence, stating: “Categories of rape 
and sex offending obscure the pervasive qualities of perpetration and victim-
hood in the culture at large. . . . [T]he ‘rape victim’ and ‘sex offender’ become 
categories of ‘otherness’—often seen as outside the norm and outside of our-
selves—that blur and erase the many different ways sexual violence disrupts, 
traumatizes, and circulates within women’s lives” (p. 62).
Importantly, much data suggests that gendered and sexualized violence is 
experienced disproportionately by women and femmes of color—and that this 
is particularly true for Black women and femmes (Green, 2017; Human Rights 
Campaign, 2019). Over the last several decades, Black feminist researchers 
have examined the precarity of women of color and of Black women, spe-
cifically, in regard to sexualized microaggressions within longer histories of 
culturally legitimized assault and abuse. According to Collins (1990), Black 
women have not only been disproportionately violated through “physi-
cal assault during slavery, domestic abuse, incest, and sexual coercion,” but 
ongoing “violence against black women tends to be legitimated and therefore 
condoned while the same acts visited on other groups may remain nonle-
gitimated and nonexcusable” (p. 177). In light of the work of Black feminists 
and other feminists of color who write on the racialization of sexual violence 
and carework (described in chapter 4), alongside research on the whiteness 
of sexual difference as it is embedded in colonialist science and early gyne-
cological practices through to today (described in the introduction to this 
book), the experiences described by the low-desiring women of color in the 
present study are especially important to pay close attention to. I highlight 
their accounts below.
Given the widespread normalization of these types of violence, linking 
the experience of sexual trauma to the desire to submit in a BDSM scenario 
(and juxtaposing them, as I do in this chapter) feels extremely taboo. It seems 
possible that this is because the only explanations we have come to imagine 
to be at our disposal for women’s enjoyment of submission are conservatively 
psychoanalytic (which many self-identified feminists shy away from) or are 
reductively biological in nature (which most feminists—hopefully—abhor). 
But if we are able to conceive of a social phenomenology which attends to how 
power relations are lived out and embodied, more than just as gestures, but 
not as monolithic instantiations of a uniquely feminine repetition-compulsion 
(which ends up sounding just as essentializing as neurobiological explana-
tions for women’s hardwired desire to submit), we may be able to make more 
space for individual desire, even as we acknowledge that individuals are part 
of populations that are, at least in part, produced through common experi-
ences of trauma.
198 • CHAPTER 5
For the participants in this study, there is certainly a delicate balance 
between owning the experience of being subjected to power (i.e., being 
sexually dominated) and feeling retraumatized. Most of the women I inter-
viewed—even those who describe being turned on by submission—have 
experienced situations where being dominated has gone awry, and they 
describe their anxiety around getting into a situation where this might hap-
pen again. Other participants reject being dominated by men on principle, 
even if they think it might turn them on, because of their experiences with 
violence at the hands of men in the past. Rose illustrates this notion of a scene 
of sexual domination not being executed with care, and of ultimately feeling 
nonconsensual:
I had one very bad sexual moment with this guy I was dating, sex started to 
get rough, but there was one night when it got really rough, and I just kept 
saying, “Stop it, what are you doing?!” But he just kind of kept going and 
afterward, I was like, “What the . . . ?!” . . . [H]e was kind of choking me a 
little, and I was right at the edge of the bed, so I kind of felt like I was gonna 
fall off the bed, and sometimes he would smack my butt, and sometimes it 
was playful, but it was starting to become painful, not fun, really. . . . [B]ut 
it was more like the choking part, it was like, “He’s like really getting off on 
this, me feeling like I can’t breathe and like I’m going to fall off the bed!” It 
was just weird . . . but the thing is—you never know what men are going to 
do . . . especially if you’ve been with guys who slap or choke you.
Rose had previously expressed how she likes being dominated sexually, so I 
ask her what makes a sexual experience of submission feel safer for her, what 
makes a positive experience different from the one she describes above. She 
explains that feeling like she and her partner are “on the same page” and that 
boundaries have been communicated clearly are crucial aspects of fostering an 
environment in which rough play feels like a turn-on rather than a violation. 
She goes on to describe how a lack of communication tends to breed the cul-
tural misconception that all women “like it rough” and thus that men should 
simply “go for it” when they are having sex with women:
I think he thinks there are women out there who really enjoy that kind of 
thing [nonconsensual rough play], and I guess he thought I was that per-
son.  .  .  . I can totally see someone else [whom he was having sex with] 
thinking, “Oh yeah, I am supposed to like this” and not saying anything . . . 
because no one else is going to say, “Yeah, that’s weird, that’s wrong, it’s dis-
respectful, it probably didn’t turn you on, it probably didn’t feel good!”
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Here, Rose is not talking about rough play, in general, as disrespectful; what 
she describes as disrespectful are the widespread notions that consent and 
intentionality are not necessary. Later, she communicates her belief that part 
of fomenting a healthy and respectful sexual relationship means actually tak-
ing the time to find out what your partner desires, what gives her pleasure, 
what turns her on. This complicated view of domination and submission 
exposes the complexities and vicissitudes of a desire-trauma matrix—this is 
rocky terrain to navigate, and there is clearly not a recipe (psychoanalytic, 
neurobiological, or otherwise) that can explain who will enjoy what kind of 
power play and role within that schema. But, taking the material and cul-
tural situation of women into account (i.e., under racist, ableist, cisheter-
opatriarchy), and considering social variables and the population-producing 
experience of repeated and feminized trauma, are clearly important when 
considering patterns around desire for submission versus domination and the 
ways in which these play out along gendered lines.
Most of the low-desiring women I spoke with had experienced sexual and/
or gendered violence at some point in their lives. Several had experienced 
sexual molestation or abuse at very early ages, but many had not experienced 
childhood sexual abuse (CSA), per se. Almost all of the women I spoke with 
described the larger milieu in which their sexualities had developed as trau-
matizing, however, and they described how heteronormative expectations tied 
to male aggression are often deployed to excuse violence against and harass-
ment of women, and of women’s bodies being violated in a variety of ways in 
everyday life and spaces. Sexual incursions could also happen closer to home, 
and many women described having sex with cis male partners with whom 
they did not feel they had particularly intentional sex lives. This illustrates the 
blurry terrain of consent versus coercion and of intentionality versus haphaz-
ardness within mundane, banal forms of sexual intimacy—a realm that we 
do not generally associate with trauma, unless it results from more “extreme,” 
“exceptional,” and thus identifiable forms of domestic or intimate partner vio-
lence. Regina sums up this sentiment about the murkiness of consent/ coercion 
within intimate relationships when I ask her if any sexual experience hap-
pened to her in her life that she thinks may have contributed to her low desire:
I don’t think so, other than the history of having not wanted to have sex with 
my partner but doing it anyway, on just kind of a daily level . . . and certainly 
“consenting” the entire time, but doing so very reluctantly.
Regina’s statement makes it clear that what happens in the bedroom is not as 
far from what happens in a dark alley as people might like to think, and it also 
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hearkens to the types of insidious trauma described by Cvetkovich (2003) and 
the notion that bad and even traumatizing sex can still be technically consen-
sual. Evie extends this idea to street harassment and other forms of violence 
that women endure in non-intimate spaces:
I think that what happens is because these things are so normalized in our 
culture but not acknowledged—like the attacks, constant hollering [on the 
street, out in the world], the fact that one in three women get raped in their 
lives, these statistics, women are subject to sexual violence whether it is 
physical or emotional in nature—but at the same time our society refuses 
to acknowledge it as a real problem and so it’s not “cool” to talk about being 
a rape victim, like things get really “heavy.” And it is very serious, but it 
becomes this thing where people don’t feel comfortable talking about it in 
everyday life even though it is part of our everyday life. And by not living 
in a society where people feel comfortable talking about it, you kind of have 
to hide it. And since sexuality is already a shameful thing, it gets channeled 
into that, and it becomes a somewhat shameful thing.
Evie’s statement elucidates the insidiousness of sexual violence and resulting 
traumas, which are muted in women’s sex lives and intimate partnerships. She 
also notes that the silence around what happens to women’s bodies becomes 
tethered to the notion that it’s not “cool” to talk about these serious issues, that 
it’s too “heavy,” and that women should “lighten up.” Many participants articu-
lated similar thoughts, and some of them also expressed this notion of voice-
lessness in terms of silence and dissociation during actual sex acts, or with 
regard to speaking about the traumas they have endured over the course of 
their lives. Many women described feeling voiceless not only in cultural rep-
resentations and conversations about violence against women but also in their 
intimate relationships, including while having sex. This theme is expressed by 
Elizabeth, who experienced sexual abuse as a child:
I find it very hard to speak up for myself when it comes to sex.  .  .  . [I]t’s 
harder than fighting with my landlord! I can fight with my landlord like it’s 
nobody’s business, but I don’t feel like—or I feel like I have that option [to 
say “no” to sex] but I have watched myself not take it in sexual situations.
Many other participants expressed similar notions, including Molly, Tif-
fany, Penelope, Evie, Sadie, Taja, Rose, and Jill—to mention only a few. These 
women also associated it with the sentiment Evie expressed about the every-
day cultural silencing of women’s stories about violence, and lamented that 
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women don’t “communicate” enough—with their partners and with each 
other—about their sex lives, including the traumatic aspects. Sadie articulates 
this idea:
I think a lot of women don’t communicate, we are not taught to be up-front 
about that .  .  . [and] that’s when I get these insights about other women’s 
experiences that maybe we are not talking about—it’s like, “Oh man, are we 
all just doing this fucking missionary position shit?!” You know? Has anyone 
ever said, “Hey, it can be different than this!”?
This multifaceted notion of voicelessness is a crucial aspect of sexual dif-
ference socialization. Participants elucidated how women are socialized to 
shut up about sex—including about infractions against their bodies. These 
women’s descriptions of their experiences of sexual violence and trauma—or 
even more mundane, banal descriptions of the obscurity around consent/
coercion that they have experienced in their everyday lives and sexual rela-
tionships—shed much light on why women express the need to feel safe, 
comfortable, and trusting in order to be able to truly “lose themselves” in a 
sexual experience.
For many of the women I spoke with, being dominated was a fantasy pri-
marily because they so rarely felt comfortable or safe enough to play with the 
boundaries of domination/submission (in this light, it makes sense that so 
many of these low-desiring participants were drawn to BDSM!). They spoke 
of the intentionality that was required to make the fantasy work and not 
have the enactment disappoint, nor go too far. In a sense, then, the fantasy is 
actually a fantasy about consent itself—consent is fetishized precisely because 
it is so exceptional. And again, for the women I interviewed, it seems that 
trust engenders consent, rather than vice versa—trust is the foundation upon 
which good sex is enacted, and consent is no longer the key term.7 For exam-
ple, Ava had very clear reservations regarding the limits of her own submis-
sion and the reasons for those limits. When I ask her what she wants from a 
partner who is dominating her, she tells me:
I have this fantasy that—if I am a sub, and this person is really attracted to 
me and really cares about me, then when he is in total power—let’s say I’m 
tied up and I have a blindfold on—then if he really cares about me—even 
 7. As the notion of “consent” is so bogged down with legal and liberal valences, I argue 
that the focus on “trust” that emerged in my data instead offers a helpful corrective. See E. A. 
Owens (2019) for more on the problems with consent as contract, wherein the equal standing 
of “consenting” parties is always a liberal fantasy.
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though I’m totally at his will—he will put my desire above whatever else it is 
that he would want to do to me, whether it’s to penetrate me or choke me or 
pull my hair or whatever it is that someone would want to do to someone all 
tied up and vulnerable—but if I was in a position of complete vulnerability 
and someone just wanted to make me feel good? That’s like the ultimate test 
of whether or not you really care about someone.
What Ava describes here is a performance of trust and safety. If someone is 
in a position of total power, total control, and they still want to please her, 
and do what she wants them to do, then for Ava, that is the ultimate enact-
ment of trust and respect, and, potentially, an enactment of a certain kind 
of (not necessarily romantic) love. It is certainly a form of care. Many of the 
women I spoke with described similarly wanting the dominant partner (for 
most of the participants in these interviews, a cis man) to know what they 
(the sub) want and to follow those intuited guidelines during the encounter. 
They explained that it would obviously defy the whole purpose of the BDSM 
scenario if they—the submissive partner—told the dominant partner exactly 
what they wanted him to do; for these women, there is something very real 
about wanting the dominant partner to perceive what they want in terms of 
domination, and to be able to trust that person to not overstep their boundar-
ies, but instead, to push them in just the right ways. Submission here is bound 
up with a paradoxical sense of being in control. Ava goes on to describe a sit-
uation in which BDSM play did go too far. Like Rose, she enjoys submitting 
sexually, but she only feels comfortable realizing that fantasy when the rela-
tionship is established as safe, consensual, and intentional, and with a partner 
who is trustworthy. She describes a relationship where that was not the case:
In [a past] relationship, he knew that I wanted him to dominate me, but 
sometimes he was too rough. . . . [S]o instead of feeling like I could trust him 
and have a positive rough sex experience, I would feel even more objectified 
and more crappy. So that was a case of him indulging in what I wanted but 
not doing it right. . . . I’ve wanted to be blindfolded and tied up and it’s not 
that a person wouldn’t do that for me, it’s that I’ve never been with some-
one I trusted enough to share that with. . . . I often find myself not sharing 
fantasies that I feel like have a high potential of not being carried out in the 
right way.
Molly, a childhood sexual abuse survivor, is involved in a long-term BDSM 
relationship with a sexual partner she trusts completely. Importantly, this 
partner is not someone with whom she is involved in a traditional, monoga-
mous, or domestic relationship—but she also does not describe their relation-
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ship as “purely sexual.” She shares similar thoughts to Ava on the requirement 
of safety and the power/control of submission:
The responsibility of the dom I see is fulfilling the sub’s desires, [it’s about] 
making them feel comfortable, making them feel good about relinquishing 
control, because if they don’t, then it doesn’t work. . . . [W]hen I am the sub 
I can just be relaxed about it, and trust that he is going to run the whole 
show. . . . I feel a very strong connection to him, and we are very intimate, 
but just in a different way, I guess. I trust him completely, which allows us 
to do things that I cannot do with other people, and one of the things that 
I like about it—having so many issues with sex—is that when I’m with him, 
because he’s in charge, I don’t have to think about things, I don’t have to get 
caught up in my head and worry about stuff. . . . [W]hen I’m with other guys 
I’m always trying to make them happy; with him I don’t have to do that.
Molly describes how her intimate BDSM relationship provides her with more 
safety and security than relationships with men she tries to date and have sex 
with in a more “conventional” manner. Although her relationship to the insti-
tutionalization of submission is not representative of most of the other women 
I spoke with (she is involved with a defined BDSM subculture, whereas most 
participants were not), her particular example sheds much light on the rela-
tionships among trust, safety, comfort, intentionality, and sexual submission. 
Interestingly, and importantly, her experience of the pleasure of submission 
with her trusted dom is something that is often lacking in her more traditional 
heterosexual relationships, where power is at play, and is often gendered, but 
is less likely to be formally negotiated or even discussed at all.
In a world in which trauma and violence are so often sexualized and 
feminized, there is something clearly comforting about taking control of that 
power imbalance in an intentional way. Evie describes it as cathartic:
Being submissive is entrusting someone to do things to you that you 
wouldn’t let anybody else do. . . . [S]o I’m dominating in the sense that I like 
to submit the way that I like to submit.  .  .  . [I]t’s like playing with societal 
norms and things you experience in everyday life on your terms. You don’t 
have any control over the dudes that holler at you, grab you, hurt you, any 
of that stuff, but you have control over the person who you feel comfortable 
with doing that stuff to you. I feel like it can be somewhat cathartic.
Evie raises the question of what it is that actually feels good about submis-
sion. She describes submission as a form of control, and thus encapsulates 
a sentiment that many of the women I spoke with shared. For these women, 
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controlling what might feel in a certain moment like your own destruction 
can be cathartic, it can be sexy. Participants’ descriptions of catharsis through 
submission on their own terms is reminiscent of psychoanalytic theorizing 
that suggests that engaging in BDSM, particularly submission, can enact a 
“rescripting” of a trauma scenario (Brothers, 1997)—but I do not want to 
reduce my participants’ experiences to this type of psychoanalytic theori-
zation. What I want to focus on instead is the crucial fact that so many of 
the low-desiring women I interviewed shared this view of catharsis emerg-
ing from trauma, and consider how this experience might be evidence not of 
something constituted through Oedipal desire, but rather as imbricated with 
a social and sexual landscape in which femininity itself is conceived as trau-
matic—a point that Benjamin (1988) and Hart (1998) have alluded to. I also 
want to consider this landscape as productive of affective experiences, and as 
productive of traumatized populations, as femininity here is the product not 
only of dyadic interpersonal traumas but also of violent discursive configura-
tions, mass social enactments, and pervasive shared emotional orientations 
(often, but not exclusively, among women and femmes)—what Cvetkovich 
(2003) might call traumatic “public cultures” drawn together through specific 
“collective sentiments” (Berlant, 2008) or “structures of feeling” (Williams, 
1977).
Many of the other participants I spoke with discussed the notion of cathar-
sis being experienced through truly consensual and safe sexual experiences. 
Sadie describes how an enactment of something that feels so taboo, a relin-
quishing of control in submission, is linked to what is most sexually stimulat-
ing for her, and frames it in terms of passion:
What it seems like is an uninhibited safety in being with somebody, an unin-
hibited experience of oneself.  .  .  . [I]t’s very much about self and other for 
me. . . . [I]t is a sense of kind of dissolving those structures . . . that exoskel-
eton that is built up. . . . [W]hen I have experienced moments of passion with 
people, it is a dissolution of those boundaries, a safety to be vulnerable, and 
like an indulgence that I haven’t had much of.
For Sadie, it seems like the conditions that allow for consent are so unusual 
that to experience them is to experience literal passion. In other words, the 
circumstances that structure consent also structure a form of passion—the 
ability to fully let go. Her description of what it feels like to relinquish control, 
and the vulnerability of her “exoskeleton,” sounds like a page out of Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle—and also resonates deeply with Cvetkovich’s 
(2003) discussion of the power and agency of femme receptivity alongside 
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butch untouchability (and the intersubjective exchange of power that this 
framing calls up, in line with Benjamin [1988]). Sadie’s desire to be vulnerable 
and cross boundaries also troubles the delineation of femme receptivity and 
butch untouchability, however, as it speaks to elements of both, and also to a 
type of passion that is borne out of or alongside trauma.
Taja expresses similar sentiments around the relinquishing of control, 
the crossing of boundaries, and why these things are so enticing, yet also 
so frightening. I ask her how these ideas have informed her feelings about 
BDSM, specifically:
A lot of my fantasies revolve around ideas of ownership, [but] I would have 
to think somebody is really wonderful in order for that to be an okay set of 
circumstances, that I would give somebody that kind of agency over me. . . . 
[O]nce I am really comfortable with somebody, I will be very submissive. I 
love the idea of someone sort of using me, being selfish with me, in fantasy. 
I never really like it in reality, which is interesting. I love the idea of giving 
to somebody and being generous in that way . . . of using me for their own 
pleasure in some way, whatever that might be . . . or feeling like it is too good 
to miss, or it is too good to wait, that they can’t help themselves.
Sam extends these ideas about the pleasures of vulnerability and being taken 
care of, explaining how the desire to relinquish control to someone she trusts 
has almost become a requirement for her own sexual excitement:
I want somebody to be there to carry part of it for me, to take part of it 
from me, to force me to relinquish it from time to time. And that is in every 
facet of my life. I want someone who is like, “I will go buy groceries, I will 
make dinner, I will clean, I will wash your hair for you, I will pin you against 
the wall”—I am such a control freak that having control taken from me is 
important to me, I desire that, I want it.
Sadie’s, Taja’s, and Sam’s comments all speak to the truism that all bottoms are 
power bottoms. Lola shares a similar sentiment about the origins of her desire 
to be dominated:
Part of me thinks it’s just because it’s the opposite of what I’m doing in 
life. . . . I feel like sex is that place where like you wanna really just kick back 
and explore other sides of yourself that you don’t normally do. . . . [I]n the 
real world, under no circumstances do I let anyone dominate me. It’s like a 
thing that I cannot allow. So it’s like I’m so adamantly against that, so maybe 
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sexually I just want the opposite, just to like balance it . . . because sometimes 
you just want to not always be in control.
The women I spoke with had very complex views on the place of power in 
sex, and nuanced thoughts on the kind of roles they like to play, with whom, 
and why. It is important to note that particularly women who identified as 
subs or who were more interested in submitting than dominating sexually 
were very thoughtful regarding the limits of the role-playing scene and what 
kinds of boundaries were being crossed. Power/play in BDSM is not some-
thing they take lightly, and most of the women I talked to were very clear 
on the fraught nature of their own enjoyment during submission. They were 
aware of the role of previous traumas, and of the violation of women’s bod-
ies as a cultural trope and as a material reality, and they actively took this 
into account when acting on their own desires and fantasies. Ultimately, they 
placed utmost importance on negotiation, intentionality, trust, and safety 
during any sexual encounter.
Submission without Coercion: Low-Desiring Women on 
Enhancing Sexual Enjoyment
Most of the women I interviewed had experienced fulfilling sex at some point 
in their lives, even if they identified as low-desiring and were currently not 
having a lot of sex—or at least not a lot of fulfilling sex. When I asked these 
women what gives them pleasure, what does fulfill them, and what their part-
ners could do to help increase their desire, they had plenty of answers (and 
suggestions). Many of these pleasures centered on issues of time, labor, effort, 
and play. The women I interviewed also stated that there are many nonsexual 
things in their lives that give them great pleasure.
Time, Labor, Presence
Many of the women I spoke with discussed how timing or tempo affects their 
sexual experiences, and described wanting partners to “slow down.” When I 
ask Sadie what gives her the most pleasure sexually, she tells me:
I have discovered that I much prefer slower tempos, so I will have to take 
control, and communicate physically that I am taking control at that time, 
and slow it down. Because there is something about that for me that totally 
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changes the situation, and that will arouse me far more than just the act of 
“doing this thing.” I feel like it shifts more from this sexual technical thing 
to the sensual enjoyment of what is going on. I discovered that was really 
exciting to me . . . with men specifically . . . when I had been so bored with 
guys. I think the root of that is just being able to play around with somebody.
In this statement, Sadie links “slowing it down” with both increased sensual-
ity and a feeling of being in control—which is something that clearly turns 
her on a lot. This is an interesting contrast to the way mindfulness is typi-
cally deployed within the popular rhetorics of mindfulness-based sex therapy, 
which rarely seem to connect mindfulness in sex to power. What Sadie seems 
to enjoy, just as much as the slowing down itself, is that she gets to enact a 
form of control in leading the sexual exchange and changing the tempo. Taja 
expands on this notion, and emphasizes the importance of reciprocity in this 
regard, raising the specter of not only play but work: “In terms of my partner, 
it’s about pace, patience, and willingness to put in the time.” When I ask her 
if she can describe a time when she was really turned on, she tells me about 
a lover she had a few years back and describes an encounter in which tempo 
really mattered, and also suggests aspects of both labor and play. She and her 
partner went to the beach together, and he put in a lot of work over a long 
period of time to build the ambiance and set the tone:
I remember thinking, “This is the best thing that has ever happened!” .  .  . 
[W]e could hear the waves, perfect temperature, just warm from the shower, 
after having this intimate experience with this person in the ocean . . . and 
so I was just really into it, really excited about his existence in that moment, 
and the fact that I was there with him. . . . [T]here had been this slow build, 
for a good two hours.  .  .  . [I]t makes a difference! Like extended foreplay 
across different locations.
Valdivia also mentions the importance of ambiance and time, explaining that 
she enjoys sex with women and genderqueer, gender-nonconforming, and 
nonbinary individuals more than with cis men, generally, because these folks 
have been more willing to extend the experience, devoting a lot of time to it, 
whereas the cis men she has dated were more concerned with “getting to the 
finish line”:
And then when I started dating queer people, I definitely understood, I was 
like, “Oh my god! It’s possible! Maybe it took this person to give me head 
for an hour [to make me come]”—which is the kind of time no man has 
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ever given me. And that can go on the record: No man has ever given me 
that kind of time.
Here, Valdivia reiterates the importance of allowing pleasure to build, over 
time, and emphasizes the importance of mutual reciprocity and shared labor 
in a sexual exchange. Her statement also hearkens back to the theme of sexual 
carework (discussed in chapter 4)—the notion that women are socialized to 
provide sexual, emotional, and relational care to men, as a form of release, 
who are generally not expected to provide the same sort of sexual care to 
women. This is not to say that there are not gendered sexual expectations for 
men; it is to say—as many of these women do—that expectations for men and 
women, in terms of this work, are different. According to these participants, 
instead of providing sexual care, men are expected to perform sexually, which 
often paradoxically indicates a rushed, (anti)climactic goal orientation toward 
any given sexual experience. Rose exemplifies this perspective:
Slowing it down would take some of the pressure off that final moment, too, 
that like, “We have to get there!” Instead it could be like, “Well, we will get 
there when we get there.” .  .  . I think men think actual penetration should 
take a while because that is what gets women off, even though it’s not actu-
ally what gets women off.
The practitioners I spoke with also shared thoughts on altering the tempo of a 
sexual experience. Celeste, a tantric/yogic healer who works specifically with 
women, states that women essentially require a slower sexual pace, and she 
links this again (as described in chapter 4) to the notion of feminine receptiv-
ity as responsibility:
When I talk about this [feminine receptive responsibility] in my training, 
I remind them of the old Pointer Sisters song “I Want a Man with a Slow 
Hand”—that whole thing of “slow down,” that’s the second chakra, the sec-
ond chakra is “slow down,” you can feel the wind on your skin, you can taste 
the cool water going inside of you, so you can feel your cells rejoicing when 
the water comes into your body.
In this quote, Celeste essentializes the notion of “slowing down,” conceptual-
izing it as part of a natural female association with the second chakra and with 
feminine receptivity. In other passages, she also extends the issue beyond the 
practices of sex—she discusses the need for women to “slow down” and “enjoy 
life” as essential for maintaining their overall health, the health of their part-
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ners, the health of their relationships, the health of the planet, and the fitness 
of society and the broader populace, all as an extension of feminized social 
reproduction. This essentializing discourse conflicts with the narratives of 
most of the women I interviewed, who did not make any naturalizing claims 
about their desire to “slow it down” during sex. Here, there is an interesting 
contrast between Celeste’s comments and those of the women I interviewed—
there is a similarity at the level of technique, but “slowing down” signifies 
differently in the two framings. Importantly, participants’ vision is more rela-
tional. Most of the women I interviewed spoke in terms of the socialization 
that men receive, which teaches them to drive toward the goal of orgasm—
their own, and in some cases, their partners’. Rose exemplifies this perspective, 
in her comment above, and she blames men’s erroneous assumptions about 
what “gets women off ” on the fact that they watch too much (heteronorma-
tive) porn. It is illustrative to compare these women’s narratives of tempo, 
speed, and labor (which pertain to the sexual experience itself, and which 
men and women have been socialized to play specific roles within) to practi-
tioners’ (both traditional clinicians’ and alternative healers’) views, which tend 
to naturalize feminine receptivity and are more likely to essentialize women’s 
desire for “slowness” when it comes to sex. It is imperative to note that it is not 
only practitioners within the medical realm who reductively focus on “being 
in the present” (through techniques like mindfulness-based sex therapy) as 
the primary way to experience one’s sexuality more fully and enhance sex-
ual pleasure.8 Celeste also frames being mindful as an apolitical tool of sen-
sual enhancement used in tantric meditational exploration, simultaneously 
admonishing BDSM, fantasy, negotiations of power, and role-playing:
To be lost in the present moment without the need for any—the deepest 
teachings of Tantra and Taoism, the deepest most advanced teachings, sug-
gest no fantasy. It suggests staying deeply rooted in the present moment, 
in what’s happening right here, right now. That ultimately that is the most 
potent form of sexual pleasure. That’s when I go to the highest heights, is 
when I’m just lost in the present moment, and I could no more begin to have 
a fantasy, I couldn’t even conceptualize a fantasy, I’m so in the flow of what’s 
happening in my cells. . . . [T]hat’s the real ecstasy, when you get to that.
In this very interesting passage, Celeste takes up the notion of “being in the 
present” in a way that resonates with the mindfulness discourse I have ana-
 8. Mindfulness, as it taken up in Western medicine, including in MBST, is increasingly 
the bridge between these two previously separate groups (traditional medical practitioners and 
alternative or holistic healers).
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lyzed in previous chapters—in which power relations, either explicitly or 
implicitly, tend to be disavowed in the name of staying in the moment, non-
judgmentally—a notion that sounds too much at times like either “bypass-
ing” trauma (in the sense in which Helen Singer Kaplan originally described 
it) or as disregarding the reality—and potential sexiness—of power relations. 
This framing does not link up with the way these participants described slow-
ing down and being in the moment, which can manifest as a form of control 
and play, and is not a disavowal of power, fantasy, or (even taboo) desire. 
Although some participants did describe “being in the present” in ways that 
are consistent with mindfulness discourse, for most, being “in the present” or 
“in the moment” and “slowing down” were mainly about manifesting a feel-
ing of communion with a partner, a sense of strong compatibility, a tangible 
chemistry—or even a sense of control. When one is with a trusted partner 
and the relationship is founded upon negotiation, clear communication, and 
intentionality, mindfulness can clearly be a tool for sexual enhancement. But, 
as I have argued throughout this book, a depoliticizing of the technique, or its 
uncritical removal from the larger context of a woman’s sexual relationships, 
background, and history, can pose problems for women—specifically those 
with histories of trauma. My participants’ stories illuminate how mindfulness 
cannot be posited as an antidote to the larger institutionalized and relational 
power structures and constraints within which women’s sex lives fundamen-
tally take shape. Molly, for instance, explains how she derives the most plea-
sure from sex when she is acting out BDSM role-playing scenarios, and how 
she finds the act of submission itself meditative:
When I am in the dom/sub relationship [subbing with her long-term dom], 
it’s almost like I am so physically involved that my mind does not wander, it’s 
almost like a weird meditative thing. I don’t think about other stuff, I don’t 
do a laundry list in my head, or wonder what’s on TV, or watch the clock.
Molly provides a powerful example here of how incorporating BDSM, submis-
sion, and fantasy into her sex life is a mindful act, how submission is medita-
tive for her, and how participating in sex in which she is mindfully submissive 
and in which power relations are clearly articulated allows her to feel more 
present than most other forms of sex with partners where power relations 
are not as clearly negotiated or intentional. In what may seem like a paradox, 
Molly is more likely to “check out” or dissociate during sex when the experi-
ence is uncritically assumed to be about being “in the moment” and simply 
feeling the sensuality of the present. Through Molly’s example, we see how 
BDSM and mindfulness are not mutually exclusive—they need not be posed 
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as binary when it comes to sex, with power, role-playing, and fantasy on one 
side of the polarity, and mindfulness, meditation, and sensually “being in the 
present” on the other (as they are framed in Celeste’s description of the nega-
tion of fantasy in the most “ecstatic” sex). There has been some attention to 
the meditative state induced by BDSM in media accounts recently (LaMor-
gese, 2016), but mainstream sex therapy discourse rarely mentions how sub-
mission and BDSM might be meditative or mindful practices.9 Many of my 
participants’ traumatic sexual experiences also bring the depoliticizing and 
detheorizing of “meditating the (sexual) pain away” into sharp relief; their 
very different stories about the uses of mindfulness, meditation, BDSM, and 
fantasy make it clear that none of these techniques are simply apolitical tools 
for sexual enhancement, and instead ought to be theorized and thoughtfully 
considered from a perspective that takes white supremacist heteropatriarchal 
power relations and women’s traumatic sexual histories into account (Gentile, 
2017a, 2017b).
Performing Femininity, Camp, and Switching
How dominance, control, and “switchiness” could feel sexy were common 
themes among the women I interviewed. Often women spoke of the power of 
“performing femininity” on their own terms. But the freedom to play with dif-
ferent gendered roles, to inhabit both “masculine” and “feminine” orientations 
to sex, and to go back and forth between dominating and submitting, were 
also considered important turn-ons by many of the women I spoke with. Ava 
describes the pleasure she derives from inhabiting and embodying femininity: 
“A lot of the way that I express my sexuality is through clothing and makeup 
and having a really feminine appearance.” Evie extends this notion, but theo-
rizes it in terms of “camp” and actively playing with gender roles:
It’s like almost satirical. . . . [T]here is something kind of sexy about putting 
on an apron and like making food for your partner—it’s like being aware of 
those gender roles and having it be something that is super normative, but 
 9. Recently, some clinical and experimental sex researchers have begun to explore the 
connection between mindfulness and BDSM. Brotto, for instance, has coauthored a few stud-
ies of clinical considerations regarding BDSM practitioners (see Dunkley & Brotto, 2018, 
2019; Dunkley, Henshaw, Henshaw, & Brotto, 2020); I am excited and hopeful about this new 
line of research and hope to see Brotto and other sex researchers and therapists who have 
focused on mindfulness further explore the meditative components of BDSM, in addition to 
exploring the connections between trauma and low desire, more broadly (see O’Loughlin & 
Brotto, 2020).
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not something super normative in my life. And so kind of playing into those 
roles is fun, it’s like playing with gender in a way that’s been prescribed to 
me my whole life but something I’ve never adhered to.
Taja describes a similar enjoyment with playing into prescribed gender roles, 
and expands on the notion of “camp” or “drag”:
I am from the South, my mother is from the South, there was a lot of cul-
tural conditioning around feminine behavior, that included things like Girl 
Scouts, and majorettes, cheerleading, ballet, tap, jazz, horseback riding, you 
name it, the traditional schooling that you would give to a girl.  .  .  . [A]nd 
I lived for all of that, I loved all of that, and wouldn’t even wear pants until 
second grade! I was super girly about all of it. . . . [A]nd so I think there is 
still for me this sort of mystique to this uber-femininity, that I would love 
to inhabit. . . . [I]t’s not necessarily what you see in an advertisement or in a 
movie, it’s camp, it’s drag. . . . I love that shit, love it! Let’s inhabit something 
that is not even us at this point . . . we are playing something else. . . . [I]t’s 
like getting closer to that [feminine] space sexually somehow, that is satisfy-
ing to me.
Taja and Evie sum up how expressing, performing, and playing with feminin-
ity can be fun and feel powerful, but they also elucidate how it is only in the 
context of performativity (as this concept is described in the quintessential 
queer theory texts of the 1990s, including in the work of Judith Butler, e.g., 
Gender Trouble [1990]) and a playful nostalgia that they tend to feel comfort-
able doing this—and only with partners whom they know are also “playing 
along.” Valdivia expresses how playing with these roles might involve explic-
itly blurring gender boundaries within a specific sex act as well, and describes 
how she plays with gender and activity/receptivity by wearing a strap-on dildo 
and penetrating her masculine-of-center non-binary partner:
I think that’s part of the sexy thing, it’s like, “Oh my God, here is this femme 
wearing a strap-on dick!” . . . That might be above some people’s heads. I am 
a femme with a dick! And it’s great! I am so proud! It’s really empowering!
Sadie also describes how she has always felt constrained by “rules” about 
the femininity that was expected of her, and that it wasn’t until she started 
experimenting with these and trying out different orientations during sexual 
encounters that she felt freed from these constraints:
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Like an exaggerated femininity, I could put on that role, which I do like, and 
being totally submissive, I found out that I like that . . . [but then I can also 
do] that super masculine, very confident thing. I was like, “Oh, I can wear 
both hats, I can play with both things, and I don’t have to choose one,” and I 
think that was hanging me up for a really long time . . . because I like aspects 
of both, and both sides of me are totally legitimate.
Zola discusses how she enjoys playing a submissive role with women, but ulti-
mately identifies as a “switch,” as she feels more empowered dominating the 
men she is sexually involved with:
I prefer to be submissive to women, I don’t want to be submissive to men, 
because of a past relationship [in which she was violated]. But I do like 
to dominate men. . .  . I have a [cis male] friend who plays with me. And 
we don’t have intercourse at all. He has given me oral sex once but other 
than that one time, we don’t have any type of penetrative sex, there are 
no fingers, no penis, it’s just like rough play, like borderline S&M, and we 
just kind of kiss and touch and play, and this is the first sexual relation-
ship I have been involved with like that. But it has been bringing me more 
gratification and satisfaction sexually than actual intercourse sometimes 
will. . . . I’m in control of it. I am dominant in it. . . . [W]e kind of switch 
off, but it is mostly me. . . . [H]e is very attentive and intuitive to how my 
body feels.
Tiffany echoes a similar sentiment about the pleasures of switchiness:
I’m still figuring all this stuff out, this is all very, very new to me. I think 
realistically I just need someone who I can share that with [sexual explora-
tion, including BDSM], and who will help me figure that out for myself, as 
well as [allowing me to help] figure that out for them. But I definitely think 
that I am a switch, I am both, I definitely like being dominant, I like to play 
that role, but I also enjoy, I’m sure I would enjoy being a submissive, serving 
someone and pleasing them in that way.
For some women, the ability to switch back and forth among different roles, 
including between “passive” and “active” roles, and between “masculine” and 
“feminine” roles within sexual acts, in addition to other forms of playfulness, 
is what makes a sexual encounter stimulating. This sense of play and the free-
dom to switch roles was just as important as the need to “slow down” and “be 
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in the present”—and for many women, they seem to go hand in hand. Molly’s 
comments in the previous section about submission as meditative again make 
it clear why these two orientations are not mutually exclusive.
Queerness, Enthusiastic Consent, and Rejecting 
Heteronormative Scripts for Sexual Pleasure
Although many of the women I spoke with identify as straight, most were 
very interested in exploring non-normative configurations of pleasure and 
intimacy, as they explicate above (this is also true for those who identify as 
queer). Part of this involved rejecting heteronormative scripts for sexual plea-
sure, a theme also identified by Cacchioni (2015), which Zola describes:
I went to a play party late last year, and it was the first play party I’d ever 
been to, and I had a really good time not having sex; it was some of the best 
sex I’ve had without having intercourse or penetrative sex. . . . [T]here was 
a lot of touching, somebody gave me a massage, and I gave somebody else a 
really sensual massage, [and] at one point I had somebody spank me with a 
paddle, while her girlfriend was kissing me, and just that—it was probably 
fifteen minutes long—but it was some of the most amazing fifteen minutes 
of my whole life!
Here we have another example of how temporality affects participants’ expe-
riences of sex. Zola’s comments make the limitations of the cisheteronorma-
tive cultural imperative to equate sex with penile-vaginal intercourse (Gavey, 
2011; Kaye, 2011; Loe, 2004; Mamo & Fishman, 2001) explicit. When I ask 
her what kind of sex is most desirable to her, or what it is that turns her on 
about going outside of or beyond the boundaries of “normal” sexual activity, 
Zola states:
When you have “alternative” sex, there is a lot of respect and negotiation 
that goes into that, and that adds to my ability to really appreciate it and feel 
satisfied by it because everyone that is involved in whatever scenario makes 
sure that everyone is getting what they want, that doesn’t hurt anybody, 
doesn’t offend you, doesn’t make you feel used or worthless. . . . [I]t’s kind of 
empowering to be able to have that.
Evie extends this notion:
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In order for me to want to have sex with somebody, I have to feel comfort-
able. . . . I have had intense sex and I’m interested in being more explorative 
with it, with bondage, S&M, that type of stuff, I’m not interested in haphaz-
ardly shoving a penis in my vagina. I’d like to be with someone who knows 
what they are doing, who is interested in not having heteronormative sex. . . . 
I’m more like, “Well, let’s get to know each other, let’s see if our sex lives 
would work together, and let’s see if you’re interesting, experimental .  .  .” I 
want to have it be a little bit more thoughtful and intentional.
Both Zola and Evie are clear about what turns them on, and explain that they 
are interested in going beyond the constraints of the hegemonic (i.e., heter-
onormative, linear, penetrative) sexual protocol that they have been cultur-
ally prescribed and socialized to expect over the course of their lives. Valdivia 
extends this explicitly to the notion of enthusiastic consent: “When somebody 
is like, ‘Can I do this thing to you?’ and you are like, ‘You want to do what? 
Okay, cool. That’s cool, I’m glad we established that!’”
Some women spoke of this in terms of advocating for oneself, of being 
“proactive”—specifically in the face of heteronormative constraints and rigid 
sexual prescriptions, including, paradoxically, for feminine flexibility and 
fluidity (Fischer, 2013; Rupp, Taylor, Regev-Messalem, Fogarty, & England, 
2014; Valocchi, 2005; Wade, 2017). Sadie illustrates this point, returning to the 
notion of feeling “voiceless” during sexual encounters, and describes how she 
has attempted to combat this:
I felt very inactive and submissive with a lot of guys I’ve been with, and really 
voiceless, like I was just kind of doing what the formula is, and that is the 
most disturbing part of the part of me that is like heterosexual, that I have to 
play by these hetero rules, because it is scripted, it is visible, we see it every-
where, it is the formula, it is the pattern—it is just so ridiculously formulaic! 
What I like about exploring things with girls is that there is so much less vis-
ibility, there’s so much more new terrain, there’s more spontaneity, freedom, 
whereas I feel more constricted with men.
Sadie’s comments illustrate how she feels voiceless not only because of the 
formulaic nature of the heteronormative sex she has had over the course of 
her life but also because there has literally been very little communication 
between her and her partners. Many of the women I spoke with expressed 
similar concerns about a lack of communication, and said that some of the 
best sex they had happened after desires had been clearly communicated by 
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both partners, and when they felt truly “on the same page” with and respected 
by a partner because of the communication that had occurred.
Kelly’s and Astrid’s experiences, after being involved in a treatment pro-
gram for women who experience low desire and pain during intercourse, also 
emphasize these points about proactivity, intentionality, communication, and 
enthusiasm. When I ask Kelly how her sex life has been since completing 
treatment in the program (which she deemed unsuccessful), she describes 
having developed a more intentional orientation toward the process of choos-
ing her sexual and romantic partners, which has dramatically increased her 
sexual desire and experience of pleasure:
I saw a [psycho]therapist [after treatment in the program] to talk about rela-
tionships in general, and she encouraged me to be much more ruthless with 
who I date, to be more picky about the people who I choose to be in rela-
tionships with. . . . [B]eing more conscious of who I’m choosing to have sex 
with [helps]. . . . [T]here are still times when it hurts, but there are a lot of 
ways to get creative with sex! As long as people are open to it . . . and even 
just waiting, if I’m going to have intercourse, not just going ahead and doing 
it, but being with men who prefer to actually make you aroused and want to 
have sex first—which not all of them do!
Astrid’s experience post-treatment is even more striking. She did not complete 
the treatment program and also deemed it as a failure, because she realized 
that the type of sex she was having with the partner she was with during that 
time was what was actually not working for her; she no longer identifies as 
having low desire because she now has a fulfilling sex life and plays the sexual 
roles she wants to and uses her body the way she wants to during sex. Regard-
ing her new orientation to sex, Astrid tells me:
I guess like in a queer understanding of sex, sex can mean a lot of different 
things and in the sex that I have today, this “disorder” is no disorder at all, 
it doesn’t get in the way of my sex. . . . [L]ooking back, I thought that I was 
supposed to have sex in a specific way and I tried to do that and it never 
felt right, it always felt invasive, it always felt like I was giving in to what 
was expected of me, never what I really desired or wanted.  .  .  . [A]nd the 
more that I acknowledged that I was not straight, the more that this “disor-
der” became a nonissue. The more that I started having queer sex, sex with 
women, the more that I realized I was completely sexually functional, that I 
could have all kinds of sex and that I could do all kinds of things, and that I 
didn’t in fact have any impediments to my sexual expression, that there are 
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certain things that my body doesn’t like, and certain kinds of touch that don’t 
feel good and that that was fine, and that that was never a problem to com-
municate to queer partners. .  .  . [N]ow I only have negotiated, consensual, 
enthusiastic, good-feeling sex. . . . [I]t’s just not an issue anymore.
Astrid’s story makes particularly clear the importance of being able to set the 
terms of any given sexual encounter, to reject heteronormative scripts for 
sexual pleasure when they feel coercive, and to only engage in intentional, 
negotiated sexual experiences that she feels enthusiastic about. Although 
her interaction with medical discourses that pathologized her low desire (or, 
rather, lack of heteronormative desire) was unique among the stories of the 
women I interviewed, she brings home the crucial notion of sexual intention-
ality—something that most of the low-desiring women I interviewed felt was 
important, and that had been missing from their sex lives. Her comment also 
lays bare the myriad problems with the broad feminized responsive desire 
framework—including the FSIAD diagnosis, the circular sexual response 
cycle, plethysmographic research that emphasizes female genital/subjective 
discordance, and associated behavior-based treatments and therapeutic pro-
tocols (including not only MBST but also other protocols from the realms 
of alternative or holistic care that emphasize mindfulness/meditation as an 
apolitical sexual enhancement tool and that admonish fantasy). We see here 
how both contemporary medical and alternative approaches to treatment for 
low female desire fall short, precisely because they assume a cis female subject 
who experiences herself as reductively feminine, who desires a specific type 
of masculine partner, who has never been traumatized (or who has or can be 
healed from that trauma), and who simply needs to bridge the gap between 
her “subjective” and “objective” arousal—or rather who needs to deal with her 
naturalized feminine discordant/dissociative tendencies in order to enhance 
her own sexual pleasure. For most of the low-desiring women I interviewed, 
this model of female sexuality is, at the very least, constraining and restrictive, 
and in some cases, it is harmful and violent.
Reclaiming Receptivity, Subverting Submission
Through medical and scientific discourses and popular representations, 
women are consistently depicted as essentially receptive or responsive, and 
their sexuality is framed as more complex, complicated, fluid, and flexible, 
often in neurobiological terms. Concomitantly, their presumed desire for 
submission is often posited as an evolutionary predisposition, or it is not 
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theorized at all. This is an unfortunate side effect of the dismantling and jet-
tisoning of psychoanalytic theory from modern-day psychiatry and psychol-
ogy, wherein trauma and desire—and especially the relationship between the 
two—are pushed out of the contemporary mainstream (including the main-
stream white liberal feminist) clinical milieu. Current scientific discourses 
and medical treatments that address low desire in women both rely on and 
simultaneously negate women’s trauma. Further, feminine dissociation is 
essentialized via its uncanny resemblance to female subjective/genital dis-
cordance, while the social and traumatizing factors that influence these phe-
nomena are not analyzed or theorized. Through these discourses, feminine 
receptivity is naturalized and even romanticized, whereas the desire for sub-
mission is more often dismissed or pathologized. My findings flip this fram-
ing on its head.
My research suggests that subbing in BDSM may be experienced as more 
agentic than utilizing mindfulness protocols in sex therapy. Myriad feminist 
researchers since the “sex-positive turn” have suggested that the explicitness 
of power dynamics in BDSM offers a space where women can actually experi-
ence safety and agency and work through trauma, and they can do all of those 
things because the erotics of power are in plain sight. Conversely, the recep-
tivity protocol of the feminized responsive desire framework functions as a 
new way to hide power relations in sexual life and particularly in cis hetero-
sex. BDSM offers a much different kind of outlet, so, just like dissociation is 
an uncanny twin of discordance, submission is an uncanny twin of receptiv-
ity. Receptivity here might be recoded as submission, and mindfulness as a 
sub state. I argue that this framing is actually much more helpful, as submis-
sion here is made explicit and visible, rather than remaining hidden behind 
medicalized hypotheses about innate feminine receptivity.
Part of my project here has been to examine why and how sexual trauma, 
gendered violence, and differences in masculine and feminine socialization 
are consistently neglected in sexological research and associated treatment 
protocols; to illuminate what women themselves have to say about these dis-
courses and about their own desire—including the desire for submission; and, 
finally, to excavate which populations are produced via these discourses. Fou-
cault (1978) outlined biopolitics as concerned with the securitization of popu-
lations and with “control over relations among the human race” (p. 245), and 
this production and regulation of feminine receptivity arguably fits within 
this framework. As I have argued throughout this book, medical and scien-
tific narratives (from the mouths and pens of clinicians who self-identify as 
feminists) biopolitically produce and configure feminized populations and 
aid in the socialization of the individuals therein into specific heterocisgen-
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dered orientations toward their own bodies, the bodies of their partners, and 
their relationships. This has dire consequences for women’s (and others’) sex-
ual personae and for their sexual and mental health.
Unfortunately, the feminist sex wars of the 1970s and 1980s, which 
occurred right alongside the research that set the stage for the reworking 
of feminine receptivity in post-Freudian terms, have not aided the cause of 
women’s empowerment through submission. Mainstream or popular, schol-
arly, political, and in some cases medical and scientific discourses framed as 
feminist have tended to perpetuate narratives of natural and essential femi-
nine receptivity (which must be guarded against, in the case of the radical 
feminist, or which alternatively may be romanticized or celebrated, in the 
case of the liberal/cultural feminist—including the liberal/cultural feminist 
sex researcher and sex therapist), while simultaneously stripping the act of 
submission within BDSM of its agency. Feminism and the clinic have unfor-
tunately worked hand in hand to take submission away from women as a 
legitimate avenue for self-care—an avenue that is sometimes sexual, or that 
sometimes might be parasexual (as it is situated near the sexual but cannot 
always be entirely encompassed by it).
My findings suggest that the naturalization and romanticization of femi-
nine receptivity and concomitant dismissal and pathologization of submis-
sion are not adequate in accounting for women’s orientations toward their 
own embodied experiences and praxes. Many of the low-desiring women I 
interviewed were interested in subbing in BDSM—sometimes as a medita-
tional practice, sometimes as an exploration of pure sensuality, sometimes as 
a reclamation of trauma through submission, and sometimes for unrelated 
reasons. Importantly, subbing requires trust, negotiation, and communica-
tion; and so essentialized feminine receptivity or responsiveness is replaced 
with intentional and controlled submission, which paradoxically becomes 
a more empowering or agentic frame. Further, this contrasts with the way 
mindfulness too often appears as a means to a (cishetero)normative end by 
clinicians and sex therapists interested in “brief ” and “efficient” treatment 
protocols within a cognitive behavioral tradition, and within bio-/psycho-
medical and evolutionary discourses of female receptivity and responsiveness 
(the same could be said for alternative healers in this vein). Subbing in BDSM 
as intentional, negotiated, and/or as a form of meditation or a very different 
version of mindfulness pushes against this heteronormative framework, and 
thus has a queer potential (even when executed by women who do not neces-
sarily identify as queer). Here, we can see how medical discourses of recep-
tivity are actually disempowering and potentially retraumatizing, whereas 
BDSM becomes a space to rework power dynamics and reclaim agency in the 
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face of trauma, including through submission, meditation, and other para-
sexual practices (which become part of a sexual-asexual-parasexual series or 
assemblage).
When considering the intersections of clinical medicine and white liberal 
or cultural feminism, and the iatrogenically retraumatizing potential of con-
temporary sexual medicine and sex therapy itself, women’s own experiences 
and practices must be considered and theorized, with broader populations 
and technologies in mind. How do these meditations on and reclamations of 
receptivity—via submission—possibly exist outside of or alongside the sex-
ual? Does this type of queer practice challenge the sexual/asexual distinction, 
making space for parasexuality, within a crip-asexual framework (Kim, 2014)? 
If so, what is the potential of being beyond sexuality in this way? And how is 
this potential impeded by misogynistic, racist, classist, colonialist, and able-
ist violence under neoliberal capitalism, and by these as facets of feminized 
trauma specifically? Discourses of medicine and science, of feminism and 
empowerment, have far-reaching effects, as do practices involving mindful-
ness and submission. Analyzing how these produce and configure gender in 
new and surprising ways in our current moment and into the future is imper-
ative, for we are all affected (albeit to different extents and in different ways) 
by these population-producing regimes and technologies. The women I inter-
viewed actively subvert, reject, queer, and sometimes take pleasure from their 
own experiences of feminine sexual difference socialization—even as it is a 
coercive experience that leaves many women with few options for pleasure. In 
spite of this, the conversations I had and that I have illuminated throughout 
this book suggest that even self-identified low-desiring women find spaces 
within the sexual, and sometimes somewhere alongside it, for pleasure, play, 
and connection. Maybe this is the kind of feminine anarchism we should pay 
more attention to.
221
C O N C L U S I O N
The Freedom to Fall Apart
Feminine Fracturing and the Affective Production 
of Gendered Populations
In June 2015, popular Canadian news outlet The Globe and Mail published a 
piece entitled “‘Arousal-First’ Desire May Be More Typical for Women, and 
It Doesn’t Need a Cure.” Author Zosia Bielski interviews a number of sexual 
medicine celebrities in her piece (many of the same ones I have discussed in 
this book), presents their research that supports the new FSIAD diagnosis, 
and emphasizes women’s desire as uniquely responsive and discordant. Bielski 
states:
The current thinking builds on decades of research about the human sexual 
response cycle. In 2000, Rosemary Basson .  .  . nudged the science away 
from a strictly linear desire-arousal-sex-orgasm model, pioneering a cycli-
cal model instead. The latest edition of the DSM-5 . . . also reflects this shift, 
collapsing women’s sexual desire and arousal disorders into a new diagno-
sis of “[Female] Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder” ([F]SIAD), after clini-
cians reported female patients often had difficulties differentiating between 
desire and arousal. Today, some researchers and clinicians believe a more 
common experience for women might be “responsive desire”: a desire that 
arises in response to something pleasurable, not in anticipation of it.
Later in the article, Bielski describes her own experience at Meredith 
Chivers’s laboratory, where she was connected to a photoplethysmograph and 
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shown a variety of different types of pornography, so that her self-reported 
“subjective arousal” could be compared to her “physiological arousal”—or, 
according to Bielski, “between what I say turns me on and what my body 
actually responds to.” She then goes on to explain, based on her interview 
with Chivers, how “discordance” between self-report and objective measure-
ment is a “mostly female phenomenon” that “researchers have been exploring 
since the 1970s, with women’s bodies often not aligning with their words.” 
She states that Chivers is “constantly having to correct those curious about 
her work who assume that what happens in a woman’s body reveals what she 
really wants—that the vaginal plethysmograph is a lie detector test.” But if 
the claim here is not that what turns women on physically explains what they 
truly desire, then why study the disconnect in the first place, so intensively 
and extensively? Why develop an “arousal-first” model of desire, and apply 
it disproportionately to women? Why not just listen to what women report 
about what turns them on? If researchers believe that physiological arousal 
does not equal desire, then why create a female-specific low-desire diagnosis 
for the DSM-5 that collapses desire and arousal in the first place—particu-
larly if the argument based on plethysmographic research is that physiological 
arousal and subjective desire operate in accordance with two entirely different 
logics, on two completely separate planes, for women uniquely? And most 
importantly, if feminist-identified sex researchers are reluctant to have ple-
thysmographic evidence for female discordance interpreted as the “truth” of 
women’s desire, why have they organized an entire research industry and set 
of treatment protocols precisely around this phenomenon? 
In recent published accounts, particularly since the DSM-5 was released in 
2013, many researchers that I have cited in this book have begun to describe 
Rosemary Basson’s circular sexual response cycle as being equally applicable 
to men and women, and have moved toward embracing both the gender-
neutral incentive motivation model of desire and a theory of state-dependent 
(over trait-dependent) desire. And sometimes when these researchers describe 
the FSIAD diagnosis, they drop the “F,” positing it as “SI/AD” instead (for 
an example, see Chivers & Brotto, 2017), thus giving the impression that it is 
gender-neutral. These researchers now also tend to only cite Basson’s article in 
the Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, “Human Sex-Response Cycles” (2001a), 
when discussing responsive desire and the circular sexual response cycle—
but it is important to note that this is the only published research account 
wherein Basson described the model as gender-neutral. In all other discus-
sions (by Basson and others)—up until very recently—it has been used to 
describe women’s responsive desire, specifically. Popular analyses such as Biel-
ski’s above highlight the problematic slippage between proclaiming “women 
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are uniquely responsive” and stating “no, men are too, we just haven’t stud-
ied them enough yet,” which is now often implied. Further, it doesn’t really 
matter if researchers now argue that this model of “responsive desire” is not 
unique to women; the history of how the circular sexual response cycle has 
informed the last two decades of research on women’s sexuality, the way it is 
linked up with the gendered use of the incentive-motivation model and with 
experimental research on male concordance and female discordance (which 
has often espoused evolutionary psychology theorizations of gender differ-
ences in desire), the use of mindfulness-based sex therapy techniques to cure 
women’s discordance, and the sheer existence of the FSIAD diagnosis itself (as 
a diagnosis that, categorically, only women can receive) all tell a very different 
story. The feminization of receptivity and responsive desire, including in the 
most cutting-edge contemporary research, is undeniable, and popular analy-
ses such as Bielski’s make the lineage here, the genealogy of feminine receptiv-
ity/responsiveness/complexity, from hysteria to FSIAD, unmistakably obvious.
The feminization of this arousal-first model of responsive desire, especially 
as it is linked to therapy protocols that prescribe mindfulness to help women 
let negative thoughts “flow downstream,” seems to suggest nothing less than 
using “the other story the plethysmograph keeps tabs on” (Bielski, 2015) to 
cast doubt on women’s verbal accounts, and to potentially control, modify, and 
change their feelings and behaviors. Or, at the very least, it opens up these pos-
sibilities. So, even if researchers such as Chivers really don’t believe that physi-
ological arousal has anything to do with women’s true subjective desires, the 
fact that they constantly have to correct people who think that their work in 
this regard represents a type of “lie detector test” is very telling indeed. And it 
suggests that regardless of Chivers’s (or any other researcher in this domain’s) 
intentions, the conclusions of this research are being received by the general 
public in a very different way.
Take, for instance, the very first comment after the Bielski article was pub-
lished online (comments that have since been taken down). A commenter 
who goes by the name of “riksaga” states: “Ok—‘responsive desire’ sounds 
great BUT the problem seems to be how forceful do I act in activating her 
responsive desire? Legal and ethical considerations are dumped on me.” The 
second commenter, “Frederick Mackenzie,” responds: “A generation of epi-
cene men, too effete to just go for it (or too quivered by possible social or 
legal repercussions) when he has a woman before him, and now there is a 
problem with a lack of arousal among women. You wonder why?” These com-
ments alone say much about public response to this research, and the poten-
tial impact it has on women, men, and sexual relations among them. riksaga is 
not concerned with how women will benefit from this new “responsive desire” 
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model; he is instead concerned with how to activate women’s desire, and with 
how far is “too far” to go with this activation, for his own legal protection. 
Luckily for the women in his life, because riksaga apparently cares about not 
getting into trouble with the law, he suggests that he is not planning on forcing 
any women into sexual acts in the name of activating their desire at this time. 
Frederick Mackenzie is frustrated by what he believes is a cultural emascula-
tion of men who no longer feel manly enough to just “go for it”; he believes 
this has caused women’s desire to suffer, and thus I’d imagine he sees promise 
in the institution of a circular sexual response cycle for women based on the 
notion of responsive feminine desire. As was also suggested by commenters 
“George” and “David” on Bergner’s 2009 New York Times pieces that I cited in 
the introduction to this book, these comments on Bielski’s piece represent at 
least some of the broad lay interpretations of a model of female sexual desire 
founded upon responsiveness and receptivity. All of these comments highlight 
the looming threat of the normalization of sexual coercion of women, and 
men’s responses to it. They illuminate these misogynistic trends regardless of 
what clinicians say their research “actually” indicates. This—the disconnect 
between purportedly objective, apolitical, atheoretical, and neutral science, on 
the one hand, and public interpretation of that research, on the other—is one 
type of discordance that really is a problem.1
•
In my participants’ stories of their experiences of sexual difference socializa-
tion, of providing sexual carework throughout their lives, and of the circu-
itous ways they have come to navigate and negotiate sexual intentionality and 
embrace parasexual care in the face of so much harm—the omnipresence of 
feminized receptivity/responsiveness and the expectations and responsibili-
ties that come along with it are the binding themes. This paradoxically and 
insidiously mandated receptivity can feel coercive, like a violation, and it can 
 1. In one final telling example: In January 2020, as I was working on the final revisions to 
this book, I came across the series Sex, Explained on Netflix. Episode 3 on “Attraction” features 
the study in which subjects watched bonobo porn in addition to other types of porn (Chivers 
et al., 2007) while their genital responses, as measured with plethysmographs, were compared 
to their subjective statements about whether or not they were turned on. The episode empha-
sizes that discordance is a largely female phenomenon, and that “men tend to be more rigid 
with the type of people they’re attracted to [in terms of gender], whereas women are more 
flexible” (this is stated by Lisa Diamond, who is interviewed throughout the episode). The nar-
rator reads a line about how this research, conducted by Chivers, Seto, and Blanchard in 2007, 
demonstrates that women are turned on by “pretty much everything” (including monkeys 
having sex).
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result in trauma. Whether it is the experience of everyday banal incursions 
such as street harassment or trust being breached in intimate relationships, 
or the more obvious violations such as child molestation and sexual abuse, 
almost all of the women I spoke with were bound by a common experience 
of gendered and sexualized trauma. For some, their experiences as women of 
color, as queer, and/or as gender-nonconforming, amplified this reality. No 
generalizations can be made about the relationship between trauma and low 
desire, as this is an exploratory qualitative study, but the narratives of my low-
desiring participants suggest that an important component of one’s experience 
of femininity in a broad sense does to some extent involve the experience of 
violation. Thus, one central aspect of this study has been an attempt to shed 
light on how femininity, as an affective and biopolitical phenomenon lived at 
the level of the population, is traumatic, and involves the constant potential 
threat of violation—at least for some women and femmes, including those 
with whom I spoke about their experiences of low desire. This is one part of 
how the category and population I have sought to illuminate—women-with-
low-desire—gets produced in everyday life.
Lynda Hart (1998) has suggested that some feminists argue that “the heter-
opatriarchal system as such is an ideological institution that interpellates and 
produces women as a traumatic category” (p. 183). This perspective on femi-
ninity is reminiscent of Kaja Silverman’s (1992) notion of a “dominant fiction” 
regarding the ideological production of masculine and feminine subjectivity 
(which are produced when bodies and ways of being are equated with valu-
able—or not-so-valuable—symbols). I appreciate a consideration of how femi-
ninity is produced as a devalued, traumatic category, but I also think we must 
go further, into the realms of affect and phenomenology, to consider what the 
experience of that feminized trauma and violation actually feels like—and, 
ultimately, to reposition it in terms of agency. Thus, I want to take up a dif-
ferent orientation to embodiment and trauma, and push through ideology 
and interpellation, into the “crisis ordinariness” (Berlant, 2011) or “insidious 
traumas” (Cvetkovich, 2003) of everyday gendered, sexualized, and racialized 
violence. Although I am concerned with the way that (low-desiring) feminin-
ity is configured within the diagnostic discourse of the DSM-5, for instance, I 
am more concerned with the material-discursive relations that are played out 
alongside clinical and therapeutic regimes and diagnoses, and their effects on 
the lives of real people.
The women I interviewed who had been treated in medical programs for 
pain and low desire experienced specific sexual problems that they eventually 
identified as largely relational. This experience reveals the emptiness of diag-
nosis, and also of the coercive, nonconsensual nature of both treatment for low 
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female desire and of cisheteronormative sexual and structural relations that 
tend to occur alongside women’s low desire more broadly. Pain, discomfort, 
and trauma are always embodied, and thus it may be imperative to consider 
why we have set up such stark boundaries through these discourses between 
the “psychological” and the “physiological” in the first place, and concomi-
tantly, why dissociation has been feminized in such violent ways (materially 
and discursively—which are always one and the same). It appears that the 
line between “the psychological” and “the physiological” can be drawn—and 
erased—at will within these protocols. But the irony here is that this violent 
essentializing, naturalizing, neurobiologizing, and, ultimately, feminizing of 
dissociation (or a mind/body disconnect or discordance) functions to hide 
the experiential realities of the actual violence women, femmes, and gender-
nonconforming folks experience every day—violences that are so expected as 
to be banal and normal, and that are, in some cases, traumatizing, and may 
produce dissociative tendencies such as depersonalization and derealization 
during sex. Further, the biologizing and feminizing of dissociation paradoxi-
cally creates a situation in which dissociation itself is, in some cases, iatrogeni-
cally induced—for instance in the research laboratory or clinic, both of which 
extend into the bedroom.
Current scientific discourses and associated treatments both depend on 
and simultaneously disavow women’s trauma. Because feminine dissociation is 
naturalized and essentialized as discordance in expert discourses about wom-
en’s low desire and the feminized responsive desire framework, while social 
factors that influence this situation (i.e., sexual, gendered, and racialized vio-
lence and resulting traumas) are not analyzed or theorized, these therapies 
and treatments may actually retraumatize women. Trauma, then, is consti-
tutive of and simultaneously denied within these regimes and by the practi-
tioners and researchers who support them. Both the experience of women’s 
low desire and the diagnostic category itself are melancholic and tropological 
(Butler, 1997)—that is, they are figurative, they are self-producing, they call 
up a fracturing, and in that very calling up, they fracture. This is made more 
starkly apparent when considering how dissociation seems to be an uncanny 
twin of discordance—I am not arguing that all women who are measured as 
discordant have experienced trauma and thus dissociate as a result of this, 
but the possibility that many women who are measured in this way have been 
traumatized (potentially by measurement apparatuses themselves) and expe-
rience dissociation as a result should not be taken lightly, nor rejected out 
of hand. Further, the concordance/discordance measurement protocol itself 
reifies a mind/body split, thus conjuring it into being—and this is part of the 
work of the gap that I have identified throughout this book.
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It has been argued by some scientists and clinicians that women’s sexuality 
is inherently fluid, flexible, and receptive or responsive; at least for the women-
with-low-desire I interviewed for this project, it may be true that women’s 
sexualities are complex. But if they are more complex than men’s sexualities 
and desires, these interviews make it clear that this is primarily due to socio-
political and material factors, including gendered and sexualized violence—
which are completely elided in scientific research that suggests that women are 
“hardwired to submit” or are “evolutionarily programmed to be sexually flex-
ible.” Not only this, but trauma and low desire are held apart discursively in 
the DSM-5 and in its foundational research; as it may result from “severe rela-
tional distress” (listed as a diagnostic caveat which would preclude diagnosis), 
being diagnosed with PTSD would likely prevent a woman from receiving the 
FSIAD diagnosis. What violence is done—discursively and materially—when 
this type of comorbidity is not explored, theorized, and politicized?
The receptivity prescribed by FSIAD and the circular sexual response 
cycle, within the feminized responsive desire framework more broadly, is 
an instantiation of the murkiness of discursive configurations of femininity, 
which are not only discursively nebulous but are materially, experientially, 
and phenomenologically confusing because of the proliferation of traumatic 
violence and its institutional enforcement. Being a low-desiring woman here 
is about facing the porous and perpetually probed boundaries of one’s femi-
nized body; it involves being forced to answer—over and over again—what 
one will accept inside, what one will invite within, what one will receive. It 
involves the assumption that that reception, that response, is consensual, but 
rarely being asked the question. And it involves knowing that others like you 
are also being probed in this way, that you are part of a population, but that 
you are discouraged, within an individualistic neoliberal milieu of blame and 
shame, from coming together as a community to speak to each other and to 
speak back against this treatment.2
One must only take a look at the titles of the numerous media accounts 
of the scientific research on women’s sexuality over the last few years to see 
what is at stake—and under conquest—here: “Cracking The Code on Female 
Sexual Desire” (Madsen, 2013), “The Misunderstood Science of Female Desire” 
(Barmak, 2018), and “Hunting the Female Libido” (Conniff, 2010) are just a 
few of them. There is a consistent investment in finding the truth of female 
desire, the truth of sexual difference. And in all of these articles, responsive-
ness and receptivity are described as constitutive of feminine sexuality. The 
 2. This framing resonates with Patsavas’s (2014) suggestion that the purported unnarrat-
ability of chronic pain is not due to anything unique about the condition itself, but rather to 
widespread cultural silencing of those who are in pain. 
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feminized responsive desire framework has become much bigger than any 
of the researchers who created it perhaps intended—and now it is increas-
ingly hard to do away with. So regardless of anyone’s intentions, this model 
is now deeply embedded, culturally pervasive, an indisputable truism—and 
the way it is being interpreted and has taken hold shouldn’t be a surprise to 
anyone. Further, sex therapy and sexology have always been to some extent 
about management and control, and they have always been white, bourgeois, 
and hetero-/cisnormative—which is why seeking the “truth” of female desire 
can never be a neutral endeavor and will instead always be a project of domi-
nation, production, modification, and surveillance. And because there is no 
singular feminine desire, the institution of responsiveness as categorical can 
never be a corrective to the older linear response models of sexology. Now we 
have the same old tropes about feminine receptivity, simply reframed in the 
guise of female empowerment under neoliberalism. But, we must ask: Empow-
erment for whom? If we embrace a model of receptive feminine “willingness” 
in sexual response models and therapy, we must responsibly inquire—who 
gets to be willing? Much is assumed here regarding a romanticized white, cis, 
hetero, wealthy or middle-class lifestyle, and it is also assumed that willingness 
is happening in the absence of coercion. Not only is the figure of the woman 
who is to be helped via sex therapy always imagined as white, wealthy, norma-
tively able-bodied, and cishet, she is also imagined to be a subject who is free 
of trauma. And trauma here is also conceptualized as something exceptional, 
extraordinary, and discrete, a rupture, break, or breach—one is either trauma-
tized or they are not. But if we take the work of feminist madness studies and 
critical trauma, queer/crip of color, and disability studies scholars seriously, 
then it is clear that trauma is not so remarkable, and it is not something that 
can be recovered from so easily (Piepzna-Samarasinha, 2018). It also affects 
different populations differently—that is, women, femmes, and particularly 
trans women and gender-nonconforming folks of color are disproportionately 
affected by both everyday insidious traumas, on the one hand, and the more 
easily identifiable traumas of stranger rape and childhood sexual abuse, on 
the other. Not only this, but survivors are consistently expected to heal and 
recover from, or to overcome trauma—on their own.3
 3. In this vein, it is also important to distinguish between trauma and stress. The sexually 
troubled woman is regularly framed as low in desire because she is “stressed out” (see www.
debunkingdesire.com for a quintessential example of this framing)—but it is imperative to 
remember that stress (for instance, from too much “multi-tasking”) and trauma (for instance, 
from experiencing everyday racialized, gendered, and sexualized violence) are not the same 
thing. But if we were committed to distinguishing stress from trauma in these discourses of 
low female desire, we would have to reckon with race, class, and other important differences 
among groups of women, and we would have to take seriously what types of treatments are 
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Through my qualitative research with low-desiring women, many of 
whom identify as trauma survivors, I have examined feminized experiences 
of violence in terms of affect and populations, but also as experiences that 
are felt and lived at the level of individual bodies and relations between and 
among them, and that are often—but not always—linked to the realm of the 
sexual. It is imperative to attend to the limitations of current biomedical con-
figurations of low desire, not only because these paradigms elide gender, race, 
and class differences in how violence is meted out and experienced, but also 
because these biomedical tropes are hetero- and cisnormative, individualizing, 
and rooted in colonialist, neoliberal, and white formulations of the body and 
mind (which are held separate). These frameworks thus perpetuate antiquated 
ableist, cisnormative, heterosexist, and racist notions of sexual difference and 
gendered experience. By attending to banal, everyday, ordinary trauma, the 
feminization and racialization of these technologies and experiences is drawn 
sharply into view, and thus women, femmes, and gender-diverse folks—par-
ticularly those of color—may have their experiences validated.
•
I want to end this book by illuminating two competing—and, unfortunately, 
incommensurable—realities about the new science of female sexuality and 
the feminized responsive desire framework. On the one hand, there are lots 
of new technologies for enhancing desire, including neurotransmitter drugs 
and mindfulness-based sex therapy, and their excesses cannot be predicted 
or controlled. This is exciting and speaks to Chivers’s notion that women can 
now explore their “internal playgrounds” (as cited in Martin, 2018, p. 46). To 
this end, we must remember that biopower (Foucault, 1978) is about control, 
and can be disciplinary, but that it is also always productive—of new catego-
ries, subjectivities, and ultimately, new ways of life. If we consider production 
within this biopolitical frame, and perhaps ironically, simultaneously turn a 
psychoanalytic lens to mindfulness-based sex therapy, plethysmography, and 
models of receptive sexual desire—in keeping with the Foucault and Freud 
of queer theory—we can see that there might be a queer excess, an erotic 
potential in these new technologies, that can never be fully accounted for, 
appropriate for whom. I argue that “stress” has become the go-to category in this discourse 
precisely because it invokes a white, middle-class, cishet woman in need of sexual help, for 
instance through mindfulness-based sex therapy, and that treating this imagined figure (with 
“brief ” and individualized behavior-based treatments) is inherently much easier, neater, and 
tidier than truly and adequately addressing feminized trauma (trauma that is sometimes 
incurred through these bourgeois treatments themselves).
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predicted, or controlled. There is potentially something very queer and hot, 
for example, about meditating, along with several other low-desiring women, 
on the “vulva-like” contours of a raisin (Brotto, 2018, p. 77), together, in a 
group mindfulness session. Even technologies that are meant to train and 
produce heterosexual desire have a queer excess and erotic potential. Take 
Brotto’s recounting of the story of “Gianna,” a woman who is learning how to 
use mindfulness in her romantic relationship to enhance her own subjective/
genital concordance, but who has a much harder time “being in the present” 
when she’s at home than she does at the clinic:
During an extended mindfulness practice one day, Gianna said, through 
tears, “I just don’t get it, I can be so present in my body when I’m here in 
this isolated room with a group of strangers, and yet at home, when I try 
to be with my physical sensations in my comfortable and familiar environ-
ment, I feel like I get even more distracted, and I just don’t feel anything in 
my body!” (p. 145)
It is worth noting that something sexy and unpredictable appears to happen in 
the clinic for Gianna, something about the mimetic, fantastic or phantasmatic, 
uncapturable qualities of desire, that cannot be re-created outside of this scene. 
Following this line of psychoanalytic thought, and the notion that mindful-
ness itself might be refigured as an internalized dom/sub scenario (as I alluded 
to at the end of chapter 2), I’d like to propose that it can also be kinky. How 
many women have been turned on by sitting in the meditation room with 
other women and the raisin? How many women have fantasized about the 
mindfulness-based sex therapy facilitator herself? How many women became 
aroused from having a plethysmographic vaginal probe inserted or other 
instruments attached to their bodies? How many were turned on knowing a 
researcher was recording their genital response, or watching them on camera 
from an adjacent room? How many got to play out their most unspeakable, 
perhaps inarticulable, fantasies when they submitted themselves to be exam-
ined in an experimental laboratory as a participant in a scientific study on 
sexual desire? If we apply a psychoanalytic lens to these behaviorist protocols, 
the possibilities are endless.
Under biopolitical regimes, while there is regulation, there is also new 
potential. Here, I would like to follow Jagose’s analysis of the “queer trace” 
(2013) of orgasmic reconditioning in gay men. Just as behaviorism and queer 
theory have surprising resonances (as neither have a sexual subject, per se, 
only a grouping of behaviors used to approximate identity) and thus they 
make strange bedfellows, I’d like to think of these new medico-scientific tech-
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nologies, on the one hand, and kink, on the other hand, in the same way—
as strange bedfellows. Fantasy is constitutive of sexual desire in a way that 
it isn’t for really any other “behavior” (including behaviors that have been 
treated with similar cognitive-behaviorist protocols), so whatever is intended 
or expected to happen as a result of the therapy (such as the cultivation of 
heterosexual desire) doesn’t always happen, and thus the treatment may take 
surprising turns. I’d like to think of the spaces in which mindfulness-based 
sex therapy, photoplethysmography, and receptive sexual response cycles are 
enacted as uncontainable and proliferative spaces, where there will always be 
a kinky queer excess and erotic potential.
On the other hand, however, these new technologies do seek to predict 
and control—and often in the service of cisheteropatriarchy, white suprem-
acy, neoliberal capitalism, colonialist medicine, and rape culture. For example, 
mindfulness—and it does makes sense that we want to use it, as it helps lots 
of us “get by” when things feel overwhelming—is now regularly used to make 
workers more productive. And, as an important extension, there are race and 
class implications regarding access to these protocols—or rather, there are rac-
ist and classist and nativist barriers to treatment. While it is a white, recep-
tive femininity off of which these treatments are modeled, different members 
of forcibly feminized populations will not all benefit in the same ways from 
being treated—however, they will all be expected to fall in line. To this end, 
not all women and femmes have the opportunity to “explore their internal 
playgrounds,” in Chivers’s words, in the same ways or to the same extents. And 
what of nonbinary, gender-nonconforming, agender, and genderqueer folks 
who will be expected, sometimes against their will, to fall in line? I think here 
of the ways that some of the participants were taught about the circular sexual 
response cycle and how it applies to women, when they had really gone in to 
a clinic for treatment of vaginal pain. Why is a protocol for femininity being 
taught in these clinical and therapeutic spaces? And what are its potentially 
noxious effects for those who do not identify with these versions of femininity 
(or perhaps any version of femininity at all)?
In an article for the Guardian in 2018, Moira Donegan points to the ways 
that racial and class divisions in feminism have now been made clear, specifi-
cally in the context of #MeToo. This is worth articulating, as well, in relation 
to the field of the new science of female sexuality, the feminized respon-
sive desire framework, and the FSIAD diagnosis. Donegan states that there 
is a central rift within feminism that is revealed by the #MeToo movement: 
“Feminism has come to contain two distinct understandings of sexism, and 
two wildly different, often incompatible ideas of how that problem should 
be solved. One approach is individualist, hard-headed, grounded in ideals of 
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pragmatism, realism, and self-sufficiency. The other is expansive, communal, 
idealistic, and premised on the ideals of mutual interest and solidarity.” This 
rift is clear in a division between, on the one hand, white liberal feminism 
of the type that requires one to pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps and 
which simultaneously erases difference; this is the typical version of “#MeToo” 
feminism which has now been largely constrained by discourses of liberal-
ism, legality/consent, and individualism in the vein of neoliberal carcerality. 
On the other hand, however, there is a more intersectional and class-attentive 
version that encompasses the idea that feminism must not only be for middle-
class and wealthy, able-boded, cishet, white women in the Global North, but 
for the most marginalized groups, including femmes of color, genderqueer 
and trans folks, and other people who are brutalized under heteropatriar-
chal, cisnormative, white supremacist, ableist, neoliberal capitalist rape cul-
ture. This second version, this more radical ideology and praxis, also attends 
to the diversity of “#MeToo moments,” reminding us that not all traumatic 
experiences are registered or received in the same way (Rodriguez, 2019). This 
second version further recognizes that many traumas do not involve a com-
plete schism, break, or rupture, and instead may be more banal or insidious.
The version of feminism that is espoused in the new science of female sex-
uality and the feminized responsive desire framework is a white liberal femi-
nism, however, insofar as it imagines a subject who can enhance her desire 
(or is it heal her trauma?) via individualistic treatments that she endeavors 
upon herself. If we chose to recognize trauma, we would also have to recog-
nize that “consent” and “nonconsent” are not so clear and easily separable in 
real life, and that trauma is not so discrete—much of trauma operates as crisis 
ordinariness (Berlant, 2011), and is also made to be productive under neolib-
eralism. We live in a culture that relies on the hypostatization or othering of 
trauma as extraordinary and exceptional (as I argued in chapter 5)—but the 
reality of many of our lives is that they are characterized by mundane, banal, 
insidious, everyday violence. Our current conception of trauma is myopic, 
however, as are proposed treatments for sexual dysfunction. I argue that we 
need to acknowledge the diversity of relationships and trauma experiences, 
distinguish trauma from “stress,” and ultimately recognize the myriad prob-
lems with models of sex therapy that assume a tidy, happy, consensual rela-
tionship under which “responsive desire” can easily and safely be accessed or 
triggered, and mindfulness techniques applied. What of those who are trau-
matized by the very notion of this tidiness?
Critical disability studies and madness studies scholars offer ways to crip 
theories of trauma, and analyze current models of dissociation as too uni-
form and restrictive (Johnson, 2015; Johnson & McRuer, 2014; Kafer, 2013; 
Spurgas, under review). We know that women and femmes are likely to be 
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victims of sexual assault, and now we know that trans women, particularly 
trans women of color, are disproportionately likely to experience violence 
(including sexual violence) during their lives. We are now in an age of ever-
present yet unspectacular violence, we are haunted by specters of violability, 
and so we are in a moment to rethink the importance of structures of gender, 
race, and class as structures of feeling (Williams, 1977). If part of living as a 
cis or trans woman, as a genderqueer, gender-nonconforming, or nonbinary 
person, as a femme-identified or AFAB individual (and particularly if one is a 
person of color who lives within these categories of experience) is about living 
with anxiety, hypervigilance, and the daily specter of a low-grade, mundane, 
and banal sexualized violence, then how might we understand dissociation? 
Maybe dissociation instead looks like anxiety, just too pervasive and partial, 
or it’s the perpetual feeling that you’re about to fall apart, to come unglued. 
Maybe it’s having a constant lump in your throat and a racing heartbeat while 
also feeling completely empty and numb when you read the news, when you 
walk down the street.
We might take the experience of dissociation, or even more usefully of 
dissociative-adjacent experiences, of feeling threadbare, of falling apart, as a 
standpoint from which to theorize. Black feminist scholars such as Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1991) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990) have utilized intersectional 
analyses to forefront the importance of standpoint, particularly for margin-
alized folks. How might we theorize discursive feminization via biomedical 
protocols, while simultaneously allowing for the real live often femme or 
feminized person who has experienced trauma to speak—or rather to feel—
from that very real material subject position? How might we use theories of 
the cripistemological (Johnson & McRuer, 2014), criphystemological (Mol-
low, 2014), and chrononormative (Freeman, 2010) to honor this feminized 
experience while simultaneously taking care not to essentialize or universal-
ize it? To think about its sociopolitical and structural, yet also embodied and 
relational, nature? And most importantly: What does feminine fracturing in 
our contemporary political terrain of slow violence and crisis ordinariness 
look and feel like? In order to get a better picture of what falling apart feels 
like—an experience akin to dissociation, derealization, and depersonaliza-
tion, but not quite the same thing—I propose that we work backward (Love, 
2007). If we look at the ways that traumatized people have been and continue 
to be expected to recover, we can get closer to a cripistemology of feminized 
fracture and falling apart, and also get beyond the white, cishet, middle-class 
femininity built into formulations of gendered trauma and sexual dysfunc-
tion. We must look at how feminized populations have been expected to heal 
themselves before we can consider more communal and radical ways of car-
ing for each other.
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Trauma has historically been conceptualized as a breach that overcomes 
the subject’s capacity to cope, and that makes it impossible to further pro-
cess distressing events. This produces long-lasting disturbances that must be 
recovered from. But what if there can be no recovery or rehabilitation, because 
there hasn’t been an actual break? Anxiety, hypervigilance, fracturing, and 
falling-apartness may be better ways to think of how femininity is produced—
and then policed, surveilled, marketed, and marketed to—under late capital-
ism. There is an ordinariness to both assault and assault-adjacent experiences 
that may not result in dissociation per se, but may result in another type of 
crip or dissociative-adjacent experience, with its own temporality and phe-
nomenology. Thus: Falling-apart femininity or feminine fracturing, as a van-
tage point that we could learn a lot from, may be one way to think and feel 
this experience.
To that end, the words of the feminized and traumatized are instructive, 
and so I am grateful that some of these folks agreed to speak with me about 
their experiences for this book. We need a better feminism that isn’t just about 
offering solutions to women-with-low-desire in the vein of “women should 
get treatments for sexual dysfunctions, too!” We need a feminist science, 
medicine, and therapy that doesn’t individualize or essentialize sexual prob-
lems, and instead looks to the sociopolitical and structural ways that com-
mon experiences of violence create traumatized populations—and understand 
that of course these experiences affect (and produce) the desire of the mem-
bers of these populations. We must think about the diversity of women and 
femmes and their experiences and remember that “solutions” aren’t solutions 
for everyone, and in fact may be harmful to some. It is with an eye toward 
this that we might stand in solidarity as members of these populations, rather 
than seeking to heal ourselves—from trauma, low desire, and sexual dysfunc-
tion—as individuals, or to attempt self-rehabilitation. Caring for each other 
in community while also attending to difference is a radical alternative to the 
isolation of self-care, and a radical alternative to simply trying to survive or 
get by. Rather than always trying to recover, to cure ourselves, and navigat-
ing these coercive structures on our own, maybe there is a freedom in falling 
apart, together.
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Annie 31 Latinx, Jewish US Mostly straight No No
Astrid 30 White Canada Gay/Queer Yes Yes
Ava 24 Palestinian US Queer No No
Bridget 54 White US Straight/Hetero No Yes
Charlie 31 White, Jewish Canada Asexual/Pansexual No No
Corinne 30 White US Straight/Hetero No No
Elaine 31 Armenian US Straight/Hetero No No
Elizabeth 30 White US Straight/Hetero No No
Evie 25 White US Queer No No
Jill 26 Russian Russia/US Straight/Hetero No No
Julia 37 White US Bisexual No No
Karen 34 White EU Straight/Hetero No No
Kelly 29 White Canada Mostly straight Yes Yes
Lisa 26 White, Jewish US Straight/Hetero No No
Lola 21 Black, African US Straight/Hetero No No
Lynn 25 Korean US Mostly straight No No
Mallory 32 White US Queer No No
Marianne 32 White US Straight/Hetero No No
Maya 30 White US Bisexual Yes No
Molly 33 White US Straight/Hetero No No
Natasha 26 White, Jewish US Queer No No
Penelope 32 White, Jewish US Straight/Hetero No No
Regina 25 White US Bisexual Yes No
Rose 33 Black, Caribbean US Straight/Hetero No No
Sadie 25 White US Queer/Bisexual No No
Sam 29 White US Straight/Hetero No No
Sarah 21 Israeli, Syrian US Queer No No
Taja 30 White US Queer/Bisexual No No
Tiffany 23 Chinese, 
Taiwanese, 
Japanese
US Queer No No
Valdivia 27 Latinx US Queer No No
Zola 29 Black, Latinx, 
African Caribbean
US Queer No No
TABLE 1. Participant Demographics
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TABLE 2. Expert Demographics
EXPERT SPECIALTY
Amelia Sex workshop leader at a feminist/queer sex toy store
Annette Clinical psychologist, sex researcher, sex therapist
Betsy Clinical director of a women’s sexual health center, sex therapist
Celeste Certified yoga teacher, Tantra/Daoism sexual energy practice 
specialist, workshop leader
Louise Clinical psychologist, antimedicalization activist
Yvette Sex workshop leader at a feminist/queer sex toy store

239
R E F E R E N C E S
Ahbel-Rappe, K. (2006). “I no longer believe”: Did Freud abandon the seduction theory? Journal 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 54, 171–199.
Ahmed, S. (2006). Orientations: Toward a queer phenomenology. GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and 
Gay Studies, 12, 543–574.
Ahmed, S. (2007). A phenomenology of whiteness. Feminist Theory, 8, 149–168.
Ahmed, S. (2010). The promise of happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Alcoff, L. (1988). Cultural feminism vs. poststructuralism. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society, 13, 405–436.
American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(3rd ed., revised). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(5th ed.). Arlington, VA: Author.
Angel, K. (2010). The history of “female sexual dysfunction” as a mental disorder in the 20th cen-
tury. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 23, 536–541.
Angel, K. (2012). Contested psychiatric ontology and feminist critique: “Female sexual dysfunc-
tion” and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. History of the Human Sciences, 25, 3–24.
240 • REFERENCES
Angel, K. (2013). Commentary on Spurgas’s “Interest, arousal, and shifting diagnoses of female 
sexual dysfunction.” Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 14, 206–216.
Ayling, K., & Ussher, J. M. (2008). “If sex hurts, am I still a woman?” The subjective experience 
of vulvodynia in hetero-sexual women. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 37, 294–304.
Bailey, J. M. (2003). The man who would be queen. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press.
Bailey, J. M. (2009). What is sexual orientation and do women have one? In D. A. Hope (Ed.), 
Contemporary perspectives on lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities (pp. 43–63). New York, NY: 
Springer.
Balon, R., & Clayton, A. H. (2014). Female sexual interest/arousal disorder: A diagnosis out of 
thin air. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43, 1227–1229.
Bancroft, J., Graham, C., Janssen, E., & Sanders, S. (2009). The dual control model: current status 
and future directions. Journal of Sex Research, 46, 121–142.
Barbach, L. (1974). Group treatment of preorgasmic women. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 1, 
139–145.
Barbach, L. (1980). Women discover orgasm. New York, NY: Free Press.
Barker, K. (2014). Mindfulness meditation: Do-it-yourself medicalization of every moment. 
Social Science & Medicine, 106, 168–176.
Barker, M. (2013). Reflections: Towards a mindful sexual and relationship therapy. Sexual and 
Relationship Therapy, 28, 147–153.
Barmak, S. (2018, April 26). The misunderstood science of sexual desire. The Cut. Retrieved from 
https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/the-misunderstood-science-of-sexual-desire.html
Barounis, C. (2014). Compulsory sexuality and asexual/crip resistance in John Cameron Mitch-
ell’s Shortbus. In M. Milks & K. J. Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexualities: Feminist and queer per-
spectives (pp. 174–197). New York, NY: Routledge.
Barounis, C. (2015, November 13). Pleasure, capacitation, and rhetorics of queer citizenship. Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the National Women’s Studies Association, Milwau-
kee, WI.
Barounis, C. (2019). Vulnerable constitutions: Queerness, disability, and the remaking of American 
manhood. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2000). The neural basis of romantic love. NeuroReport, 11, 3829–3834.
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. NeuroImage, 
21, 1155–1166.
Basson, R. (2000). The female sexual response: A different model. Journal of Sex & Marital Ther-
apy, 26, 51–65.
Basson, R. (2001a). Human sex-response cycles. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 27, 33–43.
Basson, R. (2001b). Using a different model for female sexual response to address women’s prob-
lematic low sexual desire. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 27, 395–403.
Basson, R. (2002). Are our definitions of women’s desire, arousal and sexual pain disorders too 
broad and our definitions of orgasmic disorder too narrow? Journal of Sex and Marital Ther-
apy, 28, 289–300.
Basson, R. (2008). Comment on Janssen et al. (2008). Archives of Sexual Behavior, 37, 511.
Basson, R. Berman, J., Burnett, A., Derogatis, L., Ferguson, D., Fourcroy, J., . . . Whipple, B. 
(2001). Report of the International Consensus Development Conference on Female Sexual 
Dysfunction: Definitions and classifications. Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy, 27, 83–94.
REFERENCES • 241
Basson, R. Brotto, L. A., Laan, E., Redmond, G., & Utian, W. H. (2005). Assessment and man-
agement of women’s sexual dysfunctions: Problematic desire and arousal. Journal of Sexual 
Medicine, 2, 291–300.
Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Gender differences in erotic plasticity: The female sex drive as socially 
flexible and responsive. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 347–374.
Baumeister, R. F. (2004). Gender and erotic plasticity: Sociocultural influences on the sex drive. 
Sexual and Relationship Therapy, 19, 133–139.
Benjamin, J. (1988). The bonds of love: Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the problem of domination. 
New York, NY: Pantheon.
Berg, B. L., & Lune, H. (2011). Qualitative research methods for the social sciences (8th ed.). Bos-
ton, MA: Pearson.
Bergner, D. (2009a, January 25). What do women want? The New York Times Magazine. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25desire-t.html
Bergner, D. (2009b, November 29). Women who want to want. The New York Times Magazine. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/magazine/29sex-t.html
Bergner, D. (2013a, May 22). Unexcited? There may be a pill for that. The New York Times Maga-
zine. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/magazine/unexcited-there-may-
be-a-pill-for-that.html
Bergner, D. (2013b). What do women want? Adventures in the science of female desire. New York, 
NY: HarperCollins.
Berlant, L. (2008). The female complaint: The unfinished business of sentimentality in American 
culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Berlant, L. (2011). Cruel optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Bersani, L. (1986). The Freudian body: Psychoanalysis and art. New York, NY: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
Bersani, L. (1987). Is the rectum a grave? October, 43, 197–222.
Bielski, Z. (2015, June 21). “Arousal-first” desire may be more typical for women, and it doesn’t 
need a cure. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/ 
health-and-fitness/health/arousal-first-desire-may-be-more-typical-for-women-and-it- 
doesnt-need-a-cure/article25039091/
Birke, L., & Hubbard, R. (1995). Learning from the new priesthood and the shrieking sisterhood: 
Debating the life sciences in Victorian England. In L. Birke & R. Hubbard (Eds.), Reinvent-
ing biology: Respect for life and the creation of knowledge (pp. 1–19). Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press.
Blanchard, R. (1989). The concept of autogynephilia and the typology of male gender dysphoria. 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 177, 616–623.
Borck, C. R., & Moore, L. J. (2019). This is my voice on T: Synthetic testosterone, DIY surveil-
lance, and transnormative masculinity. Surveillance & Society, 17, 631–640.
Bordo, S. (1993). Unbearable weight: Feminism, Western culture, and the body. Berkeley, CA: Uni-
versity of California Press.
Bossio, J., Basson, R., Driscoll, M., Correia, S., & Brotto, L. (2018). Mindfulness-based group 
therapy for men with situational erectile dysfunction: A mixed-methods feasibility analysis 
and pilot study. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 15, 1478–1490.
242 • REFERENCES
Both, S., & Everaerd, W. (2002). Comment on “The female sexual response: A different model.” 
Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 28, 11–15.
Boyle, M. (1993). Sexual dysfunction or heterosexual dysfunction? Feminism & Psychology, 3, 
73–88.
Braksmajer, A. (2017). “That’s kind of one of our jobs”: Sexual activity as a form of care work 
among women with sexual difficulties. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 46, 2085–2095.
Brody, S., & Costa, R. M. (2017). Vaginal orgasm is associated with indices of women’s better psy-
chological, intimate relationship, and psychophysiological function. The Canadian Journal of 
Human Sexuality, 26, 1–4.
Brom, M., Laan, E., Everaerd, W., Spinhoven, P., & Both, S. (2015). Extinction of aversive classi-
cally conditioned human sexual response. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 12, 916–935.
Brothers, D. (1997). The leather princess: Sadomasochism as the rescripting of trauma scenarios. 
Progress in Self Psychology, 13, 245–268.
Brothers, D. (2008). Toward a psychology of uncertainty: Trauma-centered psychoanalysis. New 
York, NY: The Analytic Press.
Brotto, L. A. (2010a). The DSM diagnostic criteria for hypoactive sexual desire disorder in 
women. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 39, 221–239.
Brotto, L. A. (2010b). The DSM diagnostic criteria for hypoactive sexual desire disorder in men. 
The Journal of Sexual Medicine, 7, 2015–2030.
Brotto, L. A. (2011). Non-judgmental present-moment, sex . . . as if your life depended on it. Sex-
ual and Relationship Therapy, 26, 215–216.
Brotto, L. A. (2018). Better sex through mindfulness: How women can cultivate desire. Berkeley, 
CA: Greystone Books.
Brotto, L. A, Basson, R., & Luria, M. (2008). A mindfulness-based group psychoeducational 
intervention targeting sexual arousal disorder in women. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 5, 
1646–1659.
Brotto, L. A., Chivers, M. L., Millman, R. D., & Albert, A. (2016). Mindfulness-based sex therapy 
improves genital-subjective arousal concordance in women with sexual desire/arousal dif-
ficulties. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45, 1907–1921.
Brotto, L. A., Heiman, J. R., & Tolman, D. L. (2009). Narratives of desire in mid-age women with 
and without arousal difficulties. Journal of Sex Research, 46, 387–398.
Brotto, L. A, Krychman, M., & Jacobson, P. (2008). Eastern approaches for enhancing women’s 
sexuality: Mindfulness, acupuncture, and yoga. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 5, 2741–2748.
Brotto, L. A., Seal, B. N., & Rellini, A. (2012). Pilot study of a brief cognitive behavioral versus 
mindfulness-based intervention for women with sexual distress and a history of childhood 
sexual abuse. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 38, 1–27.
Buss, D. M. (1994). The evolution of desire: Strategies of human mating. New York, NY: Basic 
Books.
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. London, UK: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex.” London, UK: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Cacchioni, T. (2007). Heterosexuality and “the labour of love”: A contribution to recent debates 
on female sexual dysfunction. Sexualities, 10, 299–320.
REFERENCES • 243
Cacchioni, T. (2015). Big pharma, women, and the labor of love. Toronto, ON: University of 
Toronto Press.
Cacchioni, T., & Wolkowitz, C. (2011). Treating women’s sexual difficulties: The body work of 
sexual therapy. Sociology of Health & Illness, 33, 266–279.
Califia, P. (1994). Public sex: The culture of radical sex. San Francisco, CA: Cleis Press.
Canner, L. (2009). Orgasm Inc. [Motion picture]. West Groton, MA: Astrea Media.
Carey, B. (2005, July 5). Straight, gay, or lying? Bisexuality revisited. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/health/straight-gay-or-lying- 
bisexuality-revisited.html
Casper, M., & Moore, L. J. (2009). Missing bodies: The politics of visibility. New York, NY: New 
York University Press.
Charest, M., & Kleinplatz, P. J. (2018). A review of recent innovations in the treatment of low 
sexual desire. Current Sexual Health Reports, 10, 281–286.
Chivers, M. L. (2005). A brief review and discussion of sex differences in the specificity of sexual 
arousal. Sexual and Relationship Therapy, 20, 377–390.
Chivers, M. L. (2010). A brief update on the specificity of sexual arousal. Sexual & Relationship 
Therapy, 25, 407–414.
Chivers, M. L. (2017a). The specificity of women’s sexual response and its relationship with sexual 
orientations: A review and ten hypotheses. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 46, 1161–1179.
Chivers, M. L. (2017b). Response to commentaries. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 46, 1213–1221.
Chivers, M. L., & Bailey, J. M. (2005). A sex difference in features that elicit genital response. Bio-
logical Psychology, 70, 115–120.
Chivers, M. L., & Brotto, L. A. (2017). Controversies of women’s sexual arousal and desire. Euro-
pean Psychologist, 22, 5–26.
Chivers, M. L., Rieger, G., Latty, E., & Bailey, J. M. (2004). A sex difference in the specificity of 
sexual arousal. Psychological Science, 15, 736–744.
Chivers, M. L., Seto, M. C., & Blanchard, R. (2007). Gender and sexual orientation differences in 
sexual response to sexual activities versus gender of actors in sexual films. Journal of Person-
ality & Social Psychology, 93, 1108–1121.
Chivers, M. L., Seto, M. C., Lalumière, M. L., Laan, E., & Grimbos, T. (2010). Agreement of 
self-reported and genital measures of sexual arousal in men and women: A meta-analysis. 
Archives of Sexual Behavior, 39, 5–56.
Chivers, M. L., Bouchard, K. N., & Timmers, A. D. (2015). Straight but not narrow; Within gen-
der variation in the gender-specificity of women’s sexual response. PLoS ONE, 10, 1–21.
Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Chu, A. L. (2019). The impossibility of feminism. differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Stud-
ies, 30, 63–81.
Cixous, H., & Clément, C. (1986). The newly born woman. Minneapolis, MN: University of Min-
nesota Press. (Original work published 1975)
Clare, E. (2017). Brilliant imperfection: Grappling with cure. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Clarke, A., Shim, J., Mamo, L., Fosket, J., & Fishman, J. (2003). Biomedicalization: Technoscien-
tific transformations of health, illness and U. S. biomedicine. American Sociological Review, 
68, 161–194.
244 • REFERENCES
Clough, P. T. (2007). Introduction. In P. T. Clough and J. Halley (Eds.), The affective turn: Theo-
rizing the social (pp. 1–33). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Clough, P. T. (2018). The user unconscious: On affect, media, and measure. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Collins, P. H. (1990). Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empow-
erment. London, UK: Routledge.
Collins, P. H. (1998). It’s all in the family: Intersection of gender, race, and nation. Hypatia, 13, 
62–82.
Collins, P. H. (2004). Black sexual politics: African Americans, gender, and the new racism. New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Comella, L. (2017). Vibrator nation: How feminist sex-toy stores changed the business of pleasure. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Conniff, R. (2010, October 5). Hunting the female libido. Men’s Health. Retrieved from https://
www.menshealth.com/sex-women/a19541894/female-libido/
Conrad, P. (1975). The discovery of hyperkinesis: Notes on the medicalization of deviant behav-
ior. Social Problems, 23, 12–21.
Conrad, P. (1992). Medicalization and social control. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 209–232.
Cooper, M. (2008). Life as surplus: Biotechnology and capitalism in the neoliberal era. Seattle, WA: 
Washington University Press.
Cooper, M., & Waldby, C. (2014). Clinical labor: Tissue donors and research subjects in the global 
bioeconomy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the invisible 
hand. The American Economic Review, 84, 327–332.
Cossman, B. (2007). Sexual citizens: The legal and cultural regulation of sex and belonging. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Crawford, R. (1980). Healthism and the medicalization of everyday life. International Journal of 
Health Services, 10, 365–388.
Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence 
against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43, 1241–1299.
Cvetkovich, A. (1995). Recasting receptivity: Femme sexualities. In K. Jay (Ed.), Lesbian erotics. 
New York, NY: New York University Press.
Cvetkovich, A. (1998). Untouchability and vulnerability: Stone butchness as emotional style. In S. 
Munt (Ed.), Butch/femme: Inside lesbian gender. London, UK: Castell.
Cvetkovich, A. (2003). An archive of feelings: Trauma, sexuality, and lesbian public cultures. Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press.
Dalla Costa, M., & James, S. (1972). The power of women and the subversion of the community. 
London: Falling Wall Press.
Daly, M. (1990). Gyn/ecology: The metaethics of radical feminism. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
(Original work published 1978)
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection. Retrieved from http://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Origin_of_Species_(1859)
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Dawson, S. J., & Chivers, M. L. (2014). Gender differences and similarities in sexual desire. Cur-
rent Sexual Health Reports, 6, 211–219.
REFERENCES • 245
Dawson, S. J., & Chivers, M. L. (2018). The effect of static versus dynamic stimuli on visual pro-
cessing of sexual cues in androphilic women and gynephilic men. Royal Society Open Sci-
ence, 5, 172286.
Dawson, S. J., Huberman, J. S., Bouchard, K. N., McInnis, M. K., Pukall, C. F., & Chivers, M. L. 
(2019). Effects of individual difference variables, gender, and exclusivity of sexual attraction 
on volunteer bias in sexuality research. Archives of Sexual Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10508-019-1451-4
de Beauvoir, S. (1989). The second sex. New York, NY: Vintage. (Original work published 1952)
DeJesus, J. M., Callanan, M. A., Solis, G., & Gelman, S. A. (2019). Generic language in scientific 
communication. PNAS, 116, 18370–18377.
Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the societies of control. October, 59, 3–7.
DeRogatis, L. R., Clayton, A. H., Rosen, R. C., Sand, M., & Pyke, R. E. (2011). Should sexual 
desire and arousal disorders in women be merged? Archives of Sexual Behavior, 40, 217–219.
DeVault, M. L. (1991). Feeding the family: The social organization of caring as gendered work. Chi-
cago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Diamond, L. M. (2005). “I’m straight, but I kissed a girl”: The trouble with American media rep-
resentations of female-female sexuality. Feminism & Psychology, 15, 104–110.
Diamond, L. M. (2008). Sexual fluidity: Understanding women’s love and desire. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Dodson, B. (1987). Sex for one: The joy of self-loving. New York, NY: Crown.
Donaldson, E. J. (2002). The corpus of the madwoman: Toward a feminist disability studies the-
ory of embodiment and mental illness. NWSA Journal, 14, 99–119.
Donegan, M. (2018, May 11). How #MeToo revealed the central rift within feminism today. 
The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/11/
how-metoo-revealed-the-central-rift-within-feminism-social-individualist
Downing, L. (2007). Beyond safety: Erotic asphyxiation and the limits of SM discourse. In D. 
Langdridge & M. Barker (Eds.), Safe sane and consensual: Contemporary perspectives on 
sadomasochism (pp. 119–132). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
Downing, L. (2013). Safewording! Kinkphobia and gender normativity in Fifty shades of grey. Psy-
chology and Sexuality, 4, 92–102.
Duncombe, J., & Marsden, D. (1996). “Whose orgasm is this anyway”? Sex work in long-term 
couple relationships. In J. Weeks & J. Holland (Eds.), Sexual cultures: Communities, values, 
and intimacy (pp. 220–238). New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Dunkley, C. R., & Brotto, L. A. (2018). Clinical considerations in treating BDSM practitioners: A 
review. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 44, 701–712.
Dunkley, C. R., & Brotto, L. A. (2019). The role of consent in the context of BDSM. Sexual Abuse, 
1–22.
Dunkley, C. R., Henshaw, C. D., Henshaw, S. K. & Brotto, L. A. (2020). Physical pain as pleasure: 
A theoretical perspective. The Journal of Sex Research, 57, 421–437. 
Dworkin, A. (1987). Intercourse. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Dymock, A. (2012). But femsub is broken too! On the normalisation of BDSM and the problem 
of pleasure. Psychology & Sexuality, 3, 54–68.
Dymock, A. (2013). Flogging sexual transgression: Interrogating the costs of the “Fifty Shades 
effect.” Sexualities, 16, 880–895.
246 • REFERENCES
Dymock, A. (2018). Anti-communal, anti-egalitarian, anti-nurturing, anti-loving: Sex and the 
“irredeemable” in Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon. Paragraph, 41, 349–363.
Ehrenreich, B., & English. D. (1978). For her own good: Two centuries of the experts’ advice to 
women. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
Elton, C. (2010, May/June). Learning to lust. Psychology Today, 70–77.
Fahs, B. (2011). Performing sex: The making and unmaking of women’s erotic lives. Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press.
Fahs, B. (2016). Naming sexual trauma: On the political necessity of nuance in rape and sex 
offender discourses. In E. Wertheimer & M. J. Casper (Eds.), Critical trauma studies: Under-
standing violence, conflict, and memory in everyday life (pp. 61–77). New York, NY: New York 
University Press.
Faludi, S. (1991). Backlash: The undeclared war against American women. New York, NY: Vintage 
Books.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of gender: Biological theories about women and men. New York, 
NY: Basic Books.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1994). Gender, race, and nation: The comparative anatomy of “Hottentot” 
women in Europe, 1815–1817. In J. Terry & J. Urla (Eds.), Deviant bodies: Critical perspectives 
on difference in science and popular culture (pp. 19–48). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1997). Beyond difference: A biologist’s perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 53, 
233–258.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the body: Gender politics and the construction of sexuality. New 
York, NY: Basic Books.
Federici, S. (2004). Caliban and the witch: Women, the body, and primitive accumulation. Brook-
lyn, NY: Autonomedia.
Federici, S. (2012). Revolution at point zero: Housework, reproduction, and feminist struggle. Oak-
land, CA: PM Press.
Feher, M. (2009). Self-appreciation; or, the aspirations of human capital. Public Culture, 21, 21–41.
Feher, M. (2018). Rated agency: Investee politics in a speculative age. New York, NY: Zone Books.
Ferenidou, F., Kirana, P., Fokas, K., Hatzichristou, D., & Athanasiadis, L. (2016). Sexual response 
models: Toward a more flexible pattern of women’s sexuality. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 13, 
1369–1376.
Ferguson, R. A. (2004). Aberrations in black: Toward a queer of color critique. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Fine, C. (2010). Delusions of gender: How our minds, society, and neurosexism create difference. 
New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Fine, C. (2013, December 4). New insights into gendered brain wiring, or a perfect case 
study in neurosexism? The Conversation. Retrieved from http://theconversation.com/
newinsights-into-gendered-brain-wiring-or-a-perfect-case-study-in-neurosexism-21083
Fine, M. (1988). Sexuality, schooling, and adolescent females: The missing discourse of desire. 
Harvard Educational Review, 58, 29–53.
Fischer, N. L. (2013). Seeing “straight,” contemporary critical heterosexuality studies and sociol-
ogy: An introduction. The Sociological Quarterly, 54, 501–510.
Flore, J. (2014). Mismeasures of asexual desires. In M. Milks & K. J. Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexu-
alities: Feminist and queer perspectives (pp. 17–34). New York, NY: Routledge.
REFERENCES • 247
Flore, J. (2016). The problem of sexual imbalance and techniques of the self in the Diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders. History of Psychiatry, 27, 320–335.
Flore, J. (2018). Pharmaceutical intimacy: Managing female sexuality through Addyi. Sexualities, 
2, 569–586.
Floyd, K. (2009). The reification of desire: Toward a queer Marxism. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press.
Fortunati, L. (1995). The arcane of reproduction: Housework, prostitution, labor, and capital. 
Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia.
Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason. London: 
Tavistock.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language. New York, NY: 
Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1973). The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception. New York, NY: 
Random House.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, NY: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality, volume 1: An introduction. New York, NY: Random 
House.
Foucault, M. (2000). Governmentality. In J. Faubion (Ed.), Power: Essential works of Foucault 
1954–1984 (pp. 201–222). New York, NY: New Press.
Foucault, M. (2003). “Society must be defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976. New 
York, NY: Picador.
Francisco-Menchavez, V. (2018). The labor of care: Filipina migrants and transnational families in 
the digital age. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Frank, A., & Jones, T. (2003). Bioethics and the later Foucault. Journal of Medical Humanities, 24, 
179–86.
Freeman, E. (2010). Time binds: Queer temporalities, queer histories. Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
Freud, S. (1952). Female sexuality. In J. Strachey (Ed.), Sigmund Freud: Collected papers: Miscella-
neous papers, 1888–1938 (Vol. 5, pp. 252–272). London, UK: Hogarth and Institute of Psycho-
Analysis. (Original work published 1931)
Freud, S. (1961). Beyond the pleasure principle. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Friedan, B. (1963). The feminine mystique. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Gannon, L. (2002). A critique of evolutionary psychology. Psychology, Evolution & Gender, 4, 
173–218.
Garland-Thomson, R. (2002). Integrating disability, transforming feminist theory. NWSA Jour-
nal, 14, 1–32.
Gavey, N. (2005). Just sex? The cultural scaffolding of rape. London, UK: Routledge.
Gavey, N. (2011). Viagra and the coital imperative. In S. Seidman, N. Fischer, & C. Meeks (Eds.), 
Introducing the New Sexuality Studies (2nd ed., pp. 119–124). New York, NY: Routledge.
Geer, J. H., Morokoff, P., & Greenwood, P. (1974). Sexual arousal in women: The development of 
a measurement device for vaginal blood volume. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 3, 559–564.
Gentile, K. (2017a). Collectively creating conditions for emergence. In S. Grand & J. Salzberg 
(Eds.), Wounds of history: Repair and resilience in the trans-generational transmission of 
trauma (pp. 169–188). New York, NY: Routledge.
248 • REFERENCES
Gentile, K. (2017b, September 18). Commentary on Spurgas’ (2017) “Queering receptivity: Para-
sexual pleasure in the face of compulsory and feminized trauma.” Presented at Women and 
Society Seminar, University Seminars, Columbia University, New York, NY. 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Giraldi, A., Kristensen, E., & Sand, M. (2015). Endorsement of models describing sexual response 
of men and women with a sexual partner: An online survey in a population sample of Dan-
ish adults ages 20–65 years. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 12, 116–128.
Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates. 
Garden City, NY: Anchor Books/Doubleday.
Goffman, E. (1978). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. New York, NY: Jason 
Aronso Press.
Goldey, K. L., & van Anders, S. M. (2012). Sexual arousal and desire: Interrelations and responses 
to three modalities of sexual stimuli. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 9, 2315–2329.
Gottlieb, L. (2014, February 6). Does a more equal marriage mean less sex? The New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/magazine/does-a-more-equal- 
marriage-mean-less-sex.html
Gould, S. J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Gowaty, P. A. (2000). Sexual natures: How feminism changed evolutionary biology. Signs: Jour-
nal of Women in Culture and Society, 28, 901–921.
Graham, C. A. (2010). The DSM diagnostic criteria for female sexual arousal disorder. Archives of 
Sexual Behavior, 39, 240–255.
Graham, C. A. (2016). Reconceptualising women’s sexual desire and arousal in DSM-5. Psychol-
ogy & Sexuality, 7, 34–47.
Graham, C. A., Sanders, S. A., Milhausen, R. R., & McBride, K. R. (2004). Turning on and turn-
ing off: A focus group study of the factors that affect women’s sexual arousal. Archives of 
Sexual Behavior, 33, 527–538.
Grant, M. G. (2014). Playing the whore: The work of sex work. New York, NY: Verso Books.
Gray, J. (1992). Men are from Mars, women are from Venus: A practical guide for improving com-
munication and getting what you want in your relationships. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
Green, S. (2017, July 13). Violence against black women—many types, far-reaching effects. 
Retrieved from Institute for Women’s Policy Research website: https://iwpr.org/violence- 
black-women-many-types-far-reaching-effects/
Gregg, M. (2018). Counterproductive: Time management in the knowledge economy. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Grosz, E. (1990). Jacques Laçan: A feminist introduction. London, UK: Routledge.
Grosz, E. (1994). Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univer-
sity Press.
Gupta, K. (2011). “Screw health”: Representations of sex as a health-promoting activity in medical 
and popular literature. Journal of Medical Humanities, 32, 127–140.
Gupta, K. (2015). Compulsory sexuality: Evaluating an emerging concept. Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, 41, 131–154.
REFERENCES • 249
Gupta, K. (2017). What does asexuality teach us about sexual disinterest? Recommendations for 
health professionals based on a qualitative study with asexually identified people. Journal of 
Sex & Marital Therapy, 43, 1–14.
Gupta, K., & Cacchioni, T. (2013). Sexual improvement as if your health depends on it: An analy-
sis of contemporary sex manuals. Feminism & Psychology, 23, 442–458.
Halberstam, J. (2011). The queer art of failure. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biol-
ogy, 7, 1–16.
Hammonds, E. (1994). Black (w)holes and the geometry of Black black female sexuality. differ-
ences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 6, 126–145.
Hammonds, E. (1999). Toward a genealogy of black female sexuality: The problematic of Silence. 
In J. Price & M. Shildrick (Eds.), Feminist theory and the body: A reader (pp. 93–104. New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2004). Multitude: War and democracy in the age of empire. New York, 
NY: Penguin Books.
Hart, L. (1998). Between the body and the flesh: Performing sadomasochism. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press.
Hartman, S. (1997). Scenes of subjection: Terror, slavery, and self-making in nineteenth-century 
America. New York, NY: Oxford.
Heiman, J. (1977). A psychophysiological exploration of sexual arousal patterns in females and 
males. Psychophysiology, 14, 266–274.
Heiman, J. (1980). Female sexual response patterns: Interactions of physiological, affective, and 
contextual cues. Archives of General Psychiatry, 37, 1311–1316.
Heiman, J. (2002). Sexual dysfunction: Overview of prevalence, etiological factors, and treat-
ments. Journal of Sex Research, 39, 73–78.
Heiman, J., Lo Piccolo, L., & Lo Piccolo J. (1976). Becoming orgasmic: A sexual growth program 
for women. New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world?. Behavioral 
and brain sciences, 33, 61–83.
Hite, S. (1976). The Hite report. New York, NY: Dell.
Hochschild, A. R. (1985). The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Hochschild, A. R. (1997). The time bind: When work becomes home and home becomes work. New 
York, NY: Henry Holt Books.
Hochschild, A. R., & Machung, A. (1989). The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at 
home. New York, NY: Viking Books.
Hollibaugh, A. (2000). My dangerous desires: A queer girl dreaming her way home. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2002). Blowups and other unhappy endings. In B. Ehrenreich & A. R. 
Hochschild (Eds.), Global woman: Nannies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy (pp. 
55–69). New York, NY: Owl Books.
250 • REFERENCES
Hoon, P. W., Wincze, J. P., & Hoon, E. F. (1976). Physiological assessment of sexual arousal in 
women. Psychophysiology, 13, 196–204.
Hoskin, R. A., & Taylor, A. (2019). Femme resistance: The fem(me)inine art of failure. Psychology 
& Sexuality, 10, 281–300.
Hubbard, R. (1990). The politics of women’s biology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Huberman, J. S., & Chivers, M. L. (2015). Examining gender specificity of sexual response with 
concurrent thermography and plethysmography. Psychophysiology, 52, 1382–1395.
Huffer, L. (2013). Are the lips a grave?: A queer feminist on the ethics of sex. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press.
Human Rights Campaign. (2019). A national epidemic: Fatal anti-transgen-
der violence in the United States in 2019. Retrieved from https://www.hrc.org/
resources/a-national-epidemic-fatal-anti-trans-violence-in-the-united-states-in-2019
Hyde, J. S., & Durik, A. (2000). Gender differences in erotic plasticity: Evolutionary or sociocul-
tural forces? Comment on Baumeister (2000). Psychological Bulletin, 126, 375–379.
Ingraham, C. (2008). White weddings: Romancing heterosexuality in popular culture. New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Irigaray, L. (1985). This sex which is not one. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Irvine, J. M. (2002). Talk about sex: The battles over sex education in the United States. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.
Irvine, J. M. (2005). Disorders of desire: Sexuality and gender in modern American sexology. Phila-
delphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Jagose, A. (2013). Orgasmology. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
James, E. L. (2011). Fifty shades of grey. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
James, S. (2012). Sex, race, and class: The perspective of winning. A selection of writings 1952—2011. 
Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Janssen, E., Everaerd, W., Spiering, M., & Janssen, J. (2000). Automatic processes and the 
appraisal of sexual stimuli: Toward an information processing model of sexual arousal. Jour-
nal of Sex Research, 37, 8–23.
Janssen, E., McBride, K. R., Yarber, W., Hill, B. J., & Butler, S. M. (2008). Factors that influence 
sexual arousal in men: A focus group study. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 37, 252–265.
Johnson, M. L. (2010). Girl in need of a tourniquet: Memoir of a borderline personality. Berkeley, 
CA: Seal Press.
Johnson, M. L. (2013, October 24). Label C/Rip. Social Text: Periscope. Retrieved from http://
socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/label-crip/
Johnson, M. L. (2015). Bad romance: A crip feminist critique of queer failure, Hypatia, 30, 
251–267.
Johnson, M. L., & R. McRuer. (2014). Cripistemologies: Introduction. Journal of Literary & Cul-
tural Disability Studies, 8, 127–147.
Jones, L. (2011, March 24). Why bad sex is shortening your life. Cosmopolitan. Retrieved from 
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/tips-moves/orgasm-news
Jordan-Young, R. M. (2011). Brain storm: The flaws in the science of sex differences. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Jordan-Young, R. M., & Karkazis, K. (2019). Testosterone: An unauthorized biography. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
REFERENCES • 251
Jutel, A. (2010). Framing disease: The example of female hypoactive sexual desire disorder. Social 
Science & Medicine, 70, 1084–1090.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: How to cope with stress, pain and illness using mind-
fulness meditation. New York, NY: Piatkus.
Kafer, A. (2013). Feminist, queer, crip. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Kaler, A. (2006). Unreal women: Sex, gender, identity, and the lived experience of vulvar pain. 
Feminist Review, 82, 50–75.
Kang, M. (2010). The managed hand: Race, gender, and the body in beauty service work. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.
Kaplan, H. S. (1974). The new sex therapy: Active treatment of sexual dysfunctions. New York, NY: 
Brunner/Mazel.
Kaplan, H. S. (1977). Hypoactive sexual desire. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 3, 3–9.
Kaplan, H. S. (1979). Disorders of sexual desire: And other new concepts and techniques in sex ther-
apy. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Karama, S., Lecours, A. R., Leroux, J., Bourgouin, P., Beaudoin, G., Joubert, S., & Beauregard, 
M. (2002). Areas of brain activation in males and females during viewing of erotic film 
excerpts. Human Brain Mapping, 16, 1–13.
Karkazis, K. (2008). Fixing sex: Intersex, medical authority, and lived experience. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Kaye, K. (2011). Sexual intercourse. In S. Seidman, N. Fischer, & C. Meeks (Eds.), Introducing the 
New Sexuality Studies (2nd ed., pp. 113–118). New York, NY: Routledge.
Kim, E. (2014). Asexualities and disabilities in constructing sexual normalcy In M. Milks & K. J. 
Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexualities: Feminist and queer perspectives (pp. 249–282). New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Kim, J. (2017). Toward a crip-of-color critique: Thinking with Minich’s “Enabling Whom?” Lat-
eral 6.1, online, https://doi.org/10.25158/L6.1.14
Klein, M. (2002). Love, guilt, and reparation: And other works, 1921–1945 (The writings of Melanie 
Klein, volume 1). New York, NY: Free Press. (Original work published 1975)
Kleinplatz, P. J. (2006). Learning from extraordinary lovers: Lessons from the edge. In P. J. Klein-
platz & C. Moser (Eds.), Sadomasochism: Powerful pleasures (pp. 325–348). New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Kleinplatz, P. J. (2011). Arousal and desire problems: Conceptual, research and clinical consid-
erations or the more things change the more they stay the same. Sexual and Relationship 
Therapy, 26, 3–15.
Kleinplatz, P. J. (2018). History of the treatment of female sexual dysfunction(s). Annual Review 
of Clinical Psychology, 14, 1–25.
Kleinplatz, P. J., Ménard, A. D., Paquet, M.-P., Paradis, N., Campbell, M., Zuccarini, D., & Mehak, 
L. (2009). The components of optimal sexuality: A portrait of “great sex.” Canadian Journal 
of Human Sexuality, 18, 1–13.
Kleinplatz, P. J., Paradis, N., Charest, M., Lawless, S., Neufeld, M., Neufeld, R., . . . Rosen, L. 
(2018). From sexual desire discrepancies to desirable sex: Creating the optimal connection. 
Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 44, 438–449.
Kleinplatz, P. J., Rosen, L., Charest, M., & Spurgas, A. K. (2020). Sexuality and sexual dysfunc-
tions: Critical analyses. In J. Ussher, J. Chrisler, & J. Perz (Eds.), The Routledge interna-
252 • REFERENCES
tional handbook of women’s sexual and reproductive health (pp. 443–454). New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Kornrich, S., Brines, J., & Leupp, K. (2012). Egalitarianism, housework, and sexual frequency in 
marriage. American Sociological Review, 78, 26–50.
Koscis, A., & Newbury-Helps, J. (2016). Mindfulness in sex therapy and intimate relationships 
(MSIR): Clinical protocol and theory development. Mindfulness, 7, 690–699.
Kristeva, J. (1982). Powers of horror: An essay on abjection. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press.
Laan, E. (2007, August). A functional MRI study on gender differences in conscious self regulation 
of sexual arousal. Presented at the meeting of the International Academy of Sex Research, 
Vancouver, Canada.
Laan, E., & Both, S. (2008). What makes women experience desire? Feminism & Psychology, 18, 
505–514.
Laan, E., & Everaerd, W. (1995). Determinants of female sexual arousal: Psychophysiological 
theory and data. Annual Review of Sex Research, 6, 32–76.
Laan, E., & Everaerd, W. (1998). Physiological measures of vaginal vasocongestion. International 
Journal of Impotence Research, 10, S107–S110.
Laan, E., Scholte, H. S., & van Stegeren, A. (2006, September). Brain imaging of gender differences 
in sexual excitation and inhibition. Invited presentation for the 12th annual World Congress 
of the International Society for Sexual Medicine, Cairo, Egypt.
Labuski, C. M. (2014). Deferred desire: The asexuality of chronic genital pain. In M. Milks & K. J. 
Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexualities: Feminist and queer perspectives (pp. 301–327). New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Labuski, C. M. (2015). It hurts down there: The bodily imaginaries of female genital pain. Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press.
Labuski, C. M. (2017). A black and white issue? Learning to see the intersectional and racialized 
dimensions of gynecological pain. Social Theory & Health, 15, 160–181.
Lalumière, M. L. (2017). On the concept of category-specificity. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 46, 
1187–1190.
Lalumière, M. L., Sawatsky, M. L., Dawson, S. J., & Suschinsky, K. D. (2020). The empirical status 
of The Preparation Hypothesis: Explicating women’s genital responses to sexual stimuli in 
the laboratory. Archives of Sexual Behavior, online, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019- 
01599-5
LaMorgese, S. (2016, July 1). Dominatrix explains how “BDSM can be a form of medi-
tation.” Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
bdsm-meditation_b_10673686
Langdridge, D. (2011). The time of the sadomasochist: Hunting with(in) the “tribus.” In S. Seid-
man, N. Fischer, & C. Meeks (Eds.), Introducing the New Sexuality Studies (2nd ed., pp. 
372–379). New York, NY: Routledge.
Laplanche, J. (1976). Life & death in psychoanalysis. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press.
Laqueur, T. (1992). Making sex: Body and gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Laumann, E. O., Paik, A., & Rosen, R. (1999). Sexual dysfunctions in the United States: Preva-
lence and predictors. Journal of the American Medical Association, 281, 537–544.
REFERENCES • 253
Lawrence, A. A., Latty, E. M., Chivers, M. L., & Bailey, J. M. (2005.) Measurement of sexual 
arousal in postoperative male-to-female transsexuals using vaginal photoplethysmography. 
Archives of Sexual Behavior, 34, 135–145.
Leiblum, S. R., & Rosen, R. C. (1988). Introduction: Changing perspectives on sexual desire. In S. 
Leiblum, & R. Rosen (Eds.), Sexual desire disorders (pp. 1–17). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Lewontin, R. C. (1991). Biology as ideology: The doctrine of DNA. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Lief, H. I. (1977). Inhibited sexual desire. Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality, 7, 94–95.
Liesen, L. T. (2007). Women, behavior, and evolution: Understanding the debate between femi-
nist evolutionists and evolutionary psychologists. Politics and the Life Sciences, 26, 51–70.
Lindemann, D. (2011). BDSM as therapy? Sexualities, 14, 151–172.
Linden, R. R. (1983). Against sadomasochism: A radical feminist analysis. East Palo Alto, CA: Frog 
in the Well.
Loe, M. (2004). The rise of Viagra: How the little blue pill changed sex in America. New York, NY: 
New York University Press.
Lorde, A. (2007). Sister outsider. New York, NY: Random House. (Original work published 1984)
Lorde, A. (2015). An open letter to Mary Daly. In C. Moraga & G. Anzaldúa (Eds.), This bridge 
called my back: Writings by radical women of color (4th ed., pp. 90–93). Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press. (Original work published 1979)
Love, H. (2007). Feeling backward: Loss and the politics of queer history. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Mac, J., & Smith, M. (2018). Revolting prostitutes: The fight for sex workers’ rights. New York, NY: 
Verso Books.
MacDonald, C. L. (2015). Nannies on the market. In A. S. Wharton (Ed.), Working in Amer-
ica: Continuity, conflict, and change in a new economic era (pp. 103–120). London, UK: 
Routledge.
MacKinnon, C. A. (1982). Feminism, Marxism, method, and the state: An agenda for theory. 
Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 7, 515–544.
Madsen, P. (2013, January 18). Cracking the code on female sexual desire. Psychology Today. 
Retrieved from https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/shameless-woman/201301/
cracking-the-code-female-sexual-desire
Malabou, C. (2012). The new wounded: From neurosis to brain damage. New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press.
Maltz, W., & Holman, B. (1987). Incest and sexuality: A guide to understanding and healing. Lex-
ington, MA: Lexington Books.
Mamo, L., & Fishman, J. R. (2001). Potency in all the right places: Viagra as a technology of the 
gendered body. Body & Society, 7, 13–35.
Maravilla, K., & Yang, C. (2008). Magnetic resonance imaging and the female sexual response: 
Overview of techniques, results, and future directions. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 5, 
1559–1571.
Markowitz, S. (2001). Pelvic politics: Sexual dimorphism and racial difference. Signs, 26, 
389—414.
Martin, W. (2018). Untrue: Why nearly everything we believe about women, lust, and infidelity is 
wrong and how the new science can set us free. New York, NY: Little Brown Sparks.
254 • REFERENCES
Martínez-Guzmán, A., & Lara, A. (2019). Affective modulation in positive psychology’s regime of 
happiness. Theory & Psychology, 29, 336–357.
Marx, K. (1990). Capital: Volume 1: A critique of political economy (Reprint ed.). New York, NY: 
Penguin Classics.
Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1966). Human sexual response. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1970). Human sexual inadequacy. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15, 11–40.
Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
McClelland, S. I. (2010). Intimate justice: A critical analysis of sexual satisfaction. Social and Per-
sonality Psychology Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00293.x
McClintock, A. (1995). Imperial leather: Race, gender, and sexuality in the colonial contest. New 
York, NY: Routledge.
McKinnon, S. (2006). Neo-liberal genetics: The myths and moral tales of evolutionary psychology. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
McRuer, R. (2006). Crip theory: Cultural signs of queerness and disability. New York, NY: New 
York University Press.
McWhorter, L. (2004). Sex, race, and biopower: A Foucauldian genealogy. Hypatia, 19, 38–62.
McWhorter, L. (2009). Racism and sexual oppression in Anglo-America: A genealogy. Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press.
Meana, M. (2010). Elucidating women’s (hetero)sexual desire: Definitional challenges and con-
tent expansion. Journal of Sex Research, 47, 104–122.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1995). Phenomenology of perception. New York, NY: Routledge. (Original 
work published 1962)
Meston, C. M., & Buss, D. M. (2007). Why humans have sex. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 36, 
477–507.
Meston, C. M., & Buss, D. M. (2009). Why women have sex: Understanding sexual motivations 
from adventure to revenge (and everything in between). New York, NY: Times Books.
Mies, M. (2010, December 29). Colonization and housewifization. Caring labor: An archive. 
Retrieved from http://caringlabor.wordpress.com/2010/12/29/maria-mies-colonization- 
and-housewifization/
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: A methods source-
book (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Milks, M., & Cerankowski, K. J. (2014). Introduction: Why asexuality? Why now? In M. Milks & 
K. J. Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexualities: Feminist and queer perspectives (pp. 1–16). New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Miller, J. B. (1976). Toward a new psychology of women. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Mitchell, J., & Rose, J. (Eds.). (1985). Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne. 
New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Mitchell, K. R., Mercer, C. H., Ploubidis, G. B., Jones, K. G., Datta, J., Field, N., &Wellings, K. 
(2013). Sexual function in Britain: Findings from the Third National Survey of Sexual Atti-
tudes and Lifestyles (Natsal-3). Lancet, 382, 1817–1829.
Moir, J. (2012, June 21). Sorry, sisters, there’s nothing liberating about mummy porn. The Daily 
Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2162998/Fifty-Shades-
Grey-Sorry-sisters-theres-liberating-mummy-porn.html
REFERENCES • 255
Mollow, A. (2014). Criphystemologies: What disability theory needs to know about hysteria. 
Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 8, 185–201.
Moore, L. J., & Clarke, A. E. (1995). Clitoral conventions and transgressions: Graphic representa-
tions of female genital anatomy, c1900–1991. Feminist Studies, 21, 255–301.
Moraga, M., & Anzaldúa, G. (2015). This bridge called my back: Writings by radical women of 
color. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Moser, C., & Kleinplatz, P. J. (2006). Introduction: The state of our knowledge on SM. In P. J. 
Kleinplatz & C. Moser (Eds.), Sadomasochism: Powerful pleasures (pp. 1–16). New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Moynihan, R. (2005). The marketing of a disease: Female sexual dysfunction. BMJ, 330, 192–194.
Moynihan, R., & Mintzes, B. (2010). Sex, lies, and pharmaceuticals: How drug companies plan to 
profit from female sexual dysfunction. Berkeley, CA: Greystone Books.
Murphy, M. (2012). Seizing the means of reproduction: Entanglements of feminism, health, and 
technoscience. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Murphy, M. (2017.) The economization of life. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Murray, S. H. (2019). Not always in the mood: The new science of men, sex, and relationships. New 
York, NY: Rowman & Littlfield.
Musser, A. J. (2014). Sensational flesh: Race, power, and masochism. New York, NY: New York 
University Press.
Nagoski, E. (2015). Come as you are: The surprising new science that will transform your sex life. 
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Nash, J. C. (2014). The black body in ecstasy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Nash, J. C. (2019). Black feminism reimagined: After intersectionality. Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
Nelson, T., Cardemil, E. V., & Adeoye, C. T. (2016). Rethinking strength: Black women’s percep-
tions of the “strong black woman” role. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 40, 551–563.
New View Campaign. (2018). Welcome. Retrieved from http://www.newviewcampaign.org/
Newman, Andy. (2008, June 12). What women want (maybe). The New York Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/fashion/12bisex.html
Ngai, S. (2005). Ugly feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
O’Loughlin, J. I., & Brotto, L. A. (2020). Women’s sexual desire, trauma exposure, and posttrau-
matic stress disorder. Journal of Traumatic Stress, online, https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.22485
Ogas, O., & Gaddam, S. (2011). A billion wicked thoughts: What the internet tells us about sexual 
relationships. New York, NY: Plume Books.
Ogden, G. (2001). Integrating sexuality and spirituality: A group approach to women’s sexual 
dilemmas. In P. J. Kleinplatz (Ed.), New directions in sex therapy: Innovations and alterna-
tives (pp. 322–346). Philadelphia, PA: Brunner-Routledge.
Oliver, K. (2001). Witnessing: Beyond recognition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Oudshoorn, N. (1994). Beyond the natural body: An archaeology of sex hormones. New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Owens, D. C. (2017). Medical bondage: Race, gender, and the origins of American gynecology. Ath-
ens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
256 • REFERENCES
Owens, E. A. (2019). Keyword 7: Consent. differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 30, 
148–156. 
Parreñas, R. S. (2002). The care crisis in the Philippines: Children and transnational families in 
the new global economy. In B. Ehrenreich & A. R. Hochschild (Eds.), Global woman: Nan-
nies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy (pp. 39–54). New York, NY: Owl Books.
Pascoe, C. J. (2011). Dude, you’re a fag: Masculinity and sexuality in high school. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Patsavas, A. (2014). Recovering a cripistemology of pain: Leaky bodies, connective tissue, and 
feeling discourse. Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 8, 203–218.
Perel, E. (2006). Mating in captivity: Reconciling the erotic & the domestic. New York, NY: 
HarperCollins.
Perel, E. (2017). The state of affairs: Rethinking infidelity. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Peterson, Z. D., & Muehlenhard, C. L. (2007). Conceptualizing the “wantedness” of women’s 
consensual and nonconsensual sexual experiences: Implications for how women label their 
experiences with rape. Journal of Sex Research, 44, 72–88.
Piepzna-Samarasinha, L. L. (2018). Care work: Dreaming disability justice. Vancouver, BC: Arse-
nal Pulp Press.
Pitts-Taylor, V. (2003). In the flesh: The cultural politics of body modification. New York, NY: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Pitts-Taylor, V. (2007). Surgery junkies: Wellness and pathology in cosmetic culture. New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Pitts-Taylor, V. (2016). The brain’s body: Neuroscience and corporeal politics. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Preciado, P. B. (2013). Testo junkie: Sex, drugs, and biopolitics in the pharmacopornographic era. 
New York, NY: Feminist Press.
Przybylo, E. (2013). Producing facts: Empirical asexuality and the scientific study of sex. Femi-
nism & Psychology, 23, 224–242.
Przybylo, E. (2014). Masculine doubt and sexual wonder: Asexually-identified men talk about 
their (a)sexualities. In M. Milks & K. J. Cerankowski (Eds.), Asexualities: Feminist and queer 
perspectives (pp. 225–247). New York, NY: Routledge.
Puar, J. (2007). Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press.
Puar, J. (2011). The cost of getting better: Suicide, sensation, switchpoints. GLQ, 18, 149–158.
Puar, J. (2017). The right to maim: Debility, capacity, disability. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.
Purser, R. E. (2019). McMindfulness: How mindfulness became the new capitalist spirituality. Lon-
don, UK: Repeater.
Rabinow, P. (1996.) Artificiality and enlightenment: From sociobiology to biosociality. In J. 
Crary and S. Kwinter (Eds.), Incorporations (pp. 234–252). New York, NY: Zone. 
Race, K. (2009). Pleasure consuming medicine: The queer politics of drugs. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Repo, J. (2016). The biopolitics of gender. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Rich, A. (1980). Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society, 5, 631–660.
REFERENCES • 257
Richardson, S. (2012). Sexing the X: How the X became the ‘female chromosome’. Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society, 37, 909–933. 
Ridley, M. (2003). The red queen: Sex and the evolution of human nature (Reprint ed.). New York, 
NY: Harper Perennial.
Rieger, G., Chivers, M. L., & Bailey, J. M. (2005). Sexual arousal patterns of bisexual men. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 16, 579–584.
Roberts, D. (1997). Killing the black body: Race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty. New 
York, NY: Vintage Books.
Rodriguez, J. M. (2019). Keyword 6: Testimony. differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 
30, 119–125. 
Rogak, H. M. E., & Connor, J. J. (2018). Practice of consensual BDSM and relationship satisfac-
tion. Sexual and Relationship Therapy, 33, 454–469.
Roiphe, K. (2012, April 16). Working women’s fantasies. Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.
newsweek.com/working-womens-fantasies-63915
Rose, N. (2001). The politics of life itself. Theory, Culture & Society, 18, 1–30.
Rose, N. (2007). The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty first 
century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rose, S., Kamin, L. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1984). Not in our genes: Biology, ideology and human 
nature. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
Rosenthal, A. M., Sylva, D., Safron, A., & Bailey, J. M. (2011). Sexual arousal patterns of bisexual 
men revisited. Biological Psychology, 88, 112–115.
Rubin, G. (1975). The traffic in women: Notes on the “political economy” of sex. In L. Nicholson 
(Ed.), The second wave: A reader in feminist theory (pp. 27–62). New York, NY: Routledge.
Rubin, G. (1984). Thinking sex: Notes for a radical theory of the politics of sexuality. In C. Vance 
(Ed.), Pleasure and danger: Exploring female sexuality (pp. 267–319). London: Routledge.
Ruído, M. (2011, February 8). Just do it! Bodies and images of women in the new division of 
labor. Caring labor: An archive. Retrieved from http://caringlabor.wordpress.com/2011/02/08/
maria-ruido-just-do-it-bodies-and-images-of-women-in-the-new-division-of-labor/
Rupp, L., Taylor, V., Regev-Messalem, S., Fogarty, A. C. K., & England, P. (2014). Queer women 
in the hookup scene: Beyond the closet? Gender & Society, 28, 212–235.
Safron, A., Sylva, D., Klimaj, V., Rosenthal, A. M., & Bailey, J. M. (2019). Neural responses to 
sexual stimuli in heterosexual and homosexual men and women: Men’s responses are more 
specific. Archives of Sexual Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-01521-z
Schreiber, K. (2012, July/August). Flex appeal. Psychology Today, 36–37.
Schuller, K. (2018). The biopolitics of feeling: Race, sex, and science in the nineteenth century. Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press.
Segal, Z., Williams, J., & Teasdale, J. (2001). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression: A 
new approach to preventing relapse. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Seltzer, L. (2012a, May 11). The triggers of sexual desire: Men vs. women [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-self/201205/
the-triggers-sexual-desire-men-vs-women
Seltzer, L. (2012b, May 14). The triggers of sexual desire Pt 2: What’s erotic for women? [Blog 
post]. Retrieved from https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-self/201205/
the-triggers-sexual-desire-pt-2-what-s-erotic-women
258 • REFERENCES
Seltzer, L. (2012c, May 17). Paradox and pragmatism in women’s sexual desire [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evolution-the-self/201205/
paradox-and-pragmatism-in-women-s-sexual-desire
Shedler, J. (2010). The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 65, 
98–109.
Shifren, J. L., Monz, B. U., Russo, P. A., Segreti, A., & Johannes, C. B. (2008). Sexual problems 
and distress in United States women: Prevalence and correlates. Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
112, 970–978.
Silverman, K. (1992). Male subjectivity at the margins. New York, NY: Routledge.
Sims, K., & Meana, M. (2010). Why did passion wane? A qualitative study of married women’s 
attributions for declines in sexual desire. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 36, 360–380.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. Minneapolis, MN: Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
Snorton, C. R. (2017). Black on both sides: A racial history of trans identity. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota.
Somerville, S. (1994). Scientific racism and the emergence of the homosexual body. Journal of the 
History of Sexuality, 5, 243–266.
Somerville, S. (2000). Queering the color line: Race and the invention of homosexuality in Ameri-
can culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Spillers, H. (1987). Mama’s baby, Papa’s maybe: An American grammar book. Diacritics, 17, 64–81.
Spurgas, A. K. (2013a). Interest, arousal, and shifting diagnoses of female sexual dysfunction, or: 
How women learn about desire. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 14, 187–205.
Spurgas, A. K. (2013b). Gendered populations and trauma beyond Oedipus: Reply to Angel’s 
commentary. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 14, 217–223.
Spurgas, A. K. (2016a). Low desire, trauma, and femininity in the DSM-5: A case for sequelae. 
Psychology & Sexuality, 7, 48–67.
Spurgas, A. K. (2016b, March 9). Solving desire. The New Inquiry. Retrieved from http://the-
newinquiry.com/essays/solving-desire/
Spurgas, A. K. (under review). The Freedom to Fall Apart: A Crip Theory of Feminine Fracture. 
Stahl, S., Sommer, B., & Allers, K. (2011). Multifunctional pharmacology of flibanserin: Possible 
mechanism of therapeutic action in hypoactive sexual desire disorder. Journal of Sexual 
Medicine, 8, 15–27.
Stekel, W. (1926). Frigidity in woman in relation to her love life. New York, NY: Liveright.
Stockton, K. B. (2006). Beautiful bottom, beautiful shame: Where “black” meets “queer.” Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.
Stoler, A. L. (1995). Race and the education of desire: Foucault’s history of sexuality and the colonial 
order of things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Subramaniam, B., & Willey, A. (2016). Fighting the derpy science of sexuality. Archives of Sexual 
Behavior, 45, 513–515.
Suschinksy, K. D., Dawson, S. J., & Chivers, M. L. (2020). Assessing gender-specificity of clitoral 
responses. The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 29, 57–64.
Suschinsky, K. D., Fisher, T. D., Maunder, L., Hollenstein, T., & Chivers, M. L. (2020). Use of 
the bogus pipeline increases sexual concordance in women but not men. Archives of Sexual 
Behavior, 49, 1517–1532. 
REFERENCES • 259
Suschinsky, K. D., Huberman, J. S., Maunder, L., Brotto, L. A., Hollenstein, T., & Chivers, M. L. 
(2019). The relationship between sexual functioning and sexual concordance in women. 
Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 45, 230–246.
Suschinsky, K. D., & Lalumière, M. L. (2011). Prepared for anything? An investigation of female 
genital arousal in response to rape cues. Psychological Science, 22, 159–165.
Suschinsky, K. D., Lalumière, M. L., & Chivers, M. L. (2009). Sex differences in patterns of geni-
tal arousal: Measurement artifact or true phenomenon? Archives of Sexual Behavior, 38, 
559–573.
Symons, D. (1979). The evolution of human sexuality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Szasz, T. (1960). The myth of mental illness. The American Psychologist, 15, 113–118.
Terranova, T. (2004). Network culture: Politics for the information age. London, UK: Pluto.
Thornhill, R., & Palmer, C. T. (2000). A natural history of rape: Biological bases of sexual coercion. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tiefer, L. (1991). Historical, scientific, clinical and feminist criticisms of “the human sexual 
response cycle” model. Annual Review of Sex Research, 2, 1–23.
Tiefer, L. (1995). Sex is not a natural act and other essays. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Tiefer, L. (1996). The medicalization of sexuality: Conceptual, normative, and professional issues. 
Annual Review of Sex Research, 7, 252–282.
Tiefer, L. (2001). A new view of women’s sexual problems: Why new? Why now? Journal of Sex 
Research, 38, 89–96.
Tiefer, L. (2006). Female sexual dysfunction: A case study of disease mongering and activist 
resistance. PLoS Medicine, 3, e178.
Tiefer, L. (2012). Medicalizations and demedicalizations of sexuality therapies. Journal of Sex 
Research, 49, 311–318.
Toates, F. (2014). How sexual desire works: The enigmatic urge. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Tolman, D. L. (1994). Doing desire: Adolescent girls’ struggles for/with sexuality. Gender & Soci-
ety, 8, 324–342.
Tolman, D. L. (2005). Dilemmas of desire: Teenage girls talk about sexuality. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Tolman, D. L. (2006). In a different position: Conceptualizing female adolescent sexuality devel-
opment within compulsory heterosexuality. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Devel-
opment, 112, 71–89.
Tolman, D. L., & McClelland, S. I. (2011). Normative sexuality development in adolescence: A 
decade in review, 2000–2009. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 21, 242–255.
Travis, C. B. (2003). Evolution, gender, and rape. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Trivers, R. L. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (Ed.), Sexual selec-
tion and the descent of man (pp. 136–179). New York, NY: Aldine DeGruyter.
Tyler, M. (2009). No means yes? Perpetuating myths in the sexological construction of women’s 
desire. Women & Therapy, 32, 40–50.
Ussher, J. M. (2011). The madness of women: Myth and experience. London, UK: Routledge.
Ussher, J. M. (2017). Unraveling the mystery of “The specificity of women’s sexual response and 
its relationship with sexual orientations”: The social construction of sex and sexual identi-
ties. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 46, 1207–1211.
260 • REFERENCES
Valocchi, S. (2005). Not yet queer enough: The lessons of queer theory for the sociology of gen-
der and sexuality. Gender & Society, 19, 750–770.
Van Anders, S. M. (2015). Beyond sexual orientation: Integrating gender/sex and diverse sexuali-
ties via sexual configurations theory. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 44, 1177–1213.
Vance, C. S. (Ed.). (1992). Pleasure and danger: Exploring female sexuality. New York, NY: New 
York University Press.
Velten, J. Scholten, S., Graham, C. A., Adolph, D., & Margraf, J. (2016). Investigating female 
sexual concordance: Do sexual excitation and sexual inhibition moderate the agreement of 
genital and subjective sexual arousal in women? Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45, 1957–1971.
Vidal, F., & Ortega, F. (2017). Being brains: Making the cerebral subject. New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press.
von Werlhof, C. (1988). On the concept of nature and society in capitalism. In M. Mies, V. Ben-
nholdt-Thomsen, & C. von Werlhof (Eds.), Women: The last colony, 96–112. London, UK: 
Zed Books.
Wade, L. (2017). American hookup: The new culture of sex on campus. New York: W. W. Norton.
Waidzunas, T., & Epstein, S. (2015). “For men, arousal is orientation”: Bodily truthing, techno-
sexual scripts, and the materialization of sexualities through the phallometric test. Social 
Studies of Science, 45, 187–213.
Ward, J. (2015). Not gay: Sex between straight white men. New York, NY: New York University 
Press.
Warner, M. (1991). Introduction: Fear of a queer planet. Social Text, 9, 3–17. 
Washington, H. A. (2006). Medical apartheid: The dark history of medical experimentation on 
black Americans from colonial times to the present. New York, NY: Broadway Books.
Weeks, K. (2011). The problem with work: Feminism, Marxism, antiwork politics, and postwork 
Imaginaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Weheliye, A. G. (2014). Habeas viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist 
theories of the human. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Weiner, L., & Avery-Clark, C. (2014). Sensate focus: Clarifying the Masters and Johnson’s model. 
Sexual and Relationship Therapy, 1–13.
Weiner-Davis, M. (2003). The sex-starved marriage: Boosting your marriage libido, a couple’s 
guide. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Weiss, M. (2011). Techniques of pleasure: BDSM and the circuits of sexuality. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Wertheimer, E., & Casper, M. (2016). Within trauma: An introduction. In E. Wertheimer & M. J. 
Casper (Eds.), Critical trauma studies: Understanding violence, conflict, and memory in every-
day life (pp. 1–18). New York, NY: New York University Press.
West, S. L., D’Aloisio, A., Agans, R., Kalsbeek, W., Borisov, N., & Thorp, J. (2008). Prevalence of 
low sexual desire and hypoactive sexual desire disorder in a nationally representative sample 
of U. S. women. Archives of Internal Medicine, 168, 1441–1449.
Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and literature. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, D. (2010, June 18). Drug for sexual desire disorder opposed by panel. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/19/business/19sexpill.html
Wilson, E. A. (2004). Psychosomatic: Feminism and the neurological body. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
REFERENCES • 261
Wilson, E. A. (2015). Gut feminism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Wilson, E. O. (2000). Sociobiology: The new synthesis (25th anniversary ed.). Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press.
Wingfield, A. H. (2015). Are some emotions marked “whites only”? Racialized feeling rules in 
professional workplaces. In A. S. Wharton (Ed.), Working in America: Continuity, conflict, 
and change in a new economic era (pp. 201–214). London, UK: Routledge.
Working Group for the New View of Women’s Sexual Problems. (2002). A new view of women’s 
sexual problems. Women & Therapy, 24, 1–8.
Yehuda, R., Lehrner, A, & Rosenbaum, T. Y. (2015). PTSD and sexual dysfunction in men and 
Women. Journal of Sexual Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1111/jsm.12856
Young, I. M. (2005). On female body experience: “Throwing like a girl” and other essays. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.




I N D E X
abuse, sexual. See trauma and gendered 
violence
active passivity, 125–26
Addyi (flibanserin), 66, 92–95, 98
affective labor. See carework and embodied 
labor
Against Sadomasochism (Linden), 193
agency, sexual, 24, 126, 172n3, 194–95, 204–5, 
218–20, 225






arousal: category-specific, 73–78; FSAD 
(female sexual arousal disorder), 84–85; 
incentive motivation model, 65n2, 
69–72, 83, 91, 222–23; information pro-
cessing model (IPM) of, 69n4; interest 
and desire linked to, 118–24; interest 
vs., 85; preceding or co-occurring with 
desire, 70, 118–21; subjective arousal 
merged with desire in FSIAD, 85. See 
also concordance and discordance; 
FSIAD diagnosis; plethysmography and 
mind/body disjuncture; receptivity; 
responsiveness
“‘Arousal-First’ Desire May Be More Typical 
for Women, and It Doesn’t Need a Cure” 
(Bielski), 221–24
arousal-first sexual response model. See cir-
cular sexual response cycle
arousometer, 4, 73
asexuality, 89, 188, 195
Avery-Clark, Constance, 43
Bailey, J. Michael, 74
Barbach, Lonnie, 51n8, 114–15
barter logic, 161–63, 176
Basson, Rosemary, 6, 67–69, 96, 164–65. See 
also circular sexual response cycle
Battaile, Georges, 194
Baumeister, Roy, 31, 57–61, 83
BDSM (bondage and discipline/dominance 
and submission/sadism and masoch-
ism). See parasexuality, submission, and 
BDSM
Becoming Orgasmic (Heiman, Lo Piccolo, 
and Lo Piccolo), 114–15
behaviorist perspective: cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT), 95, 97, 100; cognitive 
264 • INDEx
behaviorism, 43, 48, 53; conversion ther-
apy, 75; cost-benefit analysis and con-
ditioning models, 2–3; desensitization 
approach, 42–43; desire in, 52; Masters 
and Johnson Institute, 43; receptivity 
management and, 98–100; sensate focus 
technique, 43–44, 96–97; sexual self-
management and, 100–106
Benjamin, Jessica, 104, 204
Bergner, Daniel, 1–2, 4–7, 74, 224
Berlant, Lauren, 122, 225
Bersani, Leo, 187, 193n4
Bielski, Zosia, 221–24
Billion Wicked Thoughts, A (Ogas and Gad-
dam), 78
biopolitical regimes: cultural feminism and, 
115; Foucault on, 6, 20–21, 218; neoliberal 
form of labor, 150–51, 178, 182–83; popu-
lation production, 151, 157; regulation 
and new potential, 230–31; regulatory 
control and sexual self-management, 
101–6; self-optimization, 101–2, 150, 151, 
182; sexual carework and, 176–81. See 
also mindfulness-based sex therapy
biopsychosocial model, 42, 71
bisexuality, 29, 36, 74
Black femininity and sexual difference, 11–14. 
See also race and racialization
Blanchard, Ray, 74




body shutting down as resistance, 143–47
Both, Stephanie, 69, 70n5




Brotto, Lori: on BDSM, 211n9; Bergner 
on, 1–2, 6; on discordance, 142–43; 
DSM-5, FSIAD, and, 82–86; mindful-
ness-based sex therapy (MBST) and, 
96–100, 103n19; on responsiveness in 
men, 87n14; story of “Gianna,” 230; on 
trauma, 122
Buss, David, 54–57, 83
Butler, Judith, 212
bypassing, 48–49, 105, 210
Cacchioni, Thea, 131, 150–52, 164, 169, 214
camp, 211–12
capacitation, regimes of, 181–83
carework and embodied labor: barter and 
“men only want one thing” logic, 
161–64; beyond the bedroom, 174–75; 
biopolitics of, 176–81; carework, defined, 
153; in childhood and youth, 158–61; as 
coercion, 175–76; Cossman’s sexual citi-
zenship and Cacchioni’s “sex work,” 151; 
“doing it anyway” and “going through 
the motions,” 164–69; egalitarianism 
and, 148, 155–56; faking it and affective 
performances of pleasure, 169–74; lib-
eral capitalist and neoliberal biopoliti-
cal forms of work, 149–53, 178, 182–83; 
regimes of capacitation, 181–83; social 
reproduction, receptivity, and feminized 




Chivers, Meredith, 4–5, 74–82, 97–98, 190–91, 
221–23, 231
Chodorow, Nancy, 112
Chu, Andrea Long, 112n4, 193n4
circular sexual response cycle: about, 68–69; 
Brotto and, 83; critiques of, 89–91; 
defined, 6; feminism and, 115; gender 
neutrality and, 222–23; incentive moti-
vation model and, 71n6; MBST and, 
97; mindfulness and, 117; Weiner-Davis 
and, 177
cisnormativity: biomedical frameworks and, 
229; evolutionary narratives and, 109; 
feminized receptivity models and, 72; 
feminized responsive desire framework 
and, 8, 25; Masters & Johnson and, 41; 
sex therapy, sexology, and, 228; sexual 
difference and, 54, 135; volumetric stud-
ies and, 4n1
citizenship, sexual, 151, 179, 182
Clare, Eli, 109n2
clitoral photoplethysmography, 73
clitoris: Freud on shift to vagina, 35–36; Mas-
ters & Johnson on, 40, 41, 46; orgasm 
and, 40, 41, 46, 58, 132; plethysmography 
and, 4, 73
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), 95, 97, 
100
INDEx • 265
cognitive behaviorism, 43, 48, 53. See also 
behaviorist perspective
cognitive conditioning, 3
Collins, Patricia Hill, 159, 197, 233
Comella, Lynn, 179n4
complexity of female sexuality: Baumeister’s 
erotic plasticity hypothesis, 59–61, 83; in 
evolutionary psychology, 58–61; Freud 
on, 36–37; FSIAD and, 87; Kaplan and, 
47, 49; pathologizing-healing dialectic 
and, 137–39; political and material fac-
tors, 227; socialization and, 133–34
compulsory (hetero)sexuality: asexuality 
studies and, 19, 195; carework and, 25, 
150; evolutionary psychology and, 52–53; 
feminism and, 110, 115; naturalness and, 
40n5; parasexuality and, 26; self-optimi-
zation and, 102; sexual difference and, 
38–39; Viagra and, 93
concordance and discordance: Baumeister 
and, 60; Bielski on, 222; biological-
psychological-social feedback loops, 
141–47; category-specificity, 73–78; 
Chivers on, 76; consent and, 142; discor-
dance vs. concordance, 4–5, 23, 63; evo-
lutionary psychology and, 58; excessive 
concordance, 81; MBST and, 97; pleth-
ysmography and, 7, 75, 80–81; reverse 
discordance, 143; submission linked to, 
190–91; trauma and, 99. See also plethys-
mography and mind/body disjuncture
Conniff, Richard, 63
Conrad, Peter, 18
consent: Brotto on arousal and, 142; care-
work and, 176; Chivers on, 78; desire-
interest-arousal linkage and, 120–24; 
enthusiastic, 215; fantasy about, 201; 
feminized responsive desire framework 
and, 169; foreclosure of, 196; MBST and, 
99; murkiness of nonconsent vs., 232; 
parasexuality and, 199, 219; passion and, 
204; trust and, 186, 201, 201n7
conversion therapy and orgasmic recondi-




couples, research focus on, 41–42, 46
Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 233
crip theory and cripistemology, 19, 109, 144, 
232–33
cue-specificity, 73n7
cultural feminism, 110–18, 142, 193n4





Deleuze, Gilles, 101, 194
depersonalization, 120
desensitization technique, 42–43
desire: all human desire as responsive, 69; 
arousal preceding or co-occurring with, 
70, 118–21; biopolitical control and, 102; 
egalitarianism and, 148; in evolution-
ary sexology, 52–61; husbandry and, 
105–6; interest and arousal linked to, 
118–24; Kaplan and, 45; Kaplan’s, Dis-
orders of Sexual Desire, 46; nonsexual, 
186–87; in post-psychoanalytic milieu, 
52; psychoanalytic accounts after Freud, 
dismissal of, 104; seeking the “truth” of 
female desire, 227–28; spontaneous vs. 
responsive, 14–15, 65, 127–29; subjec-
tive arousal merged with, in FSIAD, 85. 
See also arousal; FSIAD diagnosis; low 
female sexual desire; plethysmography 
and mind/body disjuncture; receptivity; 
responsiveness
determinism, biological, 51–52
DeVault, Marjorie L., 167
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (DSM): biopolitical con-
trol and, 102–3; desire disorders and 
compulsory sexuality, 52–53; FSIAD in 
DSM-IV and DSM-5, 7, 84; New View 
Campaign protest against, 116–17; sex-
ual disorders in history of, 15. See also 
FSIAD diagnosis
difference, gender. See sexual difference
dilators, 42–43
disability studies, 19, 144, 232–33
discordance. See concordance and 
discordance
Disorders of Sexual Desire (Kaplan), 46
dissociation: essentialization of, 190, 218; 
feminizing of, 226; low desire and, 
165–67; rethinking, 232–34; trauma 
and, 99, 120–23, 160; voicelessness and, 
200. See also concordance and discor-
266 • INDEx
dance; plethysmography and mind/body 
disjuncture
distributive ontologies, 33
Dodson, Betty, 51n8, 114
Donegan, Moira, 231–32
drugs. See pharmaceuticals
dual control model, 70n4
Duncombe, Jean, 151n1, 169
Dworkin, Andrea, 110–11, 193n4
dyspareunia, 146, 150
egalitarianism, 148, 155–56, 191
Ellis, Havelock, 12
embodied labor, invisible. See carework and 
embodied labor
erectile disorder (ED), 66, 132
erection, 132, 135
erotic plasticity hypothesis, 59–61, 83
estrogen, 37
Everaerd, Walter, 69, 70n5
evolutionary psychology (EP): Baumeister’s 
erotic plasticity hypothesis, 59–61, 83; 
DSM-5 and, 83; Freud, affinity with, 37, 
38; history of, 53–54; impact of, 57–58; 
in popular sphere, 56, 58; prepara-
tion hypothesis, 31, 77, 143, 143n10, 189, 
190n2; “quality over quantity” and, 30; 
racialized sexual difference and, 11–12; 
rape and, 30; sexually dimorphic desire 
in, 52–61; as uncritiqueable, 55; as uni-
versal and ubiquitous, 56–57
Fahs, Breanne, 169, 196–97
fantasy, 127–29, 201–2, 231
Fausto-Sterling, Anne, 12
Federici, Silvia, 154–55
feedback loops, 50–51, 105, 141–47
female-friendly sexual response models, 
66–72
female sexual arousal disorder (FSAD), 
84–85
“Female Sexuality” (Freud), 29–30
Feminine Mystique, The (Friedan), 153
feminism: Baumeister and, 60–61; BDSM 
and, 192–95, 219; cultural, 110–18, 142, 
193n4; DSM desire diagnoses and, 52–53; 
feminized responsive desire framework 
and, 8; heteronormativity and, 110–11; 
medicalization and, 18–19; #MeToo 
movement and, 231–32; protocol femi-
nism, 115–16; psychoanalysis and, 32; 
sex-positive, 61, 111, 179, 194, 218
feminized responsive desire framework: 
behaviorist perspective and condition-
ing models, 2–3; cultural embeddedness 
of, 227–28; feminism and, 8; FSIAD 
diagnosis and, 6–7; heteronormativity 
in, 91; prediction, control, and, 229–32; 
techniques and circular sexual response 
cycle (overview), 5–6; ugly side of, 
165–66; volumetric studies and pleth-
ysmography (overview), 3–4; whiteness 
as foundation of, 13–14. See also circular 
sexual response cycle; concordance and 
discordance; FSIAD diagnosis; plethys-
mography and mind/body disjuncture; 
receptivity; responsiveness
femmes: andro-femme, 185n1; Cvetkovich on, 
126, 187, 204–5; interview participants, 
125–26, 204–5; pathologizing of, 8; queer 
femme receptivity, 126; strap-on dildos 
and, 212; tempo and, 207; trauma and, 
185, 188, 197, 225–26, 228–29, 232–33
fertility-dependent change hypothesis, 77
Fifty Shades of Grey (James), 190–92
Fine, Cordelia, 61–62
Fishman, Jennifer R., 93, 132
flashbacks, 49–50
flibanserin (Addyi), 66, 92–95, 98
Flore, Jacinthe, 89
Foucault, Michel, 6, 18n5, 20–21, 101, 218
four-dimensional model of sexuality, 115
frequency of sex, 168




FSIAD diagnosis (female sexual interest/
arousal disorder): criteria and diag-
nostic terminology, 84–89; critiques of, 
89–92; in DSM, 7; as gender-neutral SI/
AD, 222–23; MHSDD compared to, 84, 
87–89; rationale for changes in DSM-
5, 82–83; as relational diagnosis, 129; 
trauma and, 99; undertheorization and 
implications of, 102–5
Gaddam, Sai, 78, 190–91
gap, mind/body. See concordance and dis-





gender differences. See sexual difference
gender neutrality of sexual response models, 
222–23
gender-nonconforming people, 8–9, 49, 
196n5, 207, 225, 231–33
genderqueer people, 4, 9, 22, 134, 179, 181, 
183, 196n5, 207–8, 231–33
genito-pelvic pain/penetration disorder 
(GPPPD), 43
Gilligan, Carol, 113, 115
Goffman, Erving, 18n5
Gottlieb, Lori, 148
Gould, Stephen Jay, 53n10
Graham, Cynthia, 83
Grant, Melissa Gira, 152
Gray, John, 62n12
“gynephilic” women, 76–78
Hart, Lynda, 193, 194, 204, 225
Hartman, Saidiya, 12
Heiman, Julia, 114
heteronormativity: biomedical frameworks 
and, 229; carework and, 150, 178–79; 
evolutionary narratives and, 109; femi-
nism and, 110–11; feminized receptivity 
models and, 72; feminized responsive 
desire framework and, 8, 25, 91; male 
aggression and, 199; Masters & Johnson 
and, 40, 41; parasexuality and rejec-
tion of heteronormative scripts, 214–17; 
penile-vaginal intercourse as norm, 
131–33; sex therapy, sexology, and, 228; 
sexual difference and, 54, 135; volumetric 
studies and, 4n1
history of therapeutic models. See sex ther-
apy models, history of
Hite Report, 114
Hochschild, Arlie Russell, 149
hormonal cycles, 136–37
Human Sexual Response (Masters and John-
son), 39
human sexual response cycle (HSRC), 39–40, 
46, 65, 67, 116
husbandry, 105–6, 183
hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD), 
15, 52–53, 67, 84–85
hysteria, 29, 32–33, 143–44
In a Different Voice (Gilligan), 113
incentive motivation model (IMM), 65n2, 
69–72, 83, 91, 222–23
inconsistency theme, feminine, 60
individualistic approaches in sex therapy, 
53, 54
information processing model (IPM), 69n4
inhibited sexual desire (ISD), 15, 51, 52–53
intentionality, sexual, 199, 201, 203, 216–17
intercourse, penile-vaginal, social emphasis 
on, 131–33
interest: arousal and desire linked to, 118–24; 
in FSIAD, 84–87
International Society for the Study of Wom-
en’s Sexual Health (ISSWSH), 66
International Wages for Housework Cam-
paign (WfH), 153–54
intimate labor. See carework and embodied 
labor
Jagose, Annamarie, 3, 102, 172n3, 230
James, Selma, 154
Johnson, Lisa, 19, 144, 232–233
Johnson, Virginia, 38–45, 73, 96, 116
Kabat-Zinn, Jon, 95–96
Kaplan, Helen Singer, 44–52, 115, 210; Mas-








labial thermistor clip method, 73
labor, embodied. See carework and embod-
ied labor
Labuski, Christine, 10, 109, 131, 143, 150, 152, 
164, 171, 178
Lalumière, Martin, 73n7, 143n10
Laplanche, Jean, 104
Lewontin, Richard, 53n10
liberal capitalist form of labor, 149–53, 178, 
182–83
liberation, sexual, 41, 78
Loe, Meika, 93, 131, 132
Lo Piccolo, Joseph, 114
268 • INDEx
Lo Piccolo, Leslie, 114
Lorde, Audre, 111
love and sex, neurological linking of, 49–50
low female sexual desire: biopolitics and, 
176–81; carework and, 152, 159; clinical 
category, women-with-low-desire as, 118; 
clinical history of, 14–17; coercion and, 
175–76; desire-interest-arousal linkage, 
118–24; “doing it anyway” and “going 
through the motions,” 164–69; enhanc-
ing pleasure and, 206–17; faking it and 
affective performances of pleasure, 169–
74; hermeneutics of, as frames of refer-
ence, 186; “men only want one thing” 
logic and, 161–64; nature/nurture binary 
and, 130–31; penetrative sex as the only 
“real” sex and, 131–33; phenomenologi-
cal experience of gendered body and, 
135–37. See also arousal; circular sexual 
response cycle; concordance and dis-
cordance; desire; FSIAD diagnosis; sex 
therapy models, history of
Lybrido and Lybridos, 93
Mac, Juno, 152
MacKinnon, Catherine, 110–11, 193n4
male hypoactive sexual desire disorder 
(MHSDD), 84, 87–89, 121
Mamo, Laura, 93, 132
Markowitz, Sally, 12–13
Marsden, Dennis, 151n1, 169
Marx, Karl, 153
masculinization of sex, 137–39, 162
masochistic desire, 34, 78, 125, 191–92. See 
also parasexuality, submission, and 
BDSM
Masters, William, 38–45, 73, 96, 116
masturbation, 127–29
McClelland, Sara, 108n1
McRuer, Robert, 19, 102, 144, 232–233 
McWhorter, Ladelle, 12
medicalization: alternative wellness and neo-
liberal self-medicalization, 178–79; Big 
Pharma and anti-pharmaceuticalization, 
66, 93–94, 116–17; feminists against, 
52–53, 116; history of, 18–19; pathologiz-
ing-healing dialectic, 137–39. See also 
pharmaceuticals
men and women, construction of differences 
between. See sexual difference
Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus 
(Gray), 62n12
“men only want one thing” logic, 161–64
Meston, Cindy, 54–57, 83
“me” time, 127–29
#MeToo movement, 231–32
Miller, Jean Baker, 112, 115
mind/body disjuncture. See concordance 
and discordance; plethysmography and 
mind/body disjuncture
mindfulness: about, 6; BDSM and, 187, 207, 
210–11, 219; Brotto’s story of “Gianna,” 
230; bypassing and, 48–49; circular sex-
ual response cycle and, 117; desensitiza-
tion and, 43; new technologies, control, 
and, 231; sensate focus technique and, 
44; therapeutic history of, 95–100
mindfulness-based sex therapy (MBST): 
about, 96–100; as bridge between tradi-
tional and alternative medicine, 209n8; 
carework and, 173; critiques of, 98–100, 
104–5, 124; with men, 103n19; mind/
body gap and, 81; trauma and, 122
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), 
95–96
Moir, Jan, 192
Mollow, Anna, 19, 144, 233
Murphy, Michelle, 115
Murray, Sarah H., 87n14
National Health and Social Life Survey 
(NHSLS), 15
Natural History of Rape, A (Thornhill and 
Palmer), 58
nature/nurture binary, gendered, 130–31




neuroscientific imaging techniques, 81–82
Newman, Andy, 74
new science of female sexuality, 1–5, 8, 76–77, 
229–32
New Sex Therapy, The (Kaplan), 45–51
New View Campaign, 51n8, 67, 93, 116–17
nonbinary people, 8–9, 88, 123, 179, 185n1, 
207, 229, 231–33
“non-sexual motivations interact with stimu-
lus prepotency” hypothesis, 77
INDEx • 269
obviousness of body parts and functions, 
135–37
Oedipus complex, 34–35, 48
Ogas, Ogi, 78, 190–91
Ogden, Gina, 51n8, 115
one-sex model, 33n2
orgasm: Basson on, 68; Brody on, 58; clitoral, 
40, 41, 46, 58, 132; faking it and affec-
tive performances of pleasure, 169–74; 
Heiman, Lo Piccolo, and Lo Piccolo’s 
Becoming Orgasmic, 114–15; in HSRC, 
39–40; interview participants on, 124, 
128–29, 132, 135, 145, 160, 169; Jagose on, 
102, 172n3, 230; male, emphasis on, 91, 
131; Masters & Johnson on, 39–41, 46; 
multiple, 41; “pre-orgasmic” women, 
114–15; SSRIs and anorgasmia, 145; vagi-
nal, 41, 46, 102
orgasmic reconditioning and conversion 
therapy, 3, 75, 102, 230
oxytocin, 37
painful sex: body shutting down, 145–46; 
carework and, 149–50, 170–71, 176–78; 
critiques of programs for, 124, 128; dys-
pareunia, 146, 150; genito-pelvic pain/
penetration disorder (GPPPD), 43; low 
desire and, 146–47; penetrative norms 
and, 131; trauma and, 211, 226; treat-
ments for, 22, 43, 95, 98; vulvodynia, 10, 
43, 91, 143, 146, 150, 171
Palmer, Craig T., 58
parasexuality, submission, and BDSM: 
agency and, 187–88; catharsis, 203–4; 
definition of parasexuality, 187; discor-
dance linked to submission, 190–91; 
feminism and, 192–95, 219; nonconsen-
sual, 198; overview, 184–87; performing 
femininity, camp, and switching, 211–14; 
popular depictions, 188–93; queerness 
and rejection of heteronormative scripts, 
214–17; reclaiming receptivity and 
subverting submission, 217–20; sexual 
power relations, social debates about, 
193–95; taboo, trauma, and trust, 195–
206; tempo, labor, and presence, 206–11
passivity: active, 125–26; Freud on, 29, 34–36; 




pelvic size in racist frameworks, 12–13
penetrative sex as only “real” sex, 131–33
penile plethysmography, 73
penile strain gauge, 75
penis envy, 35
performance of pleasure, affective, 169–74
performativity, 170, 174, 212
phallometry, 73, 75
pharmaceuticals: Big Pharma and anti-phar-
maceuticalization, 66, 93–94, 116–17; 
neuro-drugs, 92–95
phenomenological experience: discor-
dance and, 142; embodied experience 





pleasure: affective performances of, 169–74; 
Kaplan on, 46, 47; performing feminin-
ity, camp, and switching, 211–14; queer-
ness and rejection of heteronormative 
scripts, 214–17; tempo, labor, and pres-
ence, 206–11
plethysmography and mind/body disjunc-
ture: about, 3–4, 73; assessment of sexual 
orientation with, 75; category-specificity 
and, 73–75; concerns and issues, 77–81; 
mind/body disjuncture and, 73–82; work 
of the gap, 3–4, 189–90. See also concor-
dance and discordance
pornography, 79, 111, 172
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 99, 
145
Preciado, Paul B., 10, 155
preference for responsive desire, 88, 120–21
preparation hypothesis, 31, 77, 143, 143n10, 
189, 190n2
presence (being in the present), 209–11, 230
pronouns, 9
Przybylo, Ela, 89
psychoanalysis: affinities of later approaches 
with, 37–39; Freud’s theory of female 
psychosexual development, 34–39; his-
tory of, 29–30; Kaplan and, 47–48; 
misogyny associated with, 31–32; post-
Freud accounts of desire, dismissal of, 
104; utility of, 32–33
psychological-physiological binary, 226
270 • INDEx
psychology of women subdiscipline, 110
psychosexual development, female (Freud), 
34–37
psychosomatic approach, 43n6, 45, 50–52, 147
Puar, Jasbir, 20, 27, 102n18, 150, 179
push-pull framework, 70, 71
“quality over quantity,” 30
queer excess, 229–30
queer failure, potential of, 183
queerness and rejection of heteronormative 
scripts, 214–17
race and racialization: carework and, 149, 
152, 159, 163–64; expectation and silenc-
ing, 125; feminism and, 111; FSIAD and, 
102–3; pelvic size and, 12–13; sexual dif-
ference and, 11–14; sexual violence and, 
197; whiteness, 11–14, 19, 26–27, 109–10, 
111
rape, 30, 58. See also trauma and gendered 
violence
rationalistic approach, 45–48, 52
receptivity: affective labor and, 175; as agen-
tic, 187–88; boundaries of feminized 
body and, 227; evolutionary psychology 
and, 58–59; “expert” discourses, effects 
of, 10–11; feminism and, 117; FSIAD and, 
86, 89–90; Kleinplatz on mediocre sex 
and, 89–90; men’s lack of, 88; sexual 
optimization and, 182; sleeping beauty 
model of, 89; socialization and, 124–26; 
as submission, 103, 218. See also femi-
nized responsive desire framework
regulatory control, 101–5
“remote” causes of sexual dysfunction, 45, 
47–49
responsiveness: as agentic, 187–88; all human 
desire as responsive, 69; evolutionary 
psychology and, 58–59; feminism and, 
117; FSIAD vs. MHSDD and, 87–88; 
history of sexology and, 5; Kaplan on, 
46–47; MBST and, 98–99; in men, 
87n14; normalization of, 72, 83, 89; 









seduction theory of Freud, 34
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), 145
self-management, sexual, 100–106
self-optimization, 101–2, 150, 151, 182
Seltzer, Leon, 189–90
sensate focus technique, 43–44, 96–97
servicing, sexual, 90
Seto, Michael, 75
Sex, Explained (Netflix), 224n1
sex abuse. See trauma
Sex-Starved Marriage, The (Weiner-Davis), 
177
sex therapy, field of, 41–42
sex therapy models, history of: continuity 
of, 31; evolutionary psychology, 30–31, 
52–61; Freud and psychoanalysis, 29–30, 
34–39; Kaplan and behaviorism, 45–52; 
Masters and Johnson, 39–45; naturaliza-
tion of gendered conflict, 61–62; utility 
of psychoanalysis, 32–33
sexual aversion disorder (SAD), 15
sexual carework. See carework and embod-
ied labor
sexual configurations theory (SCT), 113n5
sexual difference: Baumeister’s erotic plas-
ticity hypothesis, 59–61, 83; biological 
determinism, shift toward, 51–52; in 
evolutionary sexology and Meston & 
Buss, 52–61; Freud on, 29–30, 35–39; 
Gray’s Men Are from Mars, Women Are 
from Venus, 62n12; incentive motivation 
model and, 70–71; Kaplan and, 46–47, 
49–50; naturalization of, 61–62; neuro-
imaging and, 82; race, femininity, and 
whiteness of, 11–14
sexual difference socialization: about, 108–9; 
biology vs. socialization, 140–41; care-
work and, 156, 162–63, 174; as “certain 
kinds of sexual beings,” 140; cultural 
feminism and, 110–18; emotionality and 
complexity, 133–34; gendered nature/
nurture asymmetry and, 130–31; het-
erosexual intercourse as only “real” sex, 
131–33; linkage of desire, interest, and 
arousal, 118–24; pathologizing-healing 
dialectic and masculinization of sex, 
INDEx • 271
137–39; receptivity, 124–26; spontaneous 
desire, masturbation, and fantasy and, 
127–30; visibility, “obviousness,” and 
phenomenological experiences of gen-
dered body, 135–37
sexual orientation: bisexuality, 29, 36, 74; 
“gynephilic,” “androphilic,” and “ambi-
philic” women, 76–78; Kinsey on, 39; 
plethysmography, assessment with, 75; 
“reconditioning” of gay men, 3, 75, 102; 
women as not having, 58, 63–64
“sexual system,” 50–51
sex workers, paid, 151n1, 152. See also care-
work and embodied labor
Silverman, Kaja, 225
Sims, J. Marion, 13
Skinner, B. F., 3
sleeping beauty model, 89
Smith, Molly, 152
Snorton, C. Riley, 11, 13
social constructionism: antimedicaliza-
tion and, 19–20, 52–53; erotic plasticity 
hypothesis and, 59; evolutionary psy-
chology and, 55; gender and, 27; look-
ing beyond, 17; New View Campaign 
and, 116
socialization of carework. See carework and 
embodied labor
socialization of sex difference. See sexual dif-
ference socialization





spontaneous desire, 14–15, 65, 127–29
state theory of desire, 65n2, 70n4, 71n6, 
76n11, 222






tempo and timing, 206–10
testosterone, 37
Thornhill, Randy, 58
Tiefer, Leonore, 40n4, 67, 116–17, 173
Toates, Frederick, 69
Tolman, Deborah L., 108n1
Tooby, John, 55
Toward a New Psychology of Women (Miller), 
112
trans women, 8–9, 74, 122–23, 152, 228, 
232–33
trauma and gendered violence: bodyminds 
and, 109; Brotto on, 122; bypassing, 
48–49, 210; carework and, 164, 166; 
catharsis and, 203–4; desire-interest-
arousal linkage and sexual abuse, 120–
24; embodied experience of, 144–47; 
feminized violence, 196n5; fracturing 
and falling-apartness, 233–34; FSIAD 
and, 99; generational, 160–61; hetero-
normativity and, 199; Kaplan on, 50–51; 
Kleinplatz on, 51n8; ordinariness of, 
122–23, 199–200, 226, 232, 234; “over-
coming” and expectation of recovery, 
228, 233–34; parasexuality and, 197–206; 
preparation hypothesis, 31, 77, 143, 
143n10; PTSD, 99, 145, 227; racialization 
of, 197; rape, 30, 58; required and erased, 
188; silencing and, 200–201; stress vs., 
228n3; trans women and, 232–33; “valid,” 
“authentic,” and “exceptional” sexual 
abuse, 196–97; women of color and, 12
trust, 186, 201–6, 201n7
Tyler, Meagan, 89
unconscious, evolutionary, 55
vaginal pulse amplitude (VPA), 73
vaginal zone, Freud on shift to, 35–36
vaginismus, 42
van Anders, Sari, 113n5
Viagra, 92–94, 132, 135
violence, sexual. See trauma and gendered 
violence
visibility of body parts and functions, 136–38
visual stimuli and gender difference, 56
volumetric studies. See plethysmography
von Werlhof, Claudia, 154






whiteness, 11–14, 19, 26–27, 109–10, 111
“Why Humans Have Sex” (Buss and Mes-
ton), 54–55
“Why Sexuality Is Work” (Federici), 154–55
Why Women Have Sex (Buss and Meston), 
55–56
Willey, Angie, 113n5
Wilson, Edward O., 53–54
Wilson, Elizabeth A., 33
women and men, construction of differences 
between. See sexual difference
“women” as term, use of, 9–10
work, liberal capitalist and neoliberal biopo-
litical forms of, 149–53, 178, 182–83. See 
also carework and embodied labor
“Working Women’s Fantasies” (Roiphe), 
191–92
Zola, Iriving K., 18
ABNORMATIV IT IES :  QUEER/GENDER/EMBODIMENT
SCOTT HERRING, SERIES EDITOR
This series explores the embodiment of gender identity and queerness within national 
and global frameworks of deviance that challenge hetero- and homonormative con-
structions of the body. The scope of the series is global and transnational, its time frame 
broad, and its focus interdisciplinary—from literary and cultural studies to history and 
anthropology and beyond.
Diagnosing Desire: Biopolitics and Femininity into the Twenty-First Century
Alyson K. Spurgas
Asexual Erotics: Intimate Readings of Compulsory Sexuality
Ela Przybylo
Prevention: Gender, Sexuality, HIV, and the Media in Côte d’Ivoire
Christine Cynn
